d0d72d8cafc3418e6c03da2573bea03793dae4f4
83
Commits
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 popertots
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8d9f72b9f0 |
feat: CardDAV profile sync writes through dav.Service (photo included, DAV_BASE_URL retired)
- profile.go updateCardDAV now writes directly to the shared dav_cards table via dav.Service (mirroring registration) instead of PUTting a vCard to DAV_BASE_URL over HTTP — the Go backend no longer needs the SabreDAV URL, only the sabredav PHP container uses the server-side credential. - dav/types.go: ContactInput gains PhotoURL; GenerateVCard emits the PHOTO;VALUE=URI line when set, so the profile photo syncs into the address book. DAV_BASE_URL is retained in .env.example for reference only. |
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popertots
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69a854d857 |
fix: admin notification flood caps (C5) at every remaining insert site; gift-card expiry-sweep TOCTOU (M4)
- adminnotify: MaxUnacknowledgedCriticalLogs global cap exposed as CriticalLogsCapExceeded — a pre-check helper every insert site pairs with the atomic fold inside its INSERT (count-then-insert is atomic, closing the TOCTOU where concurrent inserts could both read a below-cap count). - jobs/cleanup.go ScanCriticalPaymentLogs: capped at the shared cap, pre-check skips the scan and logs the suppression. - scheduling: 1_week_no_pay, 1_month_no_pay, default_hours_changed, deposit_not_paid_by_deadline and the Square-erasure critical notification all flood-capped with pre-check + atomic fold (per-booking/per-user dedup kept). - time-blockers.go CleanupExpiredGiftCards (M4): the expiry SELECT now runs under FOR UPDATE row locks so the read-expired-then-zero window is atomic — a concurrent top-up either commits before the SELECT (refreshed last_used_at drops the card out of the predicate) or blocks until the sweep's tx ends and revives the zeroed card via its own expiry refresh; the top-up value can never be destroyed by the sweep. - flood-cap tests added for 1_week_no_pay; adminnotify unit coverage added. |
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popertots
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d25ba16aa7 |
feat: Square SCA tokenize-result wire contract — token as source_id, byte-identical dev mock
The CURRENT saved-card SCA contract (Square card.tokenize(verificationDetails, cardId)) returns a one-time tokenize-result that must be sent as the charge SOURCE (source_id), not a separate verification_token. - square_dev.go: the mock validates the WIRE BODY (mockPaymentWireBody — an independently assembled copy of buildCreatePaymentBody) so it accepts exactly the request shape the real client emits. SimulateSavedCardVerificationRequired now demands SCA on every saved-card charge in both wire shapes: (a) a genuine tokenize-result (cnon:sca-... — isSCATokenizeResultSource) as source_id + customer_id is ACCEPTED (the token IS the buyer verification); a RAW card.tokenize() nonce in the tokenize-result slot is REJECTED CARD_DECLINED_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED (money-F2 — the mock is the enforcement point that stops the forged shape); (b) legacy ccof: + verification_token is kept for backward-compat. - square_http_client.go: byte-identical body assembly shared with the mock, so TestCreatePayment_SCA_SavedCard_WireBody_ByteIdentical pins the mock and the real client emit identical CreatePayment bodies (a wire drift fails the test before reaching prod). |
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popertots
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1179293777 |
fix: 2FA single-use consume is DB-atomic; login lockout escalates 15/30/60m with uniform 401
F5.5 brute-force hardening: - internal/twofa.Check consume is now a conditional UPDATE (WHERE id AND two_factor_pending_code_hash) reporting rows affected: two concurrent verifications of the same code on different instances both match the digest, but only the first conditional UPDATE can affect a row — the loser sees 0 rows and fails MissingOrExpired, so one code authorizes exactly ONE operation across instances (the per-user mutex only serialized within one process). - /login lockout is now indistinguishable from a wrong password: a locked account returns the same uniform 401 'invalid credentials' and burns the same constant-time bcrypt compare (via the shared semaphore), removing the account-existence oracle and lockout-probing signal of the old 429. - Lockout tiers escalate 15m (5+) / 30m (7+) / 60m (10+): an attacker who keeps guessing past each unlock makes the lock LONGER, raising the repeat-DoS effort while the response stays uniform. |
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popertots
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4e398a7a2b |
fix: round-2 loop-B adversarial (503c326 baseline) — B1 webhook race, APPROVED refund semantics, notification cap single-source, 2FA cooldown/StateFor hardening, register bcrypt semaphore
Round 2 Loop B red-team (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) findings on the full payments overhaul: MONEY: - HIGH: webhook COMPLETED promotion now resolves the B1 parent row (mirrors the re-poll resolveB1ParentFailed + till-sale clawback) — the sweep no longer re-replays an expired key into stacked unauthorized charges - HIGH: A6 deposit-with-discount clamp — chargeAmount capped to max(0, remaining-discount) for ALL discount cases; overflow guard compares against the discounted remaining - MED-HIGH: APPROVED refunds treated as NON-terminal at the webhook (event-driven, may still fail); payments call sites aligned; FAILED can now demote an APPROVED-then-failed row - MED: B1 refund transport-error fails the row + CRITICAL immediately (no 3-charge stacking) - MED: till_sales capped-fail surfaces the outstanding funding (gift_card_transactions trace) for manual reversal - MED: guest-bookings cash/gift-card terminal charges now audited (NULL target); audit reordered post-commit; cancellation refunds audited - MED: A6 no-discount skip-path returns campaign_fully_redeemed 400 (no success-shaped no-op); skip-path writes a marker row for idempotency SECURITY: - HIGH: notification cap centralized in adminnotify (MaxUnacknowledgedCriticalLogs) + applied at ALL insert sites (webhooks x2, jwt refresh_token_reuse, account erasure, sweep, twofa) with suppressed-insert logging; per-issue bucket for reissue alerts - MED-HIGH: twofa.StateFor saturated state made IMMUTABLE (LastMintAt writes are no-ops; no cross-user throttling); eviction never drops in-window count>0 records - MED: /register now uses the shared bcrypt semaphore (authBcryptSlots, 20) — botnet CPU burn bounded - MED: NAT collateral reduced (429-reject only at top progressive tier; lower tiers sleep) - MED: ClearMintCooldownForUser exposed for fresh-charge success; reissue cooldown-skip raises a capped alert - LOW: audit coverage gaps (reschedule fee forgiveness, gift-card transfer, clawback) closed DUP/MOD: - Frontend deposit-percent literals -> POLICY constants (10 sites); LOYALTY_DISCOUNT_RATE single-sourced; generateUUID adopted; admin PaymentModal overflow-tip confirm path added; £500 gift-card cap named Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod (CI condition), both vet tags, frontend tests+build, env-docs 42/42. |
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popertots
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3866cc5963 |
fix: round-2 loop-A fresh review (503c326 baseline) — B1 replay cap, A6 discount record, 2FA reissue+cooldown, notification flood, lockout saturation, VAT/refund-status consolidation
Round 2 Loop A fresh money/security/dup-mod review. 23 findings fixed: MONEY: - CRITICAL: B1 duplicate auto-refund gains an attempt cap (b1_attempts col, cap 3) — a rejected auto-refund no longer re-replays the expired key every sweep run (which minted a stacking unauthorized charge each time); FAILED-webhook demotion respects the cap; never re-replay a key whose B1 refund failed - HIGH: A6 deposit_covered_by_discount skip path now APPLIES the eligible campaign discount rows immediately (capped) instead of skipping with no discount recorded — no more promised-discount-not-recorded overcharge - MEDIUM: 2FA code burned by the SAVE gate is re-issued on failed new-card+save_card charges (re-issue guard now covers req.SaveCard) - LOW: GetBookingPaymentSummary excludes tip rows from paidAmount (remaining now matches the authoritative tip-excluded balance) SECURITY: - MEDIUM: unacknowledged CRITICAL admin-notification flood capped (global cap on critical_payment_log + refresh_token_reuse rows) - MEDIUM: 2FA reissue no longer bypasses the mint cooldown (Check no longer clears LastMintAt on gate-verify; cleared on terminal charge success) - MEDIUM: twofa.StateFor map-saturation returns a shared permanently-locked state instead of a fresh 5-guess budget per request - MEDIUM: ProgressiveRateLimit rejects 429 past maxProgressiveSleepDelayMs instead of sleeping unboundedly; login bcrypt concurrency semaphore added - LOW: loginInProgress 409->429; webhook key-set/URL-unset startup check; email-verification per-user attempt counter DUP/MOD: - formatCurrency single source (frontend format.ts, 7 files consolidated); SquareRefundStatusToLocal single source (errors.go, all sites); admin audit-log helper dedup; SCA retry model unified (proactive on all 6 surfaces); buyDailyTotal/daily-cap mirror via backend; lock TTL from backend; generateUUID at all card-form sites; magic numbers named (defaultPostgresHost, epsilon, fee constants); admin CASH + gift-card terminal charges now audited; DAV_SKIP_INIT documented in manuals Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod (GO_TESTING=1, the CI condition), both vet tags, frontend tests+build, env-docs 42/42. |
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popertots
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4e64e32f09 |
fix: dav prod-tag test panic (DB init in package init), README SPV-only VAT claim
Quick wins from the Loop B close-out: - backend/internal/dav/service_prod.go: package-level init() connected to postgres and panicked when the DB was unreachable — breaking bare-shell 'go test -tags test,!dev' and any CI test-prod run without a live service. init() now skips connecting under GO_TESTING (the pipeline sets it) or DAV_SKIP_INIT, and defaults POSTGRES_HOST to 127.0.0.1 (the pipeline postgres-service address, matching testutils/testdb) so real prod builds still connect. The test suite wires its own pool in TestMain. - README.md:21: corrected stale 'Gift card SPV/MPV VAT treatment configurable' to the SPV-only posture (a stored MPV is overridden to SPV at read time). Verified: 26/26 dev packages, both vet tags clean. |
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popertots
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36887167c6 |
fix: loop-A fresh review (503c326 baseline) — overflow-guard bypass, discounted-deposit retry, GDPR audit scrub, till cap, sweep rescue, 2FA reissue + SCA retry, consolidation round
Loop A fresh money/security/dup-mod review of the whole payments overhaul. 28 consolidated findings fixed:
MONEY:
- HIGH-1: B12 overflow guard now uses the discounted obligation — a pre-start deposit can never mint an unintended tip; the discount is never truncated to £0 when the customer pays the discounted deposit
- HIGH-2: discounted-deposit pending-reuse retry compares pendingStoredAmountPence vs chargeAmount (the actual Square amount), not req.Amount — no more permanent amount_mismatch 400 on lost-response retries
- MEDIUM-3: sweep rescue now carves overflow as a tip record + runs completion side-effects (was booking overflow as service revenue, skipping completion)
- MEDIUM-4 (shared w/ security): admin_audit_log.admin_id made nullable + anonymize_user/delete_guest_user NULL it + scrub details.card_last4 — 2fa_fallback_charge PII no longer survives account deletion
- MEDIUM-5: till gift-card payment now passes the £5,000/day admin cap (giftcard_limits)
- LOW-6: expired gift-card balance surfaced as expired/zero in GetUserGiftCardBalance
SECURITY:
- 2FA single-use consume made atomic at verify time for all 5 saved-card gates (fresh charges consume; pending-reuse retries don't); deferred consumption removed
- reissueTwoFACodeAfterFailedCharge routed through the fail-closed issuance gate (pepper check, cooldown) + fresh-only semantics (only when a code was actually consumed)
- family-alive cache invalidated on the stale-family cleanup DELETE (no 30s warm window after expiry)
- frontend 503-retry no longer reuses a consumed 2FA code — aligns with backend re-issue
DUP/MOD:
- reissue helper single-sourced (5 call sites), squareRefundStatusToLocal (10 inline switches), writeChargeSnapshot (7 sites, immutability guard on gift-card/till), postChargeRecheck (3+1 sites), scanIdempotencySlot (2), applyVATToChargeRecord (3 patterns), user_saved_cards upsert (2), BuyGiftCard pending INSERT via service
- till completed-dedup now re-validates paymentHasLiveRefund (aligns with booking/tip/gift-card)
- frontend 402 idempotency-key regeneration added to PaymentModal (aligns with other CIT surfaces)
- PAYMENT_METHOD_SAVED_CARD constant standardised ('saved_card' everywhere)
- admin audit coverage added for AdminRefundBooking + gift-card buy/top-up
- audit-helper cross-package dedup (user/twofa.go now calls payments' exported insert)
Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod packages, both vet tags, frontend tests + build, gitleaks clean.
