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popertotsandSisyphus 985b114c8b test: payments round-2 — webhook gate/M2 refund, gift-card cancel re-issue, till lock contention, sweep VAT rescue coverage 
- webhooks: booking-status gate rejects cancelled bookings, M2 stranded-charge refund row + alert, gift-card rows left pending, payable-booking side-effects, unknown-event 503, refund-before-row 503, webhook-after-sync no-double-complete
- giftcards: saved_card_id SCA wire, card_id+token rejected, resume re-issue never over-refunds entitlement, pending-Square-refund blocks, diff re-issue only what is owed
- sweep: VAT on split-rescued primary, all-tip rows VAT-free, till status/key-changed-while-locked skip, recordUntrackedTillSalePayment VAT
- till: suffixed-key slot scan lock held across Square round-trip

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)
 2026-08-22 00:34:51 +01:00
popertots 1429eddd34 fix: payments hardening — SCA wire contract (saved-card ref + tokenize-result), terminal/till token routing, tip-cap overflow carve, completion campaign atomicity, orphan B1-evidence gate, gift-card gates/locks, admin backstops 
- ValidateCardInfo accepts saved-card ref + new_card_token coexistence (matches resolveChargeSource); new_card_token added to terminal/till request structs so SCA tokens are never dropped
- maxOnlineTipPence (£250) enforced on the overflow-tip carve AND buildSplitRecords (both carve paths) — closes the £10k bypass
- completion-path campaign increments made atomic reserve-first (conditional UPDATE ... RETURNING) + schema backstops (chk_times_redeemed, partial unique index on milestone redemptions)
- webhook orphan detection gated on B1 evidence (b1_attempts / sweep-duplicate refund row) so a delayed legit completion is never marked failed
- gift-card: per-user £500/day cap lock held across read-modify-write, expired-card top-up gate, NaN/Inf float bounds, refund_failed ack filter, on_the_house excluded from balance, postChargeRecheck notification
- admin apply-redemption route + admin-or-owner, in-handler isAdminRequest on 4 gift-card handlers, tip lock key aligned
- 2FA fallback machinery removed (insertTwoFAFallbackAudit/reissue/consent), dead fields stripped from charge structs
- tests: prod-tag suite, mock SCA parity, tip-cap overflow, completion races, cards pagination, ValidateCardInfo tables
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 4e398a7a2b fix: round-2 loop-B adversarial (503c326 baseline) — B1 webhook race, APPROVED refund semantics, notification cap single-source, 2FA cooldown/StateFor hardening, register bcrypt semaphore 
Round 2 Loop B red-team (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) findings on the full payments overhaul:

MONEY:
- HIGH: webhook COMPLETED promotion now resolves the B1 parent row (mirrors the re-poll resolveB1ParentFailed + till-sale clawback) — the sweep no longer re-replays an expired key into stacked unauthorized charges
- HIGH: A6 deposit-with-discount clamp — chargeAmount capped to max(0, remaining-discount) for ALL discount cases; overflow guard compares against the discounted remaining
- MED-HIGH: APPROVED refunds treated as NON-terminal at the webhook (event-driven, may still fail); payments call sites aligned; FAILED can now demote an APPROVED-then-failed row
- MED: B1 refund transport-error fails the row + CRITICAL immediately (no 3-charge stacking)
- MED: till_sales capped-fail surfaces the outstanding funding (gift_card_transactions trace) for manual reversal
- MED: guest-bookings cash/gift-card terminal charges now audited (NULL target); audit reordered post-commit; cancellation refunds audited
- MED: A6 no-discount skip-path returns campaign_fully_redeemed 400 (no success-shaped no-op); skip-path writes a marker row for idempotency

