package user

import (
	"crypto/hmac"
	"crypto/rand"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"crypto/subtle"
	"database/sql"
	"encoding/hex"
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"log"
	"math/big"
	"net/http"
	"os"
	"sync"
	"sync/atomic"
	"time"

	"crussell/clock"
	"crussell/db"
	"crussell/handlers/payments"
	"crussell/mw"
)

// twoFARequired reports whether 2FA enforcement is active in this deployment.
// The user endpoints and the profile handler expose this to the frontend so it
// can gate the settings UI.
func twoFARequired() bool {
	return payments.NewPaymentService().TwoFactorEnforced()
}

// twoFAPendingExpiry is how long a generated verification code stays valid.
// Loose fake: real email/SMS infrastructure will own this lifetime once it lands.
const twoFAPendingExpiry = 10 * time.Minute

// generateTwoFACode returns a random 6-digit verification code.
func generateTwoFACode() (string, error) {
	n, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(1_000_000))
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	return fmt.Sprintf("%06d", n.Int64()), nil
}

// twoFAPepperEnv is the environment variable carrying the server-side pepper
// that keys the HMAC of stored 2FA codes (documented in .env.example). When it
// is absent the code falls back to the legacy plain SHA-256 digest with a
// one-time warning — see hashTwoFACode.
const twoFAPepperEnv = "TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER"

// twoFAPepperWarnOnce guards the one-time warning when TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER is
// unset, so a misconfigured deployment is loudly flagged once rather than on
// every code operation.
var twoFAPepperWarnOnce sync.Once

// twoFAPepper returns the configured HMAC pepper, or "" when unset. Read per
// call (the rest of the backend reads env vars per call too) so a value
// provisioned at runtime is picked up; only the warning is gated on sync.Once.
func twoFAPepper() string {
	pepper := os.Getenv(twoFAPepperEnv)
	if pepper == "" {
		twoFAPepperWarnOnce.Do(func() {
			log.Printf("WARNING: TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER unset — 2FA codes hashed without an HMAC pepper (falling back to unsalted SHA-256); set TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER in production so a leaked digest cannot be brute-forced offline")
		})
	}
	return pepper
}

// hashTwoFACode returns the hex digest of a verification code as stored in the
// DB. With TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER set the digest is HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the pepper,
// so a leaked digest cannot be brute-forced offline (the key stays server-side).
// When the pepper is unset it falls back to the legacy unsalted SHA-256 digest
// and logs a one-time warning. The plaintext code is never stored — only
// delivered via the [2FA] log line (see deliverTwoFACode).
func hashTwoFACode(code string) string {
	if pepper := twoFAPepper(); pepper != "" {
		mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(pepper))
		mac.Write([]byte(code))
		return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
	}
	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(code))
	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}

// legacyHashTwoFACode returns the pre-pepper plain SHA-256 digest, used to
// verify rows written before TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER was provisioned during the
// migration window (see verifyTwoFACodeHash).
func legacyHashTwoFACode(code string) string {
	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(code))
	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}

// verifyTwoFACodeHash reports whether reqCode matches a stored pending-code
// digest, always in constant time (subtle.ConstantTimeCompare). The first
// comparison uses the current pepper'd digest; when that fails the stored hash
// may be a legacy pre-pepper plain SHA-256 (rows written before TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER
// was provisioned), so the legacy digest is tried too. When a legacy row
// matches, legacy is true and the caller should re-hash with the pepper on the
// next successful verify, retiring the plain digest.
func verifyTwoFACodeHash(reqCode, storedHash string) (match, legacy bool) {
	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(hashTwoFACode(reqCode)), []byte(storedHash)) == 1 {
		return true, false
	}
	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(legacyHashTwoFACode(reqCode)), []byte(storedHash)) == 1 {
		return true, true
	}
	return false, false
}

// twoFAMaxAttempts is the number of consecutive failed verify attempts allowed
// before the pending code is invalidated and a new one must be requested.
const twoFAMaxAttempts = 5

