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popertotsandSisyphus 9a12a2d886 fix: round-3 — tip gate asymmetry, webhook VAT align + 503 notifications, cash-tip campaign overcharge, lockout DoS, erasure durability, S3 retry cap, env parsing, per-user rate limiters, consume dead code, frontend 2FA remnants 
- tip gate: CreateTipPayment saved-card 2FA gate now has scaTokenizedSavedCard skip matching every other charge surface (booking, terminal, gift-card); isSCATokenizeResultShape escape added to tip SAVE gate
- webhook: align UPDATE clears VAT fields before re-apply (matches sweep rescue); 503 unknown-event tracking with 24h timeout notification via square_webhook_events table
- cash-tip: cashChargeBasePence no longer restores campaign or subtracts loyalty — overcharge and tip shortfall fixed; 2FA dead code remnants removed from gift-card buy flow; TwoFactorCodeInput help text deconfused; refund pre-fill unit mismatch fixed (pounds vs pence); SCA buyer names split from full_name; passwordless delete UI accepts empty password
- lockout: successful current-password clears shared failed_attempts/locked_until (victim can recover from login lockout via password change); passwordless delete condition changed to require 2FA only in enforced env
- erasure: stale-guest batch erasure persists Square card/customer targets to durable outbox before NULLing them (crash-safe); S3 deletion retry capped at 10 attempts with admin notification; S3_PROFILE_PICS_BUCKET startup check added
- env parsing: IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv and Square HTTP client base-URL switch now normalize (ToLower+TrimSpace) for consistency
- auth: change-password/delete-account get per-user rate limiters (10/min); consume param dead code suppressed with TODO
- frontend: 2FA/SCA dead code removed from gift-card buy flow, TwoFactorCodeInput help text fixed, refund pre-fill unit mismatch fixed, buyer names populated from full_name

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)
 2026-08-22 00:34:51 +01:00
popertots 1429eddd34 fix: payments hardening — SCA wire contract (saved-card ref + tokenize-result), terminal/till token routing, tip-cap overflow carve, completion campaign atomicity, orphan B1-evidence gate, gift-card gates/locks, admin backstops 
- ValidateCardInfo accepts saved-card ref + new_card_token coexistence (matches resolveChargeSource); new_card_token added to terminal/till request structs so SCA tokens are never dropped
- maxOnlineTipPence (£250) enforced on the overflow-tip carve AND buildSplitRecords (both carve paths) — closes the £10k bypass
- completion-path campaign increments made atomic reserve-first (conditional UPDATE ... RETURNING) + schema backstops (chk_times_redeemed, partial unique index on milestone redemptions)
- webhook orphan detection gated on B1 evidence (b1_attempts / sweep-duplicate refund row) so a delayed legit completion is never marked failed
- gift-card: per-user £500/day cap lock held across read-modify-write, expired-card top-up gate, NaN/Inf float bounds, refund_failed ack filter, on_the_house excluded from balance, postChargeRecheck notification
- admin apply-redemption route + admin-or-owner, in-handler isAdminRequest on 4 gift-card handlers, tip lock key aligned
- 2FA fallback machinery removed (insertTwoFAFallbackAudit/reissue/consent), dead fields stripped from charge structs
- tests: prod-tag suite, mock SCA parity, tip-cap overflow, completion races, cards pagination, ValidateCardInfo tables
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 2cdbad0cea feat: SCA-only saved-card charges — 2FA charge fallback removed (C6), versioned consent fields, token provenance 
PSR 2017 reg 100 makes SCA mandatory and non-waivable for customer-initiated
stored-credential charges; a merchant-side 2FA check cannot legally substitute
for it (authorising a token-less charge via 2FA leaves the MERCHANT liable for
ECI 7 / SLI 210 chargebacks and reg 77(6) compensation regardless of consent).

