fix: fresh-review round — 2FA deliverability, disable re-verification, GDPR batch scrub, dispute alerting, docs accuracy

Second fresh-eyes review pass (7 agents: goal, security, code-quality,
context-mining, webhooks+2FA, client+mock+sweep, refunds/giftcards/handlers).
Money-safety core verified sound (identical-body replay byte-lossless, clawback
gated on definitive proof, no double-charge window). This round fixes the
issues the fresh pass surfaced:

2FA:
- Setup now DELIVERS the code via the [2FA] server log in ALL modes (was:
  nothing in enforced mode -> production 2FA was an unbreakable dead-end and
  saved-card charges were permanently 403). Enforced mode still withholds the
  code from the API response; the log line is the fake delivery channel until
  email/SMS lands (P6).
- Disabling 2FA now requires a fresh verification code when enforcement is ON
  (previously ignored the code -> a password-only attacker could lift the gate).
  Shares the 5-attempt lockout and timing-safe compare. Dev bypass retained.
- REQUIRE_2FA parsing normalized (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive);
  startup warning extended to the empty-env/mock-client/enforced-2FA confusion.

GDPR:
- anonymize_user() SQL now scrubs two_factor_* columns + staff notes, so the
  idle-account batch cleanup (CleanupIdleAccounts) is erasure-clean, not just
  the user-initiated delete path.

Webhooks:
- dispute.created for an untracked Square payment now raises a
  critical_payment_log admin notification (chargeback the app can't reconcile
  is never silent). Reason strings truncated on rune boundaries (valid UTF-8).
  Stale at-most-once comment corrected; revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding
  duplication noted.

Sweep/mock parity:
- Mock CreatePayment dedup is now source-aware (IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED on
  source mismatch) matching ReplayPaymentByKey and real Square.
- COMPLETED-but-never-polled terminal till-sale checkouts are now recorded by
  the sweep (previously only booking checkouts were; till charges were
  invisible until the 24h blind-fail WARN).
- Legacy snapshot-less minimal-body replay, SQUARE_LOCATION_ID drift, and
  in-memory-mock-restart limitations documented.

Docs:
- Webhook path corrected everywhere (/webhooks/square, not /api/webhooks/square
  - a deployer following the old path would 404 and silently lose all webhook
  reconciliation).
- 2FA enforcement semantics + code-delivery mechanism documented accurately
  (fail-closed default; log-delivery channel; disable re-verification).
- README/User Manual note the 2FA requirement on online saved-card payments.

Tests: 2,151 (up from 2,142). Backend 26/27 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres doesn't offer scram-sha-256 for the
test role; package is byte-identical to HEAD and untouched here). Frontend
builds; svelte-check 0 errors.

backend/handlers/payments/payments_test.go

@@ -4187,7 +4187,12 @@ func TestSavedCardPayment_ClientKey_SameKeyRetry_Dedups(t *testing.T) {
 		PaymentType:     "full",
 		PaymentMethod:   strPtr("saved_card"),
 		UserSavedCardID: &cardID,
-		IdempotencyKey:  "saved-card-uuid-0001",
+		// Distinct from TestSavedCardPayment_ClientKey_DistinctCharges_NoDedup's
+		// keys: both tests share the package-level singleton mock (SquareClient
+		// is set once in TestMain), and the mock now mirrors Square's body-aware
+		// dedup — reusing a retained key with a different source_id returns
+		// IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (same as real Square).
+		IdempotencyKey: "saved-card-uuid-retry-0001",
 	}
 
 	// First charge.

backend/handlers/payments/sweep.go

@@ -511,9 +511,30 @@ func clawbackTillSaleFunding(ctx context.Context, r staleRow) bool {
 // 5xx / ambiguous) leaves the row pending — the charge may still have completed
 // at Square. The second return value is the Square payment id of the completed
 // payment ("" otherwise), written back on a rescue.
+//
+// ENV CONTRACT (finding 4): the sweep and the charge process MUST run with the
+// SAME SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT and SQUARE_LOCATION_ID. The stored snapshot embeds
+// the location_id used at charge time; if the env/location changes between a
+// charge and its replay, the replayed wire body differs and a RETAINED key
+// returns IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED — stranding every retained-key row pending
+// (safe) until the 24h blind-fail. This is a single-location deployment; the
+// contract is enforced by ops (same env for the sweeper and the API), NOT by a
+// runtime equality check — deliberately comment-only.
 func reconcileStalePaymentByKey(ctx context.Context, table string, r staleRow) (staleReconcileResult, string) {
 	snapshot := r.SquareRequestSnapshot
+	// fallbackBody is true when the row has NO stored square_request_snapshot
+	// and the minimal body (key + source + amount) is rebuilt. The rebuilt body
+	// omits reference_id / customer_id / note / buyer_email_address that the
+	// original charge carried, so for a RETAINED key real Square compares the
+	// WHOLE body, sees the difference and returns IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED
+	// (stranding the row pending) while the dev mock — which compares only the
+	// source — returns the original payment (rescuing it). Both are money-safe;
+	// the divergence is dev-vs-prod OBSERVABILITY only, and pre-launch there
+	// are no prod legacy rows (every charge now stores its snapshot), so the
+	// fallback semantics are deliberately left unchanged.
+	fallbackBody := false
 	if len(bytes.TrimSpace(snapshot)) == 0 {
+		fallbackBody = true
 		// Legacy row without a stored request snapshot — rebuild the minimal
 		// identical body (key + source + amount) exactly as the pre-snapshot
 		// replay did. Such rows can still be reconciled as long as the stored
@@ -530,6 +551,10 @@ func reconcileStalePaymentByKey(ctx context.Context, table string, r staleRow) (
 		}
 		snapshot = fallback
 	}
+	// The replay repeats the stored request snapshot verbatim so Square's
+	// idempotency dedup returns the original payment for a retained key — which
+	// requires the sweep to share SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT/SQUARE_LOCATION_ID with the
+	// charge process (see the ENV CONTRACT above).
 	pr, err := SquareClient.ReplayPaymentByKey(ctx, snapshot)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, square.ErrReplayKeyNotRetained) {
@@ -537,7 +562,16 @@ func reconcileStalePaymentByKey(ctx context.Context, table string, r staleRow) (
 			return staleReconcileDefinitivelyFailed, ""
 		}
 		if square.ErrorCode(err) == "IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED" {
-			log.Printf("CRITICAL: stale pending %s reconcile by key hit IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED — the stored square_source_id differs from the original charge's source (data bug); this is NOT proof the charge never happened — leaving pending — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", table)
+			if fallbackBody {
+				// Snapshot-less fallback row: the minimal rebuilt body cannot be
+				// identical to the original charge, so real Square rejects the
+				// retained-key replay while the dev mock (source-aware only)
+				// rescues it. The stranded row would otherwise be invisible
+				// until the 24h blind-fail — surface it now (finding 2).
+				log.Printf("CRITICAL: stale pending %s reconcile by key hit IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED via the minimal snapshot-less fallback body (key=%s) — real Square compares the WHOLE request (reference_id/customer_id/note/buyer_email_address absent from the rebuilt body) and rejects the identical-key replay, stranding the row pending; the dev mock would rescue it — dev-vs-prod observability divergence, NOT proof the charge never happened — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", table, r.IdempotencyKey)
+			} else {
+				log.Printf("CRITICAL: stale pending %s reconcile by key hit IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED — the stored square_source_id differs from the original charge's source (data bug); this is NOT proof the charge never happened — leaving pending — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", table)
+			}
 			return staleReconcileLeavePending, ""
 		}
 		log.Printf("Stale pending %s reconcile by idempotency key hit an ambiguous error (%v) — leaving pending for a later sweep run", table, err)
@@ -731,7 +765,11 @@ const staleTerminalCheckoutAge = 1 * time.Hour
 //     payment_status enum has no 'cancelled' value, and 'failed' is the same
 //     terminal state the stale-pending sweep uses, blocking the till
 //     pending-retry path); a checkout that completed during the cancel window
-//     leaves the sale pending for the poll handler to record.
+//     (or was already COMPLETED when first checked) is RECORDED by the sweep —
+//     the sale is marked 'completed' with the returned square_payment_id, the
+//     till mirror of the booking path's recordUntrackedTerminalPayment (a
+//     never-polled sale would otherwise stay invisible in till reporting until
+//     the 24h blind-fail).
 //
 // Each row is checked at Square FIRST and only cancelled when the checkout is
 // provably still waiting (ErrCheckoutPending): a COMPLETED checkout is never
@@ -822,13 +860,15 @@ func SweepStaleTerminalCheckouts(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
 			case rErr == nil && recheck.Status == "COMPLETED":
 				// The customer completed the payment during the cancel window.
 				// Record it if it was never polled/recorded — a COMPLETED
-				// checkout must not stay an untracked charge (H4).
+				// checkout must not stay an untracked charge (H4). Booking
+				// checkouts record full payments rows; till-sale checkouts
+				// record the sale row (finding 3).
 				if r.Kind == "terminal_checkout" {
 					if recordUntrackedTerminalPayment(ctx, r.CheckoutID, r.BookingID, recheck) {
 						resolved++
 					}
-				} else {
-					log.Printf("Terminal checkout %s completed during sweep cancel — leaving sale %s pending (poll handler records it)", r.CheckoutID, r.RowID)
+				} else if recordUntrackedTillSalePayment(ctx, r.RowID, recheck) {
+					resolved++
 				}
 				log.Printf("Cancelled stale terminal checkout %s (%s %s, pending >%s) but re-check shows COMPLETED — payment recorded by the sweep", r.CheckoutID, r.Kind, r.RowID, staleTerminalCheckoutAge)
 			case isTerminalCheckoutError(rErr) || errors.Is(rErr, square.ErrCheckoutPending):
@@ -860,9 +900,11 @@ func SweepStaleTerminalCheckouts(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
 				if recordUntrackedTerminalPayment(ctx, r.CheckoutID, r.BookingID, pr) {
 					resolved++
 				}
-			} else {
-				// The till poll handler records it — leave the sale pending.
-				log.Printf("Terminal checkout %s already COMPLETED at Square — leaving sale %s pending (poll handler records it)", r.CheckoutID, r.RowID)
+			} else if recordUntrackedTillSalePayment(ctx, r.RowID, pr) {
+				// A never-polled COMPLETED till-sale checkout must not stay
+				// pending until the 24h blind-fail (finding 3) — the charge is
+				// real, so the sale is recorded completed with the payment id.
+				resolved++
 			}
 		case isTerminalCheckoutError(gErr):
 			// The checkout is cancelled / cancel-requested / expired at Square.
@@ -1088,6 +1130,44 @@ func recordUntrackedTerminalPayment(ctx context.Context, checkoutID, bookingID s
 	return true
 }
 
