fix: restart-loop-A findings — pending sweep refunds, tip carve on discounts, TOCTOU redemption, single-use 2FA code + mint endpoint, refresh-token family revocation, admin 2FA code UX

Restart of Loop A (fresh review -> fix -> verify) findings from commit 5e967fa:
- B1: sweep auto-refund treats Square PENDING refunds as NON-terminal (row stays pending, no gift-card clawback, refunds row inserted for payments AND till_sales, re-polls the deterministic sweepdup- key); Square-less pre-pass exempts square_refund_id IS NOT NULL rows
- M4: terminal tip carve accounts for pending campaign discounts (headroom = total - pending - paid) so explicit tips aren't absorbed as service revenue; no-tip case stays a single record
- max_redemptions TOCTOU closed with atomic conditional UPDATE ... RETURNING; exhausted-at-apply surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- 2FA: verification code is single-use on the saved-card gate (VerifyForUser consume=true, interactive flows unaffected); new POST /api/user/2fa/code mints a fresh code for enabled users (RequireAuth + RequireNonGuest + mint cooldown + per-user limiter)
- Refresh tokens: family_id + used_at columns; reuse of an already-rotated token revokes the ENTIRE family and inserts a refresh_token_reuse admin alert; rotation mints descendants in the same family
- Frontend: 2FA code input + Request-a-new-code on all saved-card surfaces; admin modal keys code input to customer 2FA + 403 self-heal; tip-display note for pending discounts; 76 frontend tests
- Verified: all 26 backend packages pass, frontend build+tests green, env-docs 41/41

backend/auth/jwt.go

@@ -231,19 +231,26 @@ func GenerateRefreshToken(ctx context.Context, userID string, role string) (stri
 	return token, nil
 }
 
-// VerifyRefreshToken checks a refresh token and returns user details if valid
+// GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily creates a refresh token in the SAME rotation
-// The token is consumed (deleted) upon successful verification, implementing rotation.
+// family as its parent (the family_id returned by VerifyRefreshToken). Rotation
-func VerifyRefreshToken(ctx context.Context, tokenString string) (userID string, role string, err error) {
+// must mint the descendant in the parent's family so a replayed (already-used)
+// ancestor can revoke the ENTIRE lineage — the descendant included — instead of
+// leaving a fresh 90-day token alive after theft is detected.
+func GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily(ctx context.Context, userID string, role string, familyID string) (string, error) {
+	token, err := generateRefreshTokenString()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+
+	// Store hashed version in DB with 90-day expiry, in the given family
 	query := `
-		DELETE FROM refresh_tokens
+		INSERT INTO refresh_tokens (user_id, token_hash, role, family_id, expires_at)
-		WHERE token_hash = encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex')
+		VALUES ($1, encode(sha256($2::bytea), 'hex'), $3, $4, NOW() + INTERVAL '90 days')
-		AND expires_at > NOW()
+		RETURNING id`
-		AND NOT revoked
-		RETURNING user_id, role`
 
 	tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
-		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to begin transaction: %w", err)
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to begin transaction: %w", err)
 	}
 	defer func() {
 		if err := tx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
@@ -251,19 +258,102 @@ func VerifyRefreshToken(ctx context.Context, tokenString string) (userID string,
 		}
 	}()
 
-	err = tx.QueryRow(ctx, query, tokenString).Scan(&userID, &role)
+	var tokenID int64
+	err = tx.QueryRow(ctx, query, userID, token, role, familyID).Scan(&tokenID)
 	if err != nil {
-		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to store refresh token: %w", err)
-			return "", "", fmt.Errorf("invalid or expired refresh token")
-		}
-		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to verify refresh token: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
-		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to commit transaction: %w", err)
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to commit transaction: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Token was consumed (DELETE returned it) — this is rotation
+	return token, nil
-	// If a token is used twice, the second DELETE returns no rows = invalid
+}
-	return userID, role, nil
+
+// VerifyRefreshToken checks a refresh token and returns user details if valid.
+// The token is consumed (marked used) upon successful verification — rotation —
+// and its family_id is returned so the caller can mint the descendant in the
+// SAME family. If an ALREADY-ROTATED token is presented again (a replay: the
+// attacker rotated it, then the victim replayed it), the entire rotation family
+// is revoked (the descendant minted at rotation dies too) and a critical admin
+// notification (reason 'refresh_token_reuse') is raised. The caller always gets
+// the generic "invalid or expired refresh token" error so reuse is never leaked.
+func VerifyRefreshToken(ctx context.Context, tokenString string) (userID string, role string, familyID string, err error) {
+	query := `
+		UPDATE refresh_tokens SET used_at = NOW()
+		WHERE token_hash = encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex')
+		AND expires_at > NOW()
+		AND NOT revoked
+		AND used_at IS NULL
+		RETURNING user_id, role, family_id`
+
+	tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to begin transaction: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if err := tx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
+			slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	err = tx.QueryRow(ctx, query, tokenString).Scan(&userID, &role, &familyID)
+	if err == nil {
+		// Rotation: the token is marked used (kept in the row) so a later
+		// replay can be detected, and its family_id is returned.
+		if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
+			return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to commit transaction: %w", err)
+		}
+		return userID, role, familyID, nil
+	}
+	if !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
+		return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to verify refresh token: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// The rotation UPDATE matched nothing: the token is expired, revoked, or
+	// never issued — OR it was already used (replayed). A used token is theft:
+	// the descendant minted at rotation would otherwise stay valid for 90 days.
+	var reusedUserID, reusedFamilyID string
+	reuseErr := tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
+		SELECT user_id, family_id FROM refresh_tokens
+		WHERE token_hash = encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex')
+		  AND used_at IS NOT NULL
+	`, tokenString).Scan(&reusedUserID, &reusedFamilyID)
+
+	if reuseErr == nil {
+		// (i) Revoke the ENTIRE family — the reused token and every descendant.
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM refresh_tokens WHERE family_id = $1`, reusedFamilyID); err != nil {
+			slog.Error("CRITICAL: refresh token reuse detected but family revocation failed", "userID", reusedUserID, "familyID", reusedFamilyID, "err", err)
+		}
+		// (ii) Surface the theft in the admin notification centre. The NOT
+		// EXISTS guard keeps ONE alert per reused family until an admin
+		// acknowledges it — mirroring insertCriticalPaymentNotification.
+		if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
+			INSERT INTO admin_notifications (reason, user_id, created_at)
+			SELECT 'refresh_token_reuse', $1, NOW()
+			WHERE NOT EXISTS (
+				SELECT 1 FROM admin_notifications an
+				WHERE an.reason = 'refresh_token_reuse'
+				  AND an.user_id = $1
+				  AND an.acknowledged_at IS NULL
+			)
+		`, reusedUserID); err != nil {
+			slog.Error("CRITICAL: refresh token reuse detected but admin alert insert failed", "userID", reusedUserID, "err", err)
+		}
+		// Commit the family revocation + alert — NOT the deferred rollback.
+		if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
+			return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to commit transaction: %w", err)
+		}
+		// (iii) CRITICAL log; (iv) generic error — never leak that reuse was seen.
+		slog.Error("CRITICAL: refresh token reuse detected — rotation family revoked", "userID", reusedUserID, "familyID", reusedFamilyID)
+		return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("invalid or expired refresh token")
+	}
+	if !errors.Is(reuseErr, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
+		return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to verify refresh token: %w", reuseErr)
+	}
+
+	// Never-issued / expired / revoked token — indistinguishable from a replay
+	// to the client, as before.
+	return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("invalid or expired refresh token")
 }

backend/auth/jwt_test.go

@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ func TestVerifyRefreshToken_Success(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// First verify should succeed
-	retUserID, retRole, err := VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, token)
+	retUserID, retRole, _, err := VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, token)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("VerifyRefreshToken() failed: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ func TestVerifyRefreshToken_Success(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// Second verify with same token must fail (rotation — token consumed)
-	_, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, token)
+	_, _, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, token)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for consumed token, got nil")
 	}
@@ -461,13 +461,13 @@ func TestVerifyRefreshToken_Rotation(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// First call should succeed
-	_, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, token)
+	_, _, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, token)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("first verification should succeed, got: %v", err)
 	}
 
 	// Second call with the same token must fail
-	_, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, token)
+	_, _, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, token)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for rotated token, got nil")
 	}
@@ -476,12 +476,96 @@ func TestVerifyRefreshToken_Rotation(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestVerifyRefreshToken_ReuseRevokesFamilyAndAlerts verifies the reuse
+// detection: generate a token → rotate it once (minting a descendant in the
+// SAME family via GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily) → present the ORIGINAL token
+// again. The replay must (i) delete the ENTIRE rotation family (the descendant
+// included) from refresh_tokens and (ii) insert an admin_notifications row with
+// reason 'refresh_token_reuse' for the user.
+func TestVerifyRefreshToken_ReuseRevokesFamilyAndAlerts(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, tx := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
+
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create test user: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// 1. Generate a refresh token (new family) and rotate it once.
+	original, err := GenerateRefreshToken(ctx, userID, "verified_email")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GenerateRefreshToken() failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	_, _, familyID, err := VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, original)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("first verification should succeed, got: %v", err)
+	}
+	if familyID == "" {
+		t.Fatal("expected non-empty family_id from rotation")
+	}
+
+	// 2. Mint the descendant in the SAME family (as RefreshTokenHandler does).
+	descendant, err := GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily(ctx, userID, "verified_email", familyID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily() failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	var famCount int
+	if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM refresh_tokens WHERE family_id = $1`, familyID).Scan(&famCount); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to count family rows: %v", err)
+	}
+	if famCount != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 2 refresh tokens in family, got %d", famCount)
+	}
+
+	// 3. Replay the ORIGINAL token — theft.
+	_, _, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, original)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for replayed token, got nil")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid or expired") {
+		t.Errorf("expected 'invalid or expired' error, got: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// (i) The entire family is revoked: the used original AND the descendant.
+	var famAfter int
+	if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM refresh_tokens WHERE family_id = $1`, familyID).Scan(&famAfter); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to count family rows after replay: %v", err)
+	}
+	if famAfter != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 0 refresh tokens in family after reuse (descendant killed), got %d", famAfter)
+	}
+
+	var descHashCount int
+	if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM refresh_tokens WHERE token_hash = encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex')`,
+		descendant).Scan(&descHashCount); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to check descendant: %v", err)
+	}
+	if descHashCount != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("expected descendant to be deleted, got %d rows", descHashCount)
+	}
+
+	// (ii) An admin alert with reason 'refresh_token_reuse' exists for the user.
+	var alertCount int
+	if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
+		`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM admin_notifications WHERE reason = 'refresh_token_reuse' AND user_id = $1`,
+		userID).Scan(&alertCount); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to query admin_notifications: %v", err)
+	}
+	if alertCount != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 1 'refresh_token_reuse' alert, got %d", alertCount)
+	}
+}
+
 // TestVerifyRefreshToken_InvalidToken calls VerifyRefreshToken with a fake
 // token string and expects it to fail with "invalid or expired".
 func TestVerifyRefreshToken_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, _ := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
 
-	_, _, err := VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, "this-is-a-completely-fake-token-string")
+	_, _, _, err := VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, "this-is-a-completely-fake-token-string")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for invalid token, got nil")
 	}

backend/handlers/auth/auth_test.go

@@ -1781,7 +1781,7 @@ func TestRefreshToken_Generation(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("expected 1 refresh_token, got %d", count)
 	}
 
-	retrievedUserID, retrievedRole, err := auth.VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, refreshToken)
+	retrievedUserID, retrievedRole, _, err := auth.VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, refreshToken)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to verify refresh token: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -1792,7 +1792,7 @@ func TestRefreshToken_Generation(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("expected role 'verified_email', got %q", retrievedRole)
 	}
 
-	_, _, err = auth.VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, refreshToken)
+	_, _, _, err = auth.VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, refreshToken)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Error("expected error on second refresh token verification (rotated)")
 	}
@@ -1942,17 +1942,20 @@ func TestRefreshToken_RotatesRefreshToken_DBBacked(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("refresh failed: %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
 	}
 
-	// The used token was deleted (rotated) and a fresh one inserted — the row
+	// Rotation is DB-backed: the presented token was consumed (marked used, so a
-	// count is unchanged at 1, but the consumed token no longer verifies.
+	// replay can be detected and the whole family revoked) and a fresh descendant
+	// minted in the same family. The used row is RETAINED for reuse detection, so
+	// 2 rows now exist for the user (used original + new descendant), and the
+	// consumed token no longer verifies.
 	var after int
 	if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM refresh_tokens WHERE user_id = $1", userID).Scan(&after); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to count refresh tokens after refresh: %v", err)
 	}
-	if after != 1 {
+	if after != 2 {
-		t.Errorf("expected exactly 1 refresh token after rotation, got %d", after)
+		t.Errorf("expected 2 refresh tokens after rotation (used original retained + descendant), got %d", after)
 	}
 
-	if _, _, err := auth.VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, refreshToken); err == nil {
+	if _, _, _, err := auth.VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, refreshToken); err == nil {
 		t.Error("the consumed refresh token must no longer verify (rotated)")
 	}
 }

backend/handlers/auth/local.go

@@ -485,10 +485,11 @@ func LoginHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 // (rotated), and exchanged for a fresh access token + a NEW refresh token.
 //
 // B5 (security): the handler deliberately does NOT accept the access token.
-// VerifyRefreshToken rotates (DELETEs) the presented refresh token, so a stolen
+// VerifyRefreshToken rotates (marks used) the presented refresh token, so a
-// access token can never self-renew — it expires in 1 hour and only a valid,
+// stolen access token can never self-renew — it expires in 1 hour and only a
-// unexpired, unrevoked refresh token can mint a new pair. A replayed refresh
+// valid, unexpired, unrevoked refresh token can mint a new pair. A replayed
-// token (used twice) returns 401, detecting theft via rotation.
+// refresh token (used twice) returns 401, detecting theft via rotation and
+// revoking the entire rotation family with a critical admin alert.
 func RefreshTokenHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
 	if authHeader == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") {
@@ -498,9 +499,11 @@ func RefreshTokenHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	refreshToken := strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ")
 
 	// VerifyRefreshToken consumes (rotates) the refresh token: the used token
-	// is deleted from refresh_tokens, so a stolen/leaked refresh token cannot
+	// is marked used in refresh_tokens, so a stolen/leaked refresh token cannot
-	// be replayed and an access token alone can never mint a new session.
+	// be replayed and an access token alone can never mint a new session. A
-	userID, role, err := auth.VerifyRefreshToken(r.Context(), refreshToken)
+	// replayed (already-rotated) token revokes the entire rotation family and
+	// raises a critical admin alert, but still surfaces as this generic 401.
+	userID, role, familyID, err := auth.VerifyRefreshToken(r.Context(), refreshToken)
 	if err != nil {
 		mw.RespondJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, map[string]string{"error": "invalid or expired refresh token"})
 		return
@@ -522,13 +525,15 @@ func RefreshTokenHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Issue a fresh access token + refresh token pair.
+	// Issue a fresh access token + refresh token pair. The rotated refresh
+	// token is minted in the SAME family (familyID from VerifyRefreshToken) so
+	// a replayed ancestor can revoke the whole lineage, descendants included.
 	newToken, jti, err := auth.GenerateToken(userID, currentRole)
 	if err != nil {
 		mw.RespondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not generate token")
 		return
 	}
-	newRefreshToken, err := auth.GenerateRefreshToken(r.Context(), userID, currentRole)
+	newRefreshToken, err := auth.GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily(r.Context(), userID, currentRole, familyID)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Printf("failed to issue rotated refresh token for user %s: %v", userID, err)
 		mw.RespondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not generate refresh token")

backend/handlers/payments/discounts.go

@@ -2,10 +2,14 @@ package payments
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"errors"
 	"log"
+	"math"
 	"time"
 
 	"crussell/db"
+
+	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
 )
 