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popertots
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b7122be3a0 |
fix: SCA review round + gitea pipeline green — GDPR audit scrub, backend test gaps, frontend SCA/Square-API, docs parity
7 review agents (pipeline run, self-review, codebase-context, frontend-placement, backend testing-gaps, Square-API, docs-parity) audited the SCA-primary work. ALL findings fixed, including every pre-existing red CI job: GDPR (HIGH): - anonymize_user() now scrubs admin_audit_log.target_user_id (mirrors delete_guest_user) so 2fa_fallback_charge rows (customer id + card_last4 PII) no longer survive registered-user account deletion; gdpr test added BACKEND TEST GAPS (all 10): - delivery-unavailable 503 branch: prod-tag predicate test + dev-variant marker - twoFactorFallbackEnabled alias/case/default matrix tests + exported wrapper - insertTwoFAFallbackAudit details-JSON shape + audit-row assertions for all 6 gate sites (booking/tip/gift-card/payment-method/terminal/till, both actors) - CreateTerminalPayment.VerificationToken: passthrough, too-long 400, 2FA-skip, token-less fallback + SCA-required (new terminal_sca_test.go) - isVerificationRequiredError at all 5 charge sites (402 + code:verification_required) - customer_initiated handler-level assertions (MIT false admin / CIT true customer) - Mock: ApprovePendingVerification, ChallengeResult auto/deny, _deny token suffix, parseVerifyToken unit tests FRONTEND SCA + Square-API (CRITICAL): - tokenizeSavedCardWithVerification reads result.token (the verified token) not result.verificationResult (deprecated verifyBuyer shape — saved-card SCA could never succeed in production before); parseTokenizeVerificationResult pure fn extracted + pinned in square.test.ts; 'verified' with no token proceeds tokenless - HIGH: saved-card idempotency key regenerated after a definitive 402 (fresh token under the same key = IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED dead-loop); kept on 503/cancelled - challenge-cancelled copy no longer promises a 2FA fallback the UI doesn't show; 'waiting for approval in your banking app' state on CIT surfaces - sca-unavailable demotion resets per attempt; card selection disabled mid-challenge; genuine saved-card declines no longer relabeled 'requires verification'; modal-close guard during processing; retry affordance standardized PIPELINE (every red job now green): - prod-tag build break fixed (shared square stub + test_helpers_test.go, prod-safe) - govulncheck: x/image 0.45.0 bumped (x/text resolved); go mod tidy clean - race: TestDeleteAccount_InvalidatesSquareCustomerCache made deterministic - DAV_ADMIN_PASSWORD placeholder in .env.example (compose config passes) - frontend: prettier 28 files, eslint, a11y 38 errors, knip (currentZIndex), deps in-range, audit vulns (nanoid/postcss) — all fixed; 67 vitest cases DOCS PARITY (6 DRIFTs + 5 GAPs): payments doc Ch4/Ch14/Appendix A, Technical Manual 2FA + counter-reset + payment sections, README test counts + SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY, Feature Catalog, .env.example REQUIRE_2FA — SCA-primary/2FA-backup posture verified against code everywhere Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod packages, both vet tags, golangci-lint/staticcheck/ gosec 0 on both tags, gitleaks clean, 2,464 backend + 67 frontend tests. |
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popertots
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5dae0bba08 |
feat: Square 3DS2 SCA primary authorisation for saved-card charges; 2FA demoted to audited backup
SCA is now the PRIMARY authorisation for saved-card (ccof) charges (PSR 2017 /
chargeback liability shift); the homegrown 2FA becomes a BACKUP used only when
SCA is unavailable (e.g. a bank without in-app approval), with a strict audit
trail. The 'approve in your banking app' UX comes from Square buyer
verification. Email/SMS remains the intended 2FA delivery channel; the [2FA]
stdout-log relay (TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true) is the explicit-insecure
pre-email/SMS stopgap.
BACKEND:
- CreateTerminalPaymentRequest gains VerificationToken (forwarded to Square in
the admin saved-card branch; validated like the other charge handlers)
- Structured SCA-required error surfacing: isVerificationRequiredError +
writeVerificationRequiredResponse (HTTP 402 with {code:'verification_required'})
at all 5 charge error sites — the frontend keys on it to trigger the challenge
- requireTwoFactorForCardAccess reworked: SCA token present => 2FA skipped
(SCA primary); no token => 2FA fallback requires delivery channel + consume +
insertTwoFAFallbackAudit (admin_audit_log reason 2fa_fallback_charge,
{sca_performed:false,...}); TWO_FACTOR_FALLBACK env flag (default true) gates
the fallback; false => SCA-only posture
- MIT vs CIT: admin till saved-card + admin booking saved-card charges now flag
customer_initiated=false (merchant-initiated, no SCA, no liability shift);
customer-initiated online flows keep true
FRONTEND:
- square_card_id threaded through SavedCard/SelectableCard + admin lists
- isVerificationRequiredSignal + shouldFallbackTo2FA helpers (402 + code / text
fallback); VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_MESSAGE
- tokenizeSavedCardWithVerification (Square SDK tokenize(details, squareCardId))
with verified/challenge-cancelled/sca-unavailable/sca-failed outcomes
- Per-surface SCA retry with the SAME idempotency key + fresh verification_token
(booking/tip/till/gift-card/admin); 'waiting for approval in your banking
app' state on admin surfaces; 2FA backup-only UX in the shared composable
MOCK PARITY:
- SimulateSavedCardVerificationRequired toggle (default off) + grandfathering
- Challenge state (ApprovePendingVerification/DenyPendingVerification,
ChallengeResult config, token-encoded _ok|_deny outcome)
- One-time-use verify_mock_ token ledger + amount/source binding
- MockCardForm saved-card verification simulation + mock Approve button
- Tests: saved-card SCA gate, one-time-use, denied, amount-mismatch,
grandfathered; frontend helper tests
DOCS: payments-doc SCA appendix, Technical Manual 2FA section, README,
Overview, Feature Catalog updated to SCA-primary + 2FA-backup; env-var
documented (42/42).
26/26 backend packages; 95/95 frontend tests + build; env-docs 42/42.