SECURITY:
- HIGH: notification cap centralized in adminnotify (MaxUnacknowledgedCriticalLogs) + applied at ALL insert sites (webhooks x2, jwt refresh_token_reuse, account erasure, sweep, twofa) with suppressed-insert logging; per-issue bucket for reissue alerts
- MED-HIGH: twofa.StateFor saturated state made IMMUTABLE (LastMintAt writes are no-ops; no cross-user throttling); eviction never drops in-window count>0 records
- MED: /register now uses the shared bcrypt semaphore (authBcryptSlots, 20) — botnet CPU burn bounded
- MED: NAT collateral reduced (429-reject only at top progressive tier; lower tiers sleep)
- MED: ClearMintCooldownForUser exposed for fresh-charge success; reissue cooldown-skip raises a capped alert
- LOW: audit coverage gaps (reschedule fee forgiveness, gift-card transfer, clawback) closed

DUP/MOD:
- Frontend deposit-percent literals -> POLICY constants (10 sites); LOYALTY_DISCOUNT_RATE single-sourced; generateUUID adopted; admin PaymentModal overflow-tip confirm path added; £500 gift-card cap named

Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod (CI condition), both vet tags, frontend tests+build, env-docs 42/42.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots fe88f2084d fix: review-loop B — adversarial findings (sweep auto-refund, admin clamp, 2FA real challenge, opaque refresh tokens, gated client IP, GBP pence) 
Loop B aggressive adversarial round (3 attack agents) + fix + secondary + verification:
- CRITICAL: sweep replay auto-refunds provably-created-later duplicate charges (gated on parseable CreatedAt); 22h legitimate-retry window == 22h sweep cutoff (no dead zone)
- HIGH: admin Take Payment clamps to remaining obligation (cash/giftcard/saved-card/terminal); no unintended tip from overflow; campaign credit against remaining
- HIGH: /api/services/eligible-for/{id} requires auth + owner-or-admin (DOB/age + patch-test health-data leak closed)
- HIGH: opaque refresh-token rotation (login/refresh return {token, jti, refreshToken}; refresh REQUIRES opaque token; single-use rotation; logout revokes; access token rejected at refresh)
- HIGH: saved-card charges require a REAL 2FA verification code (B6/B10) — backend gate on all 8 charge paths + shared TwoFactorCodeInput frontend component on all 7 surfaces; 2FA gate is no longer setup-flag-only
- MEDIUM: ungated CF-Connecting-IP in reserve/admin_reserve gated via exported mw.ClientIP; 2FA limiter keyed on userID alone (no header-rotation bypass); ChangePassword actually revokes JTI + refresh tokens; 2FA setup mint cooldown + persistent failed-attempt counter; campaign redemption race surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- Terminal saved-card VAT applied (was under-collected); age-guard reconcile failures notify; isWeakJWTSecret entropy gate; gift-card redeem per-card counter + per-user limiter; webhook signature key startup validation
- NEW internal/twofa package (single source of truth breaking the payments<->user import cycle); consolidation of duplicate 2FA hash/verify
- Frontend: refresh-token storage + rotation, TwoFactorCodeInput component, amountPaidPence in admin modal, B5/B6/B10 contract wiring; 70 frontend tests
- Tests: loop_b_fixes_test.go, internal/twofa tests, updated auth/services/profile/twofa/mw tests