 // EligibleDiscount describes a single discount that is currently eligible for a
@@ -266,14 +270,25 @@ func ComputeEligibleDiscounts(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingID, user
 // transaction so these writes commit atomically with the payment. It is
 // idempotent per booking because ComputeEligibleDiscounts excludes discounts
 // whose source_id is already recorded for the booking.
-func ApplyEligibleDiscount(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingID, userID string, bookingTotal float64, d EligibleDiscount) {
+//
+// For campaign discounts the redemption counter is incremented FIRST, as an
+// ATOMIC CONDITIONAL UPDATE guarded by max_redemptions (B13): two concurrent
+// payments on different bookings for the same campaign can both pass the
+// caller's unlocked "is it exhausted?" read, but only the first conditional
+// increment matches — the loser's UPDATE affects zero rows (a 0-row result is
+// returned) and this function returns a *campaignExhaustedAtApplyError with
+// NOTHING written, so the caller can surface campaign_fully_redeemed. Doing the
+// reservation before the booking_discounts/payment inserts keeps the
+// transaction clean when a campaign is exhausted at apply time: no discount
+// rows are minted for a redemption that never happened.
+func ApplyEligibleDiscount(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingID, userID string, bookingTotal float64, d EligibleDiscount) error {
 	if d.IsReferral {
 		if _, err := q.Exec(ctx, `
 			INSERT INTO booking_discounts (booking_id, user_id, discount_source, source_id, campaign_type, milestone_type, discount_percent, original_total, discount_amount)
 			VALUES ($1, $2, 'referral', $3, NULL, NULL, $4, $5, $6)
 		`, bookingID, userID, d.SourceID, d.Percent, bookingTotal, d.Amount); err != nil {
 			log.Printf("Failed to insert referral discount: %v", err)
-			return
+			return nil
 		}
 		if _, err := q.Exec(ctx, `
 			INSERT INTO payments (booking_id, payment_type, payment_method, amount, status, created_by)
@@ -291,34 +306,56 @@ func ApplyEligibleDiscount(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingID, userID
 		`, d.SourceID); err != nil {
 			log.Printf("ALERT: failed to mark referral discount as used, booking %s: %v", bookingID, err)
 		}
-		return
+		return nil
 	}
 
 	var milestoneType any
 	if d.MilestoneType != nil {
 		milestoneType = *d.MilestoneType
 	}
+
+	// B13: atomic conditional reservation. The UPDATE increments the counter
+	// ONLY while the campaign still has headroom; PostgreSQL makes this safe
+	// under READ COMMITTED — a concurrent same-row UPDATE blocks, then
+	// re-evaluates this WHERE against the post-increment row, so the loser
+	// matches zero rows instead of over-redeeming past max_redemptions. Zero
+	// rows means a concurrent redemption on another booking exhausted the
+	// campaign between the caller's preview computation and this apply-time
+	// re-check; nothing has been written yet, so the caller surfaces the
+	// campaign_fully_redeemed path (B13).
+	var reservedID string
+	if err := q.QueryRow(ctx, `
+		UPDATE discount_campaigns SET times_redeemed = times_redeemed + 1
+		WHERE id = $1 AND (max_redemptions IS NULL OR times_redeemed < max_redemptions)
+		RETURNING id
+	`, d.SourceID).Scan(&reservedID); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
+			return &campaignExhaustedAtApplyError{campaignID: d.SourceID, lostPence: int64(math.Round(d.Amount * 100))}
+		}
+		log.Printf("ALERT: failed to reserve redemption for campaign %s, booking %s: %v — discount NOT applied", d.SourceID, bookingID, err)
+		return nil
+	}
+
 	if _, err := q.Exec(ctx, `
 		INSERT INTO booking_discounts (booking_id, user_id, discount_source, source_id, campaign_type, milestone_type, discount_percent, original_total, discount_amount)
 		VALUES ($1, $2, 'campaign', $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8)
 	`, bookingID, userID, d.SourceID, d.CampaignType, milestoneType, d.Percent, bookingTotal, d.Amount); err != nil {
-		log.Printf("Failed to insert %s campaign discount: %v", d.CampaignType, err)
+		// The reservation (counter increment) already stands in this tx, so the
-		return
+		// redemption was consumed. Log ALERT and skip the payment record — a
+		// discount payment row without a booking_discounts row would be a
+		// ledger anomaly. max_redemptions bounds the lost reservation: the next
+		// eligible booking finds the campaign with one fewer redemption.
+		log.Printf("ALERT: failed to insert campaign discount for campaign %s, booking %s: %v", d.SourceID, bookingID, err)
+		return nil
 	}
 	if _, err := q.Exec(ctx, `
 		INSERT INTO payments (booking_id, payment_type, payment_method, amount, status, created_by)
 		VALUES ($1, 'partial', 'discount', $2, 'completed', $3)
 	`, bookingID, d.Amount, userID); err != nil {
 		// The booking_discounts row was already inserted in this tx, so the
-		// campaign WAS redeemed — the times_redeemed counter must still be
+		// campaign WAS redeemed and the reservation already stands. Log ALERT
-		// incremented below. Log ALERT and fall through to the UPDATE instead
+		// and return (a lost record would hide the discount from the ledger).
-		// of returning early (a lost increment would let the campaign exceed
-		// its max_redemptions cap).
 		log.Printf("ALERT: failed to insert discount payment record for campaign %s, booking %s: %v", d.SourceID, bookingID, err)
 	}
-	if _, err := q.Exec(ctx, `
+	return nil
-		UPDATE discount_campaigns SET times_redeemed = times_redeemed + 1 WHERE id = $1
-	`, d.SourceID); err != nil {
-		log.Printf("ALERT: failed to increment times_redeemed for campaign %s, booking %s: %v", d.SourceID, bookingID, err)
-	}
 }

backend/handlers/payments/giftcards_test.go

@@ -527,7 +527,9 @@ func TestAdminRecordPayment_CashAndGiftCard(t *testing.T) {
 	// Setup user account with some balance first
 	_, _ = tx.Exec(ctx, "INSERT INTO user_giftcard_balances (user_id, balance) VALUES ($1, 60.00)", adminID)
 
-	// Now pay £25 using user account balance
+	// Now try to pay £25 using user account balance — the booking is ALREADY
+	// fully paid (£30 cash + £20 clamped gift card = £50), so B3 rejects the
+	// overcharge instead of recording it (the user balance must be untouched).
 	reqBody3, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{
 		"amount":         2500, // £25.00 in pence
 		"payment_type":   "full",
@@ -544,18 +546,18 @@ func TestAdminRecordPayment_CashAndGiftCard(t *testing.T) {
 	r3.Post("/api/admin/bookings/{id}/payment", CreateTerminalPayment)
 	r3.ServeHTTP(w3, req3)
 
-	if w3.Code != http.StatusOK {
+	if w3.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
-		t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d. Body: %s", w3.Code, w3.Body.String())
+		t.Errorf("expected status 400 (booking already fully paid), got %d. Body: %s", w3.Code, w3.Body.String())
 	}
 
-	// Verify user account balance was deducted
+	// Verify user account balance was NOT deducted.
 	var userBalance float64
 	err = tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT balance FROM user_giftcard_balances WHERE user_id = $1", adminID).Scan(&userBalance)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to query user balance: %v", err)
 	}
-	if userBalance != 35.00 {
+	if userBalance != 60.00 {
-		t.Errorf("expected user balance to be 35.00, got %.2f", userBalance)
+		t.Errorf("expected user balance unchanged at 60.00 (overcharge rejected), got %.2f", userBalance)
 	}
 }
 

backend/handlers/payments/handlers.go

@@ -282,6 +282,13 @@ func calculateDiscountPreview(ctx context.Context, bookingID string, userID stri
 	return resp
 }
 
+// maxTerminalTipPence caps the gratuity portion of a tip-enabled terminal
+// checkout (B3): the frontend embeds the tip in the charge amount, so the
+// booking portion must still not exceed the remaining obligation. £50 is a
+// generous single-tip bound for this business; the total charge is capped at
+// remaining + this bound.
+const maxTerminalTipPence = int64(5000) // £50
+
 // clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance caps a requested terminal charge at the
 // booking's remaining obligation (B3). The admin "Take Payment" PaymentModal
 // sends subtotal - discounts - campaignDiscountPence, which ignores PRIOR
@@ -293,11 +300,13 @@ func calculateDiscountPreview(ctx context.Context, bookingID string, userID stri
 // concurrent same-booking payment. The frontend must handle the discrepancy
 // between the amount it displayed and the clamped amount that was charged.
 //
-// A fully-paid booking (remaining <= 0) is NOT clamped: a deliberate
+// A fully-paid booking (remaining <= 0) is clamped to 0 (clamped=true,
-// overpayment the admin records is real money received and must stay on the
+// effective=0): no obligation remains, so recording the requested amount
-// ledger (the app's documented "overpayment handled manually at the counter"
+// verbatim would overcharge a customer who already paid in full. The callers
-// semantics — e.g. two identical cash receipts). The clamp protects the common
+// reject the resulting zero-charge with 400 "already fully paid" — the only
-// B3 case where prior payments left a POSITIVE remaining obligation.
+// legitimate money on a fully-paid booking is an EXPLICIT tip, which the
+// tip-enabled terminal path handles separately (it caps the total at
+// remaining + maxTerminalTipPence instead of clamping here).
 func clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance(ctx context.Context, bookingID string, amount int64) (effective, remaining int64, clamped bool, err error) {
 	remaining, err = NewPaymentService().GetBookingRemainingBalancePence(ctx, bookingID)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -306,6 +315,9 @@ func clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance(ctx context.Context, bookingID string
 	if amount > remaining && remaining > 0 {
 		return remaining, remaining, true, nil
 	}
+	if remaining <= 0 {
+		return 0, remaining, true, nil
+	}
 	return amount, remaining, false, nil
 }
 
@@ -421,14 +433,23 @@ func CreateTerminalPayment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		// B3: clamp the recorded amount to the booking's remaining obligation.
 		// The booking row FOR UPDATE lock above serializes concurrent cash/
 		// giftcard payments on this booking, so this read races no same-method
-		// payment. A fully-paid booking records the requested amount verbatim
+		// payment. A fully-paid booking is rejected below (nothing left to
-		// (the helper returns clamped=false for remaining <= 0).
+		// record).
-		effectiveAmount, _, clamped, cErr := clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance(r.Context(), bookingID, amount)
+		effectiveAmount, remaining, clamped, cErr := clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance(r.Context(), bookingID, amount)
 		if cErr != nil {
 			log.Printf("Failed to compute remaining balance for terminal %s payment on booking %s: %v", *req.PaymentMethod, bookingID, cErr)
 			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 			return
 		}
+		if clamped && effectiveAmount <= 0 {
+			// B3: the clamp zeroed the amount because the booking is fully paid
+			// (remaining <= 0). Reject rather than record a phantom £0 payment —
+			// an overpayment is handled manually at the counter, not minted
+			// into the ledger.
+			log.Printf("Terminal %s payment on booking %s rejected: booking already fully paid (remaining %d pence, requested %d pence)", *req.PaymentMethod, bookingID, remaining, amount)
+			http.Error(w, "Booking is already fully paid", http.StatusBadRequest)
+			return
+		}
 		if clamped {
 			log.Printf("Terminal %s payment on booking %s clamped from %d to %d pence (remaining obligation) — the frontend PaymentModal sent an amount that ignored prior payments; the customer is charged the remaining obligation only", *req.PaymentMethod, bookingID, amount, effectiveAmount)
 			amount = effectiveAmount
@@ -622,12 +643,6 @@ func CreateTerminalPayment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 			return
 		}
-		// 2FA gating (C5): charging the customer's SAVED card requires 2FA when
-		// the feature is enforced. Gate on the card's owner — the booking's
-		// user, not the admin. New-card/terminal paths are not gated.
-		if bookingUserID.Valid && !requireTwoFactorForCardAccess(w, r, service, bookingUserID.String, req.VerificationCode) {
-			return
-		}
 
 		// Resolve the saved-card Square source for the booking's user (the
 		// card's owner, not the admin) — shared new-card-vs-saved-card
@@ -650,21 +665,6 @@ func CreateTerminalPayment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		}
 		defer releaseBookingPaymentLock(pinConn, "crussell:payment:"+bookingID)
 
-		// B3: clamp the amount to the booking's remaining obligation. The
-		// advisory lock above serializes all same-booking payment attempts, so
-		// this read races no concurrent charge. A fully-paid booking records
-		// the requested amount verbatim (clamped=false for remaining <= 0).
-		effectiveAmount, _, clamped, cErr := clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance(r.Context(), bookingID, amount)
-		if cErr != nil {
-			log.Printf("Failed to compute remaining balance for saved-card payment on booking %s: %v", bookingID, cErr)
-			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-			return
-		}
-		if clamped {
-			log.Printf("Saved-card payment on booking %s clamped from %d to %d pence (remaining obligation) — the frontend PaymentModal sent an amount that ignored prior payments; the customer is charged the remaining obligation only", bookingID, amount, effectiveAmount)
-			amount = effectiveAmount
-		}
-
 		// Idempotency key — two tiers:
 		// 1. Client-supplied per-attempt UUID (preferred): the frontend
 		//    generates one per DISTINCT charge and reuses it across retries of
@@ -680,6 +680,12 @@ func CreateTerminalPayment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		//    never a second charge (old-client retry safety).
 		// Both stay ≤45 chars for Square's limit (36-char UUID / ~38-char
 		// deterministic key).
+		//
+		// The fallback is derived from the REQUEST amount (before the B3 clamp):
+		// a retry sends the same request and must derive the same key to hit the
+		// dedup SELECT below, and the clamp runs AFTER that SELECT's
+		// short-circuits — so a retry of an already-completed payment on a now
+		// fully-paid booking still dedups instead of being clamped/rejected.
 		scKey := req.IdempotencyKey
 		if scKey == "" {
 			// The candidate is built verbatim, then routed through
@@ -693,7 +699,10 @@ func CreateTerminalPayment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 		// Idempotency switch inside the lock: completed → dedup; pending →
 		// reuse (re-attempt Square with the same key, which dedups Square-side);
-		// failed → clean rejection.
+		// failed → clean rejection. Runs BEFORE the B3 clamp so a same-key
+		// retry of a completed payment (on a now fully-paid booking) returns
+		// the existing result instead of being clamped/rejected — the money
+		// already moved, so the amount is no longer material.
 		var existingID, existingStatus sql.NullString
 		var existingAmount sql.NullFloat64
 		err = db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
@@ -726,13 +735,8 @@ func CreateTerminalPayment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			return
 		case err == nil && existingStatus.String == "pending":
 			// Reuse the pending record: a prior attempt's Square outcome is
-			// unknown. Guard the amount — a retry with a different amount must
+			// unknown. The amount-match guard runs below, AFTER the clamp, so
-			// not reuse the old record's charge.
+			// the clamped retry amount is compared against the original record.
-			if int64(math.Round(existingAmount.Float64*100)) != amount {
-				log.Printf("Saved-card retry amount mismatch: pending %s has %d pence, request has %d pence", existingID.String, int64(math.Round(existingAmount.Float64*100)), amount)
-				http.Error(w, "Amount does not match the pending payment", http.StatusBadRequest)
-				return
-			}
 			paymentID = existingID.String
 		case err == nil && existingStatus.String == "failed":
 			log.Printf("Saved-card payment %s was previously marked failed (swept) — refusing retry", existingID.String)
@@ -744,6 +748,56 @@ func CreateTerminalPayment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			return
 		}
 
+		// B3: clamp the amount to the booking's remaining obligation. The
+		// advisory lock above serializes all same-booking payment attempts, so
+		// this read races no concurrent charge. Runs AFTER the idempotency
+		// short-circuits so a same-key retry of a completed payment (booking
+		// now fully paid) dedups above instead of being rejected here. A fully-
+		// paid booking is rejected below (nothing left to charge).
+		effectiveAmount, remaining, clamped, cErr := clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance(r.Context(), bookingID, amount)
+		if cErr != nil {
+			log.Printf("Failed to compute remaining balance for saved-card payment on booking %s: %v", bookingID, cErr)
+			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+			return
+		}
+		if clamped && effectiveAmount <= 0 {
+			// B3: the clamp zeroed the amount because the booking is fully paid
+			// (remaining <= 0). Reject before any pending row or Square charge —
+			// charging £0 (or the requested overcharge) on a fully-paid booking
+			// is never legitimate.
+			log.Printf("Saved-card payment on booking %s rejected: booking already fully paid (remaining %d pence, requested %d pence)", bookingID, remaining, amount)
+			http.Error(w, "Booking is already fully paid", http.StatusBadRequest)
+			return
+		}
+		if clamped {
+			log.Printf("Saved-card payment on booking %s clamped from %d to %d pence (remaining obligation) — the frontend PaymentModal sent an amount that ignored prior payments; the customer is charged the remaining obligation only", bookingID, amount, effectiveAmount)
+			amount = effectiveAmount
+		}
+
+		// Pending-reuse amount-match guard (moved after the clamp so the
+		// CLAMPED retry amount is compared against the original pending record,
+		// which was itself created from the clamped amount): a retry with a
+		// different effective amount must not reuse the old record's charge.
+		if paymentID != "" {
+			if int64(math.Round(existingAmount.Float64*100)) != amount {
+				log.Printf("Saved-card retry amount mismatch: pending %s has %d pence, request has %d pence", existingID.String, int64(math.Round(existingAmount.Float64*100)), amount)
+				http.Error(w, "Amount does not match the pending payment", http.StatusBadRequest)
+				return
+			}
+		}
+
+		// 2FA gating (C5): charging the customer's SAVED card requires 2FA when
+		// the feature is enforced. Gate on the card's owner — the booking's
+		// user, not the admin. New-card/terminal paths are not gated. Runs
+		// AFTER the idempotency dedup/reuse switch above: a same-key retry of
+		// an already-completed payment short-circuits there and returns the
+		// existing result WITHOUT demanding a fresh code — no new money moves,
+		// so no new authorization is needed. Pending-reuse retries and fresh
+		// charges still pass through the gate.
+		if bookingUserID.Valid && !requireTwoFactorForCardAccess(w, r, service, bookingUserID.String, req.VerificationCode) {
+			return
+		}
+
 		// B13: the pre-charge discount SET for the post-charge apply-time
 		// re-check. The online booking path (CreateBookingPayment) keeps the set
 		// computed BEFORE the charge so applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment can
@@ -1051,16 +1105,39 @@ func CreateTerminalPayment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// An accidental overpayment must never be presented to the card reader as a
 	// charge that the record path would later carve into an unintended tip. The
 	// advisory lock above serializes this read against concurrent same-booking
-	// payments. A fully-paid booking keeps the requested amount verbatim
+	// payments. A fully-paid booking is rejected below (nothing left to charge).
-	// (clamped=false for remaining <= 0).
 	checkoutAmount := amount
-	if !req.TipEnabled {
+	if req.TipEnabled {
-		effectiveAmount, _, clamped, cErr := clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance(r.Context(), bookingID, amount)
+		// The tip is embedded in the amount (totalWithTip) and its value is
+		// unknown server-side, so cap the TOTAL at the remaining obligation
+		// plus a generous max tip bound: the booking portion can never exceed
+		// what is owed, and the tip portion can never exceed £50.
+		remainingPence, remErr := service.GetBookingRemainingBalancePence(r.Context(), bookingID)
+		if remErr != nil {
+			log.Printf("Failed to compute remaining balance for tip-enabled terminal checkout on booking %s: %v", bookingID, remErr)
+			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+			return
+		}
+		maxChargePence := remainingPence + maxTerminalTipPence
+		if checkoutAmount > maxChargePence {
+			log.Printf("Terminal checkout for booking %s clamped from %d to %d pence (remaining obligation %d + max tip bound £%.2f) — the requested total exceeded the booking remainder plus the tip cap", bookingID, amount, maxChargePence, remainingPence, float64(maxTerminalTipPence)/100.0)
+			checkoutAmount = maxChargePence
+		}
+	} else {
+		effectiveAmount, remaining, clamped, cErr := clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance(r.Context(), bookingID, amount)
 		if cErr != nil {
 			log.Printf("Failed to compute remaining balance for terminal checkout on booking %s: %v", bookingID, cErr)
 			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 			return
 		}
+		if clamped && effectiveAmount <= 0 {
+			// B3: the clamp zeroed the amount because the booking is fully paid
+			// (remaining <= 0). Reject rather than present a £0 (or overpaid)
+			// checkout to the card reader.
+			log.Printf("Terminal checkout for booking %s rejected: booking already fully paid (remaining %d pence, requested %d pence)", bookingID, remaining, amount)
+			http.Error(w, "Booking is already fully paid", http.StatusBadRequest)
+			return
+		}
 		if clamped {
 			log.Printf("Terminal checkout for booking %s clamped from %d to %d pence (remaining obligation) — the frontend PaymentModal sent an amount that ignored prior payments; the card reader will present the remaining obligation only", bookingID, amount, effectiveAmount)
 			checkoutAmount = effectiveAmount
@@ -2367,6 +2444,11 @@ func refundLostCampaignAsBalanceCredit(ctx context.Context, bookingID, userID st
 // discount row and the booking would silently not complete. In that case a
 // *campaignExhaustedAtApplyError is returned so the handler can surface a clear
 // "campaign fully redeemed" error and return the promised discount value.
+// The pre-check loop below is a fast-fail only; the RACE is closed inside
+// ApplyEligibleDiscount, whose atomic conditional increment (guarded by
+// max_redemptions) is the real enforcement point — the loser of a concurrent
+// same-campaign redemption gets a zero-row result there and the same error
+// surfaces from the apply loop.
 func applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingID, userID string, expected []EligibleDiscount) error {
 	for _, d := range expected {
 		if d.Source != "campaign" {
@@ -2404,7 +2486,13 @@ func applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingI
 			continue
 		}
 		d.Amount = capped
-		ApplyEligibleDiscount(ctx, q, bookingID, userID, bookingTotal, d)
+		if applyErr := ApplyEligibleDiscount(ctx, q, bookingID, userID, bookingTotal, d); applyErr != nil {
+			var exErr *campaignExhaustedAtApplyError
+			if errors.As(applyErr, &exErr) {
+				return applyErr
+			}
+			log.Printf("Failed to apply %s discount %s for booking %s: %v", d.Source, d.SourceID, bookingID, applyErr)
+		}
 	}
 	return nil
 }