// twoFAAttemptWindow bounds how long a per-user attempt counter lives before
// resetting, and doubles as the stale-entry eviction horizon for the map.
const twoFAAttemptWindow = 10 * time.Minute

// twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts caps the in-memory attempt map so a flood of distinct
// user IDs cannot grow it without bound. Counters are purely in-memory (the DB
// schema is locked — there is no attempt column), so they reset on process
// restart; the 10-minute pending-code expiry bounds the practical impact.
// Declared as a var so the eviction policy is unit-testable at a small cap.
var twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts = 10_000

// twoFAAttemptState tracks consecutive failed verify attempts for one user. The
// per-user mutex serializes the whole verify critical section so concurrent
// attempts from the same user cannot race the limit check. count and lastAt are
// atomic so the map eviction path can read them without taking the per-user
// mutex (lock ordering forbids mapMu→st.mu: checkTwoFACode holds st.mu then
// takes mapMu). lastAt is stored as nanoseconds since the Unix epoch so the
// eviction scan and lockedOut read it race-free even on 32-bit platforms — a
// plain time.Time read/write pair there could tear the 8-byte timestamp and
// reset or extend the lockout window.
// lastMintAt is the disable-flow mint cooldown stamp (see twoFAMintCooldown);
// it is only ever touched under st.mu.
type twoFAAttemptState struct {
	mu         sync.Mutex
	count      atomic.Int32
	lastAt     atomic.Int64
	lastMintAt time.Time
}

// lastActive returns the state's last-activity timestamp (nanoseconds since the
// Unix epoch, UTC). Reads are atomic so the map eviction scan can call it while
// holding only mapMu.
func (st *twoFAAttemptState) lastActive() time.Time {
	return time.Unix(0, st.lastAt.Load()).UTC()
}

// setLastActive records a last-activity timestamp. Writes happen under st.mu
// (checkTwoFACode) while the eviction scan reads under mapMu only — the atomic
// store makes both race-free.
func (st *twoFAAttemptState) setLastActive(t time.Time) {
	st.lastAt.Store(t.UnixNano())
}

// lockedOut reports whether the state is inside its lockout window: the attempt
// counter has reached the cap and the window has not yet elapsed. Such a record
// is the rate limit's source of truth for its user and must never be evicted
// while in-window — evicting it would silently reset the counter and grant a
// fresh guessing budget.
func (st *twoFAAttemptState) lockedOut(now time.Time) bool {
	return st.count.Load() >= twoFAMaxAttempts && now.Sub(st.lastActive()) <= twoFAAttemptWindow
}

var (
	twoFAAttemptMapMu sync.Mutex
	twoFAAttemptMap   = make(map[string]*twoFAAttemptState)
)

// twoFAAttemptStateFor returns the per-user attempt state, creating it if
// needed. The map is bounded: stale (window-expired) entries are evicted
// opportunistically and, when at capacity, the least-recently-active
// non-locked-out entry is dropped. A record still inside its lockout window is
// NEVER evicted — evicting it would reset the victim's attempt counter and
// bypass the rate limit under a hostile flood of new keys. When the map is
// full of in-window locked-out records (a pathological flood), a transient,
// untracked state is returned instead of growing the map past the cap.
func twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID string) *twoFAAttemptState {
	twoFAAttemptMapMu.Lock()
	defer twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
	now := clock.Now()