All 26 backend packages pass (incl. internal/twofa); frontend 70/70 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 6d82535780 fix: adversarial review round — replay-rescue double-charge, discount credit, 2FA/per-IP limits, snapshot encryption, refund reconciliation, VAT, frontend parity, tests+docs 
Addresses the adversarial fresh-eyes audit (findings A1-A20) plus review-round fixes:
- CRITICAL A1: replay-by-key rescue cross-checks replayed CreatedAt; ccof blind-fail leaves pending with CRITICAL + notification instead of clawing back
- A2/A3/A4: till idempotency key restored to unconditional hash; tip rejected in CreateBookingPayment; campaign discount now reduces the charged amount (deposit credit)
- A5: admin notifications on blind-fail, manual-refund re-arm, cap-stranded charge-group, webhook FAILED/REJECTED refunds
- A6/A10: BuyGiftCard idempotency user-scoped; gift-card slot scan advances past failed rows
- A7/A14/A15: 2FA user+IP limiter, SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY startup validation, accurate pepper/log-delivery docs
- A8/A9: snapshot encryption on all write+reuse sites; MPV->SPV effective voucher type (single VAT point)
- A11/A12/A13/A16: amount-aware refund reconciliation; completed-booking refund re-validation; till retry dedup; PaymentWasRefunded on SquareClient interface
- A17/A18/A19/A20: CI runs npm test; confirm_overflow_tip frontend dialog; unknown-event admin notification; mock token redaction
- M7 ConfirmOverflowTip, M9 snapshot encryption, C1 discount ordering regression test
- Frontend vitest framework (41 tests), backend coverage for fixed functions, docs corrected (2,269 tests, SUPPORT_EMAIL tokens, resolution status)

All 25 backend packages pass; frontend 41/41; build + env-docs green.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 78e6d00dc5 fix: payments review rounds — money-safety, GDPR, security, gift-card cancel, modal stacking 
Money-safety:
- Deterministic till idempotency fallback (Square-charging only); cash/on_the_house keep unique keys; £250 till gift-card cap; 45-char key validation
- Gift-card admin caps £250/tx + £5,000/day; user buy £500/day; BuyGiftCard allowlist unchanged
- CancelGiftCard: CCR 2013 14-day right with partial-spend refund of the unspent balance (spend verified via payments.gift_card_id); atomic vs redeem/transfer; refunds stay pending until reversal commits; admin cancel surface (AdminCancelGiftCard)
- Sweep: cancelled-booking charges failed+notified instead of silently completed; source-override replay uses live square_source_id; legacy square-less refund sweep; snapshot refresh on pending reuse
- Refund lock consolidation; recordTerminalPaymentTx shared recorder; structured Square error codes; terminal checkout CustomerID

GDPR / security:
- Notes retained as de-identified medical/safety record at erasure (single field treated as health data; rest of record wiped, no re-identification map) + comments updated per UK GDPR/Art 9/Equality Act 2010
- square_request_snapshot PII scrubbed on all erasure paths; delete_guest_user FK unlinks; verification codes + dispute reasons handled; idle/stale-guest erasure deletes Square cards/customers + CardDAV/R2
- Durable square-erasure outbox job (retry-square-erasures); 2FA dev/prod build split, pepper fail-closed, no prod code-in-log; prod 2FA delivery fail-loud without a channel
- Webhook unknown-type family split (non-money acked, money retried); untracked dispute notifications; rate-limit CF/X-Real-IP trust gating; nginx CSP nonce + api_limit

Frontend:
- Dynamic z-index stack (ui/dialog/zindex.ts) claimed in open order via data-state observer; re-claims on every reopen; removes stale !z-* overrides — nested modals (booking→user→booking) always paint newest-on-top (browser-verified 3-level + reopen)
- Mobile: iOS zoom fixes, bottom-sheet dialogs, 44px touch targets, inputmode decimal, dvh
- Gift-card buy/cancel UI, admin £250 + daily limits, cancellation/privacy/terms policy accuracy

S3:
- Connect() creates buckets before probing; in-memory fallback only on genuine unreachability; health reports degraded; stale S3_PUBLIC_URL documented (host-specific)

Tests/docs:
- 2263 test functions; all 22 backend packages green; round8/9/10 regression suites; NextEditWindowTime removes wall-clock flake; docs reconciled (notes retention, gift-card partial-use, modal T15 future work)
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots fdf3f64a13 fix: review round 4 — per-dispute chargeback alerts, single-source clawback, 2FA lockout coherence, docs 
Fourth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security,
context-mining). All PASS on the money-safety core; this round closes the
remaining MAJOR/MINOR items they surfaced.