- payments/twofa.go: the homegrown 2FA fallback for token-less saved-card
  charges is REMOVED ENTIRELY. requireTwoFactorForCardAccess is now SCA-only:
  a non-empty Square verification_token (charge surfaces, token forwarded to
  Square) skips the gate; anything else is refused 402 verification_required.
  enforceSCAFallbackConsent is a compile-compatible no-op (fallback never runs).
- New requireTwoFactorForCardAccessWithTokenValidation distinguishes surfaces
  where the token IS forwarded to Square (charge — Square validates it) from
  card-SAVE surfaces (token client-asserted, never forwarded: a non-empty token
  must NOT skip the save gate, auth-F1).
- SCA tokenize-result wire contract (C1): a saved card charged with a fresh
  one-time tokenize-result sends the token as the charge SOURCE (new_card_token
  -> source_id) alongside saved_card_id, never a separate verification_token.
  resolveChargeSource resolves the saved-card branch FIRST (customer from the
  card row, token as source) so combined token+card requests are SCA-clean.
- C6 consent fields (consent_version / consent_accepted) added to the booking/
  tip/till/gift-card charge requests, enforced server-side before any fallback
  charge could reach Square and recorded on the 2fa_fallback_charge audit row;
  logVerificationTokenProvenance traces minted tokens to their charge.
- user 2FA issuance gate refactored into pure build-agnostic functions
  (twoFAPepperConfigured / twoFADeliveryChannelConfigured /
  twoFAEnsureIssueAllowedStrict) shared with the payments re-issue path and
  exercised directly by the test,dev suite; TWO_FACTOR_FALLBACK switch and
  .env.example entry removed; startup posture notes updated.
- Test coverage: fail-closed 2FA production gates (pepper/delivery), token
  validation on save vs charge surfaces, completion idempotency, idempotency
  key determinism, refund-policy 72h/24h epsilon boundaries, VAT parity.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 4e398a7a2b fix: round-2 loop-B adversarial (503c326 baseline) — B1 webhook race, APPROVED refund semantics, notification cap single-source, 2FA cooldown/StateFor hardening, register bcrypt semaphore 
Round 2 Loop B red-team (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) findings on the full payments overhaul:

MONEY:
- HIGH: webhook COMPLETED promotion now resolves the B1 parent row (mirrors the re-poll resolveB1ParentFailed + till-sale clawback) — the sweep no longer re-replays an expired key into stacked unauthorized charges
- HIGH: A6 deposit-with-discount clamp — chargeAmount capped to max(0, remaining-discount) for ALL discount cases; overflow guard compares against the discounted remaining
- MED-HIGH: APPROVED refunds treated as NON-terminal at the webhook (event-driven, may still fail); payments call sites aligned; FAILED can now demote an APPROVED-then-failed row
- MED: B1 refund transport-error fails the row + CRITICAL immediately (no 3-charge stacking)
- MED: till_sales capped-fail surfaces the outstanding funding (gift_card_transactions trace) for manual reversal
- MED: guest-bookings cash/gift-card terminal charges now audited (NULL target); audit reordered post-commit; cancellation refunds audited
- MED: A6 no-discount skip-path returns campaign_fully_redeemed 400 (no success-shaped no-op); skip-path writes a marker row for idempotency

SECURITY:
- HIGH: notification cap centralized in adminnotify (MaxUnacknowledgedCriticalLogs) + applied at ALL insert sites (webhooks x2, jwt refresh_token_reuse, account erasure, sweep, twofa) with suppressed-insert logging; per-issue bucket for reissue alerts
- MED-HIGH: twofa.StateFor saturated state made IMMUTABLE (LastMintAt writes are no-ops; no cross-user throttling); eviction never drops in-window count>0 records
- MED: /register now uses the shared bcrypt semaphore (authBcryptSlots, 20) — botnet CPU burn bounded
- MED: NAT collateral reduced (429-reject only at top progressive tier; lower tiers sleep)
- MED: ClearMintCooldownForUser exposed for fresh-charge success; reissue cooldown-skip raises a capped alert
- LOW: audit coverage gaps (reschedule fee forgiveness, gift-card transfer, clawback) closed

DUP/MOD:
- Frontend deposit-percent literals -> POLICY constants (10 sites); LOYALTY_DISCOUNT_RATE single-sourced; generateUUID adopted; admin PaymentModal overflow-tip confirm path added; £500 gift-card cap named

Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod (CI condition), both vet tags, frontend tests+build, env-docs 42/42.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 3866cc5963 fix: round-2 loop-A fresh review (503c326 baseline) — B1 replay cap, A6 discount record, 2FA reissue+cooldown, notification flood, lockout saturation, VAT/refund-status consolidation 
Round 2 Loop A fresh money/security/dup-mod review. 23 findings fixed:

MONEY:
- CRITICAL: B1 duplicate auto-refund gains an attempt cap (b1_attempts col, cap 3) —
  a rejected auto-refund no longer re-replays the expired key every sweep run
  (which minted a stacking unauthorized charge each time); FAILED-webhook
  demotion respects the cap; never re-replay a key whose B1 refund failed
- HIGH: A6 deposit_covered_by_discount skip path now APPLIES the eligible
  campaign discount rows immediately (capped) instead of skipping with no
  discount recorded — no more promised-discount-not-recorded overcharge
- MEDIUM: 2FA code burned by the SAVE gate is re-issued on failed
  new-card+save_card charges (re-issue guard now covers req.SaveCard)
- LOW: GetBookingPaymentSummary excludes tip rows from paidAmount (remaining
  now matches the authoritative tip-excluded balance)

SECURITY:
- MEDIUM: unacknowledged CRITICAL admin-notification flood capped (global cap
  on critical_payment_log + refresh_token_reuse rows)
- MEDIUM: 2FA reissue no longer bypasses the mint cooldown (Check no longer
  clears LastMintAt on gate-verify; cleared on terminal charge success)
- MEDIUM: twofa.StateFor map-saturation returns a shared permanently-locked
  state instead of a fresh 5-guess budget per request
- MEDIUM: ProgressiveRateLimit rejects 429 past maxProgressiveSleepDelayMs
  instead of sleeping unboundedly; login bcrypt concurrency semaphore added
- LOW: loginInProgress 409->429; webhook key-set/URL-unset startup check;
  email-verification per-user attempt counter

DUP/MOD:
- formatCurrency single source (frontend format.ts, 7 files consolidated);
  SquareRefundStatusToLocal single source (errors.go, all sites); admin
  audit-log helper dedup; SCA retry model unified (proactive on all 6
  surfaces); buyDailyTotal/daily-cap mirror via backend; lock TTL from
  backend; generateUUID at all card-form sites; magic numbers named
  (defaultPostgresHost, epsilon, fee constants); admin CASH + gift-card
  terminal charges now audited; DAV_SKIP_INIT documented in manuals

Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod (GO_TESTING=1, the CI condition), both vet
tags, frontend tests+build, env-docs 42/42.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots dfe856b181 fix: loop-B adversarial (503c326 baseline) — IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED reclassified ambiguous, 2FA reissue fail-closed alerts, family-cache crash window, consolidation regression checks 
Loop B red-team (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) findings on the full payments overhaul:

- CRITICAL-ish: IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (409) no longer classified as a definitive
  402 in chargeFailureStatus — it means the ORIGINAL charge may have landed with
  a different body, so it is now AMBIGUOUS (503): the frontend keeps the same
  idempotency key, the pending row stays rescuable by the sweep (which already
  treated it as ambiguous), and the frontend no longer regenerates the key into
  a possible double charge. SCA verification-required codes remain definitive 402.
- HIGH: reissueTwoFACodeAfterFailedCharge now writes a CRITICAL admin notification
  (insertCriticalPaymentNotification) when issuance is refused (missing pepper /
  unavailable delivery) instead of silently stranding the customer; documented that
  a pepper CHANGE invalidates all pending codes.
- MEDIUM: family-alive cache invalidation crash window documented (invalidate-after-
  commit leaves up to 30s warm on a crash; the near-TTL DB re-check bounds it).
- Consolidation regression checks (8b2fe3b helpers): writeChargeSnapshot guard
  preserved at all sites, postChargeRecheck identical, squareRefundStatusToLocal
  mappings verified, reissue fresh-only semantics confirmed at all 5 call sites.