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popertots
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1543160f6a |
fix: loop-B full-scope adversarial findings — tip-excluded detail endpoints, £0-charge guard, 24h window, 2FA single-use everywhere
Loop B full-scope red-team (money/security/dup-mod) findings: - CRITICAL: booking detail handlers (GetBookingHandler/GetAdminBookingHandler) now exclude payment_type='tip' from amount_paid — a tip before the final balance no longer undercharges the booking (bookings.go x3 sites) - HIGH: A6 deposit clamp adds a zero-guard — when the eligible discount covers the entire deposit, the flow returns deposit_covered_by_discount instead of charging £0 at Square (real Square rejects £0; the mock accepted it); square_dev CreatePayment + CreateRefund now reject Amount <= 0 (mock/prod parity) - HIGH: replayLegitimateRetryWindow restored to 22h (== stalePendingKeyedAge) so sweep-produced duplicate charges are still auto-refunded, not rescued-and-hidden - HIGH: 2FA single-use consume-at-gate applied to ALL saved-card charge gates (booking 2263, admin saved-card 960, tip 4483, till 967, gift-card purchase 1482) with re-issue-on-failed-charge on each; pending-reuse retries keep their code - MEDIUM: 2FA re-issue now fires only when the gate actually consumed a code (fresh saved-card path) — new-card failures no longer silently burn a standing code - MEDIUM: pre_start tip-exclusion consistent across admin lists + detail handlers (bookings.go) - MEDIUM: remaining-balance counts pending refunds (service.go) — capacity consistent with GetBookingPaymentInfo - Mock CreatePayment/CreateRefund reject £0 amounts (INVALID_REQUEST_ERROR) for dev/prod parity 26/26 backend packages; 80/80 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41. |
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popertots
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9a182db932 |
fix: full-scope review — tip-inclusive amount_due, sweep deposit-strand, A6 clamp cap, B13 clawback, 2FA single-use, mint audit, account-deletion re-auth, refresh dedup
Full-scope Loop A restart review (18 findings across money/security/dup-mod): MONEY: - HIGH: amount_paid/amount_due CTEs now exclude payment_type='tip' (bookings.go x6, today.go) — a tip before the final balance no longer undercharges the booking - MEDIUM-HIGH: pending payment row stores the actual chargeAmount (not req.Amount) so the sweep replay amount-match rescues deposit-with-discount rows instead of auto-refunding them; refundSweepDuplicateCharge refunds the replayed payment's actual amount - MEDIUM: A6 deposit clamp-up now caps at the discounted obligation (remainingPence - eligibleDiscountPence) — no more silent overcharge when a campaign discount >= deposit - MEDIUM: B13 campaign-loss balance credits are clawed back on cancellation (clawbackB13CampaignCredit in ProcessCancellationRefundTx) - LOW: replayLegitimateRetryWindow extended 22h->24h so a legitimate same-key retry in the retry-eligible window is rescued, not auto-refunded SECURITY: - 2FA single-use strengthened (consume-at-gate for fresh charges, re-issue on failure) - Admin 2FA mint now writes admin_audit_log + logs code reuse - Account deletion requires current password (and 2FA when enforced) — stolen token can no longer destroy the account - Multi-tab refresh-token replay deduped via cross-tab lock (no false family-kill alerts) - family-alive cache invalidated on password change / GDPR erasure - Login lockout keyed per user+IP with a capped ceiling FRONTEND/DUP-MOD: - OverflowTipConfirm shared component (UserPaymentModal + BookingFlow); overflow computation aligned (deposit-discount-aware) - PaymentModal admin 2FA gate now method-conditioned (no over-reveal on cash/giftcard) - requestTwoFactorCode shared helper (requestNewTwoFactorCode + adminRequestNewTwoFactorCode) - BookingFlow deposit display aligned to the discounted amount; formatCurrency used consistently 26/26 backend packages; 80/80 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41. |
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7c424b28b8 |
fix: loop-B adversarial findings — tip-type double-charge, tip-refund capacity, loyalty stamp farming, gate ordering, auth amplification, admin audit log
Loop B restart (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) fixes: - CRITICAL: CreateTerminalPayment rejects payment_type='tip' (mirrors CreateBookingPayment) — a tip-typed admin charge no longer records the FULL amount as a tip and double-collects (all is-paid computations exclude tip rows) - HIGH: tip refunds can no longer re-open booking capacity — refunded_total subqueries filter payment_type <> 'tip' (service.go) and RefundPayment rejects tip rows - MEDIUM: loyalty-stamp farming closed — stamp award once-per-booking via loyalty_stamp_awarded_at column (init-script.sql) + existing same-day guard - MEDIUM: CreateTipPayment/CreateBookingPayment 2FA gates moved AFTER the idempotency completed-dedup (code consumed only on new money paths; terminal path already correct) — lost-response retries return the completed payment instead of 400 - MEDIUM: replayRescueLowerBoundSkew widened to 5m (DB-clock-skew stranded originals now rescued) - MEDIUM-1: verifyFamilyAlive DB amplification reduced via 30s bounded family-alive cache; admin route group rate-limited - MEDIUM-3: admin saved-card charges now write admin_audit_log (handlers.go helper + till); [2FA] log line decoupled from user identity - LOW-1: logout scoped to the presented token's family (no cross-session kill) - LOW-2: refresh-reuse grace widened for same-IP replays - LOW-4: squareEnvironmentMismatch enforced for empty env - LOW-5: uuid.ts hard-fails on Math.random fallback (crypto.randomUUID) - Cash/giftcard tip-enabled overflow mirrors the card-terminal carve 26/26 backend packages; 72/72 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41. |
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a6a4683b74 |
fix: review round — B1 clock-skew tolerance + re-poll escalation, refresh-token access-token revocation, shared 2FA composable, per-package-DB test alignment
Three fresh reviews (money/security/dup-mod) cross-validated findings: - MEDIUM: B1 'new charge' discrimination adds a lower-bound tolerance (replayRescueLowerBoundSkew) so a retained-key replay of the ORIGINAL charge (DB clock ahead of Square) is never auto-refunded; ambiguous margins leave PENDING + CRITICAL - MEDIUM: B1 re-poll escalates after stalePendingB1RefundAge (48h) — FAILED/REJECTED refunds go terminal (fail parent, claw back till-sale funding, CRITICAL notification); no more unbounded re-polling / stranded parents without webhooks - DRIFT-REAL: processManualPaymentGroup now checks PENDING/FAILED/REJECTED on the synchronous refund response (mirrors processChargeGroup/manual handler) — no more premature 'completed' - HIGH: refresh-token family kill now also invalidates the attacker's freshly-minted ACCESS token — access tokens carry a family_id claim and VerifyToken rejects tokens whose family was deleted (GenerateTokenForFamily + family-alive check); 30s grace window for concurrent two-tab refresh (no false theft alert) - LOW: 2FA mint endpoint returns remaining_seconds; in-memory 2FA counters documented; 90-day refresh expiry single-sourced (RefreshTokenLifetime + make_interval) - Dup/mod: NEW shared useTwoFactorCodeForSavedCard Svelte composable replaces 6 surface copies of the 2FA gate logic (Request-a-new-code added to BookingFlow + TillPurchases); account page adopts generateUUID - Test architecture: removed t.Parallel() from 8 global-SquareClient-swapping tests per Testing Architecture doc line 89 (B1 flaky-test lesson) — fixes within-package race - SQL alias pence rename (total_cents/paid_cents -> total_pence/paid_pence) 26/26 backend packages; 72/72 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41. |
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4d5d2cd381 |
fix: restart-loop-A findings — pending sweep refunds, tip carve on discounts, TOCTOU redemption, single-use 2FA code + mint endpoint, refresh-token family revocation, admin 2FA code UX
Restart of Loop A (fresh review -> fix -> verify) findings from commit 5e967fa: - B1: sweep auto-refund treats Square PENDING refunds as NON-terminal (row stays pending, no gift-card clawback, refunds row inserted for payments AND till_sales, re-polls the deterministic sweepdup- key); Square-less pre-pass exempts square_refund_id IS NOT NULL rows - M4: terminal tip carve accounts for pending campaign discounts (headroom = total - pending - paid) so explicit tips aren't absorbed as service revenue; no-tip case stays a single record - max_redemptions TOCTOU closed with atomic conditional UPDATE ... RETURNING; exhausted-at-apply surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed - 2FA: verification code is single-use on the saved-card gate (VerifyForUser consume=true, interactive flows unaffected); new POST /api/user/2fa/code mints a fresh code for enabled users (RequireAuth + RequireNonGuest + mint cooldown + per-user limiter) - Refresh tokens: family_id + used_at columns; reuse of an already-rotated token revokes the ENTIRE family and inserts a refresh_token_reuse admin alert; rotation mints descendants in the same family - Frontend: 2FA code input + Request-a-new-code on all saved-card surfaces; admin modal keys code input to customer 2FA + 403 self-heal; tip-display note for pending discounts; 76 frontend tests - Verified: all 26 backend packages pass, frontend build+tests green, env-docs 41/41 |
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fe88f2084d |
fix: review-loop B — adversarial findings (sweep auto-refund, admin clamp, 2FA real challenge, opaque refresh tokens, gated client IP, GBP pence)
Loop B aggressive adversarial round (3 attack agents) + fix + secondary + verification:
- CRITICAL: sweep replay auto-refunds provably-created-later duplicate charges (gated on parseable CreatedAt); 22h legitimate-retry window == 22h sweep cutoff (no dead zone)
- HIGH: admin Take Payment clamps to remaining obligation (cash/giftcard/saved-card/terminal); no unintended tip from overflow; campaign credit against remaining
- HIGH: /api/services/eligible-for/{id} requires auth + owner-or-admin (DOB/age + patch-test health-data leak closed)
- HIGH: opaque refresh-token rotation (login/refresh return {token, jti, refreshToken}; refresh REQUIRES opaque token; single-use rotation; logout revokes; access token rejected at refresh)
- HIGH: saved-card charges require a REAL 2FA verification code (B6/B10) — backend gate on all 8 charge paths + shared TwoFactorCodeInput frontend component on all 7 surfaces; 2FA gate is no longer setup-flag-only
- MEDIUM: ungated CF-Connecting-IP in reserve/admin_reserve gated via exported mw.ClientIP; 2FA limiter keyed on userID alone (no header-rotation bypass); ChangePassword actually revokes JTI + refresh tokens; 2FA setup mint cooldown + persistent failed-attempt counter; campaign redemption race surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- Terminal saved-card VAT applied (was under-collected); age-guard reconcile failures notify; isWeakJWTSecret entropy gate; gift-card redeem per-card counter + per-user limiter; webhook signature key startup validation
- NEW internal/twofa package (single source of truth breaking the payments<->user import cycle); consolidation of duplicate 2FA hash/verify