+// recordUntrackedTillSalePayment records a stale card-machine till sale whose
+// checkout COMPLETED at Square but was never polled/recorded: the sale is
+// marked 'completed' with the returned square_payment_id written back. A
+// never-polled COMPLETED checkout would otherwise leave the sale pending until
+// the 24h blind-fail — the charge is real but invisible in till reporting
+// (money-safe: the gift card was funded pre-charge, a blind-fail never claws
+// back, and failed rows reject retries — but the till reporting would be wrong,
+// finding 3). There is no split/deposit concept for till sales — a single
+// completed row, exactly the update the till poll handler (GetTillCheckoutStatus)
+// performs. The WHERE status = 'pending' guard makes it safe against a
+// concurrent poll: only one of them wins the update, the loser sees 0 rows and
+// backs off. Returns true when the sale was updated; false when the checkout
+// carries no Square payment id (the sale is left PENDING — never blind-failed
+// — with a CRITICAL log for manual reconciliation) or the sale was already
+// resolved by someone else.
+func recordUntrackedTillSalePayment(ctx context.Context, saleID string, pr *square.PaymentResult) bool {
+	if pr == nil || pr.SquarePayID == "" {
+		log.Printf("CRITICAL: terminal checkout is COMPLETED at Square but carries no Square payment ID — cannot record till sale %s — leaving it PENDING — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", saleID)
+		return false
+	}
+	tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
+		UPDATE till_sales SET status = 'completed', square_payment_id = $1, updated_at = NOW()
+		WHERE id = $2 AND status = 'pending'
+	`, pr.SquarePayID, saleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("Failed to record untracked terminal till sale %s as completed: %v", saleID, err)
+		return false
+	}
+	if int(tag.RowsAffected()) == 0 {
+		// A concurrent poll (or a prior sweep run) already recorded the sale —
+		// nothing left for this run to do.
+		log.Printf("Terminal till sale %s was already resolved — skipping untracked terminal completion record", saleID)
+		return false
+	}
+	log.Printf("CRITICAL: recorded untracked terminal till-sale charge %s (sale %s) from a stale checkout — sale marked completed (never polled by the frontend)", pr.SquarePayID, saleID)
+	return true
+}
+
 // isTerminalCheckoutError reports whether a GetCheckout error proves the
 // checkout can never complete. Square's HTTP client returns ErrCheckoutPending
 // for a still-live checkout and surfaces a definitively CANCELED status as a

backend/handlers/payments/sweep_test.go

@@ -237,6 +237,22 @@ func (c *completedTerminalClient) GetCheckout(ctx context.Context, checkoutID st
 	return c.SquareClient.GetCheckout(ctx, checkoutID)
 }
 
+// noPaymentIDCompletedClient makes one checkout look COMPLETED at Square with
+// NO Square payment id — the record-impossible condition the till-sale sweep
+// must leave pending (never blind-fail) — while delegating everything else to
+// the real mock.
+type noPaymentIDCompletedClient struct {
+	square.SquareClient
+	checkoutID string
+}
+
+func (c *noPaymentIDCompletedClient) GetCheckout(ctx context.Context, checkoutID string) (*square.PaymentResult, error) {
+	if checkoutID == c.checkoutID {
+		return &square.PaymentResult{Status: "COMPLETED", Amount: 5000}, nil
+	}
+	return c.SquareClient.GetCheckout(ctx, checkoutID)
+}
+
 // =============================================================================
 // SweepStalePendingPayments — lost-response reconcile by idempotency key
 // =============================================================================
@@ -833,11 +849,14 @@ func TestSweepStaleTerminalCheckouts_CancelsStalePending(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestSweepStaleTerminalCheckouts_LeavesCompletedAlone locks the conservative
-// F4 rule: a checkout that has COMPLETED at Square is never cancelled — the
-// poll handler records it; cancelling a completed checkout would orphan the
-// charge.
-func TestSweepStaleTerminalCheckouts_LeavesCompletedAlone(t *testing.T) {
+// TestSweepStaleTerminalCheckouts_CompletedTillSale_Recorded locks the finding-3
+// fix: a stale card-machine till sale whose checkout has COMPLETED at Square
+// (never polled by the frontend) is RECORDED by the sweep — the sale is marked
+// 'completed' with the returned square_payment_id — instead of being left
+// pending for a poll handler that never runs (the 24h blind-fail would then
+// hide the real charge from till reporting). A COMPLETED checkout is never
+// cancelled.
+func TestSweepStaleTerminalCheckouts_CompletedTillSale_Recorded(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
 