backend/handlers/payments/loop_b_fixes_test.go

@@ -68,13 +68,12 @@ func TestTerminalCash_ClampsToRemainingObligation(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.InDelta(t, 20.00, clamped, 0.001, "the cash payment must be clamped to the £20 remaining obligation")
 }
 
-// TestTerminalCash_FullyPaid_RecordsVerbatim locks the fully-paid edge of
+// TestTerminalCash_FullyPaid_RejectsOvercharge locks the fully-paid edge of
-// B3(a): when the booking has no remaining obligation, a cash payment is
+// B3(a): when the booking has no remaining obligation, a no-tip charge is
-// recorded VERBATIM (a deliberate admin overpayment is real money received and
+// rejected with 400 — recording the requested amount verbatim would overcharge
-// must stay on the ledger — the app's "overpayment handled at the counter"
+// a customer who already paid in full (overpayment is handled manually at the
-// semantics). The clamp only protects the common B3 case where prior payments
+// counter, not minted into the ledger).
-// left a positive remaining obligation.
+func TestTerminalCash_FullyPaid_RejectsOvercharge(t *testing.T) {
-func TestTerminalCash_FullyPaid_RecordsVerbatim(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
 
@@ -89,13 +88,11 @@ func TestTerminalCash_FullyPaid_RecordsVerbatim(t *testing.T) {
 		PaymentMethod: strPtr("cash"),
 	}
 	w := makePaymentRequest(handler, "POST", "/api/admin/bookings/"+bookingID+"/payment", req, adminToken, ctx)
-	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, "a fully-paid booking must still record the admin's deliberate overpayment, body: %s", w.Body.String())
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, "a charge on a fully-paid booking must be rejected, body: %s", w.Body.String())
 
-	var resp CheckoutResponse
+	var payCount int
-	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp), "cash response must carry the payment id")
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM payments WHERE booking_id = $1 AND payment_method = 'cash'`, bookingID).Scan(&payCount))
-	var lastCash float64
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, payCount, "only the £50 prior payment may exist — the overcharge must not be recorded")
-	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT amount FROM payments WHERE id = $1`, resp.CheckoutID).Scan(&lastCash))
-	assert.InDelta(t, 45.00, lastCash, 0.001, "the fully-paid cash receipt must be recorded verbatim")
 }
 
 // TestTerminalSavedCard_ClampsToRemainingObligation locks B3(a) for the

backend/handlers/payments/m4_tip_refund_redesign_test.go

@@ -323,6 +323,91 @@ func TestGetCheckoutStatus_TerminalTipSplit(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, int64(5000), refundable, "tips must not be part of the refundable total")
 }
 
+// TestGetCheckoutStatus_TerminalTipSplit_DiscountedBooking locks the M4 fix
+// for a discounted charge: a terminal charge priced to the DISCOUNTED amount
+// plus an explicit tip must carve the tip against the DISCOUNTED obligation
+// (total − pending campaign discount − paid), NOT the full total — otherwise
+// the whole charge is booked as the booking portion and the tip is silently
+// absorbed into deposit/balance as service revenue. £50 booking with a pending
+// £5 (10%) campaign, charge £49.50 = £45 service + £4.50 tip → split into
+// deposit £25 + balance £20 + tip £4.50; the £5 discount then mints and the
+// booking completes fully paid.
+func TestGetCheckoutStatus_TerminalTipSplit_DiscountedBooking(t *testing.T) {
+	origClient := SquareClient
+	SquareClient = &testCheckoutClient{
+		SquareClient: square.NewDevClient(),
+		hexIDs:       make(map[string]string),
+	}
+	defer func() { SquareClient = origClient }()
+
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+	_, bookingID, _ := setupTestData(t, ctx, tx)
+	adminToken := jwt.GenerateAdminToken()
+
+	now := clock.Now()
+	var campaignID string
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO discount_campaigns (name, campaign_type, discount_percent, status, start_date, end_date, max_redemptions, times_redeemed)
+		VALUES ($1, 'time_based', 10, 'active', $2, $3, 10, 0)
+		RETURNING id
+	`, "M4 Terminal Sale", now.Add(-24*time.Hour), now.Add(24*time.Hour)).Scan(&campaignID))
+
+	handler := CreateTerminalPayment
+	req := CreateTerminalPaymentRequest{
+		Amount:      4950, // £45 discounted service + £4.50 explicit tip
+		PaymentType: "full",
+		TipEnabled:  true,
+	}
+	w := makePaymentRequest(handler, "POST", "/api/admin/bookings/"+bookingID+"/payment", req, adminToken, ctx)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, "body: %s", w.Body.String())
+
+	var createResp CheckoutResponse
+	require.NoError(t, json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&createResp))
+	require.NotEmpty(t, createResp.CheckoutID)
+
+	resp := pollCheckoutStatus(t, ctx, createResp.CheckoutID, bookingID, adminToken)
+	require.Equal(t, "COMPLETED", resp.Status)
+
+	// £49.50 charge on a £50 booking with a pending £5 discount → booking
+	// portion £45 (deposit £25 + balance £20) and tip £4.50 — the tip must NOT
+	// be absorbed into the booking portion. (The discount row is a separate
+	// payment_method='discount' ledger row and is excluded here.)
+	rows, err := tx.Query(ctx, `
+		SELECT payment_type, amount FROM payments
+		WHERE booking_id = $1 AND status = 'completed'
+		  AND payment_method NOT IN ('discount', 'on_the_house')
+		ORDER BY payment_type
+	`, bookingID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer rows.Close()
+	amounts := map[string]float64{}
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var pt string
+		var amt float64
+		require.NoError(t, rows.Scan(&pt, &amt))
+		amounts[pt] = amt
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, rows.Err())
+	require.Len(t, amounts, 3, "the discounted tip charge must split into deposit + balance + tip records")
+	assert.InDelta(t, 25.0, amounts["deposit"], 0.001, "deposit = 50% of the £50 booking total")
+	assert.InDelta(t, 20.0, amounts["balance"], 0.001, "balance = booking portion (£45) minus deposit")
+	assert.InDelta(t, 4.5, amounts["tip"], 0.001, "the £4.50 explicit tip must be carved out, not absorbed")
+
+	// The pending £5 campaign discount must still mint (real money £45 +
+	// discount £5 = £50) and the booking completes fully paid.
+	var discountPay float64
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT COALESCE(SUM(amount), 0) FROM payments WHERE booking_id = $1 AND payment_method = 'discount' AND status = 'completed'`, bookingID).Scan(&discountPay))
+	assert.InDelta(t, 5.0, discountPay, 0.001, "the pending £5 campaign discount must mint")
+
+	var bookingStatus string
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT status FROM bookings WHERE id = $1`, bookingID).Scan(&bookingStatus))
+	assert.Equal(t, "completed", bookingStatus, "real money + discount must complete the booking")
+
+	var redeemed int
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT times_redeemed FROM discount_campaigns WHERE id = $1`, campaignID).Scan(&redeemed))
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, redeemed, "the campaign redemption counter must be incremented exactly once")
+}
+
 func TestBuildTerminalSplitRecords_SplitsDepositBalanceTip(t *testing.T) {
 	record := makeTestRecord("b-t-term", "full", 55)
 	info := &BookingPaymentInfo{

backend/handlers/payments/payments_fixes_test.go

@@ -348,11 +348,13 @@ func TestCreateTerminalPayment_InFlightGuard_AllowsAfterCompletion(t *testing.T)
 	_, bookingID, _ := setupTestData(t, ctx, tx)
 	adminToken := jwt.GenerateAdminToken()
 
-	checkoutA := createTerminalCheckout(t, ctx, bookingID, adminToken, 5000)
+	checkoutA := createTerminalCheckout(t, ctx, bookingID, adminToken, 3000)
 	pollCheckoutStatus(t, ctx, checkoutA, bookingID, adminToken)
 
-	// Once the first checkout is recorded COMPLETED, a new charge is allowed.
+	// Once the first checkout is recorded COMPLETED, a new charge is allowed
-	checkoutB := createTerminalCheckout(t, ctx, bookingID, adminToken, 3000)
+	// (B3: a second charge is clamped to the remaining obligation, so a £20
+	// charge after a £30 one on the £50 booking is fine).
+	checkoutB := createTerminalCheckout(t, ctx, bookingID, adminToken, 2000)
 	if checkoutB == checkoutA {
 		t.Error("expected a new checkout after the previous one completed")
 	}
@@ -747,14 +749,16 @@ func TestApplyEligibleDiscount_CampaignPaymentInsertFailure_StillIncrementsCount
 	// The payments INSERT fails AFTER the booking_discounts row was inserted,
 	// so the redemption happened — the counter MUST still increment.
 	failing := failingExecQuerier{Querier: tx, failSQLContains: "INSERT INTO payments"}
-	ApplyEligibleDiscount(ctx, failing, bookingID, userID, 100.00, EligibleDiscount{
+	if err := ApplyEligibleDiscount(ctx, failing, bookingID, userID, 100.00, EligibleDiscount{
 		Source:       "campaign",
 		Name:         "Test Campaign",
 		Percent:      10.00,
 		Amount:       10.00,
 		SourceID:     campaignID,
 		CampaignType: "time_based",
-	})
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ApplyEligibleDiscount must not return an error here: %v", err)
+	}
 
 	var redeemed int
 	if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT times_redeemed FROM discount_campaigns WHERE id = $1`, campaignID).Scan(&redeemed); err != nil {
@@ -805,14 +809,16 @@ func TestApplyEligibleDiscount_ReferralPaymentInsertFailure_StillMarksUsed(t *te
 	// The payments INSERT fails AFTER the referral's booking_discounts row was
 	// inserted, so the discount WAS redeemed — the used flag MUST still be set.
 	failing := failingExecQuerier{Querier: tx, failSQLContains: "INSERT INTO payments"}
-	ApplyEligibleDiscount(ctx, failing, bookingID, userID, 100.00, EligibleDiscount{
+	if err := ApplyEligibleDiscount(ctx, failing, bookingID, userID, 100.00, EligibleDiscount{
 		Source:     "referral",
 		Name:       "Referral Discount (10%)",
 		Percent:    10.00,
 		Amount:     10.00,
 		SourceID:   rdID,
 		IsReferral: true,
-	})
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ApplyEligibleDiscount must not return an error here: %v", err)
+	}
 
 	var used bool
 	if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT used FROM referral_discounts WHERE id = $1`, rdID).Scan(&used); err != nil {
@@ -831,30 +837,43 @@ func TestApplyEligibleDiscount_ReferralPaymentInsertFailure_StillMarksUsed(t *te
 	}
 }
 
-func TestApplyEligibleDiscount_BookingDiscountsInsertFailure_NoCounterIncrement(t *testing.T) {
+func TestApplyEligibleDiscount_BookingDiscountsInsertFailure_CounterStillReserved(t *testing.T) {
-	// The booking_discounts-INSERT failure is the ONE early return that is
+	// B13 reservation-first semantics: the campaign counter increment (the
-	// correct: nothing was recorded, so the redemption never happened and the
+	// atomic conditional reservation) happens BEFORE the booking_discounts
-	// campaign counter must NOT increment.
+	// insert, so a booking_discounts-INSERT failure no longer leaves the
+	// counter untouched — the redemption slot was consumed and max_redemptions
+	// bounds the lost reservation (the next eligible booking finds the campaign
+	// with one fewer redemption). No discount payment row is minted.
 	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
 	userID, bookingID, _ := setupTestData(t, ctx, tx)
 	campaignID := seedTestCampaign(t, ctx, tx)
 
 	failing := failingExecQuerier{Querier: tx, failSQLContains: "INSERT INTO booking_discounts"}
-	ApplyEligibleDiscount(ctx, failing, bookingID, userID, 100.00, EligibleDiscount{
+	if err := ApplyEligibleDiscount(ctx, failing, bookingID, userID, 100.00, EligibleDiscount{
 		Source:       "campaign",
 		Name:         "Test Campaign",
 		Percent:      10.00,
 		Amount:       10.00,
 		SourceID:     campaignID,
 		CampaignType: "time_based",
-	})
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ApplyEligibleDiscount must not return an error here: %v", err)
+	}
 
 	var redeemed int
 	if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT times_redeemed FROM discount_campaigns WHERE id = $1`, campaignID).Scan(&redeemed); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to read campaign counter: %v", err)
 	}
-	if redeemed != 0 {
+	if redeemed != 1 {
-		t.Errorf("expected times_redeemed unchanged (0) when the booking_discounts insert fails, got %d", redeemed)
+		t.Errorf("expected times_redeemed incremented to 1 by the reservation despite the booking_discounts insert failure, got %d", redeemed)
+	}
+
+	var discountPayments int
+	if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM payments WHERE booking_id = $1 AND payment_method = 'discount'`, bookingID).Scan(&discountPayments); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to count discount payments: %v", err)
+	}
+	if discountPayments != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("expected NO discount payment row (the booking_discounts insert was simulated to fail), got %d", discountPayments)
 	}
 }
 

backend/handlers/payments/payments_test.go

@@ -4366,11 +4366,13 @@ func TestSavedCardPayment_ClientKey_DistinctCharges_NoDedup(t *testing.T) {
 
 	handler := CreateTerminalPayment
 
-	// Two legitimately distinct £50 'full' charges on the same booking — the
+	// Two legitimately distinct £20 'full' charges on the same booking — the
-	// frontend sends a different per-attempt UUID for each.
+	// frontend sends a different per-attempt UUID for each. Each stays within
+	// the £50 booking's remaining obligation (a second £50 charge would be a
+	// B3 overcharge on the now fully-paid booking and correctly rejected).
 	for i, key := range []string{"saved-card-uuid-0001", "saved-card-uuid-0002"} {
 		reqBody := CreateTerminalPaymentRequest{
-			Amount:          5000,
+			Amount:          2000,
 			PaymentType:     "full",
 			PaymentMethod:   strPtr("saved_card"),
 			UserSavedCardID: &cardID,
@@ -4450,9 +4452,11 @@ func TestSavedCardPayment_ClientKey_SameKeyRetry_Dedups(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // TestTerminalPayment_TwoIdenticalCashReceipts_NoDedup verifies the cash/
-// giftcard branch: two identical £50 cash receipts on the same booking are
+// giftcard branch: two identical cash receipts on the same booking are
 // legitimate distinct payments and must each insert their own row (there is
-// deliberately no idempotency dedup in this branch).
+// deliberately no idempotency dedup in this branch). Each £20 receipt stays
+// within the £50 booking's remaining obligation (B3 clamps only what exceeds
+// the remaining balance, and a fully-paid booking rejects further charges).
 func TestTerminalPayment_TwoIdenticalCashReceipts_NoDedup(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
@@ -4466,7 +4470,7 @@ func TestTerminalPayment_TwoIdenticalCashReceipts_NoDedup(t *testing.T) {
 
 	handler := CreateTerminalPayment
 	reqBody := CreateTerminalPaymentRequest{
-		Amount:        5000,
+		Amount:        2000,
 		PaymentType:   "full",
 		PaymentMethod: strPtr("cash"),
 	}