Webhooks:
- Untracked disputes now raise ONE admin notification PER distinct chargeback:
  the notification id is derived deterministically from the square_dispute_id
  (SHA-256 truncated into the CHAR(12) slot) so a second untracked dispute is
  no longer silently suppressed by the first's dedup row. ON CONFLICT (id)
  keeps same-dispute replays idempotent; the booking-scoped NOT EXISTS guard
  is retained for the tracked path. Verified: distinct disputes -> distinct
  rows; re-delivered dispute -> one row.
- The gift-card clawback SQL now lives in exactly ONE place:
  payments.RevertGiftCardFunding (new giftcard_clawback.go). till.go and the
  webhook path both call it — eliminating the byte-for-byte copy whose
  divergence would be a money-loss drift trap (the same two-sources-of-truth
  pattern this commit eliminated for GDPR scrubbing).

2FA:
- Applied the lockout-coherence fix from the review: when a disable request
  must mint a fresh code (no valid pending one), the held attempt counter is
  reset so the locked-out user can use the freshly delivered code in the SAME
  request (no wasted round-trip). The reuse path keeps accumulating wrong
  attempts toward the 5-attempt lockout — the two behaviors no longer
  conflict. (The 'always-fresh on disable' suggestion was NOT adopted: it
  would break the out-of-band [2FA]-log delivery model, since a code generated
  by a request can never be submitted within that same request.)
- New test pins the shared verify/disable lockout: 5 wrong verifies 429 and
  destroy the code; a stale code then 400s on disable while the freshly
  delivered code succeeds in the same request.
- Startup now warns that 2FA codes travel in PLAINTEXT via the server log in
  enforced mode (operator must restrict log access + relay out-of-band until
  email/SMS lands).

Docs:
- Test counts updated to the current 2,154 across README + Technical Manual.
- User Manual 2FA nav corrected: the settings live on the Account page, not an
  'Admin' area.

Tests: 2,154 (up from 2,151). Backend 25/26 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres auth for the test role; package
byte-identical to HEAD). Frontend builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 9bb812669e fix: fresh-review round — 2FA deliverability, disable re-verification, GDPR batch scrub, dispute alerting, docs accuracy 
Second fresh-eyes review pass (7 agents: goal, security, code-quality,
context-mining, webhooks+2FA, client+mock+sweep, refunds/giftcards/handlers).
Money-safety core verified sound (identical-body replay byte-lossless, clawback
gated on definitive proof, no double-charge window). This round fixes the
issues the fresh pass surfaced:

2FA:
- Setup now DELIVERS the code via the [2FA] server log in ALL modes (was:
  nothing in enforced mode -> production 2FA was an unbreakable dead-end and
  saved-card charges were permanently 403). Enforced mode still withholds the
  code from the API response; the log line is the fake delivery channel until
  email/SMS lands (P6).
- Disabling 2FA now requires a fresh verification code when enforcement is ON
  (previously ignored the code -> a password-only attacker could lift the gate).
  Shares the 5-attempt lockout and timing-safe compare. Dev bypass retained.
- REQUIRE_2FA parsing normalized (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive);
  startup warning extended to the empty-env/mock-client/enforced-2FA confusion.

GDPR:
- anonymize_user() SQL now scrubs two_factor_* columns + staff notes, so the
  idle-account batch cleanup (CleanupIdleAccounts) is erasure-clean, not just
  the user-initiated delete path.

Webhooks:
- dispute.created for an untracked Square payment now raises a
  critical_payment_log admin notification (chargeback the app can't reconcile
  is never silent). Reason strings truncated on rune boundaries (valid UTF-8).
  Stale at-most-once comment corrected; revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding
  duplication noted.

