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Author SHA1 Message Date
popertots 5dae0bba08 feat: Square 3DS2 SCA primary authorisation for saved-card charges; 2FA demoted to audited backup 
SCA is now the PRIMARY authorisation for saved-card (ccof) charges (PSR 2017 /
chargeback liability shift); the homegrown 2FA becomes a BACKUP used only when
SCA is unavailable (e.g. a bank without in-app approval), with a strict audit
trail. The 'approve in your banking app' UX comes from Square buyer
verification. Email/SMS remains the intended 2FA delivery channel; the [2FA]
stdout-log relay (TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true) is the explicit-insecure
pre-email/SMS stopgap.

BACKEND:
- CreateTerminalPaymentRequest gains VerificationToken (forwarded to Square in
  the admin saved-card branch; validated like the other charge handlers)
- Structured SCA-required error surfacing: isVerificationRequiredError +
  writeVerificationRequiredResponse (HTTP 402 with {code:'verification_required'})
  at all 5 charge error sites — the frontend keys on it to trigger the challenge
- requireTwoFactorForCardAccess reworked: SCA token present => 2FA skipped
  (SCA primary); no token => 2FA fallback requires delivery channel + consume +
  insertTwoFAFallbackAudit (admin_audit_log reason 2fa_fallback_charge,
  {sca_performed:false,...}); TWO_FACTOR_FALLBACK env flag (default true) gates
  the fallback; false => SCA-only posture
- MIT vs CIT: admin till saved-card + admin booking saved-card charges now flag
  customer_initiated=false (merchant-initiated, no SCA, no liability shift);
  customer-initiated online flows keep true

FRONTEND:
- square_card_id threaded through SavedCard/SelectableCard + admin lists
- isVerificationRequiredSignal + shouldFallbackTo2FA helpers (402 + code / text
  fallback); VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_MESSAGE
- tokenizeSavedCardWithVerification (Square SDK tokenize(details, squareCardId))
  with verified/challenge-cancelled/sca-unavailable/sca-failed outcomes
- Per-surface SCA retry with the SAME idempotency key + fresh verification_token
  (booking/tip/till/gift-card/admin); 'waiting for approval in your banking
  app' state on admin surfaces; 2FA backup-only UX in the shared composable

MOCK PARITY:
- SimulateSavedCardVerificationRequired toggle (default off) + grandfathering
- Challenge state (ApprovePendingVerification/DenyPendingVerification,
  ChallengeResult config, token-encoded _ok|_deny outcome)
- One-time-use verify_mock_ token ledger + amount/source binding
- MockCardForm saved-card verification simulation + mock Approve button
- Tests: saved-card SCA gate, one-time-use, denied, amount-mismatch,
  grandfathered; frontend helper tests

DOCS: payments-doc SCA appendix, Technical Manual 2FA section, README,
Overview, Feature Catalog updated to SCA-primary + 2FA-backup; env-var
documented (42/42).

26/26 backend packages; 95/95 frontend tests + build; env-docs 42/42.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 7c424b28b8 fix: loop-B adversarial findings — tip-type double-charge, tip-refund capacity, loyalty stamp farming, gate ordering, auth amplification, admin audit log 
Loop B restart (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) fixes:
- CRITICAL: CreateTerminalPayment rejects payment_type='tip' (mirrors CreateBookingPayment) — a tip-typed admin charge no longer records the FULL amount as a tip and double-collects (all is-paid computations exclude tip rows)
- HIGH: tip refunds can no longer re-open booking capacity — refunded_total subqueries filter payment_type <> 'tip' (service.go) and RefundPayment rejects tip rows
- MEDIUM: loyalty-stamp farming closed — stamp award once-per-booking via loyalty_stamp_awarded_at column (init-script.sql) + existing same-day guard
- MEDIUM: CreateTipPayment/CreateBookingPayment 2FA gates moved AFTER the idempotency completed-dedup (code consumed only on new money paths; terminal path already correct) — lost-response retries return the completed payment instead of 400
- MEDIUM: replayRescueLowerBoundSkew widened to 5m (DB-clock-skew stranded originals now rescued)
- MEDIUM-1: verifyFamilyAlive DB amplification reduced via 30s bounded family-alive cache; admin route group rate-limited
- MEDIUM-3: admin saved-card charges now write admin_audit_log (handlers.go helper + till); [2FA] log line decoupled from user identity
- LOW-1: logout scoped to the presented token's family (no cross-session kill)
- LOW-2: refresh-reuse grace widened for same-IP replays
- LOW-4: squareEnvironmentMismatch enforced for empty env
- LOW-5: uuid.ts hard-fails on Math.random fallback (crypto.randomUUID)
- Cash/giftcard tip-enabled overflow mirrors the card-terminal carve