backend/handlers/payments/refunds.go

@@ -1457,8 +1457,27 @@ type manualPendingRow struct {
 // otherwise stay 'pending' forever, blocking the over-refund guard. They are
 // marked 'failed' and surfaced in the admin notification centre, mirroring the
 // Square-less cancellation pre-pass (refunds.go:554-583) with a DISTINCT
-// origin='manual' filter so the two passes never double-process a row.
+// origin='manual' filter so the two passes never double-process a row. Rows
+// WITH a square_refund_id are exempt: a sweep auto-refund of a replay-induced
+// duplicate charge (B1) attaches its refunds row to the still-pending parent
+// payment (which has no square_payment_id) — demoting it here would kill an
+// in-flight refund whose parent Square later settles.
+//
+// A B1 re-poll pass runs FIRST (sweepPendingB1Refunds): it re-polls sweep
+// auto-refunds Square left PENDING by square_refund_id and, ONLY when Square
+// reports the refund COMPLETED, marks the parent payment/till-sale row failed
+// and claws back a funded gift card — the duplicate charge has been reversed
+// and only then is the money state settled.
 func sweepManualPendingSquareRefunds(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
+	// (a0) B1-origin sweep auto-refunds (refunds rows with a square_refund_id
+	//      that Square left PENDING): re-poll each by square_refund_id and
+	//      resolve the parent row ONLY on COMPLETED. Runs before the passes
+	//      below so an in-flight B1 refund is never demoted or re-issued.
+	b1Count, b1Err := sweepPendingB1Refunds(ctx)
+	if b1Err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Failed to re-poll B1 sweep auto-refunds: %v", b1Err)
+	}
+
 	// (a) Terminal pre-pass: legacy MANUAL card refunds whose payment has no
 	//     Square reference can never be refunded via Square → mark them failed
 	//     so they stop blocking the over-refund guard, and surface the affected
@@ -1467,7 +1486,9 @@ func sweepManualPendingSquareRefunds(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
 	//     refunds.go:554-583) with origin='manual' so the filters stay distinct
 	//     and no row is swept by both passes. Must run OUTSIDE any GROUP BY —
 	//     Postgres lumps NULLs together, so these rows can't be handled in the
-	//     per-payment grouping below.
+	//     per-payment grouping below. Rows WITH a square_refund_id are exempt —
+	//     a B1 auto-refund attaches to a parent payment with no square_payment_id
+	//     and its in-flight refund must not be demoted to failed.
 	rows, err := db.Conn.Query(ctx, fmt.Sprintf(`
 		UPDATE refunds r SET status = 'failed'
 		FROM payments p
@@ -1476,6 +1497,7 @@ func sweepManualPendingSquareRefunds(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
 		  AND p.payment_method IN ('online_square', 'in_person_card')
 		  AND p.square_payment_id IS NULL
 		  AND r.origin = 'manual'
+		  AND r.square_refund_id IS NULL
 		RETURNING r.id
 	`, maxManualRefundAttempts))
 	if err != nil {
@@ -1559,9 +1581,191 @@ func sweepManualPendingSquareRefunds(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
 		}
 		processed += n
 	}
+	return processed + b1Count, nil
+}
+
+// b1PendingRefund is one refunds row for a sweep auto-refund of a
+// replay-induced duplicate charge (B1) that Square left PENDING.
+type b1PendingRefund struct {
+	RefundID       string
+	PaymentID      string // refunds.payment_id — the parent payment row
+	Amount         float64
+	SquareRefundID string
+	IdempotencyKey string // deterministic "sweepdup-" + duplicate payment id (payments-table rows)
+	Reason         string // carries the parent till_sale id for till_sale rows
+	SquarePaymentID string // synthetic till-sale payment row's square_payment_id ("" for payments-table rows)
+	CreatedBy      string
+}
+
+// sweepPendingB1Refunds re-polls refunds rows for sweep auto-refunds of
+// replay-induced duplicate charges (B1, refundSweepDuplicateCharge in sweep.go)
+// that Square left PENDING. The refund is NON-terminal: the parent row must
+// stay pending (never marked failed, a funded gift card never clawed back)
+// until Square settles. When Square reports the refund COMPLETED the parent is
+// finally resolved — the pending payment marked failed, and a till sale's
+// funded gift card clawed back (the duplicate charge has been reversed; only
+// then is the money state settled). FAILED/REJECTED refunds are left pending
+// for the webhook FAILED-refund reconciliation (coordinated); a reconcile
+// error is an UNKNOWN state and is never resolved here. The stale-pending
+// sweeps skip rows with an in-flight B1 refund (hasInFlightSweepDuplicateRefund,
+// sweep.go), so the parent is only ever resolved from here.
+func sweepPendingB1Refunds(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
+	rows, err := db.Conn.Query(ctx, `
+		SELECT r.id, r.payment_id, r.amount, r.square_refund_id, COALESCE(r.idempotency_key, ''),
+		       r.reason, COALESCE(p.square_payment_id, ''), COALESCE(r.created_by, '')
+		FROM refunds r
+		LEFT JOIN payments p ON p.id = r.payment_id
+		WHERE r.status = 'pending' AND r.square_refund_id IS NOT NULL
+		  AND r.origin = 'manual' AND r.reason LIKE 'duplicate charge — sweep replay%'
+		ORDER BY r.id
+	`)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Failed to query B1 sweep auto-refunds for re-poll: %v", err)
+		return 0, nil
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	var pending []b1PendingRefund
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var pr b1PendingRefund
+		if err := rows.Scan(&pr.RefundID, &pr.PaymentID, &pr.Amount, &pr.SquareRefundID, &pr.IdempotencyKey, &pr.Reason, &pr.SquarePaymentID, &pr.CreatedBy); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("Failed to scan B1 sweep auto-refund: %v", err)
+			continue
+		}
+		pending = append(pending, pr)
+	}
+	if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Failed to iterate B1 sweep auto-refunds: %v", err)
+		return 0, nil
+	}
+	if len(pending) == 0 {
+		return 0, nil
+	}
+
+	processed := 0
+	for i := range pending {
+		pr := &pending[i]
+		// The Square payment id the refund targets. A till_sale's refund is
+		// attached to the synthetic payments row (square_payment_id = the
+		// duplicate charge); a payments-table refund is attached to the
+		// still-pending payment row (no square_payment_id), so the duplicate id
+		// is recovered from the deterministic refund idempotency key.
+		dupPayID := pr.SquarePaymentID
+		if dupPayID == "" {
+			dupPayID = strings.TrimPrefix(pr.IdempotencyKey, "sweepdup-")
+			if dupPayID == pr.IdempotencyKey {
+				log.Printf("Cannot re-poll B1 refund %s: no Square payment id and the stored key %q is not the sweepdup form — leaving pending", pr.RefundID, pr.IdempotencyKey)
+				continue
+			}
+		}
+		refundList, lErr := SquareClient.ListPaymentRefunds(ctx, dupPayID, time.Time{})
+		if lErr != nil {
+			log.Printf("Re-poll of B1 refund %s failed (%v) — leaving pending", pr.RefundID, lErr)
+			continue
+		}
+		status := ""
+		for j := range refundList {
+			if refundList[j].ID == pr.SquareRefundID {
+				status = refundList[j].Status
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		switch status {
+		case "COMPLETED":
+			if resolveB1RefundCompleted(ctx, pr) {
+				processed++
+			}
+		case "PENDING", "APPROVED":
+			log.Printf("B1 refund %s is still %q at Square — leaving the parent row pending", pr.RefundID, status)
+		case "":
+			log.Printf("B1 refund %s (%s) was not found at Square via ListPaymentRefunds — leaving pending; manual reconciliation may be required", pr.RefundID, dupPayID)
+		default:
+			// FAILED / REJECTED — the webhook FAILED-refund reconciliation
+			// (coordinated) owns this terminal state; never resolve it here.
+			log.Printf("B1 refund %s is %q at Square — leaving pending for the webhook FAILED-refund reconciliation", pr.RefundID, status)
+		}
+	}
 	return processed, nil
 }
 
+// resolveB1RefundCompleted resolves a B1 sweep auto-refund that Square reports
+// COMPLETED: the refunds row is marked completed (money moved), and the parent
+// row — the pending payment, or the pending till sale whose gift-card funding
+// is clawed back — is resolved to failed. Returns true when the parent was
+// resolved.
+func resolveB1RefundCompleted(ctx context.Context, pr *b1PendingRefund) bool {
+	if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
+		UPDATE refunds SET status = 'completed'
+		WHERE id = $1 AND status = 'pending'
+	`, pr.RefundID); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Failed to mark B1 refund %s completed after Square settle: %v", pr.RefundID, err)
+	}
+	if pr.Reason == sweepDuplicateRefundReason {
+		// payments-table parent: the refund's payment_id IS the pending row.
+		if failStaleRow(ctx, "payments", pr.PaymentID) {
+			log.Printf("B1 refund %s COMPLETED at Square — marked the pending payment %s failed (the duplicate charge was reversed)", pr.RefundID, pr.PaymentID)
+			return true
+		}
+		log.Printf("B1 refund %s COMPLETED at Square but payment %s was already resolved", pr.RefundID, pr.PaymentID)
+		return false
+	}
+	// till_sale parent: the sale id is encoded in the reason.
+	if idx := strings.Index(pr.Reason, "(till_sale "); idx >= 0 {
+		tillSaleID := strings.TrimSuffix(pr.Reason[idx+len("(till_sale "):], ")")
+		ts, ok := loadTillSaleStaleRow(ctx, tillSaleID)
+		if !ok {
+			log.Printf("CRITICAL: B1 refund %s COMPLETED at Square but parent till sale %s could not be loaded — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED: gift card may still be funded", pr.RefundID, tillSaleID)
+			return false
+		}
+		if ts.HasGiftCard {
+			if clawbackTillSaleFunding(ctx, ts) {
+				log.Printf("B1 refund %s COMPLETED at Square — clawed back till sale %s's funded gift card and marked it failed", pr.RefundID, tillSaleID)
+				return true
+			}
+			log.Printf("CRITICAL: B1 refund %s COMPLETED at Square but clawing back till sale %s's funding failed — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED: gift card may still be funded", pr.RefundID, tillSaleID)
+			return false
+		}
+		if failStaleRow(ctx, "till_sales", tillSaleID) {
+			log.Printf("B1 refund %s COMPLETED at Square — marked till sale %s failed", pr.RefundID, tillSaleID)
+			return true
+		}
+		log.Printf("B1 refund %s COMPLETED at Square but till sale %s was already resolved", pr.RefundID, tillSaleID)
+		return false
+	}
+	log.Printf("B1 refund %s COMPLETED at Square but the parent row could not be identified from reason %q — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", pr.RefundID, pr.Reason)
+	return false
+}
+
+// loadTillSaleStaleRow reads a till_sale's gift-card context for the B1
+// re-poll pass's clawback — the same fields fetchStaleRows/scanStaleRow
+// populate for the stale-pending sweep.
+func loadTillSaleStaleRow(ctx context.Context, id string) (staleRow, bool) {
+	var r staleRow
+	var itemID, redeemedBy sql.NullString
+	var isCreate *bool
+	var hasGiftCard bool
+	var total float64
+	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
+		SELECT ts.id, ts.item_id, gc.redeemed_by, (ts.created_at = gc.created_at) AS is_create,
+		       (gc.id IS NOT NULL) AS has_gift_card, ts.total_amount
+		FROM till_sales ts
+		LEFT JOIN gift_cards gc ON gc.id = ts.item_id
+		WHERE ts.id = $1
+	`, id).Scan(&r.ID, &itemID, &redeemedBy, &isCreate, &hasGiftCard, &total)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Failed to load till sale %s for B1 refund clawback: %v", id, err)
+		return r, false
+	}
+	r.ItemID = itemID.String
+	if redeemedBy.Valid && redeemedBy.String != "" {
+		r.RedeemToUserID = &redeemedBy.String
+	}
+	r.IsCreate = isCreate != nil && *isCreate
+	r.HasGiftCard = hasGiftCard
+	r.TotalAmount = total
+	r.AmountPence = int64(math.Round(total * 100))
+	return r, true
+}
+
 // ensureRefundKey returns the idempotency key to use when re-issuing a manual
 // refund, persisting a generated fallback to the refunds row BEFORE Square is
 // called so every retry reuses the SAME key — Square dedups same-key retries,

backend/handlers/payments/sweep.go

@@ -220,6 +220,14 @@ func sweepStaleRows(ctx context.Context, table string, cutoff time.Time) (resolv
 		return 0, 0, err
 	}
 	for _, r := range stale {
+		// B1: a row whose auto-refund of a replay-induced duplicate charge is
+		// still PENDING at Square must never be blind-failed (or have its gift
+		// card clawed back) — the refund is non-terminal and may still settle.
+		// The B1 re-poll pass resolves it on settlement.
+		if hasInFlightSweepDuplicateRefund(ctx, table, r.ID) {
+			log.Printf("Stale pending %s row %s has a sweep auto-refund of a duplicate charge still pending at Square — leaving pending until the refund settles", table, r.ID)
+			continue
+		}
 		if r.SquarePaymentID != "" {
 			switch reconcileStalePaymentAtSquare(ctx, table, r.SquarePaymentID) {
 			case staleReconcileCompleted:
@@ -323,6 +331,15 @@ func sweepKeyedStaleRows(ctx context.Context, table string, cutoff time.Time) (r
 	// a row older than that when swept can no longer be replayed trustworthily.
 	replayExpired := clock.Now().Add(-stalePendingPaymentAge)
 	for _, r := range stale {
+		// B1: a row whose auto-refund of a replay-induced duplicate charge is
+		// still PENDING at Square must be left alone — re-playing its expired
+		// idempotency key can land ANOTHER charge, and blind-failing or clawing
+		// back while the refund is non-terminal would reverse money that may
+		// still come back. The B1 re-poll pass resolves it on settlement.
+		if hasInFlightSweepDuplicateRefund(ctx, table, r.ID) {
+			log.Printf("Stale pending %s row %s has a sweep auto-refund of a duplicate charge still pending at Square — leaving pending until the refund settles", table, r.ID)
+			continue
+		}
 		if r.CreatedAt.Before(replayExpired) {
 			// Key retention window already closed — replaying would misread an
 			// expired key as "never charged". Blind-fail + WARN exactly as the
@@ -948,11 +965,16 @@ func reconcileStalePaymentByKey(ctx context.Context, table string, r staleRow) (
 			// failed (the original charge was never found — the caller's
 			// definitively-failed branch does that; a till sale's gift-card
 			// funding is clawed back there too, since the duplicate has been
-			// refunded). Only a refund FAILURE keeps the CRITICAL
+			// refunded). A refund Square leaves PENDING is NON-terminal: the row
-			// manual-reconciliation path.
+			// stays pending (no fail, no clawback) and the B1 re-poll pass
+			// resolves it when Square settles. Only a refund FAILURE keeps the
+			// CRITICAL manual-reconciliation path.
 			if refundErr := refundSweepDuplicateCharge(ctx, table, r, pr); refundErr == nil {
 				log.Printf("stale pending %s row %s: the replayed COMPLETED payment %s was a NEW charge under an expired idempotency key (lag %s) — auto-refunded the duplicate at Square and marking the row failed (the original charge was never found)", table, r.ID, pr.ID, lag)
 				return staleReconcileDefinitivelyFailed, ""
+			} else if errors.Is(refundErr, errSweepRefundPending) {
+				log.Printf("stale pending %s row %s: the auto-refund of the replay-induced duplicate charge %s is PENDING at Square (non-terminal) — leaving the row pending; the B1 refund re-poll resolves it when Square settles", table, r.ID, pr.ID)
+				return staleReconcileLeavePending, ""
 			} else {
 				return leavePendingCritical(ctx, r, "stale pending %s reconcile by key: the replayed COMPLETED payment %s was created after the pending row %s (lag %s) — a NEW charge under an expired idempotency key; auto-refund FAILED (%v) — leaving the row PENDING — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED: check Square for both charges and refund the duplicate", table, pr.ID, r.ID, lag, refundErr)
 			}
@@ -970,6 +992,38 @@ func reconcileStalePaymentByKey(ctx context.Context, table string, r staleRow) (
 	}
 }
 