Sweep/mock parity:
- Mock CreatePayment dedup is now source-aware (IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED on
  source mismatch) matching ReplayPaymentByKey and real Square.
- COMPLETED-but-never-polled terminal till-sale checkouts are now recorded by
  the sweep (previously only booking checkouts were; till charges were
  invisible until the 24h blind-fail WARN).
- Legacy snapshot-less minimal-body replay, SQUARE_LOCATION_ID drift, and
  in-memory-mock-restart limitations documented.

Docs:
- Webhook path corrected everywhere (/webhooks/square, not /api/webhooks/square
  - a deployer following the old path would 404 and silently lose all webhook
  reconciliation).
- 2FA enforcement semantics + code-delivery mechanism documented accurately
  (fail-closed default; log-delivery channel; disable re-verification).
- README/User Manual note the 2FA requirement on online saved-card payments.

Tests: 2,151 (up from 2,142). Backend 26/27 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres doesn't offer scram-sha-256 for the
test role; package is byte-identical to HEAD and untouched here). Frontend
builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots e9b0f0f2a7 fix: review-loop hardening — identical-body replay, 2FA gates, webhook at-least-once, GDPR scrub 
Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the
review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced.

Money-safety:
- Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored
  square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original
  payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending
  forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge).
- Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card
  sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface
  ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.)
- Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales
  claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog.
- Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom
  'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending.
- Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card.
- Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the
  booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse).
- M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total].

2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments:
- Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into
  all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account
  admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces.
- Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit
  mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env.
- Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare);
  plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev).
- GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes.

Infra/docs:
- nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80
  redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS;
  separate webhook rate-limit zone.
- Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id +
  square_request_snapshot.
- Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips
  policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected.
- Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26
  packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 5e3dc9b428 fix: comprehensive payment system hardening (4 review passes) 
CRITICAL fixes:
- C1: JWT exp claim now validated via jwtauth.VerifyToken (was Decode)
- C2: OverrideAmount validated post-substitution (prevents negative money minting)
- C3: Terminal gift-card payments store gift_card_id; refund credits user balance
- C4: Refund dedup returns stored amount, not req.Amount (prevents admin mislead)
- C5: Booking recheck uses FOR UPDATE (prevents TOCTOU with cancellation)
- C6: processChargeGroup idempotency key stable (charge-only, prevents double-refund)

MAJOR fixes:
- M2: Gift-card refund UPDATE checks RowsAffected; 0 rows -> failed
- M3: ProcessCancellationRefund returns commit error (was swallowed)
- M5: Dispute webhook handling (created + state.updated + disputes table)

MEDIUM fixes:
- ME1: CORS restricted to FRONTEND_ORIGIN env var (was reflect-any)
- ME2: anonymize_user() scrubs users.notes, bookings.notes, name_history, refresh_tokens
- ME3: Webhook handlers now mutate state (payment.updated, refund.updated)

Frontend fixes:
- Same-key retry on 503 (ambiguous failure) wired to all 8 payment flows
- CHARGE_AND_STORE intent for save-card flows (SCA compliance)
- Nonce staleness check verified across all flows

Additional fixes from adversarial re-review:
- F1: Till-sale completed dedup echoes stored amount (C4-class)
- F2: Cash/giftcard terminal path uses FOR UPDATE (C5-class)
- F3: Square-success UPDATE checks RowsAffected (till sales)
- F4: Dispute reason truncated to 192 chars (prevents INSERT failure)
- F5: Booking-user lookup failure marks refund failed (prevents silent money loss)
- F6: Saved-card/tip rechecks wrapped in transaction (C5 residual)

Tests:
- 15 adversarial attack tests (negative override, zero override, terminal gift card,
  refund dedup, TOCTOU, deleted gift card, advisory lock, overcharge, zero/negative/huge
  amount, raw PAN, missing auth, gift card balance, concurrent refunds)
- 14 webhook state tests (dispute created/state, payment/refund updated)
- 3 CORS tests, 3 GDPR tests, 1 HTTP timeout test
- Full suite passes with -race (25 packages, 0 failures)

25 files changed, +1532/-275 lines
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00