Files
popertots 78e6d00dc5 fix: payments review rounds — money-safety, GDPR, security, gift-card cancel, modal stacking
Money-safety:
- Deterministic till idempotency fallback (Square-charging only); cash/on_the_house keep unique keys; £250 till gift-card cap; 45-char key validation
- Gift-card admin caps £250/tx + £5,000/day; user buy £500/day; BuyGiftCard allowlist unchanged
- CancelGiftCard: CCR 2013 14-day right with partial-spend refund of the unspent balance (spend verified via payments.gift_card_id); atomic vs redeem/transfer; refunds stay pending until reversal commits; admin cancel surface (AdminCancelGiftCard)
- Sweep: cancelled-booking charges failed+notified instead of silently completed; source-override replay uses live square_source_id; legacy square-less refund sweep; snapshot refresh on pending reuse
- Refund lock consolidation; recordTerminalPaymentTx shared recorder; structured Square error codes; terminal checkout CustomerID

GDPR / security:
- Notes retained as de-identified medical/safety record at erasure (single field treated as health data; rest of record wiped, no re-identification map) + comments updated per UK GDPR/Art 9/Equality Act 2010
- square_request_snapshot PII scrubbed on all erasure paths; delete_guest_user FK unlinks; verification codes + dispute reasons handled; idle/stale-guest erasure deletes Square cards/customers + CardDAV/R2
- Durable square-erasure outbox job (retry-square-erasures); 2FA dev/prod build split, pepper fail-closed, no prod code-in-log; prod 2FA delivery fail-loud without a channel
- Webhook unknown-type family split (non-money acked, money retried); untracked dispute notifications; rate-limit CF/X-Real-IP trust gating; nginx CSP nonce + api_limit

Frontend:
- Dynamic z-index stack (ui/dialog/zindex.ts) claimed in open order via data-state observer; re-claims on every reopen; removes stale !z-* overrides — nested modals (booking→user→booking) always paint newest-on-top (browser-verified 3-level + reopen)
- Mobile: iOS zoom fixes, bottom-sheet dialogs, 44px touch targets, inputmode decimal, dvh
- Gift-card buy/cancel UI, admin £250 + daily limits, cancellation/privacy/terms policy accuracy

S3:
- Connect() creates buckets before probing; in-memory fallback only on genuine unreachability; health reports degraded; stale S3_PUBLIC_URL documented (host-specific)

Tests/docs:
- 2263 test functions; all 22 backend packages green; round8/9/10 regression suites; NextEditWindowTime removes wall-clock flake; docs reconciled (notes retention, gift-card partial-use, modal T15 future work)
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00

