ee4953277472a0b1f5b4c9adf0a5ac3f722841ec
20
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  popertotsandSisyphus
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ee49532774 |
fix: frontend 12h time display — add hour12: true to schedule, GDPR export, reschedule modal, booking create
Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent) Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai> |
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popertots
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01e7cc575d |
fix: frontend payment surfaces — SCA wire shapes (explicit token precedence), mock token parity, infinite-loop guard, money display, delete-account re-auth, admin progress UI, mobile touch targets
- new_card_token uses explicit newCardToken ?? verificationToken precedence on every charge surface (BookingFlow, UserPaymentModal, TipPayment, PaymentModal, TillPurchases, account gift-card buy); dead verification_code/consent fields + ScaFallbackConsentDialog removed from payment flows
- mock mints cnon:sca-... tokenize-results and tokenizeWithVerification returns verificationToken:null for new cards (real-SDK parity so save-card works in dev)
- UserPaymentModal infinite /payment-methods fetch loop guarded; formatCurrency(totalPaid) no longer 100x too small
- delete-account dialog collects current_password + fresh 2FA code; admin 'Begin appointment'/'Complete' wired to /admin/bookings/{id}/progress
- mobile: 44px touch targets, active: feedback, TimeSlotPicker 50dvh, dialog close sizing, .no-scrollbar utility, CSP meta, receipt fields escaped
- vitest: policy.ts cross-check + ScaFallbackConsentDialog component tests (svelte project via happy-dom)
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popertots
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0fdb2f02cd |
feat: frontend SCA-only posture — tokenize-result as charge source (C1), C6 refusal dialog, no 2FA fallback
- square.ts: shouldFallbackTo2FA replaced by shouldShowSCARefusal — a genuine 'sca-unavailable' now drives the REFUSAL path (the customer is told the payment cannot complete and to pay online later), never the 2FA code fallback (PSR 2017 SCA is non-waivable; merchant liability is not cured by consent). SCA_REFUSAL_MESSAGE_ONLINE/TILL copy added; SCA_FALLBACK_CONSENT_VERSION 'v1' + scaFallbackConsentFields() carry the versioned consent on the explicit opt-in path only (shipped surfaces send none). SquareTokenizeResult docs updated: tokenize-result token is the charge source, tokenless OK proceeds token-less under the backend's SCA-only gate. - C1 wire contract on every saved-card surface (booking, tip, gift-card buy, till, account): the proactive SCA tokenize-result is sent as new_card_token (the charge SOURCE alongside the saved-card ref), never the legacy verification_token; 402 verification-required now means the tokenize-result was consumed/expired between tokenize and charge. - New ScaFallbackConsentDialog surfaces the refusal notice; the code input (useTwoFactorCodeForSavedCard scaAvailable: () => true) only ever appears via a backend gate rejection (defensive/opt-in). - Till (M10): proactive saved-card SCA runs per sale line BEFORE the first charge; sca-unavailable aborts the whole sale before any charge. - Card save (M11/M12): STORE-intent tokenizeForStore with SCA at tokenization; 402 verification-required on save surfaces SCA-first guidance instead of a generic failure. |
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popertots
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3866cc5963 |
fix: round-2 loop-A fresh review (503c326 baseline) — B1 replay cap, A6 discount record, 2FA reissue+cooldown, notification flood, lockout saturation, VAT/refund-status consolidation