 	adminID, err := fixtures.CreateTestAdminUser(tx)
@@ -873,20 +892,100 @@ func TestSweepStaleTerminalCheckouts_LeavesCompletedAlone(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 
 	freshCtx := context.Background()
+	// Drop any other stale terminal rows left by parallel tests so the count is
+	// deterministic.
+	if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(freshCtx, `DELETE FROM till_sales WHERE status = 'pending' AND square_checkout_id IS NOT NULL AND id <> $1`, saleID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to clean leftover stale terminal sales: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(freshCtx, `DELETE FROM terminal_checkouts WHERE status IN ('PENDING', 'IN_PROGRESS')`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to clean leftover stale booking terminal checkouts: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	n, err := SweepStaleTerminalCheckouts(freshCtx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("sweep failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected the COMPLETED till-sale checkout recorded by the sweep, got %d resolutions", n)
+	}
+
+	var status, sqPayID string
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(freshCtx, "SELECT status, COALESCE(square_payment_id, '') FROM till_sales WHERE id = $1", saleID).Scan(&status, &sqPayID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to query sale: %v", err)
+	}
+	if status != "completed" {
+		t.Errorf("expected a COMPLETED till-sale checkout's sale marked 'completed', got %q", status)
+	}
+	if sqPayID != "sqp_terminal_completed" {
+		t.Errorf("expected square_payment_id written back on the recorded till sale, got %q", sqPayID)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSweepStaleTerminalCheckouts_CompletedTillSale_NoPaymentID_LeavesPending
+// locks the finding-3 safety rule: a COMPLETED till-sale checkout whose payment
+// result carries NO Square payment id cannot be recorded, so the sale is left
+// PENDING with a CRITICAL log — never blind-failed (the charge may be real and
+// the blind-fail would hide it from till reporting).
+func TestSweepStaleTerminalCheckouts_CompletedTillSale_NoPaymentID_LeavesPending(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+
+	adminID, err := fixtures.CreateTestAdminUser(tx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create admin user: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	var saleID string
+	err = tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO till_sales (item_type, description, quantity, unit_price, total_amount, payment_method, status, square_checkout_id, created_by, created_at, updated_at)
+		VALUES ('gift_card', 'Gift Card create', 1, 50.00, 50.00, 'in_person_card', 'pending', 'chk_completed_no_payment_id', $1, NOW() - INTERVAL '2 hours', NOW())
+		RETURNING id
+	`, adminID).Scan(&saleID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to seed stale terminal sale: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	origClient := SquareClient
+	SquareClient = &noPaymentIDCompletedClient{SquareClient: square.NewDevClient(), checkoutID: "chk_completed_no_payment_id"}
+	defer func() { SquareClient = origClient }()
+
+	pgxTx := db.TxFromContext(ctx)
+	if pgxTx == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no transaction in context")
+	}
+	if err := pgxTx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to commit test tx: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		_, _ = db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM till_sales WHERE id = $1`, saleID)
+		_, _ = db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $1`, adminID)
+	})
+
+	freshCtx := context.Background()
+	if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(freshCtx, `DELETE FROM till_sales WHERE status = 'pending' AND square_checkout_id IS NOT NULL AND id <> $1`, saleID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to clean leftover stale terminal sales: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(freshCtx, `DELETE FROM terminal_checkouts WHERE status IN ('PENDING', 'IN_PROGRESS')`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to clean leftover stale booking terminal checkouts: %v", err)
+	}
+
 	n, err := SweepStaleTerminalCheckouts(freshCtx)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("sweep failed: %v", err)
 	}
 	if n != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("expected a completed terminal checkout to be left alone, got %d cancellations", n)
+		t.Errorf("expected a COMPLETED till-sale checkout with no Square payment id left unresolved, got %d resolutions", n)
 	}
 
-	var status string
-	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(freshCtx, "SELECT status FROM till_sales WHERE id = $1", saleID).Scan(&status); err != nil {
+	var status, sqPayID string
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(freshCtx, "SELECT status, COALESCE(square_payment_id, '') FROM till_sales WHERE id = $1", saleID).Scan(&status, &sqPayID); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to query sale: %v", err)
 	}
 	if status != "pending" {
-		t.Errorf("expected completed terminal checkout's sale left 'pending' (poll handler records it), got %q", status)
+		t.Errorf("expected the unrecordable COMPLETED till-sale checkout left 'pending' (never blind-failed), got %q", status)
+	}
+	if sqPayID != "" {
+		t.Errorf("expected no square_payment_id written on the unrecordable till sale, got %q", sqPayID)
 	}
 }
 

backend/handlers/payments/twofa.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"log"
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
+	"strings"
 
 	"crussell/db"
 	"crussell/mw"
@@ -13,17 +14,29 @@ import (
 	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
 )
 
-// twoFactorEnforced reports whether 2FA is required for online card payments.
-// It is fail-closed: enforcement is ON unless 2FA has been explicitly disabled
-// (REQUIRE_2FA=false) or SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT explicitly selects the dev/mock
-// stack (mock/dev/development/test). Empty or unknown SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT values
-// are treated as production-enforced, so a mistyped env var can never silently
-// disarm the gate — main.go logs a startup warning for that misconfiguration.
-func twoFactorEnforced() bool {
-	if os.Getenv("REQUIRE_2FA") == "false" {
+// require2FADisabled reports whether REQUIRE_2FA explicitly disables 2FA
+// enforcement. The parse is case-insensitive and alias-tolerant (false/0/off/no),
+// so a value like "False", "OFF" or "off" never silently leaves the gate ON.
+// Any other value — including empty or unknown — keeps enforcement ON
+// (fail-closed).
+func require2FADisabled() bool {
+	switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("REQUIRE_2FA"))) {
+	case "false", "0", "off", "no":
+		return true
+	default:
 		return false
 	}
-	return !IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv()
+}
+
+// twoFactorEnforced reports whether 2FA is required for online card payments.
+// It is fail-closed: enforcement is ON unless 2FA has been explicitly disabled
+// (REQUIRE_2FA=false/0/off/no, case-insensitive — see require2FADisabled) or
+// SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT explicitly selects the dev/mock stack
+// (mock/dev/development/test). Empty or unknown SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT values are
+// treated as production-enforced, so a mistyped env var can never silently
+// disarm the gate — main.go logs a startup warning for that misconfiguration.
+func twoFactorEnforced() bool {
+	return !require2FADisabled() && !IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv()
 }
 
 // IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv reports whether SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT explicitly selects

backend/handlers/payments/twofa_test.go

@@ -49,6 +49,20 @@ func TestTwoFactorEnforced(t *testing.T) {
 		{"require2fa_false_disables_prod", "false", "production", false},
 		{"require2fa_false_disables_sandbox", "false", "sandbox", false},
 		{"require2fa_false_disables_unknown_env", "false", "staging", false},
+		// REQUIRE_2FA parsing is case-insensitive and alias-tolerant: any of
+		// false/0/off/no (any casing) disables, nothing else does.
+		{"require2fa_capitalized_false_disables", "False", "production", false},
+		{"require2fa_uppercase_false_disables", "FALSE", "production", false},
+		{"require2fa_zero_disables", "0", "production", false},
+		{"require2fa_off_disables", "off", "production", false},
+		{"require2fa_uppercase_off_disables", "OFF", "production", false},
+		{"require2fa_no_disables", "no", "production", false},
+		{"require2fa_true_stays_enforced", "true", "production", true},
+		{"require2fa_one_stays_enforced", "1", "production", true},
+		{"require2fa_yes_stays_enforced", "yes", "production", true},
+		{"require2fa_on_stays_enforced", "on", "production", true},
+		{"require2fa_unknown_stays_enforced", "enable", "production", true},
+		{"require2fa_off_but_dev_never_enforced", "off", "mock", false},
 		{"production_enforced", "", "production", true},
 		{"sandbox_enforced", "", "sandbox", true},
 		{"require2fa_true_prod_enforced", "true", "production", true},