+// errSweepRefundPending is the sentinel refundSweepDuplicateCharge returns when
+// Square accepted the auto-refund of a replay-induced duplicate charge but left
+// it PENDING — a NON-terminal state: the refund may still complete (the
+// duplicate is reversed) or fail. The caller must NOT treat it as success: the
+// parent row is left PENDING (never marked failed, a till sale's funded gift
+// card is never clawed back) so a later sweep run can re-poll the refund. The
+// refund's idempotency key ("sweepdup-"+paymentID) is deterministic, so the
+// re-poll finds the SAME refund at Square.
+var errSweepRefundPending = errors.New("sweep duplicate-charge refund pending at Square")
+
+// sweepDuplicateRefundReason is the audit-trail reason carried by every
+// refunds row for a sweep auto-refund of a replay-induced duplicate charge
+// (B1). The B1 re-poll pass (sweepPendingB1Refunds, refunds.go) and the
+// in-flight guard (hasInFlightSweepDuplicateRefund) match on it, so it must
+// stay in lockstep with refunds.go. For a till_sale the reason carries the
+// parent till_sale id (see sweepDuplicateRefundReasonFor) — refunds has no
+// till_sale column and the refund must link back to the sale the re-poll pass
+// claws back when Square settles.
+const sweepDuplicateRefundReason = "duplicate charge — sweep replay"
+
+// sweepDuplicateRefundReasonFor returns the refunds-row reason for a sweep
+// auto-refund. tillSaleID is "" for payments-table rows (whose parent is the
+// refund's own payment_id); a till_sale's parent is encoded in the reason
+// because refunds.payment_id is FK'd to payments and the sale has no payments
+// row of its own.
+func sweepDuplicateRefundReasonFor(tillSaleID string) string {
+	if tillSaleID == "" {
+		return sweepDuplicateRefundReason
+	}
+	return sweepDuplicateRefundReason + " (till_sale " + tillSaleID + ")"
+}
+
 // refundSweepDuplicateCharge auto-refunds a replayed COMPLETED payment that the
 // sweep proved to be a NEW charge under an expired idempotency key (B1) — money
 // the customer never authorized. The refund reuses the existing Square refund
@@ -983,13 +1037,23 @@ func reconcileStalePaymentByKey(ctx context.Context, table string, r staleRow) (
 //     gets a fresh key and is refunded too;
 //   - reason "duplicate charge — sweep replay" for the audit trail.
 //
-// On success a refunds row is recorded for payments-table rows (a till_sale
+// A refunds row is recorded for BOTH payments-table and till_sale rows (a
-// row has no payments row to attach the refund to — the Square refund plus the
+// till_sale's refund attaches to a synthetic payments row created for the
-// deduped critical-payment admin notification cover the audit trail there) and
+// duplicate charge, since refunds.payment_id is FK'd to payments; the insert
-// an admin notification is inserted so an operator sees the auto-refund. The
+// is idempotent on the deterministic refund key, whose UNIQUE constraint
-// caller then marks the row definitively failed (the ORIGINAL charge was never
+// doubles as the dedup guard), and an admin notification is inserted so an
-// found). Any failure leaves the money state at Square untouched and returns
+// operator sees the auto-refund.
-// the error so the caller keeps the CRITICAL manual-reconciliation path.
+//
+// Return semantics:
+//
+//   - nil — the refund COMPLETED at Square; the caller marks the row
+//     definitively failed (the ORIGINAL charge was never found) and, for a till
+//     sale, claws back the funded gift card — the duplicate has been reversed;
+//   - errSweepRefundPending — the refund is PENDING (non-terminal); the caller
+//     leaves the row pending; the B1 re-poll pass (sweepPendingB1Refunds,
+//     refunds.go) resolves the row when Square settles;
+//   - any other error — the money state at Square is untouched; the caller
+//     keeps the CRITICAL manual-reconciliation path.
 func refundSweepDuplicateCharge(ctx context.Context, table string, r staleRow, pr *square.PaymentResult) error {
 	if pr == nil || pr.ID == "" {
 		return errors.New("replayed payment has no Square payment id to refund")
@@ -1004,37 +1068,125 @@ func refundSweepDuplicateCharge(ctx context.Context, table string, r staleRow, p
 	if len(refundKey) > maxIdempotencyKeyLength {
 		refundKey = truncateIdempotencyKey("sweepdup", pr.ID)
 	}
-	reason := "duplicate charge — sweep replay"
 	res, refundErr := SquareClient.RefundPayment(ctx, square.RefundPaymentReq{
 		PaymentID:      pr.ID,
 		Amount:         r.AmountPence,
 		IdempotencyKey: refundKey,
-		Reason:         reason,
+		Reason:         sweepDuplicateRefundReason,
 	})
 	if refundErr != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("auto-refund of replay-induced duplicate charge %s failed: %w", pr.ID, refundErr)
 	}
 
 	status := "completed"
-	if res.Status == "PENDING" {
+	pending := false
+	switch res.Status {
+	case "PENDING", "APPROVED":
+		// Square's non-terminal refund states — the money has not moved yet but
+		// the refund is in flight. NON-terminal: the caller must leave the row
+		// pending and never claw back a funded gift card (reversing the funding
+		// before Square settles the refund could leave a customer charged with
+		// no gift card if the refund later fails).
 		status = "pending"
-	} else if res.Status == "FAILED" || res.Status == "REJECTED" {
+		pending = true
+	case "FAILED", "REJECTED":
 		// Square definitively rejected the refund — the duplicate charge stands.
 		return fmt.Errorf("auto-refund of replay-induced duplicate charge %s was %s at Square", pr.ID, res.Status)
 	}
-	if table == "payments" {
+
+	recordSweepDuplicateRefundRow(ctx, table, r, pr, res.ID, status, refundKey)
+
+	insertCriticalPaymentNotification(ctx, r.BookingID, r.CreatedBy)
+	if pending {
+		log.Printf("Auto-refund of replay-induced duplicate charge %s (%d pence) for pending row %s is PENDING at Square (refund %s) — leaving the row pending for the refund re-poll", pr.ID, r.AmountPence, r.ID, res.ID)
+		return errSweepRefundPending
+	}
+	log.Printf("Auto-refunded replay-induced duplicate charge %s (%d pence) for pending row %s — refund %s", pr.ID, r.AmountPence, r.ID, res.ID)
+	return nil
+}
+
+// recordSweepDuplicateRefundRow writes the refunds row for a sweep auto-refund
+// of a replay-induced duplicate charge (B1), idempotently on the deterministic
+// refund idempotency key (UNIQUE — a re-run can never mint a second row). For
+// a payments-table row the refund attaches to the pending payment row itself.
+// A till_sale has no payments row (refunds.payment_id is NOT NULL + FK), so a
+// synthetic payments row is created FIRST — 'completed' (the duplicate charge
+// genuinely landed at Square) with the duplicate's square_payment_id, so the
+// B1 re-poll pass can look the refund up by payment id — and the refund is
+// attached to it. The parent till_sale id is carried in the reason so the
+// re-poll pass claws it back when Square settles.
+func recordSweepDuplicateRefundRow(ctx context.Context, table string, r staleRow, pr *square.PaymentResult, refundID, status, refundKey string) {
 	amountPounds := float64(r.AmountPence) / 100.0
+	paymentID := r.ID
+	var bookingID *string
+	reason := sweepDuplicateRefundReason
+	if table == "payments" {
+		bookingID = r.BookingID
+	} else {
+		// till_sale: create the synthetic payments row for the duplicate charge.
+		payKey := truncateIdempotencyKey("sweepdup-pay", pr.ID)
+		err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
+			INSERT INTO payments (payment_type, payment_method, status, amount, square_payment_id, idempotency_key, created_by, created_at)
+			VALUES ('full', 'in_person_card', 'completed', $1, $2, $3, $4, NOW())
+			ON CONFLICT (idempotency_key) DO NOTHING
+			RETURNING id
+		`, amountPounds, pr.ID, payKey, r.CreatedBy).Scan(&paymentID)
+		if err != nil {
+			if !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
+				log.Printf("CRITICAL: auto-refunded duplicate charge %s at Square (refund %s) but creating the payments row for till sale %s failed: %v — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", pr.ID, refundID, r.ID, err)
+				return
+			}
+			// Re-run: the synthetic row already exists — reuse it.
+			if rErr := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT id FROM payments WHERE idempotency_key = $1`, payKey).Scan(&paymentID); rErr != nil {
+				log.Printf("CRITICAL: auto-refunded duplicate charge %s at Square (refund %s) but re-reading the payments row for till sale %s failed: %v — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", pr.ID, refundID, r.ID, rErr)
+				return
+			}
+		}
+		reason = sweepDuplicateRefundReasonFor(r.ID)
+	}
 	if _, insErr := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
 		INSERT INTO refunds (payment_id, booking_id, amount, square_refund_id, status, origin, reason, idempotency_key, created_by, created_at)
 		VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, 'manual', $6, $7, $8, NOW())
-		`, r.ID, r.BookingID, amountPounds, res.ID, status, reason, refundKey, r.CreatedBy); insErr != nil {
+		ON CONFLICT (idempotency_key) DO UPDATE SET status = EXCLUDED.status, square_refund_id = EXCLUDED.square_refund_id
-			log.Printf("CRITICAL: auto-refunded duplicate charge %s at Square (refund %s) but recording the refunds row for pending %s failed: %v — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", pr.ID, res.ID, r.ID, insErr)
+	`, paymentID, bookingID, amountPounds, refundID, status, reason, refundKey, r.CreatedBy); insErr != nil {
-		}
+		log.Printf("CRITICAL: auto-refunded duplicate charge %s at Square (refund %s) but recording the refunds row failed: %v — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", pr.ID, refundID, insErr)
 	}
+}
 
-	insertCriticalPaymentNotification(ctx, r.BookingID, r.CreatedBy)
+// hasInFlightSweepDuplicateRefund reports whether a stale pending row carries a
-	log.Printf("Auto-refunded replay-induced duplicate charge %s (%d pence) for pending row %s — refund %s", pr.ID, r.AmountPence, r.ID, res.ID)
+// sweep auto-refund of a replay-induced duplicate charge (B1) that Square left
-	return nil
+// PENDING. While the refund is in flight the row must NOT be replayed (a replay
+// of the expired-key row could land ANOTHER charge), blind-failed or clawed
+// back (the refund is non-terminal — money may still reverse). The B1 re-poll
+// pass (sweepPendingB1Refunds, refunds.go) resolves the parent row when Square
+// settles. For a till_sale the refund row's reason carries the sale id (see
+// sweepDuplicateRefundReasonFor); a payments-table refund's payment_id IS the
+// parent row.
+func hasInFlightSweepDuplicateRefund(ctx context.Context, table, id string) bool {
+	var exists bool
+	var err error
+	if table == "till_sales" {
+		err = db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
+			SELECT EXISTS (
+				SELECT 1 FROM refunds
+				WHERE status = 'pending' AND square_refund_id IS NOT NULL
+				  AND reason = $1
+			)
+		`, sweepDuplicateRefundReasonFor(id)).Scan(&exists)
+	} else {
+		err = db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
+			SELECT EXISTS (
+				SELECT 1 FROM refunds
+				WHERE payment_id = $1 AND status = 'pending' AND square_refund_id IS NOT NULL
+				  AND reason = $2
+			)
+		`, id, sweepDuplicateRefundReason).Scan(&exists)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Failed to check for an in-flight sweep duplicate refund on %s row %s: %v", table, id, err)
+		return false
+	}
+	return exists
 }
 
 // leaveGiftCardPurchasePending keeps a gift-card-purchase payment row (payments
@@ -1745,6 +1897,14 @@ func recordTerminalPaymentTx(ctx context.Context, tx pgx.Tx, checkoutID, booking
 		UpdatedAt:       clock.Now(),
 	}
 
+	// The booking user is read here (before the M4 carve) because the carve
+	// computes the campaign discounts applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment is about
+	// to apply below, and that apply needs the payer's user id.
+	var bookingUserID string
+	if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT COALESCE(user_id, '') FROM bookings WHERE id = $1`, bookingID).Scan(&bookingUserID); err != nil {
+		slog.Error("Failed to load booking user for terminal campaign apply", "booking_id", bookingID, "err", err)
+	}
+
 	// M4 split: a terminal charge above the remaining booking value is a tip —
 	// record it as its own record so only the booking portion is refundable.
 	// B3: only when the customer EXPLICITLY requested a tip (checkout
@@ -1758,13 +1918,50 @@ func recordTerminalPaymentTx(ctx context.Context, tx pgx.Tx, checkoutID, booking
 	if bErr == nil && bookingInfo != nil {
 		charged := float64(pr.Amount) / 100.0
 		remainingBookingValue := math.Max(0, bookingInfo.TotalAmount-bookingInfo.TotalPaid)
+		// Reserve the headroom of the campaign discounts that
+		// applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment is about to mint: a
+		// terminal charge already priced to the discounted amount (the frontend
+		// charges total−discount plus any explicit tip) must carve the tip
+		// against the DISCOUNTED obligation, not the full total — otherwise the
+		// whole charge lands as booking portion and the tip is silently
+		// absorbed into deposit/balance instead of being recorded as gratuity
+		// (M4). The no-tip case is unchanged: the booking portion exactly
+		// covers the discounted obligation and the discount fills the rest.
+		if pending := pendingCampaignDiscountAmount(ctx, tx, bookingID, bookingUserID, bookingInfo.TotalAmount); pending > 0.004 {
+			remainingBookingValue = math.Max(0, remainingBookingValue-pending)
+		}
 		bookingPortion := math.Min(charged, remainingBookingValue)
 		bookingPortion = math.Round(bookingPortion*100) / 100
-		tipAmount := math.Round((charged-bookingPortion)*100) / 100
+		tipAmount := math.Max(0, math.Round((charged-bookingPortion)*100)/100)
 		if checkoutTipEnabled && tipAmount > 0.004 {
 			records = buildTerminalSplitRecords(record, bookingInfo, bookingPortion, tipAmount)
 		}
 	}
+	hasTip := false
+	for _, rec := range records {
+		if rec.PaymentType == "tip" {
+			hasTip = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	// Apply eligible campaigns BEFORE the records are inserted when the M4
+	// carve minted a TIP record and a campaign discount is pending. The apply
+	// path refuses discounts once a booking has 2+ completed real payments, and
+	// the split records (deposit + balance + tip) would count as 2+ even though
+	// they are ONE charge — refusing the discount the frontend already priced
+	// in would leave the booking under-discounted and never complete. Applying
+	// before the insert is money-safe: a tip record only exists when the charge
+	// exceeds the DISCOUNTED obligation, so the booking portion plus the
+	// pending discount can never exceed the total — the F1 full-amount
+	// over-credit cannot occur here (a full-amount charge never produces a tip
+	// record, so it keeps the after-insert apply whose cap refuses it).
+	appliedCampaignsBeforeInsert := false
+	if hasTip && bookingInfo != nil && bErr == nil {
+		if pendingCampaignDiscountAmount(ctx, tx, bookingID, bookingUserID, bookingInfo.TotalAmount) > 0.004 {
+			applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment(ctx, tx, bookingID, bookingUserID, nil)
+			appliedCampaignsBeforeInsert = true
+		}
+	}
 	if len(records) == 0 {
 		records = []PaymentRecord{record}
 	}
@@ -1804,14 +2001,15 @@ func recordTerminalPaymentTx(ctx context.Context, tx pgx.Tx, checkoutID, booking
 	// skip re-application via their already-recorded guards. The apply runs
 	// AFTER the payment record insert so the headroom counts the charge as real
 	// money (never over-credits), and after the M4 tip split so tip records
-	// never affect the discount computation.
+	// never affect the discount computation. When the M4 carve minted a tip
-	var bookingUserID string
+	// record the discount was already applied BEFORE the insert (see above), so
-	if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT COALESCE(user_id, '') FROM bookings WHERE id = $1`, bookingID).Scan(&bookingUserID); err != nil {
+	// the apply is skipped here — a second run is idempotent but unnecessary.
-		slog.Error("Failed to load booking user for terminal campaign apply", "booking_id", bookingID, "err", err)
+	// The booking user was already read above for the M4 carve.
-	}
+	if !appliedCampaignsBeforeInsert {
 		if applyErr := applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment(ctx, tx, bookingID, bookingUserID, nil); applyErr != nil {
 			slog.Error("Failed to apply eligible campaigns for terminal checkout", "booking_id", bookingID, "err", applyErr)
 		}
+	}
 
 	// Release the in-flight guard: this checkout is now recorded.
 	if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
@@ -1831,6 +2029,25 @@ func recordTerminalPaymentTx(ctx context.Context, tx pgx.Tx, checkoutID, booking
 	return paymentID, nil
 }
 
+// pendingCampaignDiscountAmount sums the campaign discounts that
+// applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment is about to apply for the booking (its
+// 'expected' argument is nil in the terminal flow, so it recomputes the
+// eligible set from scratch). The discount rows do not exist yet when the M4
+// tip carve runs — they are minted later in the same transaction — so the
+// carve must reserve their headroom NOW or a terminal charge already priced to
+// the discounted amount absorbs the customer's explicit tip into the booking
+// portion (M4). Referral discounts are excluded: the terminal apply path never
+// mints them.
+func pendingCampaignDiscountAmount(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingID, userID string, bookingTotal float64) float64 {
+	var total float64
+	for _, d := range ComputeEligibleDiscounts(ctx, q, bookingID, userID, bookingTotal) {
+		if d.Source == "campaign" {
+			total += d.Amount
+		}
+	}
+	return math.Round(total*100) / 100
+}
+
 // recordUntrackedTillSalePayment records a stale card-machine till sale whose
 // checkout COMPLETED at Square but was never polled/recorded: the sale is
 // marked 'completed' with the returned square_payment_id written back. A

backend/handlers/payments/sweep_test.go

@@ -837,6 +837,246 @@ func TestSweepStalePendingPayments_KeyedReplayNewCharge_AutoRefunded(t *testing.
 	}
 }
 
