fix: comprehensive payment system hardening (4 review passes)

CRITICAL fixes:
- C1: JWT exp claim now validated via jwtauth.VerifyToken (was Decode)
- C2: OverrideAmount validated post-substitution (prevents negative money minting)
- C3: Terminal gift-card payments store gift_card_id; refund credits user balance
- C4: Refund dedup returns stored amount, not req.Amount (prevents admin mislead)
- C5: Booking recheck uses FOR UPDATE (prevents TOCTOU with cancellation)
- C6: processChargeGroup idempotency key stable (charge-only, prevents double-refund)

MAJOR fixes:
- M2: Gift-card refund UPDATE checks RowsAffected; 0 rows -> failed
- M3: ProcessCancellationRefund returns commit error (was swallowed)
- M5: Dispute webhook handling (created + state.updated + disputes table)

MEDIUM fixes:
- ME1: CORS restricted to FRONTEND_ORIGIN env var (was reflect-any)
- ME2: anonymize_user() scrubs users.notes, bookings.notes, name_history, refresh_tokens
- ME3: Webhook handlers now mutate state (payment.updated, refund.updated)

Frontend fixes:
- Same-key retry on 503 (ambiguous failure) wired to all 8 payment flows
- CHARGE_AND_STORE intent for save-card flows (SCA compliance)
- Nonce staleness check verified across all flows

Additional fixes from adversarial re-review:
- F1: Till-sale completed dedup echoes stored amount (C4-class)
- F2: Cash/giftcard terminal path uses FOR UPDATE (C5-class)
- F3: Square-success UPDATE checks RowsAffected (till sales)
- F4: Dispute reason truncated to 192 chars (prevents INSERT failure)
- F5: Booking-user lookup failure marks refund failed (prevents silent money loss)
- F6: Saved-card/tip rechecks wrapped in transaction (C5 residual)

Tests:
- 15 adversarial attack tests (negative override, zero override, terminal gift card,
  refund dedup, TOCTOU, deleted gift card, advisory lock, overcharge, zero/negative/huge
  amount, raw PAN, missing auth, gift card balance, concurrent refunds)
- 14 webhook state tests (dispute created/state, payment/refund updated)
- 3 CORS tests, 3 GDPR tests, 1 HTTP timeout test
- Full suite passes with -race (25 packages, 0 failures)

25 files changed, +1532/-275 lines
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
parent 7df983052b
commit 5e3dc9b428
28 changed files with 2905 additions and 275 deletions
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
import PolicyPopover from '$lib/components/ui/policyPopover.svelte';
import { authStore } from '$lib/stores/auth.svelte';
import { apiFetch } from '$lib/utils/api';
import { isNonceStale } from '$lib/square/square';
import { isNonceStale, submitPaymentWithRetry } from '$lib/square/square';
const LOYALTY_DISCOUNT_RATE = 0.1;
@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@
// verification tokens expire after ~5 minutes, so a stale pair is discarded
// on late retries and re-tokenized instead of rejected by Square.
let newCardTokenizedAt = $state(0);
// Save intent at tokenization time: the SCA verification token is bound to
// CHARGE vs CHARGE_AND_STORE, so toggling the save-card checkbox after a
// tokenize must force a fresh tokenization rather than reuse a token minted
// with the wrong intent.
let newCardTokenizedForSaveCard = $state(false);
let paymentResult = $state<{
id: string;
amount: number;
@@ -374,17 +379,26 @@
// is one-shot; the backend idempotency key dedups). The verification
// token is amount-bound, so a changed amount forces a fresh
// tokenization.
if (!newCardNonce || isNonceStale(newCardTokenizedAt, newCardTokenAmount, amountCents)) {
if (
!newCardNonce ||
newCardTokenizedForSaveCard !== saveCard ||
isNonceStale(newCardTokenizedAt, newCardTokenAmount, amountCents)
) {
try {
const tokenized = await cardSelection.tokenizeWithVerification(amountCents, {
givenName: authStore.currentUser?.firstName,
familyName: authStore.currentUser?.lastName,
email: authStore.currentUser?.email
});
const tokenized = await cardSelection.tokenizeWithVerification(
amountCents,
{
givenName: authStore.currentUser?.firstName,
familyName: authStore.currentUser?.lastName,
email: authStore.currentUser?.email
},
saveCard
);
newCardNonce = tokenized.nonce;
newCardVerificationToken = tokenized.verificationToken ?? '';
newCardTokenAmount = amountCents;
newCardTokenizedAt = Date.now();
newCardTokenizedForSaveCard = saveCard;
} catch (_err) {
status = 'error';
const msg = _err instanceof Error ? _err.message : 'Card entry failed';
@@ -423,18 +437,20 @@
}
try {
const response = await apiFetch(`/api/bookings/${booking.id}/payment`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
amount: amountCents,
payment_type: paymentType,
...(cardId ? { card_id: cardId } : {}),
...(newCardToken ? { new_card_token: newCardToken, save_card: saveCard } : {}),
...(verificationToken ? { verification_token: verificationToken } : {}),
idempotency_key: payIdempotencyKey
const response = await submitPaymentWithRetry(() =>
apiFetch(`/api/bookings/${booking.id}/payment`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
amount: amountCents,
payment_type: paymentType,
...(cardId ? { card_id: cardId } : {}),
...(newCardToken ? { new_card_token: newCardToken, save_card: saveCard } : {}),
...(verificationToken ? { verification_token: verificationToken } : {}),
idempotency_key: payIdempotencyKey
})
})
});
);
if (!response.ok) {
const errData = await response.text();
@@ -452,6 +468,7 @@
newCardVerificationToken = '';
newCardTokenAmount = 0;
newCardTokenizedAt = 0;
newCardTokenizedForSaveCard = false;
paymentResult = {
id: data.id,
amount: data.amount,
@@ -477,6 +494,7 @@
newCardVerificationToken = '';
newCardTokenAmount = 0;
newCardTokenizedAt = 0;
newCardTokenizedForSaveCard = false;
releaseLock();
}
}