26/26 backend packages; 72/72 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 4d5d2cd381 fix: restart-loop-A findings — pending sweep refunds, tip carve on discounts, TOCTOU redemption, single-use 2FA code + mint endpoint, refresh-token family revocation, admin 2FA code UX 
Restart of Loop A (fresh review -> fix -> verify) findings from commit 5e967fa:
- B1: sweep auto-refund treats Square PENDING refunds as NON-terminal (row stays pending, no gift-card clawback, refunds row inserted for payments AND till_sales, re-polls the deterministic sweepdup- key); Square-less pre-pass exempts square_refund_id IS NOT NULL rows
- M4: terminal tip carve accounts for pending campaign discounts (headroom = total - pending - paid) so explicit tips aren't absorbed as service revenue; no-tip case stays a single record
- max_redemptions TOCTOU closed with atomic conditional UPDATE ... RETURNING; exhausted-at-apply surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- 2FA: verification code is single-use on the saved-card gate (VerifyForUser consume=true, interactive flows unaffected); new POST /api/user/2fa/code mints a fresh code for enabled users (RequireAuth + RequireNonGuest + mint cooldown + per-user limiter)
- Refresh tokens: family_id + used_at columns; reuse of an already-rotated token revokes the ENTIRE family and inserts a refresh_token_reuse admin alert; rotation mints descendants in the same family
- Frontend: 2FA code input + Request-a-new-code on all saved-card surfaces; admin modal keys code input to customer 2FA + 403 self-heal; tip-display note for pending discounts; 76 frontend tests
- Verified: all 26 backend packages pass, frontend build+tests green, env-docs 41/41
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots fe88f2084d fix: review-loop B — adversarial findings (sweep auto-refund, admin clamp, 2FA real challenge, opaque refresh tokens, gated client IP, GBP pence) 
Loop B aggressive adversarial round (3 attack agents) + fix + secondary + verification:
- CRITICAL: sweep replay auto-refunds provably-created-later duplicate charges (gated on parseable CreatedAt); 22h legitimate-retry window == 22h sweep cutoff (no dead zone)
- HIGH: admin Take Payment clamps to remaining obligation (cash/giftcard/saved-card/terminal); no unintended tip from overflow; campaign credit against remaining
- HIGH: /api/services/eligible-for/{id} requires auth + owner-or-admin (DOB/age + patch-test health-data leak closed)
- HIGH: opaque refresh-token rotation (login/refresh return {token, jti, refreshToken}; refresh REQUIRES opaque token; single-use rotation; logout revokes; access token rejected at refresh)
- HIGH: saved-card charges require a REAL 2FA verification code (B6/B10) — backend gate on all 8 charge paths + shared TwoFactorCodeInput frontend component on all 7 surfaces; 2FA gate is no longer setup-flag-only
- MEDIUM: ungated CF-Connecting-IP in reserve/admin_reserve gated via exported mw.ClientIP; 2FA limiter keyed on userID alone (no header-rotation bypass); ChangePassword actually revokes JTI + refresh tokens; 2FA setup mint cooldown + persistent failed-attempt counter; campaign redemption race surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- Terminal saved-card VAT applied (was under-collected); age-guard reconcile failures notify; isWeakJWTSecret entropy gate; gift-card redeem per-card counter + per-user limiter; webhook signature key startup validation
- NEW internal/twofa package (single source of truth breaking the payments<->user import cycle); consolidation of duplicate 2FA hash/verify
- Frontend: refresh-token storage + rotation, TwoFactorCodeInput component, amountPaidPence in admin modal, B5/B6/B10 contract wiring; 70 frontend tests
- Tests: loop_b_fixes_test.go, internal/twofa tests, updated auth/services/profile/twofa/mw tests