Verified: 26/26 dev packages, both vet tags, frontend tests + build, env-docs 42/42.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 36887167c6 fix: loop-A fresh review (503c326 baseline) — overflow-guard bypass, discounted-deposit retry, GDPR audit scrub, till cap, sweep rescue, 2FA reissue + SCA retry, consolidation round 
Loop A fresh money/security/dup-mod review of the whole payments overhaul. 28 consolidated findings fixed:

MONEY:
- HIGH-1: B12 overflow guard now uses the discounted obligation — a pre-start deposit can never mint an unintended tip; the discount is never truncated to £0 when the customer pays the discounted deposit
- HIGH-2: discounted-deposit pending-reuse retry compares pendingStoredAmountPence vs chargeAmount (the actual Square amount), not req.Amount — no more permanent amount_mismatch 400 on lost-response retries
- MEDIUM-3: sweep rescue now carves overflow as a tip record + runs completion side-effects (was booking overflow as service revenue, skipping completion)
- MEDIUM-4 (shared w/ security): admin_audit_log.admin_id made nullable + anonymize_user/delete_guest_user NULL it + scrub details.card_last4 — 2fa_fallback_charge PII no longer survives account deletion
- MEDIUM-5: till gift-card payment now passes the £5,000/day admin cap (giftcard_limits)
- LOW-6: expired gift-card balance surfaced as expired/zero in GetUserGiftCardBalance

SECURITY:
- 2FA single-use consume made atomic at verify time for all 5 saved-card gates (fresh charges consume; pending-reuse retries don't); deferred consumption removed
- reissueTwoFACodeAfterFailedCharge routed through the fail-closed issuance gate (pepper check, cooldown) + fresh-only semantics (only when a code was actually consumed)
- family-alive cache invalidated on the stale-family cleanup DELETE (no 30s warm window after expiry)
- frontend 503-retry no longer reuses a consumed 2FA code — aligns with backend re-issue

DUP/MOD:
- reissue helper single-sourced (5 call sites), squareRefundStatusToLocal (10 inline switches), writeChargeSnapshot (7 sites, immutability guard on gift-card/till), postChargeRecheck (3+1 sites), scanIdempotencySlot (2), applyVATToChargeRecord (3 patterns), user_saved_cards upsert (2), BuyGiftCard pending INSERT via service
- till completed-dedup now re-validates paymentHasLiveRefund (aligns with booking/tip/gift-card)
- frontend 402 idempotency-key regeneration added to PaymentModal (aligns with other CIT surfaces)
- PAYMENT_METHOD_SAVED_CARD constant standardised ('saved_card' everywhere)
- admin audit coverage added for AdminRefundBooking + gift-card buy/top-up
- audit-helper cross-package dedup (user/twofa.go now calls payments' exported insert)

Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod packages, both vet tags, frontend tests + build, gitleaks clean.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 5dae0bba08 feat: Square 3DS2 SCA primary authorisation for saved-card charges; 2FA demoted to audited backup 
SCA is now the PRIMARY authorisation for saved-card (ccof) charges (PSR 2017 /
chargeback liability shift); the homegrown 2FA becomes a BACKUP used only when
SCA is unavailable (e.g. a bank without in-app approval), with a strict audit
trail. The 'approve in your banking app' UX comes from Square buyer
verification. Email/SMS remains the intended 2FA delivery channel; the [2FA]
stdout-log relay (TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true) is the explicit-insecure
pre-email/SMS stopgap.

BACKEND:
- CreateTerminalPaymentRequest gains VerificationToken (forwarded to Square in
  the admin saved-card branch; validated like the other charge handlers)
- Structured SCA-required error surfacing: isVerificationRequiredError +
  writeVerificationRequiredResponse (HTTP 402 with {code:'verification_required'})
  at all 5 charge error sites — the frontend keys on it to trigger the challenge
- requireTwoFactorForCardAccess reworked: SCA token present => 2FA skipped
  (SCA primary); no token => 2FA fallback requires delivery channel + consume +
  insertTwoFAFallbackAudit (admin_audit_log reason 2fa_fallback_charge,
  {sca_performed:false,...}); TWO_FACTOR_FALLBACK env flag (default true) gates
  the fallback; false => SCA-only posture
- MIT vs CIT: admin till saved-card + admin booking saved-card charges now flag
  customer_initiated=false (merchant-initiated, no SCA, no liability shift);
  customer-initiated online flows keep true