	if len(twoFAAttemptMap) >= twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts {
		var oldestID string
		var oldestAt time.Time
		for id, st := range twoFAAttemptMap {
			if now.Sub(st.lastActive()) > twoFAAttemptWindow {
				// Idle/expired — its counter has already lapsed; safe to evict.
				delete(twoFAAttemptMap, id)
				continue
			}
			if st.lockedOut(now) {
				// Inside its lockout window — the rate limit's source of truth
				// for this user. Never evict (finding-e fix).
				continue
			}
			if at := st.lastActive(); oldestID == "" || at.Before(oldestAt) {
				oldestID, oldestAt = id, at
			}
		}
		if len(twoFAAttemptMap) >= twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts && oldestID != "" {
			delete(twoFAAttemptMap, oldestID)
		}
		if len(twoFAAttemptMap) >= twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts {
			// Every entry is a locked-out in-window record. Do not evict one
			// (that would reset its rate limit) and do not grow past the cap:
			// return a transient, untracked state so THIS request still
			// proceeds under a fresh budget.
			st := &twoFAAttemptState{}
			st.setLastActive(now)
			return st
		}
	}

	st := twoFAAttemptMap[userID]
	if st == nil {
		st = &twoFAAttemptState{}
		st.setLastActive(now)
		twoFAAttemptMap[userID] = st
	}
	return st
}

// twoFAResetAttempts resets a user's attempt counter in place (count only)
// WITHOUT deleting the entry, preserving lastMintAt so the disable-flow mint
// cooldown survives a fresh-code delivery. Called on successful verify and when
// a fresh code is generated via setup or disable. lastAt is deliberately not
// touched here: it is re-stamped by checkTwoFACode on real activity, and
// writing it under mapMu would race with checkTwoFACode's st.mu-guarded write
// (the setup path holds no st.mu). The lock ordering is st.mu→mapMu at call
// sites, never the reverse (twoFAAttemptStateFor takes mapMu only and never
// takes st.mu).
func twoFAResetAttempts(userID string) {
	twoFAAttemptMapMu.Lock()
	defer twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
	if st := twoFAAttemptMap[userID]; st != nil {
		st.count.Store(0)
	}
}

// deliverTwoFACode generates a fresh verification code, persists only its
// SHA-256 hash plus the pending expiry (updating two_factor_method when method
// is non-empty), resets any prior lockout, and logs the plaintext code.
//
// The [2FA] log line is the delivery channel — the loose-fake stand-in for the
// not-yet-wired email/SMS transport (P6). The plaintext code is ALWAYS logged,
// enforced and unenforced alike: in enforced (production) environments the
// server log is the only way a code can reach the user, so an operator must
// relay it out-of-band. Do not gate this log line on the environment — without
// it, enforced-mode 2FA has no delivery path at all and every online saved-card
// charge stays 403. The API response still only returns the code when 2FA is
// unenforced (dev convenience). purpose labels the log line (e.g. "setup",
// "disable 2FA").
func deliverTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID, method, purpose string) (string, error) {
	code, err := generateTwoFACode()
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	expires := clock.Now().Add(twoFAPendingExpiry)
	if method != "" {
		_, err = db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
			UPDATE users
			SET two_factor_method = $2,
				two_factor_pending_code_hash = $3,
				two_factor_pending_code_expires = $4
			WHERE id = $1
		`, userID, method, hashTwoFACode(code), expires)
	} else {
		_, err = db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
			UPDATE users
			SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2,
				two_factor_pending_code_expires = $3
			WHERE id = $1
		`, userID, hashTwoFACode(code), expires)
	}
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}

	// A fresh code invalidates any prior lockout state.
	twoFAResetAttempts(userID)

	label := method
	if label == "" {
		label = purpose
	}
	log.Printf("[2FA] verification code for user %s (%s): %s", userID, label, code)
	return code, nil
}

type TwoFAStatusResponse struct {
	Enabled  bool    `json:"enabled"`
	Method   *string `json:"method"`
	Required bool    `json:"required"`
}

