Crussell

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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
popertots	fdf3f64a13	fix: review round 4 — per-dispute chargeback alerts, single-source clawback, 2FA lockout coherence, docs Fourth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security, context-mining). All PASS on the money-safety core; this round closes the remaining MAJOR/MINOR items they surfaced. Webhooks: - Untracked disputes now raise ONE admin notification PER distinct chargeback: the notification id is derived deterministically from the square_dispute_id (SHA-256 truncated into the CHAR(12) slot) so a second untracked dispute is no longer silently suppressed by the first's dedup row. ON CONFLICT (id) keeps same-dispute replays idempotent; the booking-scoped NOT EXISTS guard is retained for the tracked path. Verified: distinct disputes -> distinct rows; re-delivered dispute -> one row. - The gift-card clawback SQL now lives in exactly ONE place: payments.RevertGiftCardFunding (new giftcard_clawback.go). till.go and the webhook path both call it — eliminating the byte-for-byte copy whose divergence would be a money-loss drift trap (the same two-sources-of-truth pattern this commit eliminated for GDPR scrubbing). 2FA: - Applied the lockout-coherence fix from the review: when a disable request must mint a fresh code (no valid pending one), the held attempt counter is reset so the locked-out user can use the freshly delivered code in the SAME request (no wasted round-trip). The reuse path keeps accumulating wrong attempts toward the 5-attempt lockout — the two behaviors no longer conflict. (The 'always-fresh on disable' suggestion was NOT adopted: it would break the out-of-band [2FA]-log delivery model, since a code generated by a request can never be submitted within that same request.) - New test pins the shared verify/disable lockout: 5 wrong verifies 429 and destroy the code; a stale code then 400s on disable while the freshly delivered code succeeds in the same request. - Startup now warns that 2FA codes travel in PLAINTEXT via the server log in enforced mode (operator must restrict log access + relay out-of-band until email/SMS lands). Docs: - Test counts updated to the current 2,154 across README + Technical Manual. - User Manual 2FA nav corrected: the settings live on the Account page, not an 'Admin' area. Tests: 2,154 (up from 2,151). Backend 25/26 packages green (crussell/db fails only in this environment: local postgres auth for the test role; package byte-identical to HEAD). Frontend builds; svelte-check 0 errors.	2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots	9bb812669e	fix: fresh-review round — 2FA deliverability, disable re-verification, GDPR batch scrub, dispute alerting, docs accuracy Second fresh-eyes review pass (7 agents: goal, security, code-quality, context-mining, webhooks+2FA, client+mock+sweep, refunds/giftcards/handlers). Money-safety core verified sound (identical-body replay byte-lossless, clawback gated on definitive proof, no double-charge window). This round fixes the issues the fresh pass surfaced: 2FA: - Setup now DELIVERS the code via the [2FA] server log in ALL modes (was: nothing in enforced mode -> production 2FA was an unbreakable dead-end and saved-card charges were permanently 403). Enforced mode still withholds the code from the API response; the log line is the fake delivery channel until email/SMS lands (P6). - Disabling 2FA now requires a fresh verification code when enforcement is ON (previously ignored the code -> a password-only attacker could lift the gate). Shares the 5-attempt lockout and timing-safe compare. Dev bypass retained. - REQUIRE_2FA parsing normalized (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive); startup warning extended to the empty-env/mock-client/enforced-2FA confusion. GDPR: - anonymize_user() SQL now scrubs two_factor_* columns + staff notes, so the idle-account batch cleanup (CleanupIdleAccounts) is erasure-clean, not just the user-initiated delete path. Webhooks: - dispute.created for an untracked Square payment now raises a critical_payment_log admin notification (chargeback the app can't reconcile is never silent). Reason strings truncated on rune boundaries (valid UTF-8). Stale at-most-once comment corrected; revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding duplication noted. Sweep/mock parity: - Mock CreatePayment dedup is now source-aware (IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED on source mismatch) matching ReplayPaymentByKey and real Square. - COMPLETED-but-never-polled terminal till-sale checkouts are now recorded by the sweep (previously only booking checkouts were; till charges were invisible until the 24h blind-fail WARN). - Legacy snapshot-less minimal-body replay, SQUARE_LOCATION_ID drift, and in-memory-mock-restart limitations documented. Docs: - Webhook path corrected everywhere (/webhooks/square, not /api/webhooks/square - a deployer following the old path would 404 and silently lose all webhook reconciliation). - 2FA enforcement semantics + code-delivery mechanism documented accurately (fail-closed default; log-delivery channel; disable re-verification). - README/User Manual note the 2FA requirement on online saved-card payments. Tests: 2,151 (up from 2,142). Backend 26/27 packages green (crussell/db fails only in this environment: local postgres doesn't offer scram-sha-256 for the test role; package is byte-identical to HEAD and untouched here). Frontend builds; svelte-check 0 errors.	2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots	e9b0f0f2a7	fix: review-loop hardening — identical-body replay, 2FA gates, webhook at-least-once, GDPR scrub Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced. Money-safety: - Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge). - Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.) - Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog. - Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom 'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending. - Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card. - Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse). - M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total]. 2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments: - Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces. - Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env. - Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare); plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev). - GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes. Infra/docs: - nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80 redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS; separate webhook rate-limit zone. - Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id + square_request_snapshot. - Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected. - Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26 packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean.	2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

popertots

fdf3f64a13

fix: review round 4 — per-dispute chargeback alerts, single-source clawback, 2FA lockout coherence, docs

Fourth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security,
context-mining). All PASS on the money-safety core; this round closes the
remaining MAJOR/MINOR items they surfaced.

