b7122be3a064581b0cac6ebb36cbd619749ab1fe
4
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 popertots
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9a182db932 |
fix: full-scope review — tip-inclusive amount_due, sweep deposit-strand, A6 clamp cap, B13 clawback, 2FA single-use, mint audit, account-deletion re-auth, refresh dedup
Full-scope Loop A restart review (18 findings across money/security/dup-mod): MONEY: - HIGH: amount_paid/amount_due CTEs now exclude payment_type='tip' (bookings.go x6, today.go) — a tip before the final balance no longer undercharges the booking - MEDIUM-HIGH: pending payment row stores the actual chargeAmount (not req.Amount) so the sweep replay amount-match rescues deposit-with-discount rows instead of auto-refunding them; refundSweepDuplicateCharge refunds the replayed payment's actual amount - MEDIUM: A6 deposit clamp-up now caps at the discounted obligation (remainingPence - eligibleDiscountPence) — no more silent overcharge when a campaign discount >= deposit - MEDIUM: B13 campaign-loss balance credits are clawed back on cancellation (clawbackB13CampaignCredit in ProcessCancellationRefundTx) - LOW: replayLegitimateRetryWindow extended 22h->24h so a legitimate same-key retry in the retry-eligible window is rescued, not auto-refunded SECURITY: - 2FA single-use strengthened (consume-at-gate for fresh charges, re-issue on failure) - Admin 2FA mint now writes admin_audit_log + logs code reuse - Account deletion requires current password (and 2FA when enforced) — stolen token can no longer destroy the account - Multi-tab refresh-token replay deduped via cross-tab lock (no false family-kill alerts) - family-alive cache invalidated on password change / GDPR erasure - Login lockout keyed per user+IP with a capped ceiling FRONTEND/DUP-MOD: - OverflowTipConfirm shared component (UserPaymentModal + BookingFlow); overflow computation aligned (deposit-discount-aware) - PaymentModal admin 2FA gate now method-conditioned (no over-reveal on cash/giftcard) - requestTwoFactorCode shared helper (requestNewTwoFactorCode + adminRequestNewTwoFactorCode) - BookingFlow deposit display aligned to the discounted amount; formatCurrency used consistently 26/26 backend packages; 80/80 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41. |
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popertots
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7c424b28b8 |
fix: loop-B adversarial findings — tip-type double-charge, tip-refund capacity, loyalty stamp farming, gate ordering, auth amplification, admin audit log
Loop B restart (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) fixes: - CRITICAL: CreateTerminalPayment rejects payment_type='tip' (mirrors CreateBookingPayment) — a tip-typed admin charge no longer records the FULL amount as a tip and double-collects (all is-paid computations exclude tip rows) - HIGH: tip refunds can no longer re-open booking capacity — refunded_total subqueries filter payment_type <> 'tip' (service.go) and RefundPayment rejects tip rows - MEDIUM: loyalty-stamp farming closed — stamp award once-per-booking via loyalty_stamp_awarded_at column (init-script.sql) + existing same-day guard - MEDIUM: CreateTipPayment/CreateBookingPayment 2FA gates moved AFTER the idempotency completed-dedup (code consumed only on new money paths; terminal path already correct) — lost-response retries return the completed payment instead of 400 - MEDIUM: replayRescueLowerBoundSkew widened to 5m (DB-clock-skew stranded originals now rescued) - MEDIUM-1: verifyFamilyAlive DB amplification reduced via 30s bounded family-alive cache; admin route group rate-limited - MEDIUM-3: admin saved-card charges now write admin_audit_log (handlers.go helper + till); [2FA] log line decoupled from user identity - LOW-1: logout scoped to the presented token's family (no cross-session kill) - LOW-2: refresh-reuse grace widened for same-IP replays - LOW-4: squareEnvironmentMismatch enforced for empty env - LOW-5: uuid.ts hard-fails on Math.random fallback (crypto.randomUUID) - Cash/giftcard tip-enabled overflow mirrors the card-terminal carve 26/26 backend packages; 72/72 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41. |