- Frontend: refresh-token storage + rotation, TwoFactorCodeInput component, amountPaidPence in admin modal, B5/B6/B10 contract wiring; 70 frontend tests
- Tests: loop_b_fixes_test.go, internal/twofa tests, updated auth/services/profile/twofa/mw tests
All 26 backend packages pass (incl. internal/twofa); frontend 70/70 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
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faceb9809c |
fix: review-loop A — discount credit on admin payments, campaign over-credit cap, sweep replay window, dedup refund revalidation, duplication/modularisation, GBP pence naming
Round-A fresh review (6 agents) + fix + secondary cross-cutting + verification rounds: - F1: campaign discounts reduce the charged amount (deposit credit + admin PaymentModal discounted total); capDiscountToRemainingObligation prevents over-credit at completion in all four campaign blocks - F2: sweep replay rescue distinguishes legitimate same-key retries (21h window) from expired-key new charges; ccof blind-fails leave pending + CRITICAL instead of clawing back - F3: post-start online overflow carved as a tip record (mirrors terminal split builder) - A1: single-source Square decline-code classification (till delegates to square.IsDefinitivePaymentError) - A2/A5: refund attempt-cap literals consolidated; refund-failure counter capped + reset on terminal resolutions + admin notifications - A3/A9: idempotency helpers adopted across derivations; IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv relocated + all gates unified (incl. health-check) - A7: 2FA user+IP limiter + TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS startup warning; SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY startup validation; TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER docs corrected - A8: snapshot encryption on all 6 write sites + marker-aware reuse paths; MPV->SPV effective voucher type (single VAT point) - A10/A11/A12/A16: gift-card slot scan advances past failed; amount-aware refund reconciliation; completed-booking refund re-check; PaymentWasRefunded on SquareClient interface - Dedup refund revalidation on tip/terminal/gift-card paths; sweep acknowledged_at IS NULL parity; refund-notification single source (exported payments.InsertRefundFailedNotifications) - Duplication/modularisation round: shared frontend helpers (sanitizeDecimalInput, campaignDiscountCents, twoFactorBlocksSavedCards getter, generateUUID), single-source MaxIdempotencyKeyLength, notification-helper consolidation, snapshot-guard comments - Cross-cutting GBP rename: Cents->Pence across backend + frontend + tests (26 identifiers, 16 files) - Tests: 11 behavior-change tests updated to new invariants; coverage for fixed functions; frontend vitest 55 tests; docs corrected (test counts, 2FA delivery, pre-launch checklist, resolution status) - gitleaks: allowlist backend/internal/square test fixtures (mock idempotency keys) All 25 backend packages pass; frontend 55/55 + build clean; env-docs 41/41. |
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6d82535780 |
fix: adversarial review round — replay-rescue double-charge, discount credit, 2FA/per-IP limits, snapshot encryption, refund reconciliation, VAT, frontend parity, tests+docs
Addresses the adversarial fresh-eyes audit (findings A1-A20) plus review-round fixes: - CRITICAL A1: replay-by-key rescue cross-checks replayed CreatedAt; ccof blind-fail leaves pending with CRITICAL + notification instead of clawing back - A2/A3/A4: till idempotency key restored to unconditional hash; tip rejected in CreateBookingPayment; campaign discount now reduces the charged amount (deposit credit) - A5: admin notifications on blind-fail, manual-refund re-arm, cap-stranded charge-group, webhook FAILED/REJECTED refunds - A6/A10: BuyGiftCard idempotency user-scoped; gift-card slot scan advances past failed rows - A7/A14/A15: 2FA user+IP limiter, SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY startup validation, accurate pepper/log-delivery docs - A8/A9: snapshot encryption on all write+reuse sites; MPV->SPV effective voucher type (single VAT point) - A11/A12/A13/A16: amount-aware refund reconciliation; completed-booking refund re-validation; till retry dedup; PaymentWasRefunded on SquareClient interface - A17/A18/A19/A20: CI runs npm test; confirm_overflow_tip frontend dialog; unknown-event admin notification; mock token redaction - M7 ConfirmOverflowTip, M9 snapshot encryption, C1 discount ordering regression test - Frontend vitest framework (41 tests), backend coverage for fixed functions, docs corrected (2,269 tests, SUPPORT_EMAIL tokens, resolution status) All 25 backend packages pass; frontend 41/41; build + env-docs green. |
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78e6d00dc5 |
fix: payments review rounds — money-safety, GDPR, security, gift-card cancel, modal stacking
Money-safety: - Deterministic till idempotency fallback (Square-charging only); cash/on_the_house keep unique keys; £250 till gift-card cap; 45-char key validation - Gift-card admin caps £250/tx + £5,000/day; user buy £500/day; BuyGiftCard allowlist unchanged - CancelGiftCard: CCR 2013 14-day right with partial-spend refund of the unspent balance (spend verified via payments.gift_card_id); atomic vs redeem/transfer; refunds stay pending until reversal commits; admin cancel surface (AdminCancelGiftCard) - Sweep: cancelled-booking charges failed+notified instead of silently completed; source-override replay uses live square_source_id; legacy square-less refund sweep; snapshot refresh on pending reuse - Refund lock consolidation; recordTerminalPaymentTx shared recorder; structured Square error codes; terminal checkout CustomerID GDPR / security: - Notes retained as de-identified medical/safety record at erasure (single field treated as health data; rest of record wiped, no re-identification map) + comments updated per UK GDPR/Art 9/Equality Act 2010 - square_request_snapshot PII scrubbed on all erasure paths; delete_guest_user FK unlinks; verification codes + dispute reasons handled; idle/stale-guest erasure deletes Square cards/customers + CardDAV/R2 - Durable square-erasure outbox job (retry-square-erasures); 2FA dev/prod build split, pepper fail-closed, no prod code-in-log; prod 2FA delivery fail-loud without a channel - Webhook unknown-type family split (non-money acked, money retried); untracked dispute notifications; rate-limit CF/X-Real-IP trust gating; nginx CSP nonce + api_limit Frontend: - Dynamic z-index stack (ui/dialog/zindex.ts) claimed in open order via data-state observer; re-claims on every reopen; removes stale !z-* overrides — nested modals (booking→user→booking) always paint newest-on-top (browser-verified 3-level + reopen) - Mobile: iOS zoom fixes, bottom-sheet dialogs, 44px touch targets, inputmode decimal, dvh - Gift-card buy/cancel UI, admin £250 + daily limits, cancellation/privacy/terms policy accuracy S3: - Connect() creates buckets before probing; in-memory fallback only on genuine unreachability; health reports degraded; stale S3_PUBLIC_URL documented (host-specific) Tests/docs: - 2263 test functions; all 22 backend packages green; round8/9/10 regression suites; NextEditWindowTime removes wall-clock flake; docs reconciled (notes retention, gift-card partial-use, modal T15 future work) |
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5cc5a7f6d2 |
fix: review round 7 — fresh-eyes audit fixes (6 agents) + full test suites for every backend change
Fresh-eyes review round with 6 independent agents (money-safety, concurrency, Square wire parity, security, frontend flow, testing-gaps). Every finding was independently verified against the code before fixing. All backend changes now carry full test suites (10+ new tests, each verified to FAIL without its guard). All 20 packages green, race detector clean. Money-safety: - Gift-card purchase refunds no longer create money: manual refunds of a no-booking (gift-card purchase) payment are rejected with a clear message in the direct handler AND never re-issued by the sweep-resume path (processManualPaymentGroup skips them; reconcile-then-fail, no re-issue). - BuyGiftCard no-client-key fallback: derived deterministically under the advisory lock (pending-row reuse fixes lost-response double-charge; completed-row sequence advance preserves distinct-purchase collapse fix). - Terminal completion is never unrecorded: activeTerminalCheckoutID now calls recordUntrackedTerminalPayment when a provisional (tmp-) checkout is found COMPLETED at Square (previously only marked the row COMPLETED — a lost poll left the payment invisible and unrefundable). - Sweep: provisional tmp- checkout rows are resolved against Square first (COMPLETED → record; live → keep guard; NOT_FOUND/CANCELED → fail; ambiguous → leave pending) instead of blind-failing a possibly-live checkout. recordUntrackedTerminalPayment re-checks the booking status (FOR UPDATE) and refuses to record on a cancelled booking, inserting a critical_payment_log admin notification instead. Till-sale post-charge UPDATE now requires status='pending' (no resurrection of a clawed-back sale). Frontend (Svelte 5): - UserPaymentModal keeps CardSelection mounted through processing (bind:this ref + Square iframe survive the loyalty/tokenize awaits) — new-card payments work again. - BookingFlow clears the cached nonce/verification pair on any failure (retry re-tokenizes fresh; idempotency key retained for dedup); 409 'already paid' refetches the booking and reconciles depositPaid so the confirmation gate opens; Back button disabled during processing. - Synchronous double-submit guards on buyGiftCard/redeemGiftCard/submitTip. Square wire parity (mock vs real): - processing_fee sign unified (negated at paymentFromSquare; mock agrees). - SimulateSourceUsed (SOURCE_USED, 400) matches real CreateCard. - GetCardsOnFile excludes disabled cards (matches ListCards). - ForcePaymentStatus toggle + tests prove the charge path can't be status-blind. - CreateCheckout rejects empty device_id (env fallback SQUARE_TERMINAL_DEVICE_ID); completed terminal checkout's payment resolvable by id. Security: - 2FA attempt-map data race fixed: lastAt is atomic.Int64 (nanos) — eviction scan reads race-free; concurrent verify+evict tests under -race. - Backend refuses to start on weak/placeholder JWT_SECRET_KEY (<32 chars or known public placeholders) with openssl rand -hex 32 guidance. - Dockerfile no longer COPYs .env (secrets injected via compose env_file). - SabreDAV requires DAV_ADMIN_PASSWORD (no admin/admin default); compose fails at config time when missing. Testing gaps closed (each verified to FAIL without its guard): - refunded-dedup 409 (CreateBookingPayment), keyed sweep past-retention blind-fail, reconcile status-switch (CANCELED/FAILED/APPROVED/PENDING/unknown in both by-key and by-id paths), resolveChargeSource Square-failure branches, structured 500 / CARD_DECLINED / cancelled-context E2E (row stays pending), deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey >45-char truncation, webhook findPaymentByDisputeID fallback, clawbackOneTillSale non-gift-card branch, dispute.evidence / terminal.checkout dispatch. Infra: - local-dev-2.sh fails loudly on port-5432 squatters / docker compose failures (previously died silently under ERR_EXIT with hidden output). - Test harness defaults SQUARE_TERMINAL_DEVICE_ID; money_safety_fixes_test.go gained the missing build tag. Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (20/20 ok), -race clean on 2FA + payments money paths, go build ./... + -tags dev, go vet clean, svelte-check 0 errors, env-docs gate OK (36 vars), docker compose config valid. |