Round 2 Loop A fresh money/security/dup-mod review. 23 findings fixed: MONEY: - CRITICAL: B1 duplicate auto-refund gains an attempt cap (b1_attempts col, cap 3) — a rejected auto-refund no longer re-replays the expired key every sweep run (which minted a stacking unauthorized charge each time); FAILED-webhook demotion respects the cap; never re-replay a key whose B1 refund failed - HIGH: A6 deposit_covered_by_discount skip path now APPLIES the eligible campaign discount rows immediately (capped) instead of skipping with no discount recorded — no more promised-discount-not-recorded overcharge - MEDIUM: 2FA code burned by the SAVE gate is re-issued on failed new-card+save_card charges (re-issue guard now covers req.SaveCard) - LOW: GetBookingPaymentSummary excludes tip rows from paidAmount (remaining now matches the authoritative tip-excluded balance) SECURITY: - MEDIUM: unacknowledged CRITICAL admin-notification flood capped (global cap on critical_payment_log + refresh_token_reuse rows) - MEDIUM: 2FA reissue no longer bypasses the mint cooldown (Check no longer clears LastMintAt on gate-verify; cleared on terminal charge success) - MEDIUM: twofa.StateFor map-saturation returns a shared permanently-locked state instead of a fresh 5-guess budget per request - MEDIUM: ProgressiveRateLimit rejects 429 past maxProgressiveSleepDelayMs instead of sleeping unboundedly; login bcrypt concurrency semaphore added - LOW: loginInProgress 409->429; webhook key-set/URL-unset startup check; email-verification per-user attempt counter DUP/MOD: - formatCurrency single source (frontend format.ts, 7 files consolidated); SquareRefundStatusToLocal single source (errors.go, all sites); admin audit-log helper dedup; SCA retry model unified (proactive on all 6 surfaces); buyDailyTotal/daily-cap mirror via backend; lock TTL from backend; generateUUID at all card-form sites; magic numbers named (defaultPostgresHost, epsilon, fee constants); admin CASH + gift-card terminal charges now audited; DAV_SKIP_INIT documented in manuals Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod (GO_TESTING=1, the CI condition), both vet tags, frontend tests+build, env-docs 42/42. |
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popertots
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36887167c6 |
fix: loop-A fresh review (503c326 baseline) — overflow-guard bypass, discounted-deposit retry, GDPR audit scrub, till cap, sweep rescue, 2FA reissue + SCA retry, consolidation round
Loop A fresh money/security/dup-mod review of the whole payments overhaul. 28 consolidated findings fixed:
MONEY:
- HIGH-1: B12 overflow guard now uses the discounted obligation — a pre-start deposit can never mint an unintended tip; the discount is never truncated to £0 when the customer pays the discounted deposit
- HIGH-2: discounted-deposit pending-reuse retry compares pendingStoredAmountPence vs chargeAmount (the actual Square amount), not req.Amount — no more permanent amount_mismatch 400 on lost-response retries
- MEDIUM-3: sweep rescue now carves overflow as a tip record + runs completion side-effects (was booking overflow as service revenue, skipping completion)
- MEDIUM-4 (shared w/ security): admin_audit_log.admin_id made nullable + anonymize_user/delete_guest_user NULL it + scrub details.card_last4 — 2fa_fallback_charge PII no longer survives account deletion
- MEDIUM-5: till gift-card payment now passes the £5,000/day admin cap (giftcard_limits)
- LOW-6: expired gift-card balance surfaced as expired/zero in GetUserGiftCardBalance
SECURITY:
- 2FA single-use consume made atomic at verify time for all 5 saved-card gates (fresh charges consume; pending-reuse retries don't); deferred consumption removed
- reissueTwoFACodeAfterFailedCharge routed through the fail-closed issuance gate (pepper check, cooldown) + fresh-only semantics (only when a code was actually consumed)
- family-alive cache invalidated on the stale-family cleanup DELETE (no 30s warm window after expiry)
- frontend 503-retry no longer reuses a consumed 2FA code — aligns with backend re-issue
DUP/MOD:
- reissue helper single-sourced (5 call sites), squareRefundStatusToLocal (10 inline switches), writeChargeSnapshot (7 sites, immutability guard on gift-card/till), postChargeRecheck (3+1 sites), scanIdempotencySlot (2), applyVATToChargeRecord (3 patterns), user_saved_cards upsert (2), BuyGiftCard pending INSERT via service
- till completed-dedup now re-validates paymentHasLiveRefund (aligns with booking/tip/gift-card)
- frontend 402 idempotency-key regeneration added to PaymentModal (aligns with other CIT surfaces)
- PAYMENT_METHOD_SAVED_CARD constant standardised ('saved_card' everywhere)
- admin audit coverage added for AdminRefundBooking + gift-card buy/top-up
- audit-helper cross-package dedup (user/twofa.go now calls payments' exported insert)
Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod packages, both vet tags, frontend tests + build, gitleaks clean.
