fix: review round 6 — P0 deposit charge, idempotency rotation, dev-safety guard, 2FA/webhook hardening

Sixth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security,
context-mining). QA FAILED the deposit-required new-card flow; the P0 root
cause was backend + frontend, now fixed. All 20 packages green.

P0 money-safety:
- Deposit-required bookings now actually charge the deposit on new-card
  payment. Two-part fix: (1) CreateBookingHandler re-reads the
  trigger-maintained total_amount/total_duration_minutes from the DB after the
  booking_services insert (the INSERT..RETURNING row predates the recalc
  trigger, so TotalAmount serialized as 0 and DepositPaid computed TRUE on an
  unpaid booking — the frontend gate trusted deposit_paid:true, never charged,
  and confirmed the booking with zero payment rows); (2) BookingFlow.svelte
  gates the confirmation view on depositPaid and guards against re-creating a
  booking on retry. Regression test
  TestBookings_Create_DepositPaidFalseOnUnpaidBooking.

Payments (idempotency + money):
- deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey: no-client-key fallback now advances a
  sequence for repeatable types (partial) and rotates past refunded completed
  rows, so refund-then-repay and equal-amount partials diverge onto distinct
  keys; an un-refunded completed row keeps its key (double-charge protection
  holds). Dedup hits on refunded rows now 409, never stale success.
- chargeFailureStatus default is 503 (ambiguous), never 402; table test.
- Flaky TestBookingPayment_FullPayment_SplitsIntoDepositAndBalance fixed
  (ORDER BY payment_type).
- resolveChargeSource: orphaned card-on-file disabled via DeleteCardOnFile
  when SaveCardForUser fails (best-effort, redacted log); retry path preserved.

Square client:
- Dev builds HARD-FAIL (panic) on SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=production without
  SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API=1; sandbox routes with a loud banner.
- Mock fault-injection FailAfterCommit (commit-then-5xx) exercises the exact
  lost-response same-key retry; SimulateCardTokenUsed; 45-char idempotency-key
  cap parity; SquareEnvironment/SquareLocationID shared env helpers used by
  the sweep (env contract no longer comment-only).
- listRefunds truncation now errors (money-sensitive reconcile retries
  instead of over-refunding); getCardsOnFile truncation loudly logged.

Webhooks + 2FA:
- square-environment header checked fail-closed (403) when configured env is
  production/sandbox; dispatch DB work bounded by 30s timeout contexts.
- 2FA codes HMAC-SHA256 pepper'd (TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER) with legacy-hash
  migration + upgrade-on-verify; disable-flow mint cooldown (1/min, 429) caps
  the brute-force loop; in-lockout records never LRU-evicted.

Repo hygiene:
- env-docs CI gate green again (FRONTEND_ORIGIN + SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API +
  TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER documented; Vite DEV built-in allowlisted).
- Dead square_deposits schema dropped; obsidian/README/legal-page drift fixed
  (consumeradvice.scot signposting, CORS allowlist, p11 R3/P13, T1).
- 2FA disable residual documented; P6 email/SMS delivery and P12 sandbox
  smoke test remain the pre-go-live gates.

Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (20/20 ok),
go build ./... + -tags dev, go vet clean, svelte-check 0 errors, env-docs
gate OK, live deposit-required flow re-verified end-to-end (deposit £11
charged, square_payment_id recorded).
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
parent 39cc42b239
commit 67cf5b9a45
31 changed files with 1946 additions and 192 deletions
+7 -1
View File
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ docker compose up --build -d
`VITE_SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=mock` (default in `frontend/.env`) makes the frontend render its built-in mock card form, pairing with the backend's `SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=mock` for a token-only local walkthrough. Set it to `sandbox` or `production` only once real Square credentials are configured, never `mock` in a deployed build.
`FRONTEND_ORIGIN` (backend `.env`) is a comma-separated CORS allowlist for the API. `corsAllowedOrigins()` in `backend/main.go` splits on commas, trims, drops blanks, and falls back to `http://localhost:5173` when the var is unset or empty. Matching is exact-match only (`originAllowed()`), never reflected: `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` and `Vary: Origin` are set only when the request `Origin` is in the allowlist.
`SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API` is a dev-build safety valve: a `//go:build dev` build **HARD-FAILS** (panics) when `SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=production` unless this is set to `1`, so a typo'd or leftover production value in a dev shell cannot create real charges. Sandbox is allowed in a dev build (with a loud banner). Never set it in a deployed production build.
| Service | URL |
|---------|-----|
| Frontend | http://localhost |
@@ -72,6 +76,8 @@ docker compose up --build -d
`REQUIRE_2FA` gates saved-card online payments (PSD2 SCA stand-in) and is **fail-closed**: enforcement is ON by default for any `SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT` except an explicit `mock`/`dev`/`development`/`test` value — empty or unknown values are treated as production-enforced. Disable it with `REQUIRE_2FA=false` or an explicit mock env. The 6-digit code is delivered via the server log (`[2FA]` prefix; the operator relays it) until email/SMS lands.
`TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER` (backend `.env`, optional pre-launch) is a server-side pepper for HMAC-hashing 2FA codes: with it set, codes are hashed as HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the pepper; if unset, they fall back to the legacy unsalted SHA-256 digest and a one-time warning is logged. Set it in production so a leaked digest cannot be brute-forced offline.
### Local dev (tmux)
```bash
@@ -89,7 +95,7 @@ Default logins (password: `password`):
```bash
cd backend && go build -o bin/backend ./main.go
cd frontend && npm ci && npm run build
cd backend && go test -tags "test,dev" -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... # 2,137 tests compiled under the test,dev tags (~2min)
cd backend && go test -tags "test,dev" -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... # 2,169 tests compiled under the test,dev tags (~2min)
cd backend && go test -tags "test,dev" -count=1 -race -timeout 480s ./... # race detector (all packages, ~4min)
# NOTE: -count=N>1 is unreliable for handlers/payments and handlers/webhooks —
# those suites share package-global state (Square mock ledger, in-memory webhook