FRONTEND:
- square_card_id threaded through SavedCard/SelectableCard + admin lists
- isVerificationRequiredSignal + shouldFallbackTo2FA helpers (402 + code / text
  fallback); VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_MESSAGE
- tokenizeSavedCardWithVerification (Square SDK tokenize(details, squareCardId))
  with verified/challenge-cancelled/sca-unavailable/sca-failed outcomes
- Per-surface SCA retry with the SAME idempotency key + fresh verification_token
  (booking/tip/till/gift-card/admin); 'waiting for approval in your banking
  app' state on admin surfaces; 2FA backup-only UX in the shared composable

MOCK PARITY:
- SimulateSavedCardVerificationRequired toggle (default off) + grandfathering
- Challenge state (ApprovePendingVerification/DenyPendingVerification,
  ChallengeResult config, token-encoded _ok|_deny outcome)
- One-time-use verify_mock_ token ledger + amount/source binding
- MockCardForm saved-card verification simulation + mock Approve button
- Tests: saved-card SCA gate, one-time-use, denied, amount-mismatch,
  grandfathered; frontend helper tests

DOCS: payments-doc SCA appendix, Technical Manual 2FA section, README,
Overview, Feature Catalog updated to SCA-primary + 2FA-backup; env-var
documented (42/42).

26/26 backend packages; 95/95 frontend tests + build; env-docs 42/42.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 7c424b28b8 fix: loop-B adversarial findings — tip-type double-charge, tip-refund capacity, loyalty stamp farming, gate ordering, auth amplification, admin audit log 
Loop B restart (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) fixes:
- CRITICAL: CreateTerminalPayment rejects payment_type='tip' (mirrors CreateBookingPayment) — a tip-typed admin charge no longer records the FULL amount as a tip and double-collects (all is-paid computations exclude tip rows)
- HIGH: tip refunds can no longer re-open booking capacity — refunded_total subqueries filter payment_type <> 'tip' (service.go) and RefundPayment rejects tip rows
- MEDIUM: loyalty-stamp farming closed — stamp award once-per-booking via loyalty_stamp_awarded_at column (init-script.sql) + existing same-day guard
- MEDIUM: CreateTipPayment/CreateBookingPayment 2FA gates moved AFTER the idempotency completed-dedup (code consumed only on new money paths; terminal path already correct) — lost-response retries return the completed payment instead of 400
- MEDIUM: replayRescueLowerBoundSkew widened to 5m (DB-clock-skew stranded originals now rescued)
- MEDIUM-1: verifyFamilyAlive DB amplification reduced via 30s bounded family-alive cache; admin route group rate-limited
- MEDIUM-3: admin saved-card charges now write admin_audit_log (handlers.go helper + till); [2FA] log line decoupled from user identity
- LOW-1: logout scoped to the presented token's family (no cross-session kill)
- LOW-2: refresh-reuse grace widened for same-IP replays
- LOW-4: squareEnvironmentMismatch enforced for empty env
- LOW-5: uuid.ts hard-fails on Math.random fallback (crypto.randomUUID)
- Cash/giftcard tip-enabled overflow mirrors the card-terminal carve