Webhooks:
- Untracked disputes now raise ONE admin notification PER distinct chargeback:
  the notification id is derived deterministically from the square_dispute_id
  (SHA-256 truncated into the CHAR(12) slot) so a second untracked dispute is
  no longer silently suppressed by the first's dedup row. ON CONFLICT (id)
  keeps same-dispute replays idempotent; the booking-scoped NOT EXISTS guard
  is retained for the tracked path. Verified: distinct disputes -> distinct
  rows; re-delivered dispute -> one row.
- The gift-card clawback SQL now lives in exactly ONE place:
  payments.RevertGiftCardFunding (new giftcard_clawback.go). till.go and the
  webhook path both call it — eliminating the byte-for-byte copy whose
  divergence would be a money-loss drift trap (the same two-sources-of-truth
  pattern this commit eliminated for GDPR scrubbing).

2FA:
- Applied the lockout-coherence fix from the review: when a disable request
  must mint a fresh code (no valid pending one), the held attempt counter is
  reset so the locked-out user can use the freshly delivered code in the SAME
  request (no wasted round-trip). The reuse path keeps accumulating wrong
  attempts toward the 5-attempt lockout — the two behaviors no longer
  conflict. (The 'always-fresh on disable' suggestion was NOT adopted: it
  would break the out-of-band [2FA]-log delivery model, since a code generated
  by a request can never be submitted within that same request.)
- New test pins the shared verify/disable lockout: 5 wrong verifies 429 and
  destroy the code; a stale code then 400s on disable while the freshly
  delivered code succeeds in the same request.
- Startup now warns that 2FA codes travel in PLAINTEXT via the server log in
  enforced mode (operator must restrict log access + relay out-of-band until
  email/SMS lands).

Docs:
- Test counts updated to the current 2,154 across README + Technical Manual.
- User Manual 2FA nav corrected: the settings live on the Account page, not an
  'Admin' area.

Tests: 2,154 (up from 2,151). Backend 25/26 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres auth for the test role; package
byte-identical to HEAD). Frontend builds; svelte-check 0 errors.

2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00

popertots

9bb812669e

fix: fresh-review round — 2FA deliverability, disable re-verification, GDPR batch scrub, dispute alerting, docs accuracy

Second fresh-eyes review pass (7 agents: goal, security, code-quality,
context-mining, webhooks+2FA, client+mock+sweep, refunds/giftcards/handlers).
Money-safety core verified sound (identical-body replay byte-lossless, clawback
gated on definitive proof, no double-charge window). This round fixes the
issues the fresh pass surfaced:

2FA:
- Setup now DELIVERS the code via the [2FA] server log in ALL modes (was:
  nothing in enforced mode -> production 2FA was an unbreakable dead-end and
  saved-card charges were permanently 403). Enforced mode still withholds the
  code from the API response; the log line is the fake delivery channel until
  email/SMS lands (P6).
- Disabling 2FA now requires a fresh verification code when enforcement is ON
  (previously ignored the code -> a password-only attacker could lift the gate).
  Shares the 5-attempt lockout and timing-safe compare. Dev bypass retained.
- REQUIRE_2FA parsing normalized (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive);
  startup warning extended to the empty-env/mock-client/enforced-2FA confusion.

GDPR:
- anonymize_user() SQL now scrubs two_factor_* columns + staff notes, so the
  idle-account batch cleanup (CleanupIdleAccounts) is erasure-clean, not just
  the user-initiated delete path.

Webhooks:
- dispute.created for an untracked Square payment now raises a
  critical_payment_log admin notification (chargeback the app can't reconcile
  is never silent). Reason strings truncated on rune boundaries (valid UTF-8).
  Stale at-most-once comment corrected; revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding
  duplication noted.

Sweep/mock parity:
- Mock CreatePayment dedup is now source-aware (IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED on
  source mismatch) matching ReplayPaymentByKey and real Square.
- COMPLETED-but-never-polled terminal till-sale checkouts are now recorded by
  the sweep (previously only booking checkouts were; till charges were
  invisible until the 24h blind-fail WARN).
- Legacy snapshot-less minimal-body replay, SQUARE_LOCATION_ID drift, and
  in-memory-mock-restart limitations documented.

Docs:
- Webhook path corrected everywhere (/webhooks/square, not /api/webhooks/square
  - a deployer following the old path would 404 and silently lose all webhook
  reconciliation).
- 2FA enforcement semantics + code-delivery mechanism documented accurately
  (fail-closed default; log-delivery channel; disable re-verification).
- README/User Manual note the 2FA requirement on online saved-card payments.

Tests: 2,151 (up from 2,142). Backend 26/27 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres doesn't offer scram-sha-256 for the
test role; package is byte-identical to HEAD and untouched here). Frontend
builds; svelte-check 0 errors.

2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00

popertots

e9b0f0f2a7

fix: review-loop hardening — identical-body replay, 2FA gates, webhook at-least-once, GDPR scrub

Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the
review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced.

Money-safety:
- Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored
  square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original
  payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending
  forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge).
- Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card
  sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface
  ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.)
- Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales
  claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog.
- Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom
  'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending.
- Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card.
- Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the
  booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse).
- M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total].

2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments:
- Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into
  all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account
  admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces.
- Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit
  mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env.
- Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare);
  plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev).
- GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes.

Infra/docs:
- nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80
  redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS;
  separate webhook rate-limit zone.
- Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id +
  square_request_snapshot.
- Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips
  policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected.
- Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26
  packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean.

2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00