backend/handlers/scheduling/time_blockers_test.go

@@ -2948,6 +2948,79 @@ func TestCleanupIdleAccounts_NoBalance(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestCleanupIdleAccounts_Scrubs2FAAndNotes verifies the GDPR erasure gap
+// closure for the BATCH path: accounts anonymized via anonymize_user(unnest(...))
+// must also have their 2FA columns and staff notes scrubbed, exactly like the
+// user-initiated DeleteAccountHandler path.
+func TestCleanupIdleAccounts_Scrubs2FAAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+	ctx, tx := resetTestData(t)
+
+	// Create a user idle past the 2yr threshold (no balance) with 2FA + a note
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to create user: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `
+		UPDATE users SET
+			last_login_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '3 years',
+			notes = 'Staff note with PII for idle-account cleanup',
+			two_factor_enabled = TRUE,
+			two_factor_method = 'email',
+			two_factor_pending_code_hash = 'batch-abc123',
+			two_factor_pending_code_expires = NOW() + INTERVAL '10 minutes'
+		WHERE id = $1
+	`, userID)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to set last_login_at + 2FA + notes: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Run cleanup (batch path: SELECT anonymize_user(unnest($1::text[])))
+	_, err = CleanupIdleAccounts(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("CleanupIdleAccounts failed: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Verify the user was anonymized
+	var email string
+	err = tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT email FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&email)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to query user email: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(email, "deleted+") || !strings.HasSuffix(email, "@deleted.invalid") {
+		t.Errorf("expected anonymized email 'deleted+%s@deleted.invalid', got '%s'", userID, email)
+	}
+
+	// Verify 2FA columns + notes were scrubbed by the batch anonymization
+	var notes interface{}
+	var enabled bool
+	var method, pendingHash, pendingExpires interface{}
+	err = tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
+		SELECT notes, two_factor_enabled, two_factor_method,
+		       two_factor_pending_code_hash, two_factor_pending_code_expires
+		FROM users WHERE id = $1
+	`, userID).Scan(&notes, &enabled, &method, &pendingHash, &pendingExpires)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to query user after cleanup: %v", err)
+	}
+	if notes != nil {
+		t.Errorf("expected users.notes to be NULL after idle-account cleanup, got %v", notes)
+	}
+	if enabled {
+		t.Error("expected two_factor_enabled to be FALSE after idle-account cleanup")
+	}
+	if method != nil {
+		t.Errorf("expected two_factor_method to be NULL after idle-account cleanup, got %v", method)
+	}
+	if pendingHash != nil {
+		t.Errorf("expected two_factor_pending_code_hash to be NULL after idle-account cleanup, got %v", pendingHash)
+	}
+	if pendingExpires != nil {
+		t.Errorf("expected two_factor_pending_code_expires to be NULL after idle-account cleanup, got %v", pendingExpires)
+	}
+}
+
 // TestCleanupIdleAccounts_SkipActive verifies that recently active accounts
 // are NOT anonymized.
 func TestCleanupIdleAccounts_SkipActive(t *testing.T) {

backend/handlers/user/account.go

@@ -21,24 +21,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
 )
 
-// scrubAnonymizedUser2FA nulls the 2FA columns and staff notes that the SQL
-// anonymize_user() function does not scrub: it predates the 2FA columns and
-// intentionally preserves notes. A deleted user's live 2FA credential and any
-// PII in staff notes must not survive erasure, so run this inside the same
-// transaction as anonymize_user() to keep erasure atomic.
-func scrubAnonymizedUser2FA(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, userID string) error {
-	_, err := q.Exec(ctx, `
-		UPDATE users
-		SET two_factor_enabled = FALSE,
-			two_factor_method = NULL,
-			two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
-			two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL,
-			notes = NULL
-		WHERE id = $1
-	`, userID)
-	return err
-}
-
 // DELETE /api/user/account
 func DeleteAccountHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
@@ -169,6 +151,11 @@ func DeleteAccountHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			}
 		}()
 
+		// anonymize_user() is the single source of truth for erasure: it NULLs
+		// the 2FA columns and staff notes in the same statement that anonymizes
+		// the rest of the row, so every call site (this handler AND the
+		// idle-account batch cleanup in scheduling.CleanupIdleAccounts) is
+		// GDPR-clean without a separate Go-side scrub.
 		_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `SELECT anonymize_user($1)`, userID)
 		if err != nil {
 			log.Printf("Failed to anonymize user %s: %v", userID, err)
@@ -176,15 +163,6 @@ func DeleteAccountHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			return
 		}
 
-		// GDPR erasure gap: anonymize_user() leaves the 2FA columns and staff
-		// notes on the row. Scrub them here, in the same transaction, so erasure
-		// is atomic with the anonymization.
-		if err := scrubAnonymizedUser2FA(ctx, tx, userID); err != nil {
-			log.Printf("Failed to scrub 2FA fields for user %s: %v", userID, err)
-			http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-			return
-		}
-
 		if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
 			log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction for user anonymization: %v", err)
 			http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)

backend/handlers/user/gdpr_test.go

@@ -518,9 +518,9 @@ func TestAnonymizeUser_ClearsNotificationPrefs(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // TestAnonymizeUser_Scrubs2FAAndNotes verifies the GDPR erasure gap closure:
-// anonymize_user() alone leaves the 2FA columns and staff notes on the row, so
-// the Go-side scrub (run in the same transaction by DeleteAccountHandler) must
-// null them.
+// anonymize_user() itself NULLs the 2FA columns and staff notes on the row, so
+// every call site (user-initiated delete AND idle-account batch cleanup) is
+// covered without a separate Go-side scrub.
 func TestAnonymizeUser_Scrubs2FAAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
@@ -548,11 +548,6 @@ func TestAnonymizeUser_Scrubs2FAAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("anonymize_user failed: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// Mirror DeleteAccountHandler: scrub after anonymize_user in the same tx.
-	if err := scrubAnonymizedUser2FA(ctx, tx, userID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("scrubAnonymizedUser2FA failed: %v", err)
-	}
-
 	var notes interface{}
 	var enabled bool
 	var method, pendingHash, pendingExpires interface{}
@@ -582,8 +577,9 @@ func TestAnonymizeUser_Scrubs2FAAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // TestDeleteAccount_Scrubs2FAAndNotes runs the full DeleteAccountHandler for a
-// user with 2FA enabled and staff notes, asserting the handler's transaction
-// scrubs both. Kept sequential (no t.Parallel) because the handler reads the
+// user with 2FA enabled and staff notes, asserting the end-to-end delete path
+// scrubs both (via anonymize_user(), which is now the single source of truth).
+// Kept sequential (no t.Parallel) because the handler reads the
 // process-global payments.SquareClient.
 func TestDeleteAccount_Scrubs2FAAndNotes(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)

backend/handlers/user/twofa.go

@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@ func generateTwoFACode() (string, error) {
 }
 
 // hashTwoFACode returns the SHA-256 hex digest of a verification code. The DB
-// stores only the digest; the plaintext code is only ever logged in unenforced
-// (dev) environments (see SetupTwoFAHandler). The digest is unsalted SHA-256 —
+// stores only the digest; the plaintext code is delivered by logging it with a
+// [2FA] prefix (see deliverTwoFACode). The digest is unsalted SHA-256 —
 // peppering it via HMAC-SHA256 with a server-side 2FA_PEPPER secret is a future
 // hardening step once such a secret is provisioned.
 func hashTwoFACode(code string) string {
@@ -119,6 +119,56 @@ func twoFAResetAttempts(userID string) {
 	twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
 }
 