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popertots
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b7122be3a0 |
fix: SCA review round + gitea pipeline green — GDPR audit scrub, backend test gaps, frontend SCA/Square-API, docs parity
7 review agents (pipeline run, self-review, codebase-context, frontend-placement, backend testing-gaps, Square-API, docs-parity) audited the SCA-primary work. ALL findings fixed, including every pre-existing red CI job: GDPR (HIGH): - anonymize_user() now scrubs admin_audit_log.target_user_id (mirrors delete_guest_user) so 2fa_fallback_charge rows (customer id + card_last4 PII) no longer survive registered-user account deletion; gdpr test added BACKEND TEST GAPS (all 10): - delivery-unavailable 503 branch: prod-tag predicate test + dev-variant marker - twoFactorFallbackEnabled alias/case/default matrix tests + exported wrapper - insertTwoFAFallbackAudit details-JSON shape + audit-row assertions for all 6 gate sites (booking/tip/gift-card/payment-method/terminal/till, both actors) - CreateTerminalPayment.VerificationToken: passthrough, too-long 400, 2FA-skip, token-less fallback + SCA-required (new terminal_sca_test.go) - isVerificationRequiredError at all 5 charge sites (402 + code:verification_required) - customer_initiated handler-level assertions (MIT false admin / CIT true customer) - Mock: ApprovePendingVerification, ChallengeResult auto/deny, _deny token suffix, parseVerifyToken unit tests FRONTEND SCA + Square-API (CRITICAL): - tokenizeSavedCardWithVerification reads result.token (the verified token) not result.verificationResult (deprecated verifyBuyer shape — saved-card SCA could never succeed in production before); parseTokenizeVerificationResult pure fn extracted + pinned in square.test.ts; 'verified' with no token proceeds tokenless - HIGH: saved-card idempotency key regenerated after a definitive 402 (fresh token under the same key = IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED dead-loop); kept on 503/cancelled - challenge-cancelled copy no longer promises a 2FA fallback the UI doesn't show; 'waiting for approval in your banking app' state on CIT surfaces - sca-unavailable demotion resets per attempt; card selection disabled mid-challenge; genuine saved-card declines no longer relabeled 'requires verification'; modal-close guard during processing; retry affordance standardized PIPELINE (every red job now green): - prod-tag build break fixed (shared square stub + test_helpers_test.go, prod-safe) - govulncheck: x/image 0.45.0 bumped (x/text resolved); go mod tidy clean - race: TestDeleteAccount_InvalidatesSquareCustomerCache made deterministic - DAV_ADMIN_PASSWORD placeholder in .env.example (compose config passes) - frontend: prettier 28 files, eslint, a11y 38 errors, knip (currentZIndex), deps in-range, audit vulns (nanoid/postcss) — all fixed; 67 vitest cases DOCS PARITY (6 DRIFTs + 5 GAPs): payments doc Ch4/Ch14/Appendix A, Technical Manual 2FA + counter-reset + payment sections, README test counts + SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY, Feature Catalog, .env.example REQUIRE_2FA — SCA-primary/2FA-backup posture verified against code everywhere Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod packages, both vet tags, golangci-lint/staticcheck/ gosec 0 on both tags, gitleaks clean, 2,464 backend + 67 frontend tests. |
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popertots
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5dae0bba08 |
feat: Square 3DS2 SCA primary authorisation for saved-card charges; 2FA demoted to audited backup
SCA is now the PRIMARY authorisation for saved-card (ccof) charges (PSR 2017 /
chargeback liability shift); the homegrown 2FA becomes a BACKUP used only when
SCA is unavailable (e.g. a bank without in-app approval), with a strict audit
trail. The 'approve in your banking app' UX comes from Square buyer
verification. Email/SMS remains the intended 2FA delivery channel; the [2FA]
stdout-log relay (TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true) is the explicit-insecure
pre-email/SMS stopgap.