// GET /api/user/2fa/status
func GetTwoFAStatusHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var enabled bool
	var method sql.NullString
	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
		SELECT two_factor_enabled, two_factor_method
		FROM users
		WHERE id = $1
	`, userID).Scan(&enabled, &method)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to fetch 2FA status for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	resp := TwoFAStatusResponse{Enabled: enabled, Required: twoFARequired()}
	if method.Valid {
		resp.Method = &method.String
	}
	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp); err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to encode 2FA status response: %v", err)
	}
}

type TwoFASetupRequest struct {
	Method string `json:"method"`
}

// POST /api/user/2fa/setup
// Generates a verification code and stores only its SHA-256 hash plus a
// 10-minute expiry in the pending columns. The code is delivered by logging it
// with a [2FA] prefix — the loose-fake stand-in for the not-yet-wired email/SMS
// transport (P6). The plaintext code is ALWAYS logged, enforced and unenforced
// alike: in enforced (production) environments the server log is the only
// delivery channel, so an operator must relay the code to the user out-of-band.
// When 2FA is not enforced (dev), the code is also returned in the response so
// the flow is testable without reading backend logs.
func SetupTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var req TwoFASetupRequest
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if req.Method != "email" && req.Method != "sms" {
		http.Error(w, "method must be 'email' or 'sms'", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	var enabled bool
	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&enabled)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to check 2FA state for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if enabled {
		http.Error(w, "Two-factor authentication is already enabled", http.StatusConflict)
		return
	}

	// Deliver a fresh code via the shared setup mechanism: generate, persist
	// only the hash + expiry, reset any prior lockout, and log the plaintext
	// code (the [2FA] log channel — see deliverTwoFACode).
	code, err := deliverTwoFACode(r, userID, req.Method, "setup")
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to store 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	resp := map[string]any{"message": "Code sent"}
	if !twoFARequired() {
		// Dev convenience: unenforced environments return the code so the
		// fake-delivery flow is usable without grepping the backend log.
		resp["code"] = code
	}
	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp); err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to encode 2FA setup response: %v", err)
	}
}

type TwoFAVerifyRequest struct {
	Code string `json:"code"`
}

// twoFACodeCheckResult classifies checkTwoFACode's outcome so callers can map
// it to the correct HTTP status.
type twoFACodeCheckResult int

const (
	twoFACodeOK twoFACodeCheckResult = iota
	twoFACodeIncorrect
	twoFACodeLockedOut
	twoFACodeMissingOrExpired
)

// checkTwoFACode verifies the submitted code against the user's stored pending
// code under the per-user brute-force lockout, shared by VerifyTwoFAHandler and
// DisableTwoFAHandler. The caller must hold st.mu (from twoFAAttemptStateFor)
// so concurrent attempts from the same user cannot race the limit check. A
// correct code resets the attempt counter and returns twoFACodeOK. An incorrect
// code increments the counter and, on the 5th consecutive failure, invalidates
// the pending code (lockout). A missing or expired pending code returns
// twoFACodeMissingOrExpired. The returned error is non-nil only for DB failures
// (callers return 500); a lockout's pending-code invalidation failure is logged
// here and still reported as a lockout.
func checkTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID string, st *twoFAAttemptState, reqCode string) (twoFACodeCheckResult, error) {
	if now := clock.Now(); now.Sub(st.lastActive()) > twoFAAttemptWindow {
		st.count.Store(0)
		st.setLastActive(now)
	}
	if st.count.Load() >= twoFAMaxAttempts {
		return twoFACodeLockedOut, nil
	}

	var pendingHash sql.NullString
	var pendingExpires sql.NullTime
	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
		SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash, two_factor_pending_code_expires
		FROM users
		WHERE id = $1
	`, userID).Scan(&pendingHash, &pendingExpires)
	if err != nil {
		return twoFACodeLockedOut, err
	}
	if !pendingHash.Valid || !pendingExpires.Valid || !pendingExpires.Time.After(clock.Now()) {
		return twoFACodeMissingOrExpired, nil
	}
	// Constant-time compare (subtle) so a wrong code's match position cannot be
	// inferred from response timing. Both digests are fixed-length hex. Legacy
	// pre-pepper rows (plain SHA-256, hashed before TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER existed)
	// still verify during the transition window.
	match, legacy := verifyTwoFACodeHash(reqCode, pendingHash.String)
	if !match {
		st.count.Add(1)
		st.setLastActive(clock.Now())
		if st.count.Load() >= twoFAMaxAttempts {
			// Lockout reached: destroy the pending code so a stolen digest
			// cannot be replayed against a fresh guessing loop.
			if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
				UPDATE users
				SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
					two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL
				WHERE id = $1
			`, userID); err != nil {
				log.Printf("failed to invalidate 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
			}
			return twoFACodeLockedOut, nil
		}
		return twoFACodeIncorrect, nil
	}