+// pendingRefundClient forces RefundPayment to return a PENDING result so the
+// B1 auto-refund branch is exercised: Square accepted the refund but left it
+// non-terminal.
+type pendingRefundClient struct {
+	square.SquareClient
+}
+
+func (c *pendingRefundClient) RefundPayment(ctx context.Context, req square.RefundPaymentReq) (*square.RefundResult, error) {
+	res, err := c.SquareClient.RefundPayment(ctx, req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	res.Status = "PENDING"
+	return res, nil
+}
+
+// settledRefundClient reports every refund Square holds as COMPLETED — as if a
+// PENDING refund settled — so the B1 re-poll pass resolves the parent row.
+type settledRefundClient struct {
+	square.SquareClient
+}
+
+func (c *settledRefundClient) ListPaymentRefunds(ctx context.Context, paymentID string, beginTime time.Time) ([]square.RefundResult, error) {
+	refunds, err := c.SquareClient.ListPaymentRefunds(ctx, paymentID, beginTime)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	for i := range refunds {
+		refunds[i].Status = "COMPLETED"
+	}
+	return refunds, nil
+}
+
+// TestSweepStalePendingPayments_KeyedReplayNewCharge_RefundPending_LeavesRowPending
+// locks the B1 PENDING fix: when Square accepts the auto-refund of a
+// replay-induced duplicate charge but leaves it PENDING (non-terminal), the
+// sweep must NOT mark the parent payment failed and must record the refunds
+// row with status 'pending' + square_refund_id. The re-poll pass
+// (SweepPendingSquareRefunds) then resolves the parent row ONLY once Square
+// reports the refund COMPLETED. Sequential (flips SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT), like the
+// sibling B1 tests.
+func TestSweepStalePendingPayments_KeyedReplayNewCharge_RefundPending_LeavesRowPending(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create user: %v", err)
+	}
+	serviceID, err := fixtures.CreateTestService(tx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create service: %v", err)
+	}
+	bookingID, err := fixtures.CreateTestBookingAtTime(tx, userID, serviceID,
+		time.Date(2099, 12, 31, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create booking: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	staleID, err := fixtures.CreateTestPayment(tx, bookingID, 2000.00, "online_square", "full", "pending")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create stale pending payment: %v", err)
+	}
+	const key = "key-expired-replay-pending-refund"
+	const dupPayID = "pay_expired_key_pending_refund"
+	if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, "UPDATE payments SET created_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '23 hours', idempotency_key = $1, square_source_id = 'ccof:test-saved-card', created_by = $2 WHERE id = $3", key, userID, staleID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to age the stale payment: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	origClient := SquareClient
+	mock := square.NewDevClient()
+	t.Setenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT", "production")
+	SquareClient = &pendingRefundClient{SquareClient: &staleReplayClient{SquareClient: mock, result: &square.PaymentResult{
+		Status:      "COMPLETED",
+		ID:          dupPayID,
+		SquarePayID: dupPayID,
+		CreatedAt:   clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
+	}}}
+	defer func() { SquareClient = origClient }()
+
+	pgxTx := db.TxFromContext(ctx)
+	if pgxTx == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no transaction in context")
+	}
+	if err := pgxTx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to commit test tx: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_, _ = db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM refunds WHERE payment_id = $1`, staleID)
+		_, _ = db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM admin_notifications WHERE reason = 'critical_payment_log' AND user_id = $1`, userID)
+		_, _ = db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM payments WHERE id = $1`, staleID)
+		_, _ = db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM bookings WHERE id = $1`, bookingID)
+		_, _ = db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM services WHERE id = $1`, serviceID)
+		_, _ = db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID)
+	})
+
+	freshCtx := context.Background()
+	if _, err := SweepStalePendingPayments(freshCtx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("sweep failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// PENDING refund → NON-terminal: the parent row must NOT be marked failed.
+	var status string
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(freshCtx, "SELECT status FROM payments WHERE id = $1", staleID).Scan(&status); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to query payment: %v", err)
+	}
+	if status != "pending" {
+		t.Errorf("expected a PENDING auto-refund to leave the row pending (never failed), got %q", status)
+	}
+
+	// The in-flight refund must be recorded with status 'pending' + square_refund_id.
+	var refundStatus string
+	var sqRefundID *string
+	var reason string
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(freshCtx, `SELECT status, square_refund_id, reason FROM refunds WHERE payment_id = $1`, staleID).Scan(&refundStatus, &sqRefundID, &reason); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to query refunds row: %v", err)
+	}
+	if refundStatus != "pending" {
+		t.Errorf("expected the refunds row to be pending, got %q", refundStatus)
+	}
+	if sqRefundID == nil || *sqRefundID == "" {
+		t.Error("expected the refunds row to carry the Square refund id")
+	}
+	if reason != sweepDuplicateRefundReason {
+		t.Errorf("expected reason %q, got %q", sweepDuplicateRefundReason, reason)
+	}
+
+	// Now the refund settles at Square: the re-poll pass resolves the parent.
+	SquareClient = &settledRefundClient{SquareClient: mock}
+	if _, err := SweepPendingSquareRefunds(freshCtx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("refund re-poll sweep failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(freshCtx, "SELECT status FROM payments WHERE id = $1", staleID).Scan(&status); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to re-query payment: %v", err)
+	}
+	if status != "failed" {
+		t.Errorf("expected a COMPLETED refund to resolve the parent row to failed, got %q", status)
+	}
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(freshCtx, `SELECT status FROM refunds WHERE payment_id = $1`, staleID).Scan(&refundStatus); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to re-query refunds row: %v", err)
+	}
+	if refundStatus != "completed" {
+		t.Errorf("expected the refunds row to complete once Square settles, got %q", refundStatus)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSweepStalePendingPayments_KeyedTillReplayNewCharge_RefundPending_NoClawback
+// locks the B1 PENDING fix for till sales: a PENDING auto-refund of a
+// replay-induced duplicate charge must leave the till sale pending with its
+// funded gift card intact (NO clawback, NO fail), and the refunds row must be
+// recorded (attached to a synthetic payments row for the duplicate charge)
+// with the parent sale encoded in the reason. Once Square settles the refund
+// COMPLETED, the re-poll pass claws back the funding and marks the sale failed.
+// Sequential (flips SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT), like the sibling B1 tests.
+func TestSweepStalePendingPayments_KeyedTillReplayNewCharge_RefundPending_NoClawback(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+
+	adminID, err := fixtures.CreateTestAdminUser(tx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create admin user: %v", err)
+	}
+	pool := context.Background()
+
+	saleID, giftCardID := seedStaleTillSaleWithCard(t, ctx, tx, adminID, 50.00, "", true)
+	// Age the sale AND its created gift card inside the key window (23h,
+	// created_at equality preserved → is_create stays true) and add the key.
+	const dupPayID = "pay_expired_key_till_pending_refund"
+	if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, "UPDATE till_sales SET created_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '23 hours', idempotency_key = 'key-till-expired-pending-refund', square_source_id = 'ccof:test-saved-card' WHERE id = $1", saleID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to age the till sale: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, "UPDATE gift_cards SET created_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '23 hours' WHERE id = $1", giftCardID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to age the gift card: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	origClient := SquareClient
+	mock := square.NewDevClient()
+	t.Setenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT", "production")
+	SquareClient = &pendingRefundClient{SquareClient: &staleReplayClient{SquareClient: mock, result: &square.PaymentResult{
+		Status:      "COMPLETED",
+		ID:          dupPayID,
+		SquarePayID: dupPayID,
+		CreatedAt:   clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
+	}}}
+	defer func() { SquareClient = origClient }()
+
+	pgxTx := db.TxFromContext(ctx)
+	if pgxTx == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no transaction in context")
+	}
+	if err := pgxTx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to commit setup tx: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if _, err := SweepStalePendingPayments(pool); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("sweep failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	var status string
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(pool, `SELECT status FROM till_sales WHERE id = $1`, saleID).Scan(&status); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to query till sale: %v", err)
+	}
+	if status != "pending" {
+		t.Errorf("expected a PENDING auto-refund to leave the till sale pending (never failed, no clawback), got %q", status)
+	}
+	var cardCount int
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(pool, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM gift_cards WHERE id = $1`, giftCardID).Scan(&cardCount); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to count gift cards: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cardCount != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected the funded gift card NOT clawed back while the refund is pending, got %d cards", cardCount)
+	}
+
+	// The refund row exists with the parent till sale encoded in the reason.
+	var reason, refundStatus string
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(pool, `SELECT reason, status FROM refunds WHERE reason = $1`, sweepDuplicateRefundReasonFor(saleID)).Scan(&reason, &refundStatus); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to query B1 refund row: %v", err)
+	}
+	if refundStatus != "pending" {
+		t.Errorf("expected the B1 refunds row to be pending, got %q", refundStatus)
+	}
+
+	// Refund settles COMPLETED → re-poll claws back the funding and fails the sale.
+	SquareClient = &settledRefundClient{SquareClient: mock}
+	if _, err := SweepPendingSquareRefunds(pool); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("refund re-poll sweep failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(pool, `SELECT status FROM till_sales WHERE id = $1`, saleID).Scan(&status); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to re-query till sale: %v", err)
+	}
+	if status != "failed" {
+		t.Errorf("expected a COMPLETED refund to resolve the till sale to failed, got %q", status)
+	}
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(pool, `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM gift_cards WHERE id = $1`, giftCardID).Scan(&cardCount); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to count gift cards: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cardCount != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("expected the created gift card clawed back after the refund settled COMPLETED, got %d cards", cardCount)
+	}
+}
+
 // TestSweepStalePendingPayments_KeyedReplayUnparseableCreatedAt_LeavesPending
 // locks the B1 caveat: a replayed COMPLETED payment whose created_at CANNOT be
 // parsed must NOT be auto-refunded. An unparseable created_at does not prove

backend/handlers/payments/twofa.go

@@ -75,11 +75,14 @@ func (s *PaymentService) UserTwoFactorEnabled(ctx context.Context, userID string
 // stored pending 2FA code. It is a thin delegation shim over
 // twofa.VerifyForUser — the single source of truth for the verification core
 // (per-user brute-force lockout, constant-time compare, legacy pre-pepper
-// hash fallback, code lifetime). It returns nil on a valid code, or a
+// hash fallback, code lifetime). consume=true is passed so a verified code is
-// classified twofa.ErrIncorrect / twofa.ErrLockedOut / twofa.ErrMissingOrExpired
+// SINGLE-USE: the gate NULLs the pending code on success, so one code
-// (or a wrapped DB error) for the caller to map to the correct HTTP status.
+// authorizes exactly one saved-card charge (not unlimited charges for its
+// 10-minute lifetime). It returns nil on a valid code, or a classified
+// twofa.ErrIncorrect / twofa.ErrLockedOut / twofa.ErrMissingOrExpired (or a
+// wrapped DB error) for the caller to map to the correct HTTP status.
 func verifyPendingTwoFactorCode(ctx context.Context, userID, code string) error {
-	return twofa.VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, code)
+	return twofa.VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, code, true)
 }
 
 // requireTwoFactorForCardAccess gates the saved-card online payment paths

backend/handlers/payments/twofa_test.go

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ package payments
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
+	"database/sql"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
@@ -176,6 +177,37 @@ func TestRequireTwoFactorForCardAccess_Enforced(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 
+// TestRequireTwoFactorForCardAccess_CodeIsSingleUse pins the finding-1 fix: a
+// code verified through the gate is CONSUMED (the pending code is NULLed), so
+// the same code cannot authorize a second saved-card charge within its
+// 10-minute lifetime. The second attempt with the same code is denied with the
+// documented "expired — request a new one" 400.
+func TestRequireTwoFactorForCardAccess_CodeIsSingleUse(t *testing.T) {
+	helperEnvEnforce2FA(t)
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	seedTwoFAPendingCode(t, tx, userID, "424242")
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/", nil).WithContext(ctx)
+	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	require.True(t, requireTwoFactorForCardAccess(w, req, NewPaymentService(), userID, "424242"), "first use of the code must pass the gate")
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+
+	// The verified code must now be consumed (NULLed) in the DB.
+	var pendingHash sql.NullString
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&pendingHash))
+	require.False(t, pendingHash.Valid, "a verified gate code must be consumed (NULLed)")
+
+	// A second charge attempt with the same code must be denied as expired.
+	w = httptest.NewRecorder()
+	require.False(t, requireTwoFactorForCardAccess(w, req, NewPaymentService(), userID, "424242"), "a consumed code must not pass the gate twice")
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
+	var body map[string]string
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body))
+	require.Equal(t, "Verification code expired — request a new one", body["error"])
+}
+
 // TestTwoFactorEnforced_CreateBookingPayment_SaveCard_Blocked verifies the
 // end-to-end gate on the save-card path: enforced + user without 2FA → 403 with
 // no payment row and no saved card (Square never called).

backend/handlers/user/profile_test.go

@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ func TestPasswordChange_RevokesTokens(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// The consumed refresh token no longer verifies.
-	if _, _, err := auth.VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, refreshToken); err == nil {
+	if _, _, _, err := auth.VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, refreshToken); err == nil {
 		t.Error("refresh token must be invalid after a password change (B9)")
 	}
 }

backend/handlers/user/twofa.go

@@ -322,9 +322,11 @@ const (
 // DisableTwoFAHandler and VerifyTwoFACodeForUser. The caller must hold st.Mu
 // (from twoFAAttemptStateFor) so concurrent attempts from the same user cannot
 // race the limit check. Delegates to the shared implementation in
-// crussell/internal/twofa.
+// crussell/internal/twofa with consume=false: the interactive setup/disable
+// flows clear the pending code themselves on success (enableTwoFA /
+// disableTwoFA), so the code must stay valid through the whole handshake here.
 func checkTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID string, st *twoFAAttemptState, reqCode string) (twoFACodeCheckResult, error) {
-	res, err := twofa.Check(r.Context(), userID, st, reqCode)
+	res, err := twofa.Check(r.Context(), userID, st, reqCode, false)
 	return twoFACodeCheckResult(res), err
 }
 
@@ -345,7 +347,7 @@ func VerifyTwoFACodeForUser(ctx context.Context, userID, code string) error {
 	st.Mu.Lock()
 	defer st.Mu.Unlock()
 
-	result, err := twofa.Check(ctx, userID, st, code)
+	result, err := twofa.Check(ctx, userID, st, code, false)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -506,7 +508,7 @@ func SendDisableCodeHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	st.Mu.Lock()
 	defer st.Mu.Unlock()
 
-	if err := ensurePendingTwoFACode(r, userID, st); err != nil {
+	if _, err := ensurePendingTwoFACode(r, userID, st, "disable 2FA"); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFAMintThrottled) {
 			http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Wait before requesting a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
 			return
@@ -525,6 +527,84 @@ func SendDisableCodeHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 }
 
+// POST /api/user/2fa/code
+// Lets an ENABLED user request a fresh verification code for a saved-card
+// charge (the B6/B10 gate). This closes the enforced-deployment dead-end where
+// 2FA setup clears the pending code and SetupTwoFAHandler refuses already
+// enabled users (409): without it there is no way to mint a code for a
+// saved-card charge, so every charge returned 400 "Verification code expired —
+// request a new one" with no way to get a new one.
+//
+// The mint machinery is shared with the disable flow: ensurePendingTwoFACode
+// reuses a still-valid pending code when one exists and otherwise mints +
+// delivers a fresh one via the same build-dependent channel as setup
+// (deliverTwoFACode — [2FA] log in dev/test; pepper- and delivery-channel
+// gated in production). Fresh-code mints are throttled per-user
+// (twoFAMintCooldown) and never reset the failed-attempt counter (B11b).
+//
+// Contract: 200 {"message":"Code sent"} (+ a dev-only "code" field when 2FA is
+// unenforced, matching setup); 409 when the user has not enabled 2FA; 429 on
+// the mint cooldown; 503 when no delivery channel is configured (production
+// without TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true); 500 on DB failure. The route is
+// mounted with RequireAuth + RequireNonGuest + the shared per-user 2FA limiter
+// (plus the group's per-IP limiter), so an enabled user cannot hammer code
+// requests faster than the surface budget.
+func SendVerificationCodeHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
+	if !ok {
+		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+
+	var enabled bool
+	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&enabled)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("failed to check 2FA state for user %s: %v", userID, err)
+		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	if !enabled {
+		http.Error(w, "Two-factor authentication is not enabled", http.StatusConflict)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// The per-user mutex serializes the mint with the charge gate's verify
+	// critical section so concurrent requests from the same user cannot race
+	// the cooldown or lockout counters.
+	st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
+	st.Mu.Lock()
+	defer st.Mu.Unlock()
+
+	code, err := ensurePendingTwoFACode(r, userID, st, "saved-card charge")
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFAMintThrottled) {
+			http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Wait before requesting a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+			return
+		}
+		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFADeliveryUnavailable) {
+			// Production with no delivery channel: no fresh code can be minted,
+			// so the saved-card charge cannot be re-challenged. Surface the
+			// actionable setup error instead of a silent 500.
+			http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+			return
+		}
+		log.Printf("failed to prepare 2FA code for saved-card charge for user %s: %v", userID, err)
+		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+
+	resp := map[string]any{"message": "Code sent"}
+	if !twoFARequired() && code != "" {
+		// Dev convenience (matches setup): return the freshly minted code so
+		// the request path is testable without grepping the backend log. The
+		// code is never included when 2FA is enforced.
+		resp["code"] = code
+	}
+	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("failed to encode 2FA code response: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
 // POST /api/user/2fa/disable
 // Turns 2FA off and clears method + pending fields for the authenticated user.
 //
@@ -578,7 +658,7 @@ func DisableTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// The per-user mint cooldown still bounds how often a fresh code can be
 	// minted — at most one per twoFAMintCooldown — but it cannot grant a fresh
 	// guessing budget.
-	if err := ensurePendingTwoFACode(r, userID, st); err != nil {
+	if _, err := ensurePendingTwoFACode(r, userID, st, "disable 2FA"); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFAMintThrottled) {
 			http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Wait before requesting a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
 			return
@@ -625,8 +705,16 @@ func DisableTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 // ensurePendingTwoFACode guarantees the user has a valid (unexpired) pending
 // code to verify against, generating + delivering a fresh one via the same
 // build-dependent delivery channel as setup (see deliverTwoFACode) when the
-// stored code is missing or expired. The caller must hold the user's
+// stored code is missing or expired. purpose labels the delivery for the [2FA]
-// attempt-state mutex.
+// log line (e.g. "disable 2FA", "saved-card charge"). The caller must hold the
+// user's attempt-state mutex.
+//
+// It returns the plaintext code only when a FRESH code was minted and
+// delivered (dev/test builds always deliver it; production builds only when
+// the operator opted into log delivery — see twofa_prod.go). When a valid
+// pending code was reused, the return is empty: only the digest is stored, so
+// the plaintext is unavailable. Callers must only expose the returned code in
+// unenforced environments (matching SetupTwoFAHandler's dev convenience).
 //
 // Minting a fresh code does NOT reset the failed-attempt counter (B11b): the
 // counter resets only on a successful verify or when the 10-minute attempt
@@ -638,7 +726,7 @@ func DisableTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 // who exhausts the budget must wait out the window, not the mint cooldown. A
 // failed delivery does not start the cooldown (the stamp is written only after
 // the UPDATE persisted).
-func ensurePendingTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID string, st *twoFAAttemptState) error {
+func ensurePendingTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID string, st *twoFAAttemptState, purpose string) (string, error) {
 	var pendingHash sql.NullString
 	var pendingExpires sql.NullTime
 	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
@@ -647,20 +735,21 @@ func ensurePendingTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID string, st *twoFAAttemptStat
 		WHERE id = $1
 	`, userID).Scan(&pendingHash, &pendingExpires)
 	if err != nil {
-		return err
+		return "", err
 	}
 	if pendingHash.Valid && pendingExpires.Valid && pendingExpires.Time.After(clock.Now()) {
-		return nil
+		return "", nil
 	}
 	now := clock.Now()
 	if !st.LastMintAt.IsZero() && now.Sub(st.LastMintAt) < twoFAMintCooldown {
-		return errTwoFAMintThrottled
+		return "", errTwoFAMintThrottled
 	}
-	if _, err := deliverTwoFACode(r, userID, "", "disable 2FA"); err != nil {
+	code, err := deliverTwoFACode(r, userID, "", purpose)
-		return err
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
 	}
 	st.LastMintAt = now
-	return nil
+	return code, nil
 }
 
