fix: review-loop hardening — identical-body replay, 2FA gates, webhook at-least-once, GDPR scrub
Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced. Money-safety: - Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge). - Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.) - Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog. - Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom 'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending. - Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card. - Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse). - M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total]. 2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments: - Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces. - Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env. - Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare); plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev). - GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes. Infra/docs: - nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80 redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS; separate webhook rate-limit zone. - Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id + square_request_snapshot. - Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected. - Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26 packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean.
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@@ -57,12 +57,17 @@ type PaymentRecord struct {
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NetAmount *float64
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UserSavedCardID *string
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SquarePaymentID *string
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IdempotencyKey *string
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Fees float64
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CreatedAt time.Time
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UpdatedAt time.Time
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CreatedBy *string
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GiftCardID *string
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// SquareSourceID is the exact source_id (cnon: nonce or ccof: card id) sent
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// in the CreatePayment call, stored on the pending row so the sweep can
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// replay the charge with an IDENTICAL request body under the same
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// idempotency key.
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SquareSourceID *string
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IdempotencyKey *string
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Fees float64
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CreatedAt time.Time
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UpdatedAt time.Time
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CreatedBy *string
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GiftCardID *string
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}
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type RefundRecord struct {
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@@ -129,8 +134,8 @@ func (s *PaymentService) insertPaymentRecord(ctx context.Context, record Payment
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booking_id, payment_type, payment_method, vendor_code, invoice_number,
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status, amount, is_vat_applicable, vat_rate, vat_amount, net_amount,
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user_saved_card_id, square_payment_id, idempotency_key, fees, created_at, updated_at, created_by,
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gift_card_id
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) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12, $13, $14, $15, $16, $17, $18, $19)
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gift_card_id, square_source_id
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) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12, $13, $14, $15, $16, $17, $18, $19, $20)
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RETURNING id
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`,
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bookingID,
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@@ -152,6 +157,7 @@ func (s *PaymentService) insertPaymentRecord(ctx context.Context, record Payment
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record.UpdatedAt,
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record.CreatedBy,
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giftCardID,
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record.SquareSourceID,
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).Scan(&id)
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if err != nil {
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@@ -509,9 +515,21 @@ func (s *PaymentService) GetBookingRemainingBalanceCents(ctx context.Context, bo
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-- A tip is money paid beyond the booking total — it does not
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-- reduce the balance owed, so it must not count as "paid".
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AND payment_type <> 'tip'
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),
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refunded_total AS (
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SELECT COALESCE(SUM(r.amount), 0) AS refunded_pounds
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FROM refunds r
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JOIN payments p ON r.payment_id = p.id
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WHERE p.booking_id = $1 AND r.status = 'completed'
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)
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SELECT GREATEST(0, ROUND((bt.total_pounds - pt.paid_pounds) * 100))::bigint
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FROM booking_total bt, paid_total pt
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-- Money-safety (M-cap): refunds return money, so they re-open booking
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-- capacity — remaining = total - paid + refunded. LEAST clamps the cap
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-- at the booking total so the M-cap can never allow a charge beyond the
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-- booking's full value even in the pathological case where completed
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-- refunds exceed payments, and GREATEST floors at 0 so a fully-paid
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-- (or over-paid) booking can never be charged again.
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SELECT GREATEST(0, ROUND(LEAST(bt.total_pounds - pt.paid_pounds + rt.refunded_pounds, bt.total_pounds) * 100))::bigint
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FROM booking_total bt, paid_total pt, refunded_total rt
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`, bookingID).Scan(&remainingCents)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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