BACKEND:
- CreateTerminalPaymentRequest gains VerificationToken (forwarded to Square in
the admin saved-card branch; validated like the other charge handlers)
- Structured SCA-required error surfacing: isVerificationRequiredError +
writeVerificationRequiredResponse (HTTP 402 with {code:'verification_required'})
at all 5 charge error sites — the frontend keys on it to trigger the challenge
- requireTwoFactorForCardAccess reworked: SCA token present => 2FA skipped
(SCA primary); no token => 2FA fallback requires delivery channel + consume +
insertTwoFAFallbackAudit (admin_audit_log reason 2fa_fallback_charge,
{sca_performed:false,...}); TWO_FACTOR_FALLBACK env flag (default true) gates
the fallback; false => SCA-only posture
- MIT vs CIT: admin till saved-card + admin booking saved-card charges now flag
customer_initiated=false (merchant-initiated, no SCA, no liability shift);
customer-initiated online flows keep true
FRONTEND:
- square_card_id threaded through SavedCard/SelectableCard + admin lists
- isVerificationRequiredSignal + shouldFallbackTo2FA helpers (402 + code / text
fallback); VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_MESSAGE
- tokenizeSavedCardWithVerification (Square SDK tokenize(details, squareCardId))
with verified/challenge-cancelled/sca-unavailable/sca-failed outcomes
- Per-surface SCA retry with the SAME idempotency key + fresh verification_token
(booking/tip/till/gift-card/admin); 'waiting for approval in your banking
app' state on admin surfaces; 2FA backup-only UX in the shared composable
MOCK PARITY:
- SimulateSavedCardVerificationRequired toggle (default off) + grandfathering
- Challenge state (ApprovePendingVerification/DenyPendingVerification,
ChallengeResult config, token-encoded _ok|_deny outcome)
- One-time-use verify_mock_ token ledger + amount/source binding
- MockCardForm saved-card verification simulation + mock Approve button
- Tests: saved-card SCA gate, one-time-use, denied, amount-mismatch,
grandfathered; frontend helper tests
DOCS: payments-doc SCA appendix, Technical Manual 2FA section, README,
Overview, Feature Catalog updated to SCA-primary + 2FA-backup; env-var
documented (42/42).
26/26 backend packages; 95/95 frontend tests + build; env-docs 42/42.
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popertots
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b46927336b |
fix: dup/mod secondary round — till 2FA gate parity, mint-cooldown single source, notification parity, pence comments
Loop B dup/mod attack findings:
- TillPurchases admin 2FA gate now mirrors PaymentModal and the backend: gateActive = twoFactorEnforced && customerTwoFactorEnabled && paymentMethod='saved_card'; the customer's setup flag is fetched from GET /api/admin/users/{id} on selection. A 2FA-disabled customer in an enforced env no longer hits a dead-end blocked input — the charge 403 surfaces the actionable message via the existing self-heal.
- Extracted twoFAMintThrottled helper shared by SetupTwoFAHandler and ensurePendingTwoFACode — mint-cooldown rule can no longer drift between setup and disable-flow paths
- Notification-helper drift documented: sweep copy states the intentional booking+user scoping vs the canonical webhook copy (cross-referenced); auth refresh_token_reuse insert verified to carry the same NOT EXISTS acknowledged_at IS NULL guard; no import cycle (webhooks→payments one-way)
- Pence convention: 'rounded to the cent' corrected to 'pence' (handlers.go:2726)
26/26 backend packages; 72/72 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41.
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popertots
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03d85c6d13 |
fix: admin-scoped 2FA mint targets the CUSTOMER — user authentication for saved cards, never the admin
The till and admin payment modal 'Request a new code' buttons previously called
the session-scoped POST /api/user/2fa/code, which mints a code for the ADMIN's
session — a code that can never satisfy the card-owner gate and is delivered to
the admin's log line, not the customer.
- New POST /api/admin/users/{id}/2fa/code (AdminSendVerificationCodeHandler,
RequireAdmin + per-user limiter): mints/reuses a code for the TARGET user
(the card owner/customer), keyed to the CUSTOMER's userID so the [2FA]
delivery log carries the customer's ID — the customer, never the admin, is
the authentication subject for their card
- Shared useTwoFactorCodeForSavedCard composable gains an optional mint()
option; admin surfaces (PaymentModal, TillPurchases) pass the customer-scoped
mint, customer surfaces keep the session default
- Frontend: adminRequestNewTwoFactorCode(userID) in square.ts; PaymentModal
mints for booking.user_id, TillPurchases for selectedCustomer.id
- Tests: admin mint keys the code to the customer's userID (log line contains
customer ID, NOT the admin ID) + pending hash persisted for the customer;
unknown target user 404s
Backend 26/26 packages; frontend 72/72 + build clean.