+// deliverTwoFACode generates a fresh verification code, persists only its
+// SHA-256 hash plus the pending expiry (updating two_factor_method when method
+// is non-empty), resets any prior lockout, and logs the plaintext code.
+//
+// The [2FA] log line is the delivery channel — the loose-fake stand-in for the
+// not-yet-wired email/SMS transport (P6). The plaintext code is ALWAYS logged,
+// enforced and unenforced alike: in enforced (production) environments the
+// server log is the only way a code can reach the user, so an operator must
+// relay it out-of-band. Do not gate this log line on the environment — without
+// it, enforced-mode 2FA has no delivery path at all and every online saved-card
+// charge stays 403. The API response still only returns the code when 2FA is
+// unenforced (dev convenience). purpose labels the log line (e.g. "setup",
+// "disable 2FA").
+func deliverTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID, method, purpose string) (string, error) {
+	code, err := generateTwoFACode()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	expires := clock.Now().Add(twoFAPendingExpiry)
+	if method != "" {
+		_, err = db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
+			UPDATE users
+			SET two_factor_method = $2,
+				two_factor_pending_code_hash = $3,
+				two_factor_pending_code_expires = $4
+			WHERE id = $1
+		`, userID, method, hashTwoFACode(code), expires)
+	} else {
+		_, err = db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
+			UPDATE users
+			SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2,
+				two_factor_pending_code_expires = $3
+			WHERE id = $1
+		`, userID, hashTwoFACode(code), expires)
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+
+	// A fresh code invalidates any prior lockout state.
+	twoFAResetAttempts(userID)
+
+	label := method
+	if label == "" {
+		label = purpose
+	}
+	log.Printf("[2FA] verification code for user %s (%s): %s", userID, label, code)
+	return code, nil
+}
+
 type TwoFAStatusResponse struct {
 	Enabled  bool    `json:"enabled"`
 	Method   *string `json:"method"`
@@ -161,10 +211,13 @@ type TwoFASetupRequest struct {
 
 // POST /api/user/2fa/setup
 // Generates a verification code and stores only its SHA-256 hash plus a
-// 10-minute expiry in the pending columns. The code itself is delivered by
-// logging it with a [2FA] prefix — a loose fake for the not-yet-wired email/SMS
-// transport. When 2FA is not enforced (dev), the code is also returned in the
-// response so the flow is testable without reading backend logs.
+// 10-minute expiry in the pending columns. The code is delivered by logging it
+// with a [2FA] prefix — the loose-fake stand-in for the not-yet-wired email/SMS
+// transport (P6). The plaintext code is ALWAYS logged, enforced and unenforced
+// alike: in enforced (production) environments the server log is the only
+// delivery channel, so an operator must relay the code to the user out-of-band.
+// When 2FA is not enforced (dev), the code is also returned in the response so
+// the flow is testable without reading backend logs.
 func SetupTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
 	if !ok {
@@ -194,39 +247,16 @@ func SetupTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	code, err := generateTwoFACode()
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Printf("failed to generate 2FA code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
-		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
-	expires := clock.Now().Add(twoFAPendingExpiry)
-	_, err = db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
-		UPDATE users
-		SET two_factor_method = $2,
-			two_factor_pending_code_hash = $3,
-			two_factor_pending_code_expires = $4
-		WHERE id = $1
-	`, userID, req.Method, hashTwoFACode(code), expires)
+	// Deliver a fresh code via the shared setup mechanism: generate, persist
+	// only the hash + expiry, reset any prior lockout, and log the plaintext
+	// code (the [2FA] log channel — see deliverTwoFACode).
+	code, err := deliverTwoFACode(r, userID, req.Method, "setup")
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Printf("failed to store 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
 		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
 
-	// A fresh code invalidates any prior lockout state.
-	twoFAResetAttempts(userID)
-
-	if !twoFARequired() {
-		// Dev-only convenience: unenforced environments log the plaintext code
-		// (loose fake delivery). NEVER log it when enforced — a production
-		// misconfiguration must not leak verification codes to stdout.
-		log.Printf("[2FA] verification code for user %s (%s): %s", userID, req.Method, code)
-	} else {
-		log.Printf("[2FA] 2FA code generated for user %s (delivery channel: %s — NOT SENT, fake delivery)", userID, req.Method)
-	}
-
 	resp := map[string]any{"message": "Code sent"}
 	if !twoFARequired() {
 		// Dev convenience: unenforced environments return the code so the
@@ -242,6 +272,77 @@ type TwoFAVerifyRequest struct {
 	Code string `json:"code"`
 }
 
+// twoFACodeCheckResult classifies checkTwoFACode's outcome so callers can map
+// it to the correct HTTP status.
+type twoFACodeCheckResult int
+
+const (
+	twoFACodeOK twoFACodeCheckResult = iota
+	twoFACodeIncorrect
+	twoFACodeLockedOut
+	twoFACodeMissingOrExpired
+)
+
+// checkTwoFACode verifies the submitted code against the user's stored pending
+// code under the per-user brute-force lockout, shared by VerifyTwoFAHandler and
+// DisableTwoFAHandler. The caller must hold st.mu (from twoFAAttemptStateFor)
+// so concurrent attempts from the same user cannot race the limit check. A
+// correct code resets the attempt counter and returns twoFACodeOK. An incorrect
+// code increments the counter and, on the 5th consecutive failure, invalidates
+// the pending code (lockout). A missing or expired pending code returns
+// twoFACodeMissingOrExpired. The returned error is non-nil only for DB failures
+// (callers return 500); a lockout's pending-code invalidation failure is logged
+// here and still reported as a lockout.
+func checkTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID string, st *twoFAAttemptState, reqCode string) (twoFACodeCheckResult, error) {
+	if now := clock.Now(); now.Sub(st.lastAt) > twoFAAttemptWindow {
+		st.count = 0
+		st.lastAt = now
+	}
+	if st.count >= twoFAMaxAttempts {
+		return twoFACodeLockedOut, nil
+	}
+
+	var pendingHash sql.NullString
+	var pendingExpires sql.NullTime
+	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
+		SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash, two_factor_pending_code_expires
+		FROM users
+		WHERE id = $1
+	`, userID).Scan(&pendingHash, &pendingExpires)
+	if err != nil {
+		return twoFACodeLockedOut, err
+	}
+	if !pendingHash.Valid || !pendingExpires.Valid || !pendingExpires.Time.After(clock.Now()) {
+		return twoFACodeMissingOrExpired, nil
+	}
+	// Constant-time compare (subtle) so a wrong code's match position cannot be
+	// inferred from response timing. Both digests are fixed-length hex.
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(hashTwoFACode(reqCode)), []byte(pendingHash.String)) != 1 {
+		st.count++
+		st.lastAt = clock.Now()
+		if st.count >= twoFAMaxAttempts {
+			// Lockout reached: destroy the pending code so a stolen digest
+			// cannot be replayed against a fresh guessing loop.
+			if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
+				UPDATE users
+				SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
+					two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL
+				WHERE id = $1
+			`, userID); err != nil {
+				log.Printf("failed to invalidate 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
+			}
+			return twoFACodeLockedOut, nil
+		}
+		return twoFACodeIncorrect, nil
+	}
+
+	// Success: clear the attempt counter before the caller performs its action.
+	st.count = 0
+	st.lastAt = clock.Now()
+	twoFAResetAttempts(userID)
+	return twoFACodeOK, nil
+}
+
 // POST /api/user/2fa/verify
 // Confirms the pending code (SHA-256, timing-safe, not expired) and flips
 // two_factor_enabled on. When 2FA is not enforced (dev) any code — including an
@@ -271,67 +372,31 @@ func VerifyTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Enforced path — brute-force resistant. The attempt counter is per-user and
-	// in-memory (no schema change); after 5 consecutive failures the pending
-	// code is invalidated and further attempts get 429 until a new code is
-	// requested via setup. The per-user mutex serializes the critical section so
-	// concurrent attempts cannot race the limit.
+	// Enforced path — brute-force resistant (see checkTwoFACode): the per-user
+	// mutex serializes the critical section so concurrent attempts cannot race
+	// the limit; after 5 consecutive failures the pending code is invalidated
+	// and further attempts get 429 until a new code is requested via setup.
 	st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
 	st.mu.Lock()
 	defer st.mu.Unlock()
 