All 26 backend packages pass (incl. internal/twofa); frontend 70/70 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots faceb9809c fix: review-loop A — discount credit on admin payments, campaign over-credit cap, sweep replay window, dedup refund revalidation, duplication/modularisation, GBP pence naming 
Round-A fresh review (6 agents) + fix + secondary cross-cutting + verification rounds:
- F1: campaign discounts reduce the charged amount (deposit credit + admin PaymentModal discounted total); capDiscountToRemainingObligation prevents over-credit at completion in all four campaign blocks
- F2: sweep replay rescue distinguishes legitimate same-key retries (21h window) from expired-key new charges; ccof blind-fails leave pending + CRITICAL instead of clawing back
- F3: post-start online overflow carved as a tip record (mirrors terminal split builder)
- A1: single-source Square decline-code classification (till delegates to square.IsDefinitivePaymentError)
- A2/A5: refund attempt-cap literals consolidated; refund-failure counter capped + reset on terminal resolutions + admin notifications
- A3/A9: idempotency helpers adopted across derivations; IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv relocated + all gates unified (incl. health-check)
- A7: 2FA user+IP limiter + TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS startup warning; SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY startup validation; TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER docs corrected
- A8: snapshot encryption on all 6 write sites + marker-aware reuse paths; MPV->SPV effective voucher type (single VAT point)
- A10/A11/A12/A16: gift-card slot scan advances past failed; amount-aware refund reconciliation; completed-booking refund re-check; PaymentWasRefunded on SquareClient interface
- Dedup refund revalidation on tip/terminal/gift-card paths; sweep acknowledged_at IS NULL parity; refund-notification single source (exported payments.InsertRefundFailedNotifications)
- Duplication/modularisation round: shared frontend helpers (sanitizeDecimalInput, campaignDiscountCents, twoFactorBlocksSavedCards getter, generateUUID), single-source MaxIdempotencyKeyLength, notification-helper consolidation, snapshot-guard comments
- Cross-cutting GBP rename: Cents->Pence across backend + frontend + tests (26 identifiers, 16 files)
- Tests: 11 behavior-change tests updated to new invariants; coverage for fixed functions; frontend vitest 55 tests; docs corrected (test counts, 2FA delivery, pre-launch checklist, resolution status)
- gitleaks: allowlist backend/internal/square test fixtures (mock idempotency keys)

All 25 backend packages pass; frontend 55/55 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 9bb812669e fix: fresh-review round — 2FA deliverability, disable re-verification, GDPR batch scrub, dispute alerting, docs accuracy 
Second fresh-eyes review pass (7 agents: goal, security, code-quality,
context-mining, webhooks+2FA, client+mock+sweep, refunds/giftcards/handlers).
Money-safety core verified sound (identical-body replay byte-lossless, clawback
gated on definitive proof, no double-charge window). This round fixes the
issues the fresh pass surfaced:

2FA:
- Setup now DELIVERS the code via the [2FA] server log in ALL modes (was:
  nothing in enforced mode -> production 2FA was an unbreakable dead-end and
  saved-card charges were permanently 403). Enforced mode still withholds the
  code from the API response; the log line is the fake delivery channel until
  email/SMS lands (P6).
- Disabling 2FA now requires a fresh verification code when enforcement is ON
  (previously ignored the code -> a password-only attacker could lift the gate).
  Shares the 5-attempt lockout and timing-safe compare. Dev bypass retained.
- REQUIRE_2FA parsing normalized (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive);
  startup warning extended to the empty-env/mock-client/enforced-2FA confusion.

GDPR:
- anonymize_user() SQL now scrubs two_factor_* columns + staff notes, so the
  idle-account batch cleanup (CleanupIdleAccounts) is erasure-clean, not just
  the user-initiated delete path.

Webhooks:
- dispute.created for an untracked Square payment now raises a
  critical_payment_log admin notification (chargeback the app can't reconcile
  is never silent). Reason strings truncated on rune boundaries (valid UTF-8).
  Stale at-most-once comment corrected; revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding
  duplication noted.

Sweep/mock parity:
- Mock CreatePayment dedup is now source-aware (IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED on
  source mismatch) matching ReplayPaymentByKey and real Square.
- COMPLETED-but-never-polled terminal till-sale checkouts are now recorded by
  the sweep (previously only booking checkouts were; till charges were
  invisible until the 24h blind-fail WARN).
- Legacy snapshot-less minimal-body replay, SQUARE_LOCATION_ID drift, and
  in-memory-mock-restart limitations documented.

Docs:
- Webhook path corrected everywhere (/webhooks/square, not /api/webhooks/square
  - a deployer following the old path would 404 and silently lose all webhook
  reconciliation).
- 2FA enforcement semantics + code-delivery mechanism documented accurately
  (fail-closed default; log-delivery channel; disable re-verification).
- README/User Manual note the 2FA requirement on online saved-card payments.

Tests: 2,151 (up from 2,142). Backend 26/27 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres doesn't offer scram-sha-256 for the
test role; package is byte-identical to HEAD and untouched here). Frontend
builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots e9b0f0f2a7 fix: review-loop hardening — identical-body replay, 2FA gates, webhook at-least-once, GDPR scrub 
Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the
review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced.

Money-safety:
- Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored
  square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original
  payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending
  forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge).
- Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card
  sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface
  ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.)
- Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales
  claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog.
- Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom
  'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending.
- Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card.
- Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the
  booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse).
- M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total].

2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments:
- Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into
  all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account
  admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces.
- Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit
  mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env.
- Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare);
  plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev).
- GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes.

Infra/docs:
- nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80
  redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS;
  separate webhook rate-limit zone.
- Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id +
  square_request_snapshot.
- Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips
  policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected.
- Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26
  packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00