	// Success: a legacy (pre-pepper) hash that verified is re-hashed with the
	// pepper so the plain digest is retired on the next successful verify.
	if legacy {
		if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
			UPDATE users
			SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2
			WHERE id = $1
		`, userID, hashTwoFACode(reqCode)); err != nil {
			log.Printf("failed to upgrade legacy 2FA pending code hash for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		}
	}
	// Success: clear the attempt counter (and any disable-flow mint cooldown)
	// before the caller performs its action.
	st.count.Store(0)
	st.setLastActive(clock.Now())
	st.lastMintAt = time.Time{}
	twoFAResetAttempts(userID)
	return twoFACodeOK, nil
}

// POST /api/user/2fa/verify
// Confirms the pending code (SHA-256, timing-safe, not expired) and flips
// two_factor_enabled on. When 2FA is not enforced (dev) any code — including an
// empty one — verifies, so local testing never depends on reading the logged
// code.
func VerifyTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var req TwoFAVerifyRequest
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if !twoFARequired() {
		// Dev bypass: no code verification in unenforced environments.
		if err := enableTwoFA(r, userID); err != nil {
			log.Printf("failed to enable 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
			http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		writeTwoFAEnabled(w)
		return
	}

	// Enforced path — brute-force resistant (see checkTwoFACode): the per-user
	// mutex serializes the critical section so concurrent attempts cannot race
	// the limit; after 5 consecutive failures the pending code is invalidated
	// and further attempts get 429 until a new code is requested via setup.
	st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
	st.mu.Lock()
	defer st.mu.Unlock()

	result, err := checkTwoFACode(r, userID, st, req.Code)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to check 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	switch result {
	case twoFACodeIncorrect:
		http.Error(w, "incorrect verification code", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	case twoFACodeLockedOut:
		http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Request a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
		return
	case twoFACodeMissingOrExpired:
		http.Error(w, "verification code is missing or has expired", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := enableTwoFA(r, userID); err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to enable 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	writeTwoFAEnabled(w)
}

// enableTwoFA persists two_factor_enabled=true and clears the pending code
// fields (the method was set during setup).
func enableTwoFA(r *http.Request, userID string) error {
	_, err := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
		UPDATE users
		SET two_factor_enabled = true,
			two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
			two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL
		WHERE id = $1
	`, userID)
	return err
}

func writeTwoFAEnabled(w http.ResponseWriter) {
	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]bool{"enabled": true}); err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to encode 2FA verify response: %v", err)
	}
}

// twoFAMintCooldown bounds how often a fresh 2FA code may be minted for one
// user during the disable flow. Without it, a password-only attacker could loop
// disable → fresh code (which resets the 5-attempt counter) → 5 wrong guesses →
// fresh code again, for ~100 guesses/min unbounded. The cooldown caps guessing
// at 5 per window (~5/min) while still letting a legitimate code-lost user
// recover after a short wait.
const twoFAMintCooldown = 1 * time.Minute