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67cf5b9a45 |
fix: review round 6 — P0 deposit charge, idempotency rotation, dev-safety guard, 2FA/webhook hardening
Sixth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security, context-mining). QA FAILED the deposit-required new-card flow; the P0 root cause was backend + frontend, now fixed. All 20 packages green. P0 money-safety: - Deposit-required bookings now actually charge the deposit on new-card payment. Two-part fix: (1) CreateBookingHandler re-reads the trigger-maintained total_amount/total_duration_minutes from the DB after the booking_services insert (the INSERT..RETURNING row predates the recalc trigger, so TotalAmount serialized as 0 and DepositPaid computed TRUE on an unpaid booking — the frontend gate trusted deposit_paid:true, never charged, and confirmed the booking with zero payment rows); (2) BookingFlow.svelte gates the confirmation view on depositPaid and guards against re-creating a booking on retry. Regression test TestBookings_Create_DepositPaidFalseOnUnpaidBooking. Payments (idempotency + money): - deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey: no-client-key fallback now advances a sequence for repeatable types (partial) and rotates past refunded completed rows, so refund-then-repay and equal-amount partials diverge onto distinct keys; an un-refunded completed row keeps its key (double-charge protection holds). Dedup hits on refunded rows now 409, never stale success. - chargeFailureStatus default is 503 (ambiguous), never 402; table test. - Flaky TestBookingPayment_FullPayment_SplitsIntoDepositAndBalance fixed (ORDER BY payment_type). - resolveChargeSource: orphaned card-on-file disabled via DeleteCardOnFile when SaveCardForUser fails (best-effort, redacted log); retry path preserved. Square client: - Dev builds HARD-FAIL (panic) on SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=production without SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API=1; sandbox routes with a loud banner. - Mock fault-injection FailAfterCommit (commit-then-5xx) exercises the exact lost-response same-key retry; SimulateCardTokenUsed; 45-char idempotency-key cap parity; SquareEnvironment/SquareLocationID shared env helpers used by the sweep (env contract no longer comment-only). - listRefunds truncation now errors (money-sensitive reconcile retries instead of over-refunding); getCardsOnFile truncation loudly logged. Webhooks + 2FA: - square-environment header checked fail-closed (403) when configured env is production/sandbox; dispatch DB work bounded by 30s timeout contexts. - 2FA codes HMAC-SHA256 pepper'd (TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER) with legacy-hash migration + upgrade-on-verify; disable-flow mint cooldown (1/min, 429) caps the brute-force loop; in-lockout records never LRU-evicted. Repo hygiene: - env-docs CI gate green again (FRONTEND_ORIGIN + SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API + TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER documented; Vite DEV built-in allowlisted). - Dead square_deposits schema dropped; obsidian/README/legal-page drift fixed (consumeradvice.scot signposting, CORS allowlist, p11 R3/P13, T1). - 2FA disable residual documented; P6 email/SMS delivery and P12 sandbox smoke test remain the pre-go-live gates. Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (20/20 ok), go build ./... + -tags dev, go vet clean, svelte-check 0 errors, env-docs gate OK, live deposit-required flow re-verified end-to-end (deposit £11 charged, square_payment_id recorded). |
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9bb812669e |
fix: fresh-review round — 2FA deliverability, disable re-verification, GDPR batch scrub, dispute alerting, docs accuracy
Second fresh-eyes review pass (7 agents: goal, security, code-quality, context-mining, webhooks+2FA, client+mock+sweep, refunds/giftcards/handlers). Money-safety core verified sound (identical-body replay byte-lossless, clawback gated on definitive proof, no double-charge window). This round fixes the issues the fresh pass surfaced: 2FA: - Setup now DELIVERS the code via the [2FA] server log in ALL modes (was: nothing in enforced mode -> production 2FA was an unbreakable dead-end and saved-card charges were permanently 403). Enforced mode still withholds the code from the API response; the log line is the fake delivery channel until email/SMS lands (P6). - Disabling 2FA now requires a fresh verification code when enforcement is ON (previously ignored the code -> a password-only attacker could lift the gate). Shares the 5-attempt lockout and timing-safe compare. Dev bypass retained. - REQUIRE_2FA parsing normalized (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive); startup warning extended to the empty-env/mock-client/enforced-2FA confusion. GDPR: - anonymize_user() SQL now scrubs two_factor_* columns + staff notes, so the idle-account batch cleanup (CleanupIdleAccounts) is erasure-clean, not just the user-initiated delete path. Webhooks: - dispute.created for an untracked Square payment now raises a critical_payment_log admin notification (chargeback the app can't reconcile is never silent). Reason strings truncated on rune boundaries (valid UTF-8). Stale at-most-once comment corrected; revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding duplication noted. Sweep/mock parity: - Mock CreatePayment dedup is now source-aware (IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED on source mismatch) matching ReplayPaymentByKey and real Square. - COMPLETED-but-never-polled terminal till-sale checkouts are now recorded by the sweep (previously only booking checkouts were; till charges were invisible until the 24h blind-fail WARN). - Legacy snapshot-less minimal-body replay, SQUARE_LOCATION_ID drift, and in-memory-mock-restart limitations documented. Docs: - Webhook path corrected everywhere (/webhooks/square, not /api/webhooks/square - a deployer following the old path would 404 and silently lose all webhook reconciliation). - 2FA enforcement semantics + code-delivery mechanism documented accurately (fail-closed default; log-delivery channel; disable re-verification). - README/User Manual note the 2FA requirement on online saved-card payments. Tests: 2,151 (up from 2,142). Backend 26/27 packages green (crussell/db fails only in this environment: local postgres doesn't offer scram-sha-256 for the test role; package is byte-identical to HEAD and untouched here). Frontend builds; svelte-check 0 errors. |
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e9b0f0f2a7 |
fix: review-loop hardening — identical-body replay, 2FA gates, webhook at-least-once, GDPR scrub
Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced. Money-safety: - Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge). - Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.) - Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog. - Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom 'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending. - Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card. - Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse). - M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total]. 2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments: - Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces. - Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env. - Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare); plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev). - GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes. Infra/docs: - nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80 redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS; separate webhook rate-limit zone. - Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id + square_request_snapshot. - Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected. - Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26 packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean. |
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4b28e93710 |
fix: tip double-count, fully-paid auto-completion, discount-refund hardening
Tip double-count (root cause of £33.75 vs £28.75 display):
- Remove mock's fixed +500p auto-tip when AllowTipping is true (square_dev.go) —
real Square only enables a terminal prompt, it never adds a tip to the amount
- Set AllowTipping=false in CreateTerminalPayment: the frontend already embeds
the tip in the amount, so the terminal must not prompt for a second tip
- M4 tip split now derives the tip as charged amount minus remaining booking
value ('after 100% is tips'), not from Square's TipAmount field
- Success screens divide paymentResult.amount by 100 (pence -> pounds) in both
PaymentModal and UserPaymentModal
Fully-paid bookings auto-complete:
- Extract ApplyBookingCompletionSideEffects into payments package (shared by
admin progress endpoint and payment paths; avoids circular import)
- Add bookingIsFullyPaid + completeFullyPaidBooking: when completed non-tip
payments reach 100% of the booking total, an active booking transitions to
'completed' so it leaves the admin Current Appointment view
- Wired into CreateBookingPayment (inside tx) and GetCheckoutStatus (terminal,
after commit); completion side-effects (loyalty, campaigns, deposits_required)
fire identically to the manual progress endpoint
- Add /admin/bookings/{id}/refund route (AdminRefundBooking)
Discount-refund hardening:
- RefundPayment explicitly rejects discount/on_the_house payments (was relying
on the incidental NULL-square_payment_id guard)
- Hide the Refund button for discount/on_the_house payments in EditBookingModal
- Cancel-refund estimate in BookingModal also excludes on_the_house
- Cancellation refund loop + GetBookingPaymentInfo + GetBookingRefundableAmountCents
exclude payment_type='tip' from refundable totals
Tip flow (start-time guard) fixes tests:
- Tip tests updated to use past-dated bookings (tips now require booking started)
Tests:
- m4_tip_refund_redesign_test.go (tip split, refund exclusion, admin refund cap)
- m5_fully_paid_completion_test.go (online + terminal full-payment completion,
partial stays active, tip excluded, cancelled stays cancelled)
- Full suite passes with -race (25 packages)
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5e3dc9b428 |
fix: comprehensive payment system hardening (4 review passes)
