diff --git a/backend/handlers/payments/handlers.go b/backend/handlers/payments/handlers.go
index d5f9675..44c5806 100644
--- a/backend/handlers/payments/handlers.go
+++ b/backend/handlers/payments/handlers.go
@@ -2723,7 +2723,7 @@ func applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingI
 //
 // MONEY INVARIANT (deliberately kept exact): the returned records always
 // partition paymentAmount — deposit + balance + tip === paymentAmount exactly
-// (every component is rounded to the cent and the parts are derived from one
+// (every component is rounded to the pence and the parts are derived from one
 // another, so no rounding residue exists). The sum of the split records can
 // therefore never exceed the amount actually charged at Square. When deposit
 // AND balance are both zero (booking already fully paid) the tip record alone
diff --git a/backend/handlers/payments/sweep.go b/backend/handlers/payments/sweep.go
index cc8579e..ac0d9cf 100644
--- a/backend/handlers/payments/sweep.go
+++ b/backend/handlers/payments/sweep.go
@@ -1245,8 +1245,19 @@ func leaveGiftCardPurchasePending(ctx context.Context, r staleRow) {
 // ties to a user (gift-card purchases). The NOT EXISTS guard keeps ONE
 // notification per issue instead of one per sweep run, and requires the prior
 // notification to be unacknowledged (acknowledged_at IS NULL) so that after an
-// admin acknowledges it, a NEW event for the same booking/user re-notifies —
-// matching the webhook copy's guard (handlers/webhooks/square.go) exactly.
+// admin acknowledges it, a NEW event for the same booking/user re-notifies.
+//
+// This is the SWEEP-specific variant of a same-named helper in the webhooks
+// package (handlers/webhooks/square.go, insertCriticalPaymentNotification) with
+// an INTENTIONAL scoping difference: this one dedups on (reason, booking_id,
+// user_id) — booking and/or user — because sweep-originated events may be
+// user-attributed without a booking (gift-card purchases) or booking-attributed
+// without a user (untracked terminal charges). The webhook variant takes
+// (ctx, bookingID, disputeID string), never writes user_id, and dedups on
+// (reason, booking_id) or a deterministic per-dispute id. Both share the
+// admin_notifications table and the 'critical_payment_log' reason but serve
+// different call paths (sweep vs webhook) — do not merge them, and if the
+// NOT EXISTS guard shape ever changes, update BOTH copies.
 func insertCriticalPaymentNotification(ctx context.Context, bookingID, userID *string) {
 	tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
 		INSERT INTO admin_notifications (reason, booking_id, user_id, created_at)
diff --git a/backend/handlers/user/twofa.go b/backend/handlers/user/twofa.go
index 587136a..dd5216e 100644
--- a/backend/handlers/user/twofa.go
+++ b/backend/handlers/user/twofa.go
@@ -106,6 +106,15 @@ func twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID string) *twoFAAttemptState {
 	return twofa.StateFor(userID)
 }
 
+// twoFAMintThrottled reports whether a fresh 2FA code mint for the user is
+// still inside the per-user cooldown window (twoFAMintCooldown): a previous
+// mint within the window throttles the request (429) instead of minting
+// another code. Shared by SetupTwoFAHandler and ensurePendingTwoFACode so the
+// cooldown rule cannot drift between the setup and disable-flow call paths.
+func twoFAMintThrottled(st *twoFAAttemptState, now time.Time) bool {
+	return !st.LastMintAt.IsZero() && now.Sub(st.LastMintAt) < twoFAMintCooldown
+}
+
 // twoFAResetAttempts zeroes the shared per-user attempt counter in place.
 // Called on successful verify only — a fresh code mint must NOT reset it (B11b).
 func twoFAResetAttempts(userID string) {
@@ -260,13 +269,14 @@ func SetupTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	st.Mu.Lock()
 	defer st.Mu.Unlock()
 
-	// Mint cooldown (B11a): the same twoFAMintCooldown guard the disable flow
-	// applies via ensurePendingTwoFACode now bounds setup re-mints too. A fresh
-	// setup code no longer resets the failed-attempt counter (B11b), so without
-	// this a setup-spam loop could mint fresh codes (each invalidating the
-	// prior lockout state) and keep a guessing budget alive indefinitely.
+	// Mint cooldown (B11a): the shared twoFAMintThrottled helper bounds setup
+	// re-mints — the same guard the disable flow applies via
+	// ensurePendingTwoFACode. A fresh setup code no longer resets the
+	// failed-attempt counter (B11b), so without this a setup-spam loop could
+	// mint fresh codes (each invalidating the prior lockout state) and keep a
+	// guessing budget alive indefinitely.
 	now := clock.Now()
-	if !st.LastMintAt.IsZero() && now.Sub(st.LastMintAt) < twoFAMintCooldown {
+	if twoFAMintThrottled(st, now) {
 		http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Wait before requesting a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
 		return
 	}
@@ -821,7 +831,7 @@ func ensurePendingTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID string, st *twoFAAttemptStat
 		return "", pendingExpires.Time.Sub(clock.Now()), nil
 	}
 	now := clock.Now()
-	if !st.LastMintAt.IsZero() && now.Sub(st.LastMintAt) < twoFAMintCooldown {
+	if twoFAMintThrottled(st, now) {
 		return "", 0, errTwoFAMintThrottled
 	}
 	code, err := deliverTwoFACode(r, userID, "", purpose)
diff --git a/backend/handlers/webhooks/square.go b/backend/handlers/webhooks/square.go
index 41040a0..8757f77 100644
--- a/backend/handlers/webhooks/square.go
+++ b/backend/handlers/webhooks/square.go
@@ -667,8 +667,10 @@ func disputeNotificationID(squareDisputeID string) string {
 // an.booking_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM $1 AND an.acknowledged_at IS NULL` (a
 // notification blocks a re-notify until the admin acknowledges it, then a NEW
 // event re-arms). sweep.go's insertCriticalPaymentNotification mirrors this
-// predicate exactly (its copy is the same guard over (reason, booking_id,
-// user_id)); if the guard ever changes, sweep.go must be updated to match.
+// predicate in shape (its copy applies the same NOT EXISTS/acknowledged_at
+// IS NULL guard over (reason, booking_id, user_id) — an intentional
+// user-scoping addition for sweep-originated events, documented on the sweep
+// copy itself); if the guard ever changes, sweep.go must be updated to match.
 //
 // Untracked disputes (no local payment row, booking_id NULL) pass disputeID
 // instead: each DISTINCT square dispute gets its OWN notification under the
diff --git a/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/TillPurchases.svelte b/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/TillPurchases.svelte
index 72be188..3657a7e 100644
--- a/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/TillPurchases.svelte
+++ b/frontend/src/lib/components/admin/TillPurchases.svelte
@@ -112,18 +112,26 @@
 
