fix: pre-launch review — security, money safety, privacy, legal, code quality
Security (P0): - IsJTIRevoked fails closed on DB error (previously accepted revoked tokens) - Remove dead consume parameter from SCA gate (prevented token replay) - Rate limiter map TTL-based eviction (prevented memory exhaustion) - 2FA attempt map already had LRU eviction (verified) Money Safety (P1): - Gift card transfer refuses expired destination cards - Gift card balance deduction has WHERE balance >= amount guard - Webhook clawback acquires till-sale advisory lock - Sweep/retry lock keys aligned Privacy/Cookies (P2): - Self-host Google Fonts (Playfair Display woff2) - Replace CARTO map tiles with OpenStreetMap raster tiles - Replace Wikimedia/icon-icons external images with local SVGs - Remove external image URLs from CSP Legal (P3): - Privacy policy: add 6 missing data categories (gift cards, 2FA, GDPR, notifications, technical, cookies) - Terms: add Tips section (optionality, non-refundable, same processing as bookings) Code Quality (P4): - twofa.Check accepts db.Querier for testability - depositPromotionMinPct uses literal 0.20 (not misleading alias) - HolidayHours.svelte uses proper type (not as any[]) - Remove stale TODO comments from main.go Testing (P5): - 94 new float64 money validity tests across 3 test files - Cover VAT, splits, refunds, gift cards, rounding, precision boundaries - All 27 backend test packages pass
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@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ const (
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// error is non-nil only for DB failures (callers return 500); a lockout's
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// pending-code invalidation failure is logged here and still reported as a
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// lockout.
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func Check(ctx context.Context, userID string, st *AttemptState, reqCode string, consume bool) (Result, error) {
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func Check(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, userID string, st *AttemptState, reqCode string, consume bool) (Result, error) {
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if now := clock.Now(); now.Sub(st.LastActive()) > AttemptWindow {
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st.Count.Store(0)
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st.SetLastActive(now)
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@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ func Check(ctx context.Context, userID string, st *AttemptState, reqCode string,
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var pendingHash sql.NullString
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var pendingExpires sql.NullTime
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err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
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err := q.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash, two_factor_pending_code_expires
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FROM users
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WHERE id = $1
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@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ func Check(ctx context.Context, userID string, st *AttemptState, reqCode string,
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if st.Count.Load() >= MaxAttempts {
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// Lockout reached: destroy the pending code so a stolen digest
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// cannot be replayed against a fresh guessing loop.
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if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
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if _, err := q.Exec(ctx, `
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UPDATE users
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SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
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two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL
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@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ func Check(ctx context.Context, userID string, st *AttemptState, reqCode string,
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// code stays valid for the rest of the handshake — consume mode destroys
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// the digest outright, so there is nothing to upgrade.
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if legacy && !consume {
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if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
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if _, err := q.Exec(ctx, `
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UPDATE users
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SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2
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WHERE id = $1
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@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ func Check(ctx context.Context, userID string, st *AttemptState, reqCode string,
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// locked_until) — a successful 2FA challenge is a strong auth signal, and
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// the only way to reach a 2FA verify is an already-authenticated session.
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// Best-effort: a failure only logs; the verify has already succeeded.
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if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
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if _, err := q.Exec(ctx, `
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UPDATE users
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SET failed_attempts = 0, locked_until = NULL
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WHERE id = $1
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@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ func Check(ctx context.Context, userID string, st *AttemptState, reqCode string,
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// it, but only the first conditional UPDATE can affect a row — the
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// loser sees 0 rows and must fail (MissingOrExpired), so one code
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// authorizes exactly ONE operation even across instances.
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tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
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tag, err := q.Exec(ctx, `
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UPDATE users
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SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
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two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL
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@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ func VerifyForUser(ctx context.Context, userID, code string, consume bool) error
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st.Mu.Lock()
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defer st.Mu.Unlock()
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result, err := Check(ctx, userID, st, code, consume)
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result, err := Check(ctx, db.Conn, userID, st, code, consume)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("2FA verify: %w", err)
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}
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@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ func TestVerifyForUser_DBAtomicConsume_Concurrent(t *testing.T) {
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defer wg.Done()
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st := &AttemptState{}
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st.SetLastActive(clock.Now())
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res, err := Check(context.Background(), userID, st, "424242", true)
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res, err := Check(context.Background(), db.Conn, userID, st, "424242", true)
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results <- outcome{result: res, err: err}
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}()
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}
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