fix: review-loop hardening — identical-body replay, 2FA gates, webhook at-least-once, GDPR scrub
Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced. Money-safety: - Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge). - Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.) - Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog. - Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom 'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending. - Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card. - Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse). - M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total]. 2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments: - Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces. - Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env. - Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare); plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev). - GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes. Infra/docs: - nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80 redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS; separate webhook rate-limit zone. - Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id + square_request_snapshot. - Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected. - Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26 packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean.
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@@ -41,6 +41,13 @@ SQUARE_ACCESS_TOKEN=
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SQUARE_LOCATION_ID=
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SQUARE_TERMINAL_DEVICE_ID=
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SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=mock
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# 2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online card payments. Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED:
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# ON unless REQUIRE_2FA=false OR SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT explicitly equals one of
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# mock/dev/development/test. Empty or unknown SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT values are
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# treated as production-enforced (a mistyped env var can never silently disarm
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# the gate; the backend logs a startup warning in that case). Set
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# REQUIRE_2FA=false only in controlled environments.
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REQUIRE_2FA=true
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# Webhook config MUST exactly match the Square Dashboard webhook subscription
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# (URL + signature key). If SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL is left unset it
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# defaults to http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square, which is fail-closed (503
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