 	// B6/B10: charging a customer's saved card via the till requires the
 	// customer's current 2FA verification code when the backend enforces the
-	// gate. The backend keys on the CARD OWNER (not the admin), so the input is
-	// surfaced whenever the gate is enforced — the operator relays the
-	// customer's code. Cash, card machine, and online (new-card nonce) payments
-	// are unaffected. Shared two-factor-code state (code, reveal, show/missing
-	// derivations, "Request a new code" handler) — see
-	// $lib/stores/twoFactorCode.svelte.ts. The admin always supplies the
-	// CUSTOMER's code — the admin's own 2FA flag is irrelevant to the backend
-	// gate, so `enabled` is always true.
-	const savedCardChargeRequires2FACode = $derived(authStore.savedCardChargeRequires2FACode);
+	// gate. The backend keys on the CARD OWNER (not the admin) and only gates
+	// customers who have actually ENABLED 2FA (requireTwoFactorForCardAccess:
+	// twoFactorEnforced() && UserTwoFactorEnabled(cardUserID)), so the input is
+	// surfaced only when BOTH hold — mirroring PaymentModal. The customer's
+	// setup flag is not carried by the till customer search, so it is fetched
+	// from GET /api/admin/users/{id} when a customer is selected (see
+	// fetchCustomerTwoFactor). For a 2FA-disabled customer in an enforced
+	// environment the input stays hidden so the charge can be attempted; the
+	// backend then returns the clear "Enable it in your account settings" 403,
+	// which the isTwoFactorVerificationGateFailure self-heal surfaces. Cash,
+	// card machine, and online (new-card nonce) payments are unaffected. Shared
+	// two-factor-code state (code, reveal, show/missing derivations, "Request a
+	// new code" handler) — see $lib/stores/twoFactorCode.svelte.ts. The admin
+	// always supplies the CUSTOMER's code — the admin's own 2FA flag is
+	// irrelevant to the backend gate, so `enabled` is always true.
+	const twoFactorEnforced = $derived(!!authStore.currentUser?.twoFactorRequired);
+	let customerTwoFactorEnabled = $state(false);
 	const twoFactor = useTwoFactorCodeForSavedCard({
 		enabled: () => true,
-		gateActive: () => savedCardChargeRequires2FACode && paymentMethod === 'saved_card',
+		gateActive: () => twoFactorEnforced && customerTwoFactorEnabled && paymentMethod === 'saved_card',
 		mint: () =>
 			selectedCustomer?.id ? adminRequestNewTwoFactorCode(selectedCustomer.id) : requestNewTwoFactorCode()
 	});
@@ -178,6 +186,7 @@
 		customerResults = [];
 		showCustomerResults = false;
 		fetchSavedCards(customer.id);
+		fetchCustomerTwoFactor(customer.id);
 	}
 
 	function clearSelectedCustomer() {
@@ -187,6 +196,7 @@
 		selectedSavedCardId = null;
 		customerResults = [];
 		showCustomerResults = false;
+		customerTwoFactorEnabled = false;
 	}
 
 	async function fetchSavedCards(userId: string) {
@@ -208,6 +218,25 @@
 		}
 	}
 
+	// B6/B10: the till customer search (GET /api/admin/users) carries no 2FA
+	// state, so the selected customer's setup flag is fetched from the admin
+	// user detail endpoint — the same source PaymentModal's fetchCustomerTwoFactor
+	// keys on. A failure leaves the flag false; the charge 403 self-heal still
+	// reveals the input.
+	async function fetchCustomerTwoFactor(userId: string) {
+		try {
+			const res = await apiFetch(`/api/admin/users/${userId}`);
+			if (res.ok) {
+				const data = await res.json();
+				customerTwoFactorEnabled = data?.twoFactorEnabled === true;
+			} else {
+				customerTwoFactorEnabled = false;
+			}
+		} catch {
+			customerTwoFactorEnabled = false;
+		}
+	}
+
 	const subtotal = $derived(cart.reduce((sum, item) => sum + item.price * item.qty, 0));
 	const itemCount = $derived(cart.reduce((sum, item) => sum + item.qty, 0));