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popertots
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4d5d2cd381 |
fix: restart-loop-A findings — pending sweep refunds, tip carve on discounts, TOCTOU redemption, single-use 2FA code + mint endpoint, refresh-token family revocation, admin 2FA code UX
Restart of Loop A (fresh review -> fix -> verify) findings from commit 5e967fa: - B1: sweep auto-refund treats Square PENDING refunds as NON-terminal (row stays pending, no gift-card clawback, refunds row inserted for payments AND till_sales, re-polls the deterministic sweepdup- key); Square-less pre-pass exempts square_refund_id IS NOT NULL rows - M4: terminal tip carve accounts for pending campaign discounts (headroom = total - pending - paid) so explicit tips aren't absorbed as service revenue; no-tip case stays a single record - max_redemptions TOCTOU closed with atomic conditional UPDATE ... RETURNING; exhausted-at-apply surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed - 2FA: verification code is single-use on the saved-card gate (VerifyForUser consume=true, interactive flows unaffected); new POST /api/user/2fa/code mints a fresh code for enabled users (RequireAuth + RequireNonGuest + mint cooldown + per-user limiter) - Refresh tokens: family_id + used_at columns; reuse of an already-rotated token revokes the ENTIRE family and inserts a refresh_token_reuse admin alert; rotation mints descendants in the same family - Frontend: 2FA code input + Request-a-new-code on all saved-card surfaces; admin modal keys code input to customer 2FA + 403 self-heal; tip-display note for pending discounts; 76 frontend tests - Verified: all 26 backend packages pass, frontend build+tests green, env-docs 41/41 |
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popertots
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fe88f2084d |
fix: review-loop B — adversarial findings (sweep auto-refund, admin clamp, 2FA real challenge, opaque refresh tokens, gated client IP, GBP pence)
Loop B aggressive adversarial round (3 attack agents) + fix + secondary + verification:
- CRITICAL: sweep replay auto-refunds provably-created-later duplicate charges (gated on parseable CreatedAt); 22h legitimate-retry window == 22h sweep cutoff (no dead zone)
- HIGH: admin Take Payment clamps to remaining obligation (cash/giftcard/saved-card/terminal); no unintended tip from overflow; campaign credit against remaining
- HIGH: /api/services/eligible-for/{id} requires auth + owner-or-admin (DOB/age + patch-test health-data leak closed)
- HIGH: opaque refresh-token rotation (login/refresh return {token, jti, refreshToken}; refresh REQUIRES opaque token; single-use rotation; logout revokes; access token rejected at refresh)
- HIGH: saved-card charges require a REAL 2FA verification code (B6/B10) — backend gate on all 8 charge paths + shared TwoFactorCodeInput frontend component on all 7 surfaces; 2FA gate is no longer setup-flag-only
- MEDIUM: ungated CF-Connecting-IP in reserve/admin_reserve gated via exported mw.ClientIP; 2FA limiter keyed on userID alone (no header-rotation bypass); ChangePassword actually revokes JTI + refresh tokens; 2FA setup mint cooldown + persistent failed-attempt counter; campaign redemption race surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- Terminal saved-card VAT applied (was under-collected); age-guard reconcile failures notify; isWeakJWTSecret entropy gate; gift-card redeem per-card counter + per-user limiter; webhook signature key startup validation
- NEW internal/twofa package (single source of truth breaking the payments<->user import cycle); consolidation of duplicate 2FA hash/verify
- Frontend: refresh-token storage + rotation, TwoFactorCodeInput component, amountPaidPence in admin modal, B5/B6/B10 contract wiring; 70 frontend tests
- Tests: loop_b_fixes_test.go, internal/twofa tests, updated auth/services/profile/twofa/mw tests
All 26 backend packages pass (incl. internal/twofa); frontend 70/70 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
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