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popertots
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a6a4683b74 |
fix: review round — B1 clock-skew tolerance + re-poll escalation, refresh-token access-token revocation, shared 2FA composable, per-package-DB test alignment
Three fresh reviews (money/security/dup-mod) cross-validated findings: - MEDIUM: B1 'new charge' discrimination adds a lower-bound tolerance (replayRescueLowerBoundSkew) so a retained-key replay of the ORIGINAL charge (DB clock ahead of Square) is never auto-refunded; ambiguous margins leave PENDING + CRITICAL - MEDIUM: B1 re-poll escalates after stalePendingB1RefundAge (48h) — FAILED/REJECTED refunds go terminal (fail parent, claw back till-sale funding, CRITICAL notification); no more unbounded re-polling / stranded parents without webhooks - DRIFT-REAL: processManualPaymentGroup now checks PENDING/FAILED/REJECTED on the synchronous refund response (mirrors processChargeGroup/manual handler) — no more premature 'completed' - HIGH: refresh-token family kill now also invalidates the attacker's freshly-minted ACCESS token — access tokens carry a family_id claim and VerifyToken rejects tokens whose family was deleted (GenerateTokenForFamily + family-alive check); 30s grace window for concurrent two-tab refresh (no false theft alert) - LOW: 2FA mint endpoint returns remaining_seconds; in-memory 2FA counters documented; 90-day refresh expiry single-sourced (RefreshTokenLifetime + make_interval) - Dup/mod: NEW shared useTwoFactorCodeForSavedCard Svelte composable replaces 6 surface copies of the 2FA gate logic (Request-a-new-code added to BookingFlow + TillPurchases); account page adopts generateUUID - Test architecture: removed t.Parallel() from 8 global-SquareClient-swapping tests per Testing Architecture doc line 89 (B1 flaky-test lesson) — fixes within-package race - SQL alias pence rename (total_cents/paid_cents -> total_pence/paid_pence) 26/26 backend packages; 72/72 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41. |
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popertots
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fe88f2084d |
fix: review-loop B — adversarial findings (sweep auto-refund, admin clamp, 2FA real challenge, opaque refresh tokens, gated client IP, GBP pence)
Loop B aggressive adversarial round (3 attack agents) + fix + secondary + verification:
- CRITICAL: sweep replay auto-refunds provably-created-later duplicate charges (gated on parseable CreatedAt); 22h legitimate-retry window == 22h sweep cutoff (no dead zone)
- HIGH: admin Take Payment clamps to remaining obligation (cash/giftcard/saved-card/terminal); no unintended tip from overflow; campaign credit against remaining
- HIGH: /api/services/eligible-for/{id} requires auth + owner-or-admin (DOB/age + patch-test health-data leak closed)
- HIGH: opaque refresh-token rotation (login/refresh return {token, jti, refreshToken}; refresh REQUIRES opaque token; single-use rotation; logout revokes; access token rejected at refresh)
- HIGH: saved-card charges require a REAL 2FA verification code (B6/B10) — backend gate on all 8 charge paths + shared TwoFactorCodeInput frontend component on all 7 surfaces; 2FA gate is no longer setup-flag-only
- MEDIUM: ungated CF-Connecting-IP in reserve/admin_reserve gated via exported mw.ClientIP; 2FA limiter keyed on userID alone (no header-rotation bypass); ChangePassword actually revokes JTI + refresh tokens; 2FA setup mint cooldown + persistent failed-attempt counter; campaign redemption race surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- Terminal saved-card VAT applied (was under-collected); age-guard reconcile failures notify; isWeakJWTSecret entropy gate; gift-card redeem per-card counter + per-user limiter; webhook signature key startup validation
- NEW internal/twofa package (single source of truth breaking the payments<->user import cycle); consolidation of duplicate 2FA hash/verify
- Frontend: refresh-token storage + rotation, TwoFactorCodeInput component, amountPaidPence in admin modal, B5/B6/B10 contract wiring; 70 frontend tests
- Tests: loop_b_fixes_test.go, internal/twofa tests, updated auth/services/profile/twofa/mw tests
All 26 backend packages pass (incl. internal/twofa); frontend 70/70 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
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popertots
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78e6d00dc5 |
fix: payments review rounds — money-safety, GDPR, security, gift-card cancel, modal stacking