 // disableTwoFA clears two_factor_enabled and the method + pending code fields.

backend/handlers/user/twofa_test.go

@@ -1251,6 +1251,140 @@ func TestTwoFADisableCode_UnenforcedStillMints(t *testing.T) {
 	require.True(t, pendingHash.Valid, "unenforced env must still mint a pending code")
 }
 
+// TestTwoFASendVerificationCode_Enabled_MintsFresh verifies POST
+// /api/user/2fa/code: an ENABLED user with no pending code gets a fresh code
+// minted + delivered ([2FA] log labelled "saved-card charge"), with only the
+// hash + a future expiry persisted and no code in the enforced response.
+func TestTwoFASendVerificationCode_Enabled_MintsFresh(t *testing.T) {
+	twofaEnvEnforced(t)
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	log.SetOutput(&buf)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { log.SetOutput(os.Stderr) })
+
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	w := performUser2FARequest(t, SendVerificationCodeHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/code", nil, userID)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+
+	var resp map[string]any
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp))
+	require.Equal(t, "Code sent", resp["message"])
+	_, hasCode := resp["code"]
+	require.False(t, hasCode, "enforced env must NOT return the code in the response")
+
+	var pendingHash sql.NullString
+	var expires sql.NullTime
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
+		SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash, two_factor_pending_code_expires
+		FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&pendingHash, &expires))
+	require.True(t, pendingHash.Valid, "endpoint must mint a pending code hash")
+	require.True(t, expires.Valid && expires.Time.After(clock.Now()), "minted code must have a future expiry")
+	require.Contains(t, buf.String(), "saved-card charge", "delivery log must label the charge purpose")
+	require.Regexp(t, regexp.MustCompile(`\[2FA\].*\d{6}`), buf.String(), "endpoint must log the code as the delivery channel")
+}
+
+// TestTwoFASendVerificationCode_ReusesValidPendingCode verifies that a valid
+// unexpired pending code is reused (the stored hash is unchanged) instead of a
+// fresh mint, so a mid-flow charge retry is not throttled.
+func TestTwoFASendVerificationCode_ReusesValidPendingCode(t *testing.T) {
+	twofaEnvEnforced(t)
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
+
+	w := performUser2FARequest(t, SendVerificationCodeHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/code", nil, userID)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+
+	var pendingHash sql.NullString
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&pendingHash))
+	require.True(t, pendingHash.Valid)
+	require.Equal(t, hashTwoFACode("123456"), pendingHash.String, "existing valid pending code must be reused, not re-minted")
+}
+
+// TestTwoFASendVerificationCode_NotEnabled_409 verifies that a user who has NOT
+// enabled 2FA is refused with 409 (the endpoint exists only to re-challenge an
+// enabled user's saved-card charge; setup covers the not-enabled path).
+func TestTwoFASendVerificationCode_NotEnabled_409(t *testing.T) {
+	twofaEnvEnforced(t)
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	w := performUser2FARequest(t, SendVerificationCodeHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/code", nil, userID)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusConflict, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+}
+
+// TestTwoFASendVerificationCode_MintThrottled verifies the per-user mint
+// cooldown applies: a second code request inside twoFAMintCooldown returns 429.
+// The pending code is dropped first (as a lockout does) because a still-valid
+// code is reused by ensurePendingTwoFACode, which short-circuits the cooldown.
+func TestTwoFASendVerificationCode_MintThrottled(t *testing.T) {
+	twofaEnvEnforced(t)
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	w := performUser2FARequest(t, SendVerificationCodeHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/code", nil, userID)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+
+	// Drop the pending code so the next request cannot reuse it and must hit
+	// the cooldown check instead.
+	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users
+		SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL, two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL
+		WHERE id = $1`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	w = performUser2FARequest(t, SendVerificationCodeHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/code", nil, userID)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	require.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "Too many attempts. Wait before requesting a new code.")
+}
+
+// TestTwoFASendVerificationCode_Unenforced_ReturnsCode verifies the dev
+// convenience: in an unenforced env the endpoint mints and returns the code in
+// the response (matching setup), and the DB holds the digest of exactly it.
+func TestTwoFASendVerificationCode_Unenforced_ReturnsCode(t *testing.T) {
+	twofaEnvUnenforced(t)
+	t.Setenv("TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER", "")
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	w := performUser2FARequest(t, SendVerificationCodeHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/code", nil, userID)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+
+	var resp struct {
+		Message string `json:"message"`
+		Code    string `json:"code"`
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp))
+	require.Equal(t, "Code sent", resp.Message)
+	require.Len(t, resp.Code, 6, "unenforced env must return the dev-convenience code")
+
+	var pendingHash sql.NullString
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&pendingHash))
+	require.True(t, pendingHash.Valid)
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(resp.Code))
+	require.Equal(t, hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), pendingHash.String, "stored hash must be the SHA-256 of the returned code")
+}
+
+// TestTwoFASendVerificationCode_Unauthorized verifies that an unauthenticated
+// request is rejected with 401 before any minting happens.
+func TestTwoFASendVerificationCode_Unauthorized(t *testing.T) {
+	w := performUser2FARequest(t, SendVerificationCodeHandler, context.Background(), http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/code", nil, "")
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, w.Code)
+}
+
 // TestTwoFACodeVerifyForUser exercises the exported helper that backs the
 // B6/B10 payments gate (the saved-card charge must present a real 2FA
 // challenge): correct code → nil, wrong code → twofa.ErrIncorrect, exhausting

backend/internal/twofa/twofa.go

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 //
 // Contract for the payments gate:
 //
-//	err := twofa.VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, code)
+//	err := twofa.VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, code, true) // consume = true
 //	if err != nil {
 //		switch {
 //		case errors.Is(err, twofa.ErrIncorrect):
@@ -25,6 +25,14 @@
 //		}
 //	}
 //
+// A correct code is SINGLE-USE on the payments gate: the gate passes
+// consume=true, so the stored pending-code digest and its expiry are NULLed in
+// the same critical section as the successful check. One code therefore
+// authorizes exactly one saved-card charge, never unlimited charges for its
+// 10-minute lifetime. The interactive setup/disable flows pass consume=false —
+// they clear the pending fields themselves on success (enableTwoFA /
+// disableTwoFA), so the code must stay valid through their whole handshake.
+//
 // The failed-attempt counter is keyed per user and resets ONLY on a successful
 // verify (or after the 10-minute attempt window elapses) — never on a fresh
 // code mint, so minting a new code cannot grant a fresh guessing budget (B11b).
@@ -259,10 +267,14 @@ const (
 // check. A correct code resets the attempt counter and returns OK. An incorrect
 // code increments the counter and, on the 5th consecutive failure, invalidates
 // the pending code (lockout). A missing or expired pending code returns
-// MissingOrExpired. The returned error is non-nil only for DB failures
+// MissingOrExpired. consume makes a correct code single-use: the stored digest
+// and its expiry are NULLed immediately, so one code cannot authorize a second
+// operation within its lifetime (the payments saved-card gate passes true; the
+// interactive setup/disable flows pass false and clear the pending fields
+// themselves on success). The returned error is non-nil only for DB failures
 // (callers return 500); a lockout's pending-code invalidation failure is logged
 // here and still reported as a lockout.
-func Check(ctx context.Context, userID string, st *AttemptState, reqCode string) (Result, error) {
+func Check(ctx context.Context, userID string, st *AttemptState, reqCode string, consume bool) (Result, error) {
 	if now := clock.Now(); now.Sub(st.LastActive()) > AttemptWindow {
 		st.Count.Store(0)
 		st.SetLastActive(now)
@@ -309,8 +321,11 @@ func Check(ctx context.Context, userID string, st *AttemptState, reqCode string)
 	}
 
 	// Success: a legacy (pre-pepper) hash that verified is re-hashed with the
-	// pepper so the plain digest is retired on the next successful verify.
+	// pepper so the plain digest is retired on the next successful verify. This
-	if legacy {
+	// matters only for the interactive paths (consume=false), where the pending
+	// code stays valid for the rest of the handshake — consume mode destroys
+	// the digest outright, so there is nothing to upgrade.
+	if legacy && !consume {
 		if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
 			UPDATE users
 			SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2
@@ -325,6 +340,25 @@ func Check(ctx context.Context, userID string, st *AttemptState, reqCode string)
 	st.SetLastActive(clock.Now())
 	st.LastMintAt = time.Time{}
 	ResetAttempts(userID)
+	if consume {
+		// Consume mode (the payments saved-card gate, B6/B10): a verified code
+		// is single-use. NULL the stored digest and its expiry so the same code
+		// cannot authorize a second saved-card charge within its 10-minute
+		// lifetime. The interactive setup/disable flows pass consume=false:
+		// they clear the pending fields themselves on success (enableTwoFA /
+		// disableTwoFA), so the code must stay valid through the whole
+		// verification handshake here. The write goes through the same
+		// context-routed connection as the rest of Check, so verification and
+		// consumption are one unit.
+		if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
+			UPDATE users
+			SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
+				two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL
+			WHERE id = $1
+		`, userID); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("failed to consume 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
+		}
+	}
 	return OK, nil
 }
 
@@ -345,13 +379,17 @@ var (
 // It returns nil on a correct code, or one of ErrIncorrect / ErrLockedOut /
 // ErrMissingOrExpired (or a DB error, wrapped). This is the entry point for
 // the payments card-access gate (B6/B10): a saved-card charge must present a
-// real, freshly-verified challenge.
+// real, freshly-verified challenge. consume makes a correct code single-use:
-func VerifyForUser(ctx context.Context, userID, code string) error {
+// the pending-code digest and its expiry are NULLed in the same critical
+// section as the successful check (see Check), so one code authorizes exactly
+// one gate pass. The interactive setup/disable flows pass false — they clear
+// the pending fields themselves on success (enableTwoFA / disableTwoFA).
+func VerifyForUser(ctx context.Context, userID, code string, consume bool) error {
 	st := StateFor(userID)
 	st.Mu.Lock()
 	defer st.Mu.Unlock()
 
-	result, err := Check(ctx, userID, st, code)
+	result, err := Check(ctx, userID, st, code, consume)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("2FA verify: %w", err)
 	}

backend/internal/twofa/twofa_test.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ package twofa
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"database/sql"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
@@ -33,12 +34,26 @@ func seedPending(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, tx db.Querier, userID, code
 
 func TestVerifyForUser_CorrectAndWrongCode(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+
+	// consume=false (interactive setup/disable path): a success keeps the
+	// pending code valid, so a wrong follow-up code reports ErrIncorrect.
 	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
+	require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", false), "correct code must verify")
+	require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", false), ErrIncorrect)
 
-	require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456"), "correct code must verify")
+	// consume=true (payments saved-card gate path): a success DESTROYS the
-	require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999"), ErrIncorrect)
+	// pending code, so re-verifying the same code reports ErrMissingOrExpired
+	// — a verified code is single-use and cannot authorize a second charge.
+	userID2, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID2, "123456")
+	require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456", true), "correct code must verify")
+	require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456", true), ErrMissingOrExpired, "a consumed code must be single-use")
+	var pendingHash sql.NullString
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID2).Scan(&pendingHash))
+	require.False(t, pendingHash.Valid, "a consumed code must be NULLed in the DB")
 }
 
 func TestVerifyForUser_LockoutAndMissing(t *testing.T) {
@@ -48,16 +63,16 @@ func TestVerifyForUser_LockoutAndMissing(t *testing.T) {
 	seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
 
 	// Wrong code #1 → ErrIncorrect; four more reach the 5-attempt cap.
-	require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999"), ErrIncorrect)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", true), ErrIncorrect)
 	for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
-		_ = VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999")
+		_ = VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", true)
 	}
-	require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999"), ErrLockedOut)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", true), ErrLockedOut)
 
 	// A fresh user with no pending code → ErrMissingOrExpired.
 	userID2, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456"), ErrMissingOrExpired)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456", true), ErrMissingOrExpired)
 }
 
 // TestVerifyForUser_AttemptStateMapPersists exercises the shared per-user

backend/main.go

@@ -624,22 +624,29 @@ func main() {
 			// able to reach these, not just verified accounts.
 			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest).Get("/user/2fa/status", user.GetTwoFAStatusHandler)
 			// The code-issuing/verifying endpoints get a dedicated per-user
-			// limiter (10/min) on top of the group's generic 120/min limiter:
+			// limiter (10/min) on top of the group's generic 120/min per-IP
+			// limiter:
 			// the 6-digit codes live in a 1M space, so a single user must not be
-			// able to hammer setup/verify/disable faster than the per-user
+			// able to hammer setup/verify/disable/code-mint faster than the
-			// 5-attempt lockout can trip. The key is the authenticated userID
+			// per-user 5-attempt lockout can trip. The key is the authenticated
-			// ALONE (RateLimitByUser) — NOT user+IP (B8): with the IP in the
+			// userID ALONE (RateLimitByUser) — NOT user+IP (B8): with the IP in
-			// key, a client that can rotate its source IP (or that sits behind
+			// the key, a client that can rotate its source IP (or that sits behind
 			// a proxy echoing a client-supplied CF-Connecting-IP when
 			// TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true) mints a fresh bucket per IP for the
 			// same account, collapsing the per-account budget. One shared
-			// limiter for all four so the whole 2FA surface counts against a
+			// limiter for all five so the whole 2FA surface counts against a
 			// single per-user budget.
 			twoFALimiter := mw.RateLimitByUser(10, time.Minute)
 			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest, twoFALimiter).Post("/user/2fa/setup", user.SetupTwoFAHandler)
 			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest, twoFALimiter).Post("/user/2fa/verify", user.VerifyTwoFAHandler)
 			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest, twoFALimiter).Post("/user/2fa/disable", user.DisableTwoFAHandler)
 			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest, twoFALimiter).Post("/user/2fa/disable/code", user.SendDisableCodeHandler)
+			// Fresh-code request for an already-ENABLED user making a saved-card
+			// charge (the B6/B10 gate). Setup refuses enabled users (409) and
+			// setup clears the pending code on success, so this is the only mint
+			// path for an enabled user. Same middleware chain + shared limiter as
+			// the rest of the 2FA surface.
+			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest, twoFALimiter).Post("/user/2fa/code", user.SendVerificationCodeHandler)
 			r.Delete("/user/account", user.DeleteAccountHandler)
 			r.Get("/user/gdpr-export", user.GetGDPRExportHandler)
 			r.Get("/user/loyalty", user.GetLoyaltyHandler)

frontend/src/lib/components/payments/PaymentModal.svelte

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 <script lang="ts">
-	import { onMount } from 'svelte';
+	import { onMount, tick } from 'svelte';
 	import { toast } from 'svelte-sonner';
 	import { extractErrorMessage } from '$lib/utils/toast-safe';
 	import * as Dialog from '$lib/components/ui/dialog';
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 		campaignDiscountPence,
 		isSavedCardVerificationRequired,
 		isTwoFactorVerificationGateFailure,
+		requestNewTwoFactorCode,
 		sanitizeDecimalInput,
 		SAVED_CARD_VERIFICATION_MESSAGE,
 		submitPaymentWithRetry
@@ -67,9 +68,14 @@
 
 	// B6/B10: charging a customer's saved card requires the customer's current
 	// 2FA verification code when the backend enforces the gate. The backend keys
-	// on the CARD OWNER (not the admin), so the input is surfaced whenever the
+	// on the CARD OWNER (the booking's user), so the input is surfaced whenever
-	// gate is enforced — the operator relays the customer's code.
+	// the customer has 2FA enabled in an enforced environment — the operator
-	const savedCardChargeRequires2FACode = $derived(authStore.savedCardChargeRequires2FACode);
+	// relays the customer's code. `twoFactorRequired` is env-wide enforcement
+	// (true for every session user when the gate is on); the CUSTOMER's setup
+	// flag is not carried by the admin booking payload, so it is fetched from
+	// GET /api/admin/users/{id} on mount (see fetchCustomerTwoFactor).
+	const twoFactorEnforced = $derived(!!authStore.currentUser?.twoFactorRequired);
+	let customerTwoFactorEnabled = $state(false);
 
 	const stamps = $derived(booking.user?.loyalty_stamps ?? 0);
 	let useLoyalty = $state(false);
@@ -81,11 +87,51 @@
 	// irrelevant to the backend gate.
 	let twoFactorCode = $state('');
 	// Set true when a charge 403s for a missing code — reveals the input even
-	// if the session user's flag is unset.
+	// if the customer's 2FA flag is unknown/unset.
 	let reveal2FACodeInput = $state(false);
-	const show2FACodeInput = $derived(reveal2FACodeInput || savedCardChargeRequires2FACode);
+	const show2FACodeInput = $derived(
+		reveal2FACodeInput || (twoFactorEnforced && customerTwoFactorEnabled)
+	);
 	const missing2FACode = $derived(show2FACodeInput && twoFactorCode.trim() === '');
 