CRITICAL fixes: - C1: JWT exp claim now validated via jwtauth.VerifyToken (was Decode) - C2: OverrideAmount validated post-substitution (prevents negative money minting) - C3: Terminal gift-card payments store gift_card_id; refund credits user balance - C4: Refund dedup returns stored amount, not req.Amount (prevents admin mislead) - C5: Booking recheck uses FOR UPDATE (prevents TOCTOU with cancellation) - C6: processChargeGroup idempotency key stable (charge-only, prevents double-refund) MAJOR fixes: - M2: Gift-card refund UPDATE checks RowsAffected; 0 rows -> failed - M3: ProcessCancellationRefund returns commit error (was swallowed) - M5: Dispute webhook handling (created + state.updated + disputes table) MEDIUM fixes: - ME1: CORS restricted to FRONTEND_ORIGIN env var (was reflect-any) - ME2: anonymize_user() scrubs users.notes, bookings.notes, name_history, refresh_tokens - ME3: Webhook handlers now mutate state (payment.updated, refund.updated) Frontend fixes: - Same-key retry on 503 (ambiguous failure) wired to all 8 payment flows - CHARGE_AND_STORE intent for save-card flows (SCA compliance) - Nonce staleness check verified across all flows Additional fixes from adversarial re-review: - F1: Till-sale completed dedup echoes stored amount (C4-class) - F2: Cash/giftcard terminal path uses FOR UPDATE (C5-class) - F3: Square-success UPDATE checks RowsAffected (till sales) - F4: Dispute reason truncated to 192 chars (prevents INSERT failure) - F5: Booking-user lookup failure marks refund failed (prevents silent money loss) - F6: Saved-card/tip rechecks wrapped in transaction (C5 residual) Tests: - 15 adversarial attack tests (negative override, zero override, terminal gift card, refund dedup, TOCTOU, deleted gift card, advisory lock, overcharge, zero/negative/huge amount, raw PAN, missing auth, gift card balance, concurrent refunds) - 14 webhook state tests (dispute created/state, payment/refund updated) - 3 CORS tests, 3 GDPR tests, 1 HTTP timeout test - Full suite passes with -race (25 packages, 0 failures) 25 files changed, +1532/-275 lines |
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01ac211408 |
Square client and dev mock: replay-by-key reconcile, refund classification, mock parity
ReplayPaymentByKey (POST /v2/payments re-issue with the same idempotency key and a synthetic probe source token that can never process a real charge): Square returns the ORIGINAL payment for a retained key and definitively rejects an unknown/expired one, so the stale-pending sweep can rescue lost-response charges without ever issuing a second payment. ErrReplayKeyNotRetained marks a probe rejection as proof the charge never happened. Refund classification: zero-amount refunds are now rejected (Square requires amount_money) instead of lenient full-refund; REFUND_ALREADY_PENDING is classified as already-processed to match the real contract. Dev mock parity: SquarePayID == payment ID (was fabricated 'sqp_' prefix), ForceCheckoutState for IN_PROGRESS/CANCEL_REQUESTED terminal states, replay-by-key support, aligned refund error codes. |
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a8d54f1e2a |
Fix review findings: aggregated-refund/saved-card/legacy-refund idempotency keys, structured Square error classification, CSP for Square SDK
Money-safety idempotency fixes (external review bugs 1-3): - processChargeGroup: aggregated refund key now hashes the sorted pending-row set (chargeID-square-agg-<sha256 suffix>) so a changed group can never mark a new row completed against an old smaller refund; >45-char chargeIDs use a hashed prefix instead of verbatim truncation (which would collide charges on Square's global key dedup). Same-set crash-retry keeps Square's dedup. - CreateTerminalPayment saved_card: two-tier idempotency key — client-supplied per-attempt UUID preferred (distinct identical charges no longer collapse), deterministic booking+type+amount+card fallback for no-key retry safety. PaymentModal sends a per-charge UUID cleared after success. - ensureRefundKey: legacy NULL-key manual refunds persist a generated key to the row BEFORE the Square call (race-safe AND idempotency_key IS NULL guard), so a lost-response retry reuses the key and never double-refunds. Wired into resumeManualPendingRefund and the sweep's manual-retry loop. Classification + money-safety hardening: - till.go/sweep.go: structured square.ErrorCode/IsNotFound are authoritative when present; message-substring matching only for non-structured errors (dev mock, client-side status errors). Fixes fragile string-matching driving sweep retries and gift-card clawbacks. - SaveCardForUser: ON CONFLICT (user_id, square_card_id) DO NOTHING + re-select (was a latent UNIQUE-violation 500 on save-card retry). - CreateBookingPayment: partial payments re-validated against remaining balance inside the advisory lock (closes concurrent-overpayment race). - InvalidateSquareCustomerCache on GDPR erasure paths (account.go, time-blockers.go stale-guest anonymization). - GetUserGiftCardBalanceAdmin: in-handler admin check (defense-in-depth). - getCheckoutHTTP: warn on multi-payment checkouts instead of dropping payments[1:]. - Cash/giftcard terminal branch: removed dead idempotency SELECT, "tip-" -> "till-" prefix. - UserPaymentModal: removed vestigial polling state; proper interval cleanup. - account/+page.svelte: gift-card redeem dialog links /terms. - nginx CSP: allow *.squarecdn.com and js.squareup.com so the Square Web Payments SDK + card iframe can tokenize behind the proxy. Tests: +8 regression tests covering changed-set refund keys, legacy NULL-key single-refund, saved-card client-key dedup/no-dedup, concurrent partials, and cache invalidation. Full suite + race detector clean via run-tests.sh lockfile. |
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726ac8cb65 |
Harden money-safety re-review findings: nonce-independent idempotency keys, reconciliation-required logging, terminal-state classification
Re-review (2 Oracle + security + QA + librarian + context-miner) surfaced fixes, all applied: (1) UserPaymentModal and the account-page gift-card buy now key the cached idempotency key on a stable 'new-card' sentinel instead of the cnon: nonce, so clearing the nonce on a failed charge no longer regenerates the key — a lost-response retry now dedups at Square instead of double-charging (the tip flows already keyed on amount only). (2) The create-with-redeem clawback now logs CRITICAL when the guarded balance reversal is blocked (previously silent), and its transaction DELETE is scoped to this sale instead of deleting every transaction on the card. (3) reconcileStalePaymentAtSquare now treats APPROVED/PENDING as non-terminal (leave pending) instead of definitively failed, matching Square's documented state machine. (4) GetTillCheckoutStatus returns 404 for a sale already swept to failed instead of reporting a live state. (5) The critical-payment scan job skips candidates whose booking was hard-deleted, so one orphan can no longer silence all critical alerts. |
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5605402e13 |
Surface unresolved critical payment states as admin notifications
Adds the scan-critical-payment-logs job (daily 2:45am) that surfaces stale pending payments/till-sales and refunds at the retry cap as admin_notifications with reason='critical_payment_log' — the app has no log/alert pipeline (Gap Backlog T14), so money events that would otherwise sit in un-watched CRITICAL log lines now reach the owner's in-app notification centre. Dedup is NULL-safe (IS NOT DISTINCT FROM) and re-surfaces acknowledged-but-still-unresolved rows. Stopgap until a real alerting pipeline lands. |
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8a3a7ec062 |
Mirror Square's customer_id requirement in the dev mock card-creation gate
Square rejects POST /v2/cards without card.customer_id at runtime (confirmed by Square's SDK maintainer); the production client omits an empty id via omitempty and every caller provisions a customer first, so the mock now enforces the same structured 400 INVALID_REQUEST_ERROR to keep sandbox/dev parity with the gate the production code depends on. |
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8720e28dbe |
Add webhook-event retention job, schema, and testdb pre-flight hint
square_webhook_events is now CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS, registered as the 24th maintenance job (sweep-square-webhook-events, daily 2:30am) pruning rows older than 90 days, and testdb gives a clear docker compose hint when the admin DB connection fails. |
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8ff77bc39b |
Add tests for Square client hardening and GDPR deletion
Covers DeleteCustomer (success + NOT_FOUND no-op), doJSON truncation (oversized bodies + rune-safe capBody), validCardID rejection without leaking the token, paymentFromSquare empty-card consistency, and mock-side customer-ID redaction in logs. |
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f0099714ff |
Harden Square HTTP client and dev mock: DeleteCustomer, response limits, token redaction
Adds SquareClient.DeleteCustomer for GDPR erasure (DELETE /v2/customers/{id}, NOT_FOUND as no-op), bounds doJSON response reads to 1 MiB with rune-safe 500-byte error snippets, adds validCardID guard to the disable-card URL, makes paymentFromSquare card fields consistent when the card ID is empty, redacts ccof/cnon tokens in all log paths, and fixes the idempotency-key-length comment (45 chars for payments/refunds/cards, 64 only for terminal checkouts).
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12af3af3b3 |
Harden Square HTTP client and dev mock: status codes, token validation, deadline wire format
Add StatusCode/Category/Field to squareAPIError and an IsNotFound helper so 400/401/404/429/5xx are distinguishable structurally instead of by substring. Validate cnon:/ccof: token prefixes in createPayment/createCardOnFile (PCI parity with the mock). Reject ccof charges without customer_id in the mock so dev parity catches the production bug. Emit Deadline as the RFC 3339 duration (PT5M) and correct the deprecated-comment. |
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54a5b1024e |
Implement full Square payment review fixes + frontend polish
Implement every finding from the deep payment review (P0-P2, minors, nitpicks), then close the post-implementation re-review items, then align card-form typography and roll out the Square trust badge. Backend - Square API alignment: - tip_settings.allow_tipping nested under device_options (was top-level: terminal tips were silently lost in prod) - CreateCardOnFile now accepts customerID and sends card.customer_id; saved-card (ccof:) charges forward square_customer_id as CustomerID - New SquareClient methods GetPayment, CreateCustomer, CancelCheckout - SCA verification_token accepted + forwarded in all charge paths - ExpMonth/ExpYear -> *int; URL-path id validation; CancelCheckout NOT_FOUND-only no-op (dropped unverified NOOP); exported ErrorCode/ ErrorDetail helpers; mock rejects raw PANs, RList locks, redacts emails, ForceRefundPending hook Backend - money safety: - sweepManualPendingSquareRefunds reconciles rows WITH square_refund_id instead of stranding them forever - SweepStalePendingPayments reconciles at Square before failing (tri-state: leave pending on transport error, rescue completed, fail definitively) - GetCheckoutStatus cancellation-recheck; terminal CANCELED resolution; SweepStaleTerminalCheckouts covers terminal_checkouts table - till gift-card clawback on definitive failure incl. retry path + INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS/ADDRESS_VERIFICATION_FAILURE/TRANSACTION_LIMIT - cross-user saved-card collision fixed (UNIQUE(user_id,square_card_id)) - customer provisioning (lazy, save-only); one-off/guest mint no customer - discount preview/apply unified in discounts.go (global-milestone visible in preview, N+1 eliminated, redemption counter preserved on failures) - webhook event_id dedup; refund loop dedup; stale comment fixes - test-isolation t.Cleanup on committed sweep tests Frontend: - SCA tokenizeWithVerification across all charge flows (amount as major-units decimal), 5-min token-expiry re-tokenize, verification_token in request bodies - PaymentModal synchronous double-click + zero/negative-amount guards - till online-card UI wired to /api/admin/till/sale - policyPopover generalised; new /privacy-policy route; consent checkbox copy + Square privacy link - Square card iframe styled to app typography (Inter 14px, oklch tokens); mock form md:text-sm parity - 'Secure payment powered by Square' badge on all 8 card-payment flows Schema/docs: terminal_checkouts + square_customer_id + per-user card constraint in init-script.sql; README migrations; P14 plan + backlog + Technical Manual updated. Includes 39 modified/new test files; full backend suite (25 pkgs), -race on payments+square, and frontend build are green. |