Money-safety: - Deterministic till idempotency fallback (Square-charging only); cash/on_the_house keep unique keys; £250 till gift-card cap; 45-char key validation - Gift-card admin caps £250/tx + £5,000/day; user buy £500/day; BuyGiftCard allowlist unchanged - CancelGiftCard: CCR 2013 14-day right with partial-spend refund of the unspent balance (spend verified via payments.gift_card_id); atomic vs redeem/transfer; refunds stay pending until reversal commits; admin cancel surface (AdminCancelGiftCard) - Sweep: cancelled-booking charges failed+notified instead of silently completed; source-override replay uses live square_source_id; legacy square-less refund sweep; snapshot refresh on pending reuse - Refund lock consolidation; recordTerminalPaymentTx shared recorder; structured Square error codes; terminal checkout CustomerID GDPR / security: - Notes retained as de-identified medical/safety record at erasure (single field treated as health data; rest of record wiped, no re-identification map) + comments updated per UK GDPR/Art 9/Equality Act 2010 - square_request_snapshot PII scrubbed on all erasure paths; delete_guest_user FK unlinks; verification codes + dispute reasons handled; idle/stale-guest erasure deletes Square cards/customers + CardDAV/R2 - Durable square-erasure outbox job (retry-square-erasures); 2FA dev/prod build split, pepper fail-closed, no prod code-in-log; prod 2FA delivery fail-loud without a channel - Webhook unknown-type family split (non-money acked, money retried); untracked dispute notifications; rate-limit CF/X-Real-IP trust gating; nginx CSP nonce + api_limit Frontend: - Dynamic z-index stack (ui/dialog/zindex.ts) claimed in open order via data-state observer; re-claims on every reopen; removes stale !z-* overrides — nested modals (booking→user→booking) always paint newest-on-top (browser-verified 3-level + reopen) - Mobile: iOS zoom fixes, bottom-sheet dialogs, 44px touch targets, inputmode decimal, dvh - Gift-card buy/cancel UI, admin £250 + daily limits, cancellation/privacy/terms policy accuracy S3: - Connect() creates buckets before probing; in-memory fallback only on genuine unreachability; health reports degraded; stale S3_PUBLIC_URL documented (host-specific) Tests/docs: - 2263 test functions; all 22 backend packages green; round8/9/10 regression suites; NextEditWindowTime removes wall-clock flake; docs reconciled (notes retention, gift-card partial-use, modal T15 future work) |
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popertots
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e9b0f0f2a7 |
fix: review-loop hardening — identical-body replay, 2FA gates, webhook at-least-once, GDPR scrub
Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced. Money-safety: - Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge). - Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.) - Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog. - Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom 'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending. - Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card. - Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse). - M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total]. 2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments: - Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces. - Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env. - Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare); plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev). - GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes. Infra/docs: - nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80 redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS; separate webhook rate-limit zone. - Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id + square_request_snapshot. - Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected. - Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26 packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean. |
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popertots
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5e3dc9b428 |
fix: comprehensive payment system hardening (4 review passes)
CRITICAL fixes: - C1: JWT exp claim now validated via jwtauth.VerifyToken (was Decode) - C2: OverrideAmount validated post-substitution (prevents negative money minting) - C3: Terminal gift-card payments store gift_card_id; refund credits user balance - C4: Refund dedup returns stored amount, not req.Amount (prevents admin mislead) - C5: Booking recheck uses FOR UPDATE (prevents TOCTOU with cancellation) - C6: processChargeGroup idempotency key stable (charge-only, prevents double-refund) MAJOR fixes: - M2: Gift-card refund UPDATE checks RowsAffected; 0 rows -> failed - M3: ProcessCancellationRefund returns commit error (was swallowed) - M5: Dispute webhook handling (created + state.updated + disputes table) MEDIUM fixes: - ME1: CORS restricted to FRONTEND_ORIGIN env var (was reflect-any) - ME2: anonymize_user() scrubs users.notes, bookings.notes, name_history, refresh_tokens - ME3: Webhook handlers now mutate state (payment.updated, refund.updated) Frontend fixes: - Same-key retry on 503 (ambiguous failure) wired to all 8 payment flows - CHARGE_AND_STORE intent for save-card flows (SCA compliance) - Nonce staleness check verified across all flows Additional fixes from adversarial re-review: - F1: Till-sale completed dedup echoes stored amount (C4-class) - F2: Cash/giftcard terminal path uses FOR UPDATE (C5-class) - F3: Square-success UPDATE checks RowsAffected (till sales) - F4: Dispute reason truncated to 192 chars (prevents INSERT failure) - F5: Booking-user lookup failure marks refund failed (prevents silent money loss) - F6: Saved-card/tip rechecks wrapped in transaction (C5 residual) Tests: - 15 adversarial attack tests (negative override, zero override, terminal gift card, refund dedup, TOCTOU, deleted gift card, advisory lock, overcharge, zero/negative/huge amount, raw PAN, missing auth, gift card balance, concurrent refunds) - 14 webhook state tests (dispute created/state, payment/refund updated) - 3 CORS tests, 3 GDPR tests, 1 HTTP timeout test - Full suite passes with -race (25 packages, 0 failures) 25 files changed, +1532/-275 lines |
