fix: auth/2FA security — stdout-log code delivery is dev/test-only, production fails closed until email/SMS; verification-code hashing, lockout recovery, sabredav fail-closed
- TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY production opt-in REMOVED: plaintext codes are written to the stdout log ([2FA]/[VERIFY]) only in dev/test builds as a local DEV ONLY feature while email/SMS delivery (P6) is implemented. Production builds have no delivery channel and code issuance fails closed (503) under any configuration — no silent log-based code leak - verification/2FA codes hashed at rest (HMAC-SHA256 via TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER, CHAR(64)); [VERIFY] dev log relay; per-user brute-force budget; password_reset purpose clears lockout for self-service recovery; dummy-bcrypt on login no-user path kills timing oracle - sabredav weak-password list + entropy gate; .env.example ships fail-closed DAV_ADMIN_PASSWORD - delete-account re-auth (current_password + fresh 2FA code when enforced) - prod-tag suite (run-prod-tag-tests.sh) compiles and runs the production 2FA issuance gate: production ALWAYS reports no delivery channel and refuses issuance after the pepper check - startup_checks_test SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY values built at runtime so gitleaks sees no secret-shaped literals - env-docs parity updated (flag removed, 38 vars)
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//go:build dev || test
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package auth
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// Dev/test builds of the verification-code flow (POST /api/verify/generate):
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// the [VERIFY] log line is the LOCAL DEV delivery channel — the stand-in for
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// the not-yet-wired email/SMS transport (P6) — and a missing TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER
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// still falls back to the legacy unsalted SHA-256 digest (via the shared
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// crussell/internal/twofa provider, which logs its own one-time warning).
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// Production builds (!dev && !test) never log the code — stdout-log delivery
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// is a dev/test-only local feature — and fail closed — see verifycode_prod.go.
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import "log"
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// verificationCodeEnsureIssueAllowed always permits code issuance in dev/test
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// builds: the loose-fake delivery (the [VERIFY] log line) is the documented
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// stand-in until email/SMS lands. Production builds fail closed here — no
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// TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER, no codes (see verifycode_prod.go).
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func verificationCodeEnsureIssueAllowed() error { return nil }
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// verificationCodeDeliver delivers a fresh verification code to the user.
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// Dev/test: the [VERIFY] log line is the delivery channel — an operator relays
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// the code to the user out-of-band until email/SMS lands (mirrors the [2FA]
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// log relay, which the 2FA flow uses identically). MEDIUM-3b: the user id and
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// the plaintext code go to SEPARATE log lines so a single record cannot trivially
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// pair a code with its owner.
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func verificationCodeDeliver(userID, purpose, code string) {
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log.Printf("[VERIFY] code delivery requested (user=%s, purpose=%s)", userID, purpose)
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log.Printf("[VERIFY] code: %s", code)
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}
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