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7439fa86c1 |
Fix payment review round 3: saved-card idempotency, stale-pending sweep, webhook fail-closed
R1/R4: saved_card branch in CreateTerminalPayment now mirrors CreateTipPayment - advisory lock (crussell:payment:<bookingID>) serializes concurrent double-clicks - deterministic key bookingID-sc-type-amount-cardID (<=45 chars) so a lost-response retry derives the same key and dedups instead of double-charging - idempotency switch inside the lock: completed -> dedup, pending -> reuse with pence amount-guard, failed -> clean 409 - success response includes card_brand/card_last4 (frontend already reads them) R2: add 'failed' case to all four retry switches (tip, booking, gift card, till) - a swept/definitively-rejected record returns 409 instead of 500-ing on the idempotency_key UNIQUE constraint R3: extend SweepStalePendingPayments to till_sales card rows - sweeps pending till_sales (online_square/in_person_card) past Square's ~24h key retention, closing the double-charge window for till sales - swept rows logged with the same CRITICAL manual-reconciliation marker as the refund sweep Webhook fail-closed: reject 503 when SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY unset, 403 on bad signature (was: skip verification in dev) Refund status resolution: refunds now resolve by Square status (COMPLETED/PENDING/FAILED/REJECTED) instead of assuming completed; real error codes (REFUND_AMOUNT_INVALID, PAYMENT_NOT_REFUNDABLE, REFUND_ALREADY_PENDING) added to the definitive/processed classification HTTP client: CreateCard key truncated to <=45 chars, device_options always sent (env SQUARE_TERMINAL_DEVICE_ID fallback), processing_fee reads amount_money, ListCards cursor loop, refund keys hashed to <=45 chars Other fixes: payment/till/gift-card advisory-lock + FOR UPDATE asymmetries, GetPaymentByID NULL scans, loyalty redemption lock, card upsert on conflict, mock ccof: prefix parity, IsValidSquareCheckoutID for real Square IDs, isAdminRequest defense-in-depth on all 6 admin payment handlers, webhook signature docs, M8/L5 debug markers removed Docs: README/FC/TM/Overview updated (22 jobs, 20 CRITICAL sites, 23-section GDPR export, sweep jobs, webhook fail-closed); P11 plan marks remaining items (sandbox smoke test, M-8 customer_id, saved-card key dedup trade-off) as deferred with rationale; gap backlog pruned of completed items |
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16240d67e3 |
Fix Square card linkage: reference_id instead of customer_id (no Square customer provisioning)
The app does not provision Square customers, so sending the local user ID as customer_id in Create Card was rejected with CUSTOMER_NOT_FOUND, and filtering List Cards by it returned nothing. reference_id is Square's free-form client reference — max 128 chars, no uniqueness constraint — and is echoed in both Create and List responses. - Create Card payload: reference_id = local user ID (customer_id absent) - List Cards: native ?reference_id=<userID> filter (no limit/customer_id, no client-side filter, no cursor handling needed) - Mock parity: CreateCardOnFile stores ReferenceID; GetCardsOnFile unchanged - Regression guards: TestCreateCardOnFileHTTP_IdempotencyKey asserts reference_id=user_1 and customer_id ABSENT; new TestGetCardsOnFileHTTP_ReferenceIDFilter asserts the query shape |
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53ca89603d |
Fix payment review round: till integrity, HTTP client tests, concurrency tests, card-selection consolidation
Addresses the payment review (all 10 blocking + 2 minor findings): Till money-integrity (CreateTillSale): - Add pg_advisory_lock on the idempotency key (concurrent same-key double-funding race) - Guard amount on pending-reuse retry (mirrors tip/gift-card guards) - Explicitly complete the row for cash/on_the_house pending-reuse - Reject method-switch on a live card-machine checkout (double-charge guard) - 3 regression tests (amount-mismatch, cash-completes-row, method-switch) BookingFlow: - Fetch saved cards at the deposit step (was dead code) - Charge the server-computed deposit_amount, not the client estimate HTTP client tests (was untested): doJSON error parsing, refund sentinel classification, payment/refund/card wire shapes, checkout polling states, list-refunds pagination + 20-page guard, sha256 card idempotency key Concurrency regression tests: real two-goroutine races for BuyGiftCard, tip, and booking-payment locks asserting exactly-one record each Frontend: - Fix CRIT-1: zero-saved-card users blocked (all flows now handle it) - Consolidate tip/deposit/Buy-Gift-Card card UI onto CardSelection - Explicit save-card consent checkbox (was silent/inconsistent) - Fix stale saved-card field names in BookingFlow (last4 -> last_4) - Unique instance ids (crypto.randomUUID) in CardSelection/SquareCardInput - UserPaymentModal: keep card form mounted on error + Try Again button Health/docs: /api/health reports square state (mock/ok, was not_implemented), close P1 backlog, correct stale webhook and env-var claims |
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ae8735ba2f |
Close refund system and gate raw-PAN card entry
Refund system (Round 3 fixes + follow-up + alignment): - Serialize cancellation refunds against the manual handler via per-payment advisory locks taken before the prior-refunds read (pg_advisory_xact_lock, ascending, same crussell:refund: key space) - Aggregate pending cancellation refunds into ONE Square refund per charge (stable charge-level -square-agg key); atomic group UPDATE keeps crash-retry amounts identical for Square key-dedup - Persist paymentID-square-amount idempotency keys on cancellation refunds; scheduler reads the stored key (legacy fallback for old rows) - Add sweep-pending-square-refunds cron (*/5, concurrency 1) with refund_attempts cap; sweep retries stale manual pending refunds with each row's own stored idempotency key - Reconcile at Square (GET /v2/refunds ListPaymentRefunds) before every terminal failed transition: tri-state result leaves rows pending on reconcile error instead of false-failing; PAYMENT_ALREADY_REFUNDED resolves to completed - Move over-refund guard inside the lock, counting completed + pending (excluding failed); ErrRefundDeclined distinguishes definitive vs ambiguous outcomes - forgiveFees now executes a real full refund (forceFullRefund override) with admin_forgiven_fees reason threaded to Square - Surface failed card refunds in the admin notification centre (refund_failed enum, RETURNING-id pre-pass inserts, NOT EXISTS dedup) - Dedup double-cancel refund inserts via ON CONFLICT (idempotency_key) DO NOTHING without consuming refundRemaining Frontend: - Remove all raw-PAN card entry: zero card_number/card_cvc/new_card_token in request bodies; gate new-card entry behind CardEntryUnavailable notice + newCardDisabled prop across all 8 flows - Delete hand-rolled CardInput.svelte; keep CardSelection saved-card UI and CardEntryUnavailable fallback - Update cancellation-policy page to in-person cash pickup wording Tests: - Rewrite the two amount-blind dedup tests to assert real money movement (single call, aggregated amount, shared refund ID) - Add coverage: manual refund vs cancellation serialization (concurrent goroutines), reconcile error vs no-match branches, stale manual retry, forgive-fees real refund row + reason, double-cancel dedup, mock refund key dedup, ListPaymentRefunds filtering - Fix time-dependent booking flakes with fixtures.NextWorkingDayAt - 25/25 packages pass; -race clean on payments/square/db/jobs/bookings |
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54f6bf3c1a |
Fix P0/P1 review findings: truncation, raw-PAN API edge, refund lock, till pending-retry, idempotency keys
P0 — float truncation: applied math.Round to all remaining int64(x*100) sites (till penceAmount, refund over-refund guard, GetAlreadyRefundedAmount, payment summary conversions). A £1.14 till sale previously charged 113p. P0 — raw PAN stopped at the API edge: - Deleted CardNumber/CardExpMonth/CardExpYear/CardCVC from TillSaleRequest and CardNumber/Expiry/CVC from CreatePaymentMethodRequest. Both now accept card_token (Square nonce) and return 400 when absent. PAN+CVV no longer transit the application server (PCI-DSS SAQ-A scope). - Deleted CreateCardOnFileRaw from the SquareClient interface and all implementations (MockClient, ProdClient, devProdClient). - Added idempotency_key column to refunds table (UNIQUE). P0 — RefundPayment hardened: advisory lock on payment ID (prevents two concurrent refunds passing the over-refund guard), pending-refund-record- then-Square pattern (scheduler reprocesses on failure), same-key dedup. P1 — till sale pending-retry now re-attempts the Square charge instead of returning the stale 'pending' status (gift card was already funded in the committed tx — silent money loss otherwise). Sale row reused, not duplicated. P1 — idempotency key caching in frontend: BuyGiftCard and UserPaymentModal/BookingFlow now cache the key per amount+card, regenerated on change and cleared on success — matches the tip-flow pattern so a lost-response retry dedups instead of double-charging. P1 — CreateTerminalPayment cash/giftcard INSERTs now persist idempotency_key. Key is unique per payment (booking+type+amount would wrongly dedup two legitimate identical payments, e.g. two £50 cash receipts). P1 — gift-card codes no longer logged (spendable credential; value+recipient only). Tests: till pending-retry re-attempt, refund same-key dedup, mock CreatePayment idempotency dedup, CreatePaymentMethod nonce happy path + raw-PAN rejection, till online_square card_token required/valid. |
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4f5dd5c426 |
Fix review findings: BuyGiftCard concurrency lock, amount guards, NULL scan, mock dedup, docs