// errTwoFAMintThrottled is returned by ensurePendingTwoFACode when the user's
// last disable-flow mint is inside twoFAMintCooldown, so the caller returns 429
// instead of minting another fresh code.
var errTwoFAMintThrottled = errors.New("2FA code mint throttled")

type TwoFADisableRequest struct {
	Code string `json:"code"`
}

// POST /api/user/2fa/disable
// Turns 2FA off and clears method + pending fields for the authenticated user.
//
// Disabling 2FA lifts the SCA stand-in gate on saved-card charges, so in
// enforced environments a verification code is required — a password-only
// attacker must not be able to disable the protection. A fresh code is generated
// and delivered via the [2FA] log channel when no valid pending code exists, and
// the submitted code is checked under the shared 5-attempt lockout (wrong code →
// 400, lockout → 429); only a correct code clears the flag. Fresh-code mints are
// throttled per-user (twoFAMintCooldown) so the loop above cannot reset the
// lockout faster than once per cooldown. In unenforced (dev) environments the
// loose behavior is kept: no code required, so local dev is not blocked.
func DisableTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	// Body is optional; decode leniently so an empty body still works in
	// unenforced (dev) environments.
	var req TwoFADisableRequest
	_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req)

	if !twoFARequired() {
		// Dev bypass: no re-verification in unenforced environments.
		if err := disableTwoFA(r, userID); err != nil {
			log.Printf("failed to disable 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
			http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
		return
	}

	// Enforced path. The per-user mutex serializes the whole critical section
	// (fresh-code generation + code check) so concurrent requests cannot race
	// the lockout counter.
	st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
	st.mu.Lock()
	defer st.mu.Unlock()

	// Reuse a valid pending code when one exists; otherwise generate + deliver
	// a fresh one via the same [2FA] log channel as setup. A fresh code gets its
	// own independent 5-attempt budget (the mint resets the counter), so the
	// per-user mint cooldown is what stops the unlimited-guess loop — an
	// attacker can mint at most one fresh code per twoFAMintCooldown.
	if err := ensurePendingTwoFACode(r, userID, st); err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFAMintThrottled) {
			http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Wait before requesting a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("failed to prepare 2FA code for disable for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	result, err := checkTwoFACode(r, userID, st, req.Code)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to check 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	switch result {
	case twoFACodeIncorrect:
		http.Error(w, "incorrect verification code", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	case twoFACodeLockedOut:
		http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Request a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
		return
	case twoFACodeMissingOrExpired:
		// ensurePendingTwoFACode just guaranteed a valid pending code; defensive.
		http.Error(w, "verification code is missing or has expired", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := disableTwoFA(r, userID); err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to disable 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}

// ensurePendingTwoFACode guarantees the user has a valid (unexpired) pending
// code to verify against, generating + delivering a fresh one via the same
// [2FA] log channel as setup when the stored code is missing or expired. The
// caller must hold the user's attempt-state mutex.
//
// A fresh code gets its own independent 5-attempt budget (deliverTwoFACode
// resets the counter via twoFAResetAttempts), so the per-user mint cooldown is
// what prevents a password-only attacker from looping mint → burn 5 guesses →
// mint forever: only one fresh code per twoFAMintCooldown per user. A locked-out
// user can still use the code minted in THIS request; a user who exhausts it
// must wait out the cooldown for the next mint — the documented disable-flow
// residual. A failed delivery does not start the cooldown (the stamp is written
// only after the UPDATE persisted).
func ensurePendingTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID string, st *twoFAAttemptState) error {
	var pendingHash sql.NullString
	var pendingExpires sql.NullTime
	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
		SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash, two_factor_pending_code_expires
		FROM users
		WHERE id = $1
	`, userID).Scan(&pendingHash, &pendingExpires)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if pendingHash.Valid && pendingExpires.Valid && pendingExpires.Time.After(clock.Now()) {
		return nil
	}
	now := clock.Now()
	if !st.lastMintAt.IsZero() && now.Sub(st.lastMintAt) < twoFAMintCooldown {
		return errTwoFAMintThrottled
	}
	if _, err := deliverTwoFACode(r, userID, "", "disable 2FA"); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	st.lastMintAt = now
	return nil
}

// disableTwoFA clears two_factor_enabled and the method + pending code fields.
func disableTwoFA(r *http.Request, userID string) error {
	_, err := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
		UPDATE users
		SET two_factor_enabled = false,
			two_factor_method = NULL,
			two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
			two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL
		WHERE id = $1
	`, userID)
	return err
}