26/26 backend packages; 72/72 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 4d5d2cd381 fix: restart-loop-A findings — pending sweep refunds, tip carve on discounts, TOCTOU redemption, single-use 2FA code + mint endpoint, refresh-token family revocation, admin 2FA code UX 
Restart of Loop A (fresh review -> fix -> verify) findings from commit 5e967fa:
- B1: sweep auto-refund treats Square PENDING refunds as NON-terminal (row stays pending, no gift-card clawback, refunds row inserted for payments AND till_sales, re-polls the deterministic sweepdup- key); Square-less pre-pass exempts square_refund_id IS NOT NULL rows
- M4: terminal tip carve accounts for pending campaign discounts (headroom = total - pending - paid) so explicit tips aren't absorbed as service revenue; no-tip case stays a single record
- max_redemptions TOCTOU closed with atomic conditional UPDATE ... RETURNING; exhausted-at-apply surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- 2FA: verification code is single-use on the saved-card gate (VerifyForUser consume=true, interactive flows unaffected); new POST /api/user/2fa/code mints a fresh code for enabled users (RequireAuth + RequireNonGuest + mint cooldown + per-user limiter)
- Refresh tokens: family_id + used_at columns; reuse of an already-rotated token revokes the ENTIRE family and inserts a refresh_token_reuse admin alert; rotation mints descendants in the same family
- Frontend: 2FA code input + Request-a-new-code on all saved-card surfaces; admin modal keys code input to customer 2FA + 403 self-heal; tip-display note for pending discounts; 76 frontend tests
- Verified: all 26 backend packages pass, frontend build+tests green, env-docs 41/41
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots fe88f2084d fix: review-loop B — adversarial findings (sweep auto-refund, admin clamp, 2FA real challenge, opaque refresh tokens, gated client IP, GBP pence) 
Loop B aggressive adversarial round (3 attack agents) + fix + secondary + verification:
- CRITICAL: sweep replay auto-refunds provably-created-later duplicate charges (gated on parseable CreatedAt); 22h legitimate-retry window == 22h sweep cutoff (no dead zone)
- HIGH: admin Take Payment clamps to remaining obligation (cash/giftcard/saved-card/terminal); no unintended tip from overflow; campaign credit against remaining
- HIGH: /api/services/eligible-for/{id} requires auth + owner-or-admin (DOB/age + patch-test health-data leak closed)
- HIGH: opaque refresh-token rotation (login/refresh return {token, jti, refreshToken}; refresh REQUIRES opaque token; single-use rotation; logout revokes; access token rejected at refresh)
- HIGH: saved-card charges require a REAL 2FA verification code (B6/B10) — backend gate on all 8 charge paths + shared TwoFactorCodeInput frontend component on all 7 surfaces; 2FA gate is no longer setup-flag-only
- MEDIUM: ungated CF-Connecting-IP in reserve/admin_reserve gated via exported mw.ClientIP; 2FA limiter keyed on userID alone (no header-rotation bypass); ChangePassword actually revokes JTI + refresh tokens; 2FA setup mint cooldown + persistent failed-attempt counter; campaign redemption race surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- Terminal saved-card VAT applied (was under-collected); age-guard reconcile failures notify; isWeakJWTSecret entropy gate; gift-card redeem per-card counter + per-user limiter; webhook signature key startup validation
- NEW internal/twofa package (single source of truth breaking the payments<->user import cycle); consolidation of duplicate 2FA hash/verify
- Frontend: refresh-token storage + rotation, TwoFactorCodeInput component, amountPaidPence in admin modal, B5/B6/B10 contract wiring; 70 frontend tests
- Tests: loop_b_fixes_test.go, internal/twofa tests, updated auth/services/profile/twofa/mw tests

All 26 backend packages pass (incl. internal/twofa); frontend 70/70 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots faceb9809c fix: review-loop A — discount credit on admin payments, campaign over-credit cap, sweep replay window, dedup refund revalidation, duplication/modularisation, GBP pence naming 
Round-A fresh review (6 agents) + fix + secondary cross-cutting + verification rounds:
- F1: campaign discounts reduce the charged amount (deposit credit + admin PaymentModal discounted total); capDiscountToRemainingObligation prevents over-credit at completion in all four campaign blocks
- F2: sweep replay rescue distinguishes legitimate same-key retries (21h window) from expired-key new charges; ccof blind-fails leave pending + CRITICAL instead of clawing back
- F3: post-start online overflow carved as a tip record (mirrors terminal split builder)
- A1: single-source Square decline-code classification (till delegates to square.IsDefinitivePaymentError)
- A2/A5: refund attempt-cap literals consolidated; refund-failure counter capped + reset on terminal resolutions + admin notifications
- A3/A9: idempotency helpers adopted across derivations; IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv relocated + all gates unified (incl. health-check)
- A7: 2FA user+IP limiter + TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS startup warning; SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY startup validation; TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER docs corrected
- A8: snapshot encryption on all 6 write sites + marker-aware reuse paths; MPV->SPV effective voucher type (single VAT point)
- A10/A11/A12/A16: gift-card slot scan advances past failed; amount-aware refund reconciliation; completed-booking refund re-check; PaymentWasRefunded on SquareClient interface
- Dedup refund revalidation on tip/terminal/gift-card paths; sweep acknowledged_at IS NULL parity; refund-notification single source (exported payments.InsertRefundFailedNotifications)
- Duplication/modularisation round: shared frontend helpers (sanitizeDecimalInput, campaignDiscountCents, twoFactorBlocksSavedCards getter, generateUUID), single-source MaxIdempotencyKeyLength, notification-helper consolidation, snapshot-guard comments
- Cross-cutting GBP rename: Cents->Pence across backend + frontend + tests (26 identifiers, 16 files)
- Tests: 11 behavior-change tests updated to new invariants; coverage for fixed functions; frontend vitest 55 tests; docs corrected (test counts, 2FA delivery, pre-launch checklist, resolution status)
- gitleaks: allowlist backend/internal/square test fixtures (mock idempotency keys)