N1 (HIGH) — BuyGiftCard concurrent same-key retry could double-issue gift cards (2× value for 1 charge). Added pg_advisory_lock on the idempotency key (mirroring the tip pattern) acquired before the idempotency check, so concurrent same-key retries serialize and only one executes gift-card creation. N2 — Amount-equality guards in both reuse branches (CreateTipPayment and BuyGiftCard). A same-key retry with a different amount now returns 400 instead of silently mutating the pending record's books/VAT/refund caps. N3 — test coverage: - TestBuyGiftCard_RetryPending_ReattemptsCharge: pending record + same-key retry re-attempts, reuses the record (count=1), completes, and issues the gift card exactly once. - TestCreateCheckoutHTTP_DeviceOptionsWireShape: httptest.Server asserts device_id is under checkout.device_options (not top-level). Extracted createCheckoutHTTPWithClient for injectable base URL. - MockClient.CreatePayment now dedups on idempotency key (paymentByKey map), matching real Square behaviour. N4 — Corrected the savepoint comments in handlers.go and giftcards.go: the savepoint only exists in the test harness; in production db.Conn.Begin is a plain tx and the status UPDATE runs on a separate pooled connection. Commit is a harmless no-op in prod but required in tests. Bonus bug fixed: CheckIdempotencyByKey scanned NULL booking_id/gift_card_id (gift-card purchases) into plain string, failing with 'cannot scan NULL'. Now uses sql.NullString. Docs: Technical Manual.md:53 and Feature Catalog.md (2.1, 2.5) corrected — no longer claim Web Payments SDK is live; new-card entry is documented as pending P11, saved-card flow works via ccof tokens, dev mock rejects raw PANs. |
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3db8b54923 |
Fix silent tip/gift-card money loss on pending retry; terminal checkout wire; sentinel error; docs
CRITICAL — same-amount tip retry silently never charged: - CreateTipPayment idempotency check now only short-circuits when the existing record is 'completed'. A 'pending' record (previous Square call failed) is REUSED and the charge re-attempted with the same key (Square dedups safely), instead of returning the stale pending record as 200 with a success toast and no charge. - Same fix in BuyGiftCard: pending records trigger a re-attempt, not a false-success response. Unique idempotency_key constraint means the pending record must be reused, not re-inserted. - Fixes the savepoint/rollback interaction: the nested tx (savepoint) is now committed in the reuse path so the deferred rollback doesn't undo the later status UPDATE on the same connection. - Regression test: TestTipPayment_RetryPending_ReattemptsCharge verifies a pending record + same-key retry re-attempts and completes, reusing the record (count stays 1). MAJOR — terminal checkout wire contract: - device_id now sent as checkout.device_options.device_id (Square's required shape), not a top-level field which Square rejects with 400. - 'checkout pending' detection now uses typed sentinel ErrCheckoutPending with errors.Is in both handlers, matching mock and real HTTP client. MAJOR — exp_month/exp_year omitted from card creation payload when unset (now *int with omitempty) — Square would 400 on 0/0; expiry comes from the tokenized source. Docs: - README payments/infrastructure sections corrected (Web Payments SDK claim replaced with accurate P11-backlog note; dev mock parity described) - Future Work P11 updated to reflect raw-PAN rejection is now enforced in both mock and prod (new-card flows are a documented dead end) - Added plans/p11-square-web-payments-sdk.md: full implementation plan + handoff prompt for the agent picking up P11 (Web Payments SDK nonces) |
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bbb55dae82 |
Match dev mock to production: reject raw PAN card creation (PCI-DSS parity)
Previously the dev MockClient was more permissive than production: - MockClient.CreateCardOnFileRaw processed raw PANs and stored mock cards, while ProdClient and devProdClient both block raw PANs. A dev testing the raw-card flow saw it succeed, masking a production failure. - MockClient.CreateCardOnFile accepted raw PANs as source_id via an isAllDigits branch. Real Square only accepts cnon:xxx/ccof:xxx tokens. Now the mock behaves identically to production: - CreateCardOnFileRaw returns the same PCI error as ProdClient - CreateCardOnFile validates source_id is token-like (cnon:/ccof:) and rejects raw PANs - Removed dead isAllDigits helper Tests updated to assert the parity behavior: - TestDevClient_CreateCardOnFileRaw_Rejected_ProdParity (table-driven, replaces 5 brand-specific raw-PAN tests) - TestDevClient_CreateCardOnFile_RejectsRawPAN (replaces RawNumber) - TestCreatePaymentMethod_HappyPath / SecondCardNotDefault now expect 500 instead of 200, documenting the prod block |
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28f0ddb328 |
Fix tip amount-change false dedup, wire BuyerEmail everywhere, clear ESLint errors
Money-moving fixes:
- Tip idempotency key regenerates when the tip amount changes after a failed
attempt (all 3 tip flows). Cached key still reused on same-amount retry
(dedup intact) and cleared on success/modal reset. Prevents silent
under-charge when a user retries at a different amount.
- Till replay path returns actual till_sales.status (may be 'pending') instead
of hardcoded 'completed' — no more misreported successful charge.
- BuyerEmail wired for CreateBookingPayment, gift card purchases, and till
sales (saved_card + online_square), matching the tip flow. Email lookup
errors logged, non-fatal.
- Till buyer-email errors now logged (was silently swallowed).
- on_the_house till top-up uses cached getIdempotencyKey() for retry-safe dedup
(was fresh crypto.randomUUID()).
Test/validation fixes:
- Add TestPaymentFromSquare_* unit tests (else-branch + nil card details),
build tag relaxed to 'test' so they run in the standard dev suite.
- Add TestValidateCardInfo table test (7 cases: both/either/neither/empty).
- Add TestCreateTillSale_TwoIdenticalCreateSales_BothSucceed regression test.
- Remove dead mock pre-registration in TestTipPayment_WithSavedCard.
- Correct misleading till regression-test comment.
ESLint cleanup (12 errors -> 0):
- Remove unused loadingCards in tip + pay-tip pages (dead assignments in
loadSavedCards).
- Scoped eslint-disable for {@html} in CardBrandIcon (hardcoded brand SVGs).
- Remove dead confirmSaveDefaultHours + unused rescheduleVersion prop in
WeeklySchedule (and its parent pass-through).
- Replace new Date() with SvelteDate in WeeklySchedule + BusinessHours.
- Fix each-block key in BusinessHours skeleton loader.
- Use void expression for reactivity-tracker reads in effects.
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a4441b6acf |
Fix review findings: till idempotency keys, sha256 card key, paymentFromSquare fallback, regression test
till.go: - Replace deterministicTillKey (request-field hash) with uniqueTillKey (crypto/rand.Text) - Deterministic hashes broke legitimate identical create sales (empty gift_card_id collides on till_sales idempotency_key UNIQUE constraint → 500 on second sale) - Client-supplied keys handle dedup; fallback only needs uniqueness - Use rand.Text() (Go 1.24+) instead of deprecated rand.Read with dead error check till_test.go: - Add TestCreateTillSale_TwoIdenticalCreateSales_BothSucceed regression test (two identical keyless cash creates must both return 201) square_http_client.go: - createCardOnFileHTTP: replace reversible hex encoding with crypto/sha256 - paymentFromSquare: replace dead-code fallback with reachable else branch - Remove unused url import cleanup where applicable |
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2459ddc919 |
Fix review findings: expiry bug (all 8 files), idempotency keys, card_expiry/card_cvc removal, URL encoding, BuyerEmail logging, ValidateCardInfo, saved-card test, future work doc
Backend: - Fix refund idempotency key: clock.Now() → deterministic (pr.ID + amount) - Fix ValidateCardInfo: enforce mutual exclusivity, handle empty strings symmetrically - Fix paymentFromSquare brand fallback (remove dead SourceType fallback) - Fix URL encoding: PathEscape → QueryEscape for customer_id query param - Fix BuyerEmail: log warning on DB error instead of silent discard - Fix idempotency key in createCardOnFileHTTP: time.Now() → deterministic hex hash - Add BuyerEmail to CreateTipPayment Square request - Move realBaseURL from shared file to square_dev.go (only used in dev) - Add TestTipPayment_WithSavedCard test (card_id path coverage) - Fix AMEX brand in mock (AMEX → AMERICAN_EXPRESS, fix test) Frontend: - Fix off-by-month expiry bug in ALL 8 files using year-month arithmetic (parseExpiryParts returns 1-indexed, SvelteDate expects 0-indexed) Files: tip/+page, pay-tip/[id], UserBookingModal, UserPaymentModal, BookingFlow, account/+page (add card + buy gift card sections) - Remove card_expiry/card_cvc from tip request bodies (backend has no fields) Docs: - Mark P9 (placeholder tokens) as completed, add P11 (Square Web Payments SDK) - Mark T13 (rune arithmetic) as completed |
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4abcb324c9 |
Square payment integration: real HTTP client, tip flow rewrite, card UI/validation overhaul
Backend: - Create square_http_client.go: real Square REST API client (Payments, Terminal Checkouts, Refunds, Cards, Locations) with proper JSON types, auth, error handling - Update ProdClient in square.go to delegate to shared HTTP functions - Wire devProdClient in square_dev.go to also make real HTTP calls for sandbox/prod env - Rewrite CreateTipPayment handler: accept card_id OR new_card_token (+save_card), advisory lock, idempotency check, max amount validation - Add ValidateCardInfo, bump ValidateAmount max to £10,000 - Fix mock CreateCardOnFile to detect brand/last4 from raw card numbers - Fix mock RefundPayment to index by SquarePayID and accept unknown payment IDs - Remove dead types (ProcessingFee, sqAddress), add Deadline parity - Fix AMEX brand inconsistency (AMEX -> AMERICAN_EXPRESS) - Pre-existing fix: remove unused context import in giftcards.go Frontend: - CardInput.svelte: add onfieldblur/onfieldinput callbacks for blur-based validation - CardBrandIcon.svelte: brand SVGs for VISA, MC, AMEX, Discover, Diners, JCB, Square Gift Card, UnionPay, Interac, EFTPOS - tip/+page, pay-tip/[id], UserBookingModal tip: saved card list + CardInput + Luhn/expiry/CVC validation + blur-based errors + no-saved-cards edge case - UserPaymentModal, BookingFlow: card validation parity (blur-based, all-valid check) - account page: replace text brand badges with CardBrandIcon - Fix handleCustomTip bug (state mutations outside if block) - Remove dead pageState variable - Add tip modal scroll (max-h-[90vh] overflow-y-auto) - Submit button disabled on !isCardValid Tests: - 30 square package tests (+new: CreateCardOnFile raw number path, detectCardInfo variants) - 5 tip handler tests (HappyPath, NoPriorPayment, WrongOwner, MultipleTips, TxFailure) - All +-race clean, refund tests fixed |
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70613497b4 |
feat: add daily cron to apply scheduled default hours changes
Add ApplyScheduledDefaultHours which checks default_hours_scheduled_changes at midnight, bulk-updates working_hours with staged values, and inserts an admin_notification. Register as the 'apply-default-hours' job in the scheduler (daily at 00:05). |
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bbbffce20d |
fix: gocritic linter issues (appendAssign, ifElseChain, regexpMust)
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35bc021857 |
fix: replace err.Error() string match with errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed)
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Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent) Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai> |