-	if now := clock.Now(); now.Sub(st.lastAt) > twoFAAttemptWindow {
-		st.count = 0
-		st.lastAt = now
-	}
-	if st.count >= twoFAMaxAttempts {
-		http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Request a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
-		return
-	}
-
-	var pendingHash sql.NullString
-	var pendingExpires sql.NullTime
-	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
-		SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash, two_factor_pending_code_expires
-		FROM users
-		WHERE id = $1
-	`, userID).Scan(&pendingHash, &pendingExpires)
+	result, err := checkTwoFACode(r, userID, st, req.Code)
 	if err != nil {
-		log.Printf("failed to fetch 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
+		log.Printf("failed to check 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
 		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
-	if !pendingHash.Valid || !pendingExpires.Valid || !pendingExpires.Time.After(clock.Now()) {
+	switch result {
+	case twoFACodeIncorrect:
+		http.Error(w, "incorrect verification code", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	case twoFACodeLockedOut:
+		http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Request a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+		return
+	case twoFACodeMissingOrExpired:
 		http.Error(w, "verification code is missing or has expired", http.StatusBadRequest)
 		return
 	}
-	// Constant-time compare (subtle) so a wrong code's match position cannot be
-	// inferred from response timing. Both digests are fixed-length hex.
-	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(hashTwoFACode(req.Code)), []byte(pendingHash.String)) != 1 {
-		st.count++
-		st.lastAt = clock.Now()
-		if st.count >= twoFAMaxAttempts {
-			// Lockout reached: destroy the pending code so a stolen digest
-			// cannot be replayed against a fresh guessing loop.
-			if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
-				UPDATE users
-				SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
-					two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL
-				WHERE id = $1
-			`, userID); err != nil {
-				log.Printf("failed to invalidate 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
-			}
-			http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Request a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
-			return
-		}
-		http.Error(w, "incorrect verification code", http.StatusBadRequest)
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Success: clear the attempt counter before enabling 2FA.
-	st.count = 0
-	st.lastAt = clock.Now()
-	twoFAResetAttempts(userID)
 
 	if err := enableTwoFA(r, userID); err != nil {
 		log.Printf("failed to enable 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
@@ -366,8 +431,15 @@ type TwoFADisableRequest struct {
 
 // POST /api/user/2fa/disable
 // Turns 2FA off and clears method + pending fields for the authenticated user.
-// The code field is accepted but ignored — a documented loose-fake simplification
-// until the real SCA flow requires re-authentication to disable.
+//
+// Disabling 2FA lifts the SCA stand-in gate on saved-card charges, so in
+// enforced environments a verification code is required — a password-only
+// attacker must not be able to disable the protection. A fresh code is generated
+// and delivered via the [2FA] log channel when no valid pending code exists, and
+// the submitted code is checked under the shared 5-attempt lockout (wrong code →
+// 400, lockout → 429); only a correct code clears the flag. In unenforced (dev)
+// environments the loose behavior is kept: no code required, so local dev is not
+// blocked.
 func DisableTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
 	if !ok {
@@ -375,10 +447,89 @@ func DisableTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Body is optional; decode leniently so an empty body disables cleanly.
+	// Body is optional; decode leniently so an empty body still works in
+	// unenforced (dev) environments.
 	var req TwoFADisableRequest
 	_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req)
 
+	if !twoFARequired() {
+		// Dev bypass: no re-verification in unenforced environments.
+		if err := disableTwoFA(r, userID); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("failed to disable 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
+			http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+			return
+		}
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Enforced path. The per-user mutex serializes the whole critical section
+	// (fresh-code generation + code check) so concurrent requests cannot race
+	// the lockout counter.
+	st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
+	st.mu.Lock()
+	defer st.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Reuse a valid pending code when one exists; otherwise generate + deliver
+	// a fresh one via the same [2FA] log channel as setup.
+	if err := ensurePendingTwoFACode(r, userID); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("failed to prepare 2FA code for disable for user %s: %v", userID, err)
+		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+
+	result, err := checkTwoFACode(r, userID, st, req.Code)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("failed to check 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
+		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	switch result {
+	case twoFACodeIncorrect:
+		http.Error(w, "incorrect verification code", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	case twoFACodeLockedOut:
+		http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Request a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+		return
+	case twoFACodeMissingOrExpired:
+		// ensurePendingTwoFACode just guaranteed a valid pending code; defensive.
+		http.Error(w, "verification code is missing or has expired", http.StatusBadRequest)
+		return
+	}
+
+	if err := disableTwoFA(r, userID); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("failed to disable 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
+		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+}
+
+// ensurePendingTwoFACode guarantees the user has a valid (unexpired) pending
+// code to verify against, generating + delivering a fresh one via the same [2FA]
+// log channel as setup when the stored code is missing or expired. A fresh code
+// also resets any prior lockout, matching setup's recovery behavior. The caller
+// must hold the user's attempt-state mutex.
+func ensurePendingTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID string) error {
+	var pendingHash sql.NullString
+	var pendingExpires sql.NullTime
+	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
+		SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash, two_factor_pending_code_expires
+		FROM users
+		WHERE id = $1
+	`, userID).Scan(&pendingHash, &pendingExpires)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if pendingHash.Valid && pendingExpires.Valid && pendingExpires.Time.After(clock.Now()) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	_, err = deliverTwoFACode(r, userID, "", "disable 2FA")
+	return err
+}
+
+// disableTwoFA clears two_factor_enabled and the method + pending code fields.
+func disableTwoFA(r *http.Request, userID string) error {
 	_, err := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
 		UPDATE users
 		SET two_factor_enabled = false,
@@ -387,11 +538,5 @@ func DisableTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL
 		WHERE id = $1
 	`, userID)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Printf("failed to disable 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
-		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
-		return
-	}
-
-	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	return err
 }

backend/handlers/user/twofa_test.go

@@ -241,22 +241,125 @@ func TestTwoFAVerify_Unenforced_AnyCodeSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
 	require.True(t, enabled)
 }
 
-func TestTwoFADisable(t *testing.T) {
+// TestTwoFADisable_CorrectCode verifies that disabling in an enforced env
+// requires the pending code: the correct code clears the flag, method and
+// pending fields.
+func TestTwoFADisable_CorrectCode(t *testing.T) {
 	twofaEnvEnforced(t)
 	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
 	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
+	seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
 