All 25 backend packages pass; frontend 55/55 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 9bb812669e fix: fresh-review round — 2FA deliverability, disable re-verification, GDPR batch scrub, dispute alerting, docs accuracy 
Second fresh-eyes review pass (7 agents: goal, security, code-quality,
context-mining, webhooks+2FA, client+mock+sweep, refunds/giftcards/handlers).
Money-safety core verified sound (identical-body replay byte-lossless, clawback
gated on definitive proof, no double-charge window). This round fixes the
issues the fresh pass surfaced:

2FA:
- Setup now DELIVERS the code via the [2FA] server log in ALL modes (was:
  nothing in enforced mode -> production 2FA was an unbreakable dead-end and
  saved-card charges were permanently 403). Enforced mode still withholds the
  code from the API response; the log line is the fake delivery channel until
  email/SMS lands (P6).
- Disabling 2FA now requires a fresh verification code when enforcement is ON
  (previously ignored the code -> a password-only attacker could lift the gate).
  Shares the 5-attempt lockout and timing-safe compare. Dev bypass retained.
- REQUIRE_2FA parsing normalized (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive);
  startup warning extended to the empty-env/mock-client/enforced-2FA confusion.

GDPR:
- anonymize_user() SQL now scrubs two_factor_* columns + staff notes, so the
  idle-account batch cleanup (CleanupIdleAccounts) is erasure-clean, not just
  the user-initiated delete path.

Webhooks:
- dispute.created for an untracked Square payment now raises a
  critical_payment_log admin notification (chargeback the app can't reconcile
  is never silent). Reason strings truncated on rune boundaries (valid UTF-8).
  Stale at-most-once comment corrected; revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding
  duplication noted.

Sweep/mock parity:
- Mock CreatePayment dedup is now source-aware (IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED on
  source mismatch) matching ReplayPaymentByKey and real Square.
- COMPLETED-but-never-polled terminal till-sale checkouts are now recorded by
  the sweep (previously only booking checkouts were; till charges were
  invisible until the 24h blind-fail WARN).
- Legacy snapshot-less minimal-body replay, SQUARE_LOCATION_ID drift, and
  in-memory-mock-restart limitations documented.

Docs:
- Webhook path corrected everywhere (/webhooks/square, not /api/webhooks/square
  - a deployer following the old path would 404 and silently lose all webhook
  reconciliation).
- 2FA enforcement semantics + code-delivery mechanism documented accurately
  (fail-closed default; log-delivery channel; disable re-verification).
- README/User Manual note the 2FA requirement on online saved-card payments.

Tests: 2,151 (up from 2,142). Backend 26/27 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres doesn't offer scram-sha-256 for the
test role; package is byte-identical to HEAD and untouched here). Frontend
builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots e9b0f0f2a7 fix: review-loop hardening — identical-body replay, 2FA gates, webhook at-least-once, GDPR scrub 
Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the
review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced.

Money-safety:
- Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored
  square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original
  payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending
  forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge).
- Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card
  sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface
  ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.)
- Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales
  claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog.
- Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom
  'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending.
- Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card.
- Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the
  booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse).
- M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total].

2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments:
- Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into
  all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account
  admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces.
- Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit
  mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env.
- Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare);
  plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev).
- GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes.

Infra/docs:
- nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80
  redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS;
  separate webhook rate-limit zone.
- Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id +
  square_request_snapshot.
- Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips
  policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected.
- Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26
  packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00