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popertots
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ea771ffaf5 |
Till: saved-card payment surface with customer picker and valid-card gating
Staff may charge a customer's saved card at the till but cannot add or save
one. A customer picker (reusing the admin user-search pattern, excluding
admin/guest/affiliate) loads the customer's cards via
GET /admin/users/{id}/payment-methods; the 'Saved card' payment option is
hidden outright when the customer has no currently-valid cards, computed
client-side with the Square convention (valid through the end of
exp_month/exp_year). The saved-card charge sends payment_method saved_card
plus user_id/user_saved_card_id with no card_token or verification_token, and
the per-line idempotency keys also key on the selected card so switching cards
yields fresh keys. No Square Dashboard hint, no new-card form, no save
checkbox — the till can never persist a card.
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popertots
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54a5b1024e |
Implement full Square payment review fixes + frontend polish
Implement every finding from the deep payment review (P0-P2, minors, nitpicks), then close the post-implementation re-review items, then align card-form typography and roll out the Square trust badge. Backend - Square API alignment: - tip_settings.allow_tipping nested under device_options (was top-level: terminal tips were silently lost in prod) - CreateCardOnFile now accepts customerID and sends card.customer_id; saved-card (ccof:) charges forward square_customer_id as CustomerID - New SquareClient methods GetPayment, CreateCustomer, CancelCheckout - SCA verification_token accepted + forwarded in all charge paths - ExpMonth/ExpYear -> *int; URL-path id validation; CancelCheckout NOT_FOUND-only no-op (dropped unverified NOOP); exported ErrorCode/ ErrorDetail helpers; mock rejects raw PANs, RList locks, redacts emails, ForceRefundPending hook Backend - money safety: - sweepManualPendingSquareRefunds reconciles rows WITH square_refund_id instead of stranding them forever - SweepStalePendingPayments reconciles at Square before failing (tri-state: leave pending on transport error, rescue completed, fail definitively) - GetCheckoutStatus cancellation-recheck; terminal CANCELED resolution; SweepStaleTerminalCheckouts covers terminal_checkouts table - till gift-card clawback on definitive failure incl. retry path + INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS/ADDRESS_VERIFICATION_FAILURE/TRANSACTION_LIMIT - cross-user saved-card collision fixed (UNIQUE(user_id,square_card_id)) - customer provisioning (lazy, save-only); one-off/guest mint no customer - discount preview/apply unified in discounts.go (global-milestone visible in preview, N+1 eliminated, redemption counter preserved on failures) - webhook event_id dedup; refund loop dedup; stale comment fixes - test-isolation t.Cleanup on committed sweep tests Frontend: - SCA tokenizeWithVerification across all charge flows (amount as major-units decimal), 5-min token-expiry re-tokenize, verification_token in request bodies - PaymentModal synchronous double-click + zero/negative-amount guards - till online-card UI wired to /api/admin/till/sale - policyPopover generalised; new /privacy-policy route; consent checkbox copy + Square privacy link - Square card iframe styled to app typography (Inter 14px, oklch tokens); mock form md:text-sm parity - 'Secure payment powered by Square' badge on all 8 card-payment flows Schema/docs: terminal_checkouts + square_customer_id + per-user card constraint in init-script.sql; README migrations; P14 plan + backlog + Technical Manual updated. Includes 39 modified/new test files; full backend suite (25 pkgs), -race on payments+square, and frontend build are green. |
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popertots
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4af2b8dfb4 | style: fix prefer-const and prettier formatting issues | ||
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popertots
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ad0ad253ad | style: apply prettier formatting to frontend | ||
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popertotsandSisyphus
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b23a8b89c4 |
feat(frontend): update admin components
Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent) Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai> |
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popertots
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5258f90b06 | Add giftcard management |