-	w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", nil, userID)
-	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
+	w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "123456"}, userID)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
 
 	var enabled bool
 	var method sql.NullString
-	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled, two_factor_method FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled, &method))
+	var pendingHash sql.NullString
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled, two_factor_method, two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled, &method, &pendingHash))
 	require.False(t, enabled, "disable must clear two_factor_enabled")
 	require.False(t, method.Valid, "disable must clear the method")
+	require.False(t, pendingHash.Valid, "disable must clear the pending code")
+}
+
+// TestTwoFADisable_WrongCode verifies that a wrong code leaves 2FA enabled:
+// the gate cannot be lifted with the password alone.
+func TestTwoFADisable_WrongCode(t *testing.T) {
+	twofaEnvEnforced(t)
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
+
+	w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+
+	var enabled bool
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
+	require.True(t, enabled, "wrong code must not disable 2FA")
+}
+
+// TestTwoFADisable_NoPendingCode_GeneratesFreshCode verifies that disabling
+// with no valid pending code delivers a fresh one via the [2FA] log channel and
+// requires it before clearing the flag.
+func TestTwoFADisable_NoPendingCode_GeneratesFreshCode(t *testing.T) {
+	twofaEnvEnforced(t)
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	log.SetOutput(&buf)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { log.SetOutput(os.Stderr) })
+
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// No pending code exists: the handler must generate + log a fresh code and
+	// reject the (empty) submission.
+	w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: ""}, userID)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	require.Regexp(t, regexp.MustCompile(`\[2FA\].*\d{6}`), buf.String(), "disable must log the fresh code as the delivery channel")
+
+	var pendingHash sql.NullString
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&pendingHash))
+	require.True(t, pendingHash.Valid, "disable must persist a fresh pending code when none existed")
+
+	var enabled bool
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
+	require.True(t, enabled, "fresh code must be verified before 2FA can be disabled")
+}
+
+// TestTwoFADisable_LockoutAfterFiveFailedAttempts verifies that disable shares
+// the 5-attempt lockout: 4 wrong codes 400, the 5th 429s and invalidates the
+// pending code.
+func TestTwoFADisable_LockoutAfterFiveFailedAttempts(t *testing.T) {
+	twofaEnvEnforced(t)
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
+
+	for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
+		w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
+		require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, "attempt %d", i+1)
+	}
+
+	w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	require.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "Too many attempts. Request a new code.")
+
+	var pendingHash sql.NullString
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&pendingHash))
+	require.False(t, pendingHash.Valid, "lockout must invalidate the pending code")
+
+	var enabled bool
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
+	require.True(t, enabled, "locked-out user must still have 2FA enabled")
+}
+
+// TestTwoFADisable_Unenforced_NoCodeRequired verifies the dev bypass: in an
+// unenforced env disabling works with no code at all.
+func TestTwoFADisable_Unenforced_NoCodeRequired(t *testing.T) {
+	twofaEnvUnenforced(t)
+	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
+	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: ""}, userID)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
+
+	var enabled bool
+	require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
+	require.False(t, enabled, "dev bypass must disable without a code")
 }
 
 func TestTwoFA_Unauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
@@ -335,25 +438,25 @@ func TestTwoFASetup_Enforced_NoCodeInResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	require.False(t, hasCode, "enforced setup must NOT return the code in the response")
 }
 
-func TestTwoFASetup_CodeLoggedOnlyWhenUnenforced(t *testing.T) {
+func TestTwoFASetup_CodeAlwaysLoggedAsDeliveryChannel(t *testing.T) {
 	// Capture the standard logger so we can assert on what setup logs.
 	var buf bytes.Buffer
 	log.SetOutput(&buf)
 	t.Cleanup(func() { log.SetOutput(os.Stderr) })
 
-	// Enforced: the [2FA] log line must carry the delivery note but never the
-	// plaintext code — a production misconfig must not leak codes to stdout.
+	// Enforced (production): the plaintext code MUST be logged — the [2FA] log
+	// line is the only delivery channel until email/SMS lands, and an operator
+	// relays it to the user out-of-band. Without it, enforced-mode 2FA is a
+	// dead-end (every online saved-card charge stays 403).
 	twofaEnvEnforced(t)
 	ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
 	userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	w := performUser2FARequest(t, SetupTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/setup", TwoFASetupRequest{Method: "email"}, userID)
 	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
-	out := buf.String()
-	require.Contains(t, out, "NOT SENT, fake delivery")
-	require.NotContains(t, out, "verification code for user", "enforced setup must NOT log the plaintext code")
+	require.Regexp(t, regexp.MustCompile(`\[2FA\].*\d{6}`), buf.String(), "enforced setup must log the plaintext code as the delivery channel")
 
-	// Unenforced (dev): the plaintext code IS logged for the loose-fake flow.
+	// Unenforced (dev): the plaintext code is also logged for the loose-fake flow.
 	buf.Reset()
 	twofaEnvUnenforced(t)
 	ctx2, tx2 := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)

backend/handlers/webhooks/square.go

@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ type SquareWebhookEvent struct {
 // event IDs. It is a FAST-PATH cache only: the persistent source of truth is
 // the square_webhook_events table (see HandleSquareWebhook). It lets a replayed
 // delivery be dropped without a DB round-trip, but a restart clears it — the DB
-// row is what guarantees at-most-once processing across restarts.
+// row is what keeps delivery at-least-once across restarts (a replay after a
+// crash is re-dispatched and absorbed by the idempotent handlers, per the
+// dispatch-first ordering in HandleSquareWebhook).
 type squareWebhookDedup struct {
 	mu    sync.Mutex
 	seen  map[string]struct{}
@@ -598,8 +600,13 @@ func clawbackOneTillSale(saleID, itemType string, itemID sql.NullString, totalAm
 // whose charge definitively failed, in the SAME transaction as the failed mark
 // (claim-first): a created card is deleted (with its purchase transaction) and
 // any immediate redeem-to-account credit reversed; a topped-up card has the
-// amount subtracted back out and its top-up transaction removed. SQL mirrors
-// handlers/payments/till.go revertGiftCardFunding.
+// amount subtracted back out and its top-up transaction removed.
+//
+// This is a byte-for-byte copy of revertGiftCardFunding in
+// handlers/payments/till.go (the webhook path cannot reuse the till handler's
+// signature), and the two MUST be kept in sync: a fix or schema change applied
+// to only one silently diverges the sweep's clawback from the webhook's. Keep
+// the SQL and the CRITICAL log lines identical in both.
 func revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding(action, giftCardID string, amount float64, redeemToUserID *string, tillSaleID string) error {
 	tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {
@@ -732,18 +739,29 @@ func handleRefundUpdated(data json.RawMessage) error {
 // VARCHAR(192) column width. An over-long reason would fail the disputes
 // INSERT; the handler treats that as a dispatch error (no dedup row, 5xx), so
 // Square would retry forever — truncating lets the event succeed instead.
+// VARCHAR(192) counts CHARACTERS, not bytes, so truncation must slice on a rune
+// boundary: byte-slicing (reason[:192]) can split a multi-byte UTF-8 rune and
+// store invalid UTF-8 (which Postgres rejects), failing the INSERT the same way
+// an over-long reason would. Slicing the []rune form keeps the stored reason a
+// valid, at-most-192-character UTF-8 string.
 func truncateDisputeReason(reason string) string {
-	if len(reason) > 192 {
-		return reason[:192]
+	runes := []rune(reason)
+	if len(runes) > 192 {
+		return string(runes[:192])
 	}
 	return reason
 }
 