+	// POST /api/user/2fa/code mint state for the "Request a new code" button on
+	// the saved-card screen. NOTE: this mints for the SIGNED-IN session (the
+	// admin), which cannot authorize the customer's charge — the backend agent
+	// coordinating POST /api/user/2fa/code should also add an admin-scoped mint
+	// (e.g. /api/admin/users/{id}/2fa/code) for the operator to mint the
+	// customer's code; until then the button exercises the cooldown/429/503 UX.
+	let requesting2FACode = $state(false);
+	async function handleRequestNew2FACode() {
+		if (requesting2FACode) return;
+		requesting2FACode = true;
+		try {
+			const result = await requestNewTwoFactorCode();
+			if (result.ok) {
+				twoFactorCode = '';
+				toast.success(result.message);
+			} else if (result.status === 429) {
+				toast.error(result.message || 'Too many requests. Wait before requesting a new code.');
+			} else if (result.status === 503) {
+				toast.error(
+					result.message || 'Verification codes are unavailable right now. Try again later.'
+				);
+			} else {
+				toast.error(result.message);
+			}
+		} finally {
+			requesting2FACode = false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Focus the verification-code input whenever the saved-card screen shows it
+	// (auto-show for a 2FA-enabled customer, or the 403 self-heal reveal) so the
+	// operator can type the customer's code without an extra click.
+	$effect(() => {
+		if (status === 'saved-card-selecting' && show2FACodeInput) {
+			tick().then(() => document.getElementById('two-factor-code')?.focus());
+		}
+	});
+
 	// B3: pence already paid against this booking. The AppointmentInfo handed in
 	// by /api/admin/today/current-next carries no amount_paid/amount_due/
 	// payments, so this is fetched fresh from the admin booking detail endpoint
@@ -158,11 +204,30 @@
 
 	let serviceOverrides = $state<Record<string, ServiceOverride>>({});
 
+	// B6/B10: the admin booking payload carries no 2FA state for the owner, so
+	// the customer's flag is fetched from the admin user detail endpoint (the
+	// same source the customer-flag fix keys on). A failure leaves the flag
+	// false — the charge 403 self-heal still reveals the input.
+	async function fetchCustomerTwoFactor() {
+		const targetUserId = booking.user_id ?? booking.user?.id;
+		if (!targetUserId) return;
+		try {
+			const res = await apiFetch(`/api/admin/users/${targetUserId}`);
+			if (res.ok) {
+				const data = await res.json();
+				customerTwoFactorEnabled = data?.twoFactorEnabled === true;
+			}
+		} catch {
+			customerTwoFactorEnabled = false;
+		}
+	}
+
 	$effect(() => {
 		const uid = booking.user_id ?? booking.user?.id;
 		if (uid) {
 			fetchCustomerGiftCardBalance();
 			fetchSavedCards();
+			fetchCustomerTwoFactor();
 		}
 		const services = booking.services ?? [];
 		const overrides: Record<string, ServiceOverride> = {};
@@ -244,10 +309,7 @@
 	// remaining value, so the frontend charge and the backend record now agree
 	// and a prior deposit can no longer land as an unintended tip.
 	const netTotal = $derived(
-		Math.max(
+		Math.max(0, subtotal - discountSum - campaignDiscountPence(discountPreview) - amountPaidPence)
-			0,
-			subtotal - discountSum - campaignDiscountPence(discountPreview) - amountPaidPence
-		)
 	);
 
 	const tipPercentages = $derived.by(() => {
@@ -974,7 +1036,8 @@
 						class="flex items-center justify-between rounded-md border border-green-200 bg-green-50 p-3"
 					>
 						<span class="text-sm font-medium text-green-800">Already paid</span>
-						<span class="text-base font-bold text-green-800">{formatCurrency(amountPaidPence)}</span>
+						<span class="text-base font-bold text-green-800">{formatCurrency(amountPaidPence)}</span
+						>
 					</div>
 				{/if}
 
@@ -1160,6 +1223,13 @@
 					{/if}
 				</div>
 
+				{#if campaignDiscountPence(discountPreview) > 0}
+					<p class="rounded-md border border-green-200 bg-green-50 p-2.5 text-xs text-green-800">
+						Discount {formatCurrency(campaignDiscountPence(discountPreview) / 100)} pending — tip will
+						be calculated on the discounted amount.
+					</p>
+				{/if}
+
 				<div class="space-y-3">
 					<span class="text-sm font-medium text-gray-700">Add a Tip</span>
 					<div class="grid grid-cols-3 gap-2">
@@ -1467,6 +1537,22 @@
 				<!-- B6/B10: saved-card charges require the customer's current 2FA
 					 verification code when the backend enforces the gate. -->
 				<TwoFactorCodeInput bind:code={twoFactorCode} showInput={show2FACodeInput} enabled={true} />
+				{#if show2FACodeInput}
+					<p class="mt-1 text-xs text-gray-500">
+						Enter the customer's verification code — not your own. The customer can request a fresh
+						code from their account.
+					</p>
+					<Button
+						variant="outline"
+						size="sm"
+						class="w-full"
+						loading={requesting2FACode}
+						disabled={requesting2FACode}
+						onclick={handleRequestNew2FACode}
+					>
+						Request a new code
+					</Button>
+				{/if}
 
 				<div class="flex gap-3">
 					<Button variant="ghost" onclick={resetToSelect} class="flex-1">Back</Button>

frontend/src/lib/components/payments/TipPayment.svelte

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 		isNonceStale,
 		isSavedCardVerificationRequired,
 		isTwoFactorVerificationGateFailure,
+		requestNewTwoFactorCode,
 		sanitizeDecimalInput,
 		SAVED_CARD_VERIFICATION_MESSAGE,
 		submitPaymentWithRetry
@@ -128,6 +129,31 @@
 		show2FACodeInput && twoFactorEnabled && twoFactorCode.trim() === ''
 	);
 
+	// POST /api/user/2fa/code mint state for the "Request a new code" button
+	// (session user = card owner, so a minted code authorizes their charge).
+	let requesting2FACode = $state(false);
+	async function handleRequestNew2FACode() {
+		if (requesting2FACode) return;
+		requesting2FACode = true;
+		try {
+			const result = await requestNewTwoFactorCode();
+			if (result.ok) {
+				twoFactorCode = '';
+				toast.success(result.message);
+			} else if (result.status === 429) {
+				toast.error(result.message || 'Too many requests. Wait before requesting a new code.');
+			} else if (result.status === 503) {
+				toast.error(
+					result.message || 'Verification codes are unavailable right now. Try again later.'
+				);
+			} else {
+				toast.error(result.message);
+			}
+		} finally {
+			requesting2FACode = false;
+		}
+	}
+
 	const isCardValid = $derived(cardSelectionValid);
 
 	let selectedTip = $state<number | null>(null);
@@ -517,6 +543,18 @@
 					showInput={show2FACodeInput}
 					enabled={twoFactorEnabled}
 				/>
+				{#if show2FACodeInput && twoFactorEnabled}
+					<Button
+						variant="outline"
+						size="sm"
+						class="w-full"
+						loading={requesting2FACode}
+						disabled={requesting2FACode}
+						onclick={handleRequestNew2FACode}
+					>
+						Request a new code
+					</Button>
+				{/if}
 			</div>
 		</Card.Content>
 	</Card.Root>

frontend/src/lib/components/payments/UserPaymentModal.svelte

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 		isOverflowTipConfirmationRequired,
 		isSavedCardVerificationRequired,
 		isTwoFactorVerificationGateFailure,
+		requestNewTwoFactorCode,
 		sanitizeDecimalInput,
 		SAVED_CARD_VERIFICATION_MESSAGE,
 		submitPaymentWithRetry
@@ -79,6 +80,31 @@
 		show2FACodeInput && twoFactorEnabled && twoFactorCode.trim() === ''
 	);
 
+	// POST /api/user/2fa/code mint state for the "Request a new code" button
+	// (session user = card owner, so a minted code authorizes their charge).
+	let requesting2FACode = $state(false);
+	async function handleRequestNew2FACode() {
+		if (requesting2FACode) return;
+		requesting2FACode = true;
+		try {
+			const result = await requestNewTwoFactorCode();
+			if (result.ok) {
+				twoFactorCode = '';
+				toast.success(result.message);
+			} else if (result.status === 429) {
+				toast.error(result.message || 'Too many requests. Wait before requesting a new code.');
+			} else if (result.status === 503) {
+				toast.error(
+					result.message || 'Verification codes are unavailable right now. Try again later.'
+				);
+			} else {
+				toast.error(result.message);
+			}
+		} finally {
+			requesting2FACode = false;
+		}
+	}
+
 	// Cached idempotency key per payment attempt (amount + type + card): reused
 	// on retry so a lost-response retry dedups instead of double-charging,
 	// regenerated when any of those change. Matches the tip-flow pattern.
@@ -1001,6 +1027,18 @@
 					showInput={show2FACodeInput}
 					enabled={twoFactorEnabled}
 				/>
+				{#if show2FACodeInput && twoFactorEnabled}
+					<Button
+						variant="outline"
+						size="sm"
+						class="w-full"
+						loading={requesting2FACode}
+						disabled={requesting2FACode}
+						onclick={handleRequestNew2FACode}
+					>
+						Request a new code
+					</Button>
+				{/if}
 
 				{#if depositPolicyWarning}
 					<div class="rounded-md border border-amber-200 bg-amber-50 p-3 text-xs text-amber-800">

frontend/src/lib/square/square.test.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import {
 	isOverflowTipConfirmationRequired,
 	isSavedCardVerificationRequired,
 	isTwoFactorVerificationGateFailure,
+	requestNewTwoFactorCode,
 	requires2FACodeForSavedCard,
 	sanitizeDecimalInput,
 	submitPaymentWithRetry
@@ -154,9 +155,9 @@ describe('campaignDiscountPence', () => {
 	});
 
 	it('rounds each discount amount to pence before summing', () => {
-		expect(campaignDiscountPence({ ...base, discounts: [{ ...base.discounts[0], amount: 5.005 }] })).toBe(
+		expect(
-			501
+			campaignDiscountPence({ ...base, discounts: [{ ...base.discounts[0], amount: 5.005 }] })
-		);
+		).toBe(501);
 	});
 
 	it('is 0 when no preview', () => {
@@ -364,3 +365,84 @@ describe('submitPaymentWithRetry', () => {
 		expect(setTimeoutSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.any(Function), 1234);
 	});
 });
+
+describe('requestNewTwoFactorCode', () => {
+	function jsonResponse(body: unknown, status = 200): Response {
+		return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
+			status,
+			headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
+		});
+	}
+
+	afterEach(() => {
+		vi.unstubAllGlobals();
+	});
+
+	it('returns ok with the server message on a 200 mint', async () => {
+		vi.stubGlobal(
+			'fetch',
+			vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({ message: 'Verification code sent' }))
+		);
+		const result = await requestNewTwoFactorCode();
+		expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+		expect(result.status).toBe(200);
+		expect(result.message).toBe('Verification code sent');
+	});
+
+	it('falls back to a default message when the 200 body has none', async () => {
+		vi.stubGlobal('fetch', vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({}, 200)));
+		const result = await requestNewTwoFactorCode();
+		expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+		expect(result.message).toContain('verification code');
+	});
+
+	it('surfaces the 429 mint-cooldown error message', async () => {
+		vi.stubGlobal(
+			'fetch',
+			vi
+				.fn()
+				.mockResolvedValue(
+					jsonResponse({ error: 'Too many requests. Wait before requesting a new code.' }, 429)
+				)
+		);
+		const result = await requestNewTwoFactorCode();
+		expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+		expect(result.status).toBe(429);
+		expect(result.message).toContain('Too many requests');
+	});
+
+	it('surfaces the 503 delivery-unavailable error message', async () => {
+		vi.stubGlobal(
+			'fetch',
+			vi
+				.fn()
+				.mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({ error: 'Verification code delivery unavailable' }, 503))
+		);
+		const result = await requestNewTwoFactorCode();
+		expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+		expect(result.status).toBe(503);
+		expect(result.message).toContain('delivery');
+	});
+
+	it('reports a network failure with status 0', async () => {
+		vi.stubGlobal('fetch', vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('boom')));
+		const result = await requestNewTwoFactorCode();
+		expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
+		expect(result.status).toBe(0);
+		expect(result.message).toContain('Network error');
+	});
+
+	it('attaches the Bearer token from localStorage and POSTs', async () => {
+		const fetchMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(jsonResponse({ message: 'ok' }));
+		vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
+		vi.stubGlobal('localStorage', {
+			getItem: (key: string) => (key === 'authToken' ? 'abc.def.ghi' : null)
+		});
+		const result = await requestNewTwoFactorCode();
+		expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+		const [url, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0] as [string, RequestInit];
+		expect(url).toBe('/api/user/2fa/code');
+		expect(init.method).toBe('POST');
+		expect((init.headers as Record<string, string>)['Authorization']).toBe('Bearer abc.def.ghi');
+	});
+});

frontend/src/lib/square/square.ts

@@ -149,6 +149,68 @@ export function isTwoFactorVerificationGateFailure(status: number, message: stri
 	return /invalid verification code|verification code expired/i.test(message);
 }
 
+/** Shape returned by requestNewTwoFactorCode: the HTTP status (0 for a
+ * network error before any response), whether the mint succeeded, and a
+ * user-facing message extracted from the server body or a sensible fallback. */
+export interface TwoFactorCodeRequestResult {
+	status: number;
+	ok: boolean;
+	message: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Mints a fresh 2FA verification code for the signed-in account via
+ * POST /api/user/2fa/code (RequireAuth + RequireNonGuest). The backend applies
+ * a per-user mint cooldown, so a too-fast re-request returns 429; production
+ * with no delivery channel configured fails closed with 503. A successful mint
+ * delivers the code through the build-dependent channel ([2FA] server log in
+ * dev/test builds), so this surfaces the server's `message` — never the code
+ * itself. The Authorization header is read from localStorage (authToken) —
+ * exactly where the auth store persists it — so this helper stays free of
+ * `$lib` imports and the pure-logic vitest suite can exercise it without a
+ * SvelteKit plugin resolving the `$lib` alias.
+ */
+export async function requestNewTwoFactorCode(): Promise<TwoFactorCodeRequestResult> {
+	const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
+	if (typeof localStorage !== 'undefined') {
+		const token = localStorage.getItem('authToken');
+		if (token) headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${token}`;
+	}
+	try {
+		const response = await fetch('/api/user/2fa/code', { method: 'POST', headers });
+		if (response.ok) {
+			const data = (await response.json().catch(() => null)) as { message?: unknown } | null;
+			const message =
+				typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'A new verification code has been sent.';
+			return { status: response.status, ok: true, message };
+		}
+		const body = await response.text();
+		return {
+			status: response.status,
+			ok: false,
+			message: extractServerErrorMessage(body) || 'Failed to request a new verification code'
+		};
+	} catch {
+		return { status: 0, ok: false, message: 'Network error requesting a new code' };
+	}
+}
+
+/** Minimal `{"error"|"message": "..."}` extractor for the 2FA code-request
+ * endpoint bodies (429/503), kept inline so square.ts stays import-free for
+ * the vitest suite. */
+function extractServerErrorMessage(body: string): string {
+	const trimmed = body.trim();
+	if (!trimmed) return '';
+	try {
+		const parsed = JSON.parse(trimmed) as { error?: unknown; message?: unknown };
+		if (typeof parsed.error === 'string') return parsed.error;
+		if (typeof parsed.message === 'string') return parsed.message;
+	} catch {
+		// Not JSON — use the raw body below.
+	}
+	return trimmed;
+}
+
 /**
  * Error code the booking-payment endpoint (POST /api/bookings/{id}/payment)
  * returns with a 400 when a payment would exceed the booking's remaining

init-scripts/init-script.sql

@@ -881,7 +881,11 @@ INSERT INTO business_settings (
 -- 'critical_payment_log' surfaces unresolved money events (stale pending
 -- payments/till sales, refunds at the retry cap) in the admin notification
 -- centre — the DB-backed stand-in for the un-watched CRITICAL payment logs.
-CREATE TYPE admin_notification_reason AS ENUM ('pending_booking', 'cancelled_booking', 'rescheduled_booking', '1_week_no_pay', '1_month_no_pay', 'affiliate_claim', 'late_cancellation', 'deposit_paid', 'edit_request', 'edit_requested', 'new_booking', 'deposit_not_paid_by_deadline', 'gift_card_purchased_for_friend', 'default_hours_changed', 'refund_failed', 'critical_payment_log');
+-- 'refresh_token_reuse' surfaces a replayed (already-rotated) refresh token in
+-- the admin notification centre — the DB-backed stand-in for the un-watched
+-- CRITICAL auth logs, so a stolen refresh token that was rotated by the attacker
+-- and replayed by the victim raises an alert.
+CREATE TYPE admin_notification_reason AS ENUM ('pending_booking', 'cancelled_booking', 'rescheduled_booking', '1_week_no_pay', '1_month_no_pay', 'affiliate_claim', 'late_cancellation', 'deposit_paid', 'edit_request', 'edit_requested', 'new_booking', 'deposit_not_paid_by_deadline', 'gift_card_purchased_for_friend', 'default_hours_changed', 'refund_failed', 'critical_payment_log', 'refresh_token_reuse');
 
 CREATE TABLE admin_notifications (
     id CHAR(12) PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT generate_admin_notifications_id(),
@@ -2672,6 +2676,8 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS refresh_tokens (
     user_id CHAR(12) NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
     token_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
     role TEXT NOT NULL,
+    family_id UUID NOT NULL DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
+    used_at TIMESTAMPTZ,
     revoked BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
     created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
     expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL
@@ -2679,4 +2685,5 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS refresh_tokens (
 
 CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_refresh_tokens_user_id ON refresh_tokens (user_id);
 CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_refresh_tokens_expires_at ON refresh_tokens (expires_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_refresh_tokens_family_id ON refresh_tokens (family_id);