 // handleDisputeCreated records a newly opened dispute: inserts the disputes row
 // and surfaces a critical_payment_log admin notification so the owner sees the
-// chargeback in-app. Idempotent via ON CONFLICT (square_dispute_id) DO NOTHING
-// plus the event_id dedup. A non-nil error means dispatch failed (no dedup row
-// committed — Square retries).
+// chargeback in-app. A disputed Square payment with NO local payments row (a
+// Dashboard-initiated charge, a mismatched Square id, or a deleted/erased row)
+// cannot be reconciled to a booking — no disputes row is written — but the
+// admin notification is STILL raised with booking_id NULL, because there is no
+// sweep fallback for disputes and a chargeback the app cannot see is a silent
+// money-loss path the owner must always be told about. Idempotent via
+// ON CONFLICT (square_dispute_id) DO NOTHING plus the event_id dedup. A non-nil
+// error means dispatch failed (no dedup row committed — Square retries).
 func handleDisputeCreated(data json.RawMessage) error {
 	var env squareWebhookData
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
@@ -761,7 +779,15 @@ func handleDisputeCreated(data json.RawMessage) error {
 	}
 	paymentID, bookingID, paymentFound := findPaymentBySquareID(squarePaymentID)
 	if !paymentFound {
-		log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute.created: no local payment for square payment %q — dispute %s not recorded", squarePaymentID, dispute.ID)
+		// Untracked chargeback: no local payments row for this Square charge
+		// (Dashboard-initiated, mismatched Square payment id, or a deleted/erased
+		// row). There is NO sweep fallback for disputes — this notification is
+		// the only in-app trace the owner gets that Square is clawing back funds,
+		// so it must never be skipped. booking_id stays NULL; the helper's dedup
+		// guard keeps ONE unacknowledged row until the owner acts on it. Still
+		// return nil so the dedup row commits and Square's retry is acknowledged.
+		log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] CRITICAL: dispute %s created for square payment %q with NO local payment row — chargeback cannot be reconciled in-app — admin notified (booking_id NULL)", dispute.ID, squarePaymentID)
+		insertCriticalPaymentNotification("")
 		return nil
 	}
 	amount := squareMoneyToAmount(dispute.AmountMoney)

backend/handlers/webhooks/webhooks_state_test.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"unicode/utf8"
 
 	"crussell/db"
 	"crussell/testutils/fixtures"
@@ -315,6 +316,15 @@ func TestWebhook_DisputeCreated_InsertsDisputeRow(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestWebhook_DisputeCreated_NoLocalPayment_NoRow(t *testing.T) {
+	// insertCriticalPaymentNotification dedups on unacknowledged rows per
+	// (reason, booking_id), so a NULL-booking notification left unacknowledged
+	// by an earlier test would mask this test's assertion. Acknowledge any
+	// stragglers first.
+	if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(),
+		"UPDATE admin_notifications SET acknowledged_at = NOW() WHERE reason = 'critical_payment_log' AND acknowledged_at IS NULL"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to acknowledge prior critical notifications: %v", err)
+	}
+
 	event := SquareWebhookEvent{
 		Type:      "dispute.created",
 		EventID:   "evt_dispute_orphan_1",
@@ -336,6 +346,7 @@ func TestWebhook_DisputeCreated_NoLocalPayment_NoRow(t *testing.T) {
 	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
 		t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
 	}
+	// No local payment to reconcile against — no disputes row can be written.
 	var n int
 	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(context.Background(),
 		"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM disputes WHERE square_dispute_id = 'dts_orphan_1'").Scan(&n); err != nil {
@@ -344,6 +355,23 @@ func TestWebhook_DisputeCreated_NoLocalPayment_NoRow(t *testing.T) {
 	if n != 0 {
 		t.Errorf("expected no disputes row for an unknown square payment, got %d", n)
 	}
+	// ...but the chargeback MUST still surface in-app: a dispute on a payment
+	// with no local row is exactly the silent money-loss path this guards (no
+	// sweep fallback, no reconciliable booking). One unacknowledged
+	// NULL-booking critical notification must exist.
+	var unack int
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(context.Background(),
+		"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM admin_notifications WHERE reason = 'critical_payment_log' AND booking_id IS NULL AND acknowledged_at IS NULL").Scan(&unack); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("failed to count unacknowledged critical notifications: %v", err)
+	}
+	if unack != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected exactly 1 unacknowledged NULL-booking critical_payment_log notification, got %d", unack)
+	}
+	// The dedup row still commits: the handler returned nil, so Square's retry
+	// is acknowledged 200 rather than re-dispatched forever.
+	if got := countWebhookEvents(t, event.EventID); got != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected 1 dedup row for the untracked dispute, got %d", got)
+	}
 }
 
 func TestWebhook_DisputeCreated_LongReason_Truncated(t *testing.T) {
@@ -390,6 +418,52 @@ func TestWebhook_DisputeCreated_LongReason_Truncated(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestWebhook_DisputeCreated_Utf8Reason_StoredValid delivers a dispute whose
+// reason is long enough that the old byte-truncation (reason[:192]) would have
+// split a 3-byte rune and stored invalid UTF-8 — which Postgres rejects,
+// failing the INSERT and making Square retry forever. Rune-safe truncation must
+// store a valid, at-most-192-character string.
+func TestWebhook_DisputeCreated_Utf8Reason_StoredValid(t *testing.T) {
+	const squarePaymentID = "sqp_dispute_utf8"
+	_ = createWebhookTestPayment(t, squarePaymentID, "completed")
+
+	// 300 three-byte runes = 900 bytes, far past VARCHAR(192).
+	reason := strings.Repeat("界", 300)
+	event := SquareWebhookEvent{
+		Type:      "dispute.created",
+		EventID:   "evt_dispute_utf8_1",
+		CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+		Data: json.RawMessage(`{
+			"type": "dispute",
+			"id": "dts_utf8_1",
+			"object": {
+				"dispute": {
+					"id": "dts_utf8_1",
+					"state": "UNDER_REVIEW",
+					"amount_money": {"amount": 1234, "currency": "GBP"},
+					"reason": "` + reason + `",
+					"disputed_payment": {"payment_id": "` + squarePaymentID + `"}
+				}
+			}
+		}`),
+	}
+	w := deliverWebhook(t, event)
+	if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
+	}
+	var stored string
+	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(context.Background(),
+		"SELECT reason FROM disputes WHERE square_dispute_id = 'dts_utf8_1'").Scan(&stored); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected a disputes row to be inserted, got: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !utf8.ValidString(stored) {
+		t.Errorf("expected stored reason to be valid UTF-8, got %q", stored)
+	}
+	if r := []rune(stored); len(r) != 192 {
+		t.Errorf("expected stored reason to be exactly 192 characters, got %d", len(r))
+	}
+}
+
 // =============================================================================
 // Dispute handling — dispute.state.updated
 // =============================================================================

backend/handlers/webhooks/webhooks_test.go

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
 	"os"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"unicode/utf8"
 
 	"crussell/db"
 	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
@@ -101,6 +102,37 @@ func TestVerifySquareSignature_TamperedBody(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestTruncateDisputeReason_RuneSafe(t *testing.T) {
+	// 191 ASCII bytes + a 4-byte emoji: byte-slicing at 192 would split the
+	// emoji into an incomplete rune (invalid UTF-8). Rune-safe truncation must
+	// keep the whole emoji and stay valid UTF-8.
+	edge := strings.Repeat("a", 191) + "\U0001F600"
+	got := truncateDisputeReason(edge)
+	if !utf8.ValidString(got) {
+		t.Errorf("expected valid UTF-8 after truncation, got %q", got)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasSuffix(got, "\U0001F600") {
+		t.Errorf("expected the 4-byte rune to be preserved intact, got %q", got)
+	}
+	if len(got) != 195 { // 191 ASCII + 4-byte emoji
+		t.Errorf("expected 195 bytes (191 ASCII + 4-byte emoji), got %d", len(got))
+	}
+
+	// An over-long multi-byte reason truncates to exactly 192 runes.
+	got = truncateDisputeReason(strings.Repeat("界", 300))
+	if r := []rune(got); len(r) != 192 {
+		t.Errorf("expected exactly 192 runes after truncation, got %d", len(r))
+	}
+	if !utf8.ValidString(got) {
+		t.Errorf("expected valid UTF-8 after truncation, got %q", got)
+	}
+
+	// Short and ASCII reasons pass through untouched.
+	if got := truncateDisputeReason("NO_KNOWLEDGE"); got != "NO_KNOWLEDGE" {
+		t.Errorf("expected short reason unchanged, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
 // =============================================================================
 // Integration tests — HandleSquareWebhook
 // =============================================================================