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# Rate limiting (per IP) — must be at http level, not inside server block
# api_limit mirrors the backend's own per-IP cap (mw.RateLimit(120, time.Minute)).
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=api_limit:10m rate=120r/m;
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=dav_limit:10m rate=100r/m;
# Webhook bursts (Square retry storms) need a higher ceiling than the API limit
limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=webhook_limit:10m rate=120r/m;
# Real client IP resolution behind Cloudflare (FAULT A4): Cloudflare sets
# CF-Connecting-IP BEFORE nginx, so stripping it (as the old config did) hid
# the real client from the backend and collapsed per-IP rate limiting to
# per-Cloudflare-edge-IP buckets. Instead the real_ip module rewrites
# $remote_addr to the CF-Connecting-IP value ONLY when the actual TCP peer
# matches one of the trusted Cloudflare ranges below — a direct client cannot
# spoof it, because its own address is never in these ranges. The rewritten
# $remote_addr then flows into X-Real-IP (and CF-Connecting-IP) downstream.
# Must be at http level so every server/location sees the resolved address.
# Cloudflare IPv4 ranges (https://www.cloudflare.com/ips/).
set_real_ip_from 173.245.48.0/20;
set_real_ip_from 103.21.244.0/22;
set_real_ip_from 103.22.200.0/22;
set_real_ip_from 103.31.4.0/22;
set_real_ip_from 141.101.64.0/18;
set_real_ip_from 108.162.192.0/18;
set_real_ip_from 190.93.240.0/20;
set_real_ip_from 188.114.96.0/20;
set_real_ip_from 197.234.240.0/22;
set_real_ip_from 198.41.128.0/17;
set_real_ip_from 162.158.0.0/15;
set_real_ip_from 104.16.0.0/13;
set_real_ip_from 104.24.0.0/14;
set_real_ip_from 172.64.0.0/13;
set_real_ip_from 131.0.72.0/22;
# Cloudflare IPv6 ranges.
set_real_ip_from 2a06:98c0::/29;
set_real_ip_from 2606:4700::/32;
set_real_ip_from 2803:f800::/32;
set_real_ip_from 2405:b500::/32;
set_real_ip_from 2405:8100::/32;
set_real_ip_from 2c0f:f248::/32;
real_ip_header CF-Connecting-IP;
# Only redirect to HTTPS for non-local hosts, so local dev on :80 keeps working.
# nginx map keys support regexes, which is how the RFC1918 ranges are matched.
# Every regex is anchored with $ so a hostname like 127.0.0.1.evil.com cannot
# match a private-IP prefix and bypass the HTTPS redirect.
map $host $ssl_redirect {
default 1;
~^localhost$ 0;
~^127\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$ 0;
~^10\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$ 0;
~^192\.168\.\d+\.\d+$ 0;
~^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.\d+\.\d+$ 0;
~^\[::1\]$ 0;
}
# Port 80: serve normally for localhost/private hosts, redirect everything else
server {
listen 80;
server_name _;
# Non-local hosts are forced to HTTPS; local/private hosts fall through
# and are served normally below.
if ($ssl_redirect) {
return 301 https://$host$request_uri;
}
# Security headers
add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff;
add_header X-Frame-Options DENY;
add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block";
# Square Web Payments SDK: script from *.squarecdn.com, card-entry iframe
# from js.squareup.com (frame-src; without it the payment form cannot
# tokenize behind this proxy). connect-src allows the SDK's own network calls.
# The SvelteKit SPA emits one inline bootstrap <script> in index.html whose
# content changes every build, so a static 'sha256-...' would break rebuilds.
# sub_filter injects a per-request nonce ($request_id, unique per request)
# into that inline script, and the same nonce appears in script-src below.
sub_filter '<script>' '<script nonce="$request_id">';
sub_filter_once on;
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-$request_id' https://*.squarecdn.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' https://*.squareup.com https://*.squarecdn.com; frame-src https://js.squareup.com https://*.squareup.com; frame-ancestors 'none';" always;
# Serve static frontend
root /usr/share/nginx/html;
index index.html;
# Cache immutable assets aggressively
location ~ ^/_app/immutable/ {
expires 1y;
add_header Cache-Control "public, immutable";
}
# Normal frontend routes (SPA fallback)
location / {
try_files $uri /index.html;
}
# Square webhook — registered at the root in the Go app, NOT under /api/.
# Exact match takes precedence over the static location / fallback.
location = /webhooks/square {
limit_req zone=webhook_limit burst=10 nodelay;
proxy_pass http://backend:8080;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
# Forward the real client IP as CF-Connecting-IP: $remote_addr has
# already been rewritten by the real_ip module from Cloudflare's
# CF-Connecting-IP (validated against the set_real_ip_from ranges
# above), or is the genuine peer address when no trusted edge is in
# front. Any client-supplied value is overwritten with the validated
# $remote_addr, so a direct client cannot spoof it. The backend
# additionally only honors it with TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true.
proxy_set_header CF-Connecting-IP $remote_addr;
}
# Proxy API requests to backend. No response caching here: the backend sends
# no Cache-Control headers, so a shared cache keyed on URI alone would serve
# one user's authenticated GETs to any caller.
location /api/ {
limit_req zone=api_limit burst=20 nodelay;
proxy_pass http://backend:8080;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
# Forward the real client IP as CF-Connecting-IP: $remote_addr has
# already been rewritten by the real_ip module from Cloudflare's
# CF-Connecting-IP (validated against the set_real_ip_from ranges
# above), or is the genuine peer address when no trusted edge is in
# front. Any client-supplied value is overwritten with the validated
# $remote_addr, so a direct client cannot spoof it. The backend
# additionally only honors it with TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true.
proxy_set_header CF-Connecting-IP $remote_addr;
}
# SabreDAV - CardDAV and CalDAV
location /dav/ {
limit_req zone=dav_limit burst=20 nodelay;
# Important: rewrite to remove /dav prefix for PHP processing
rewrite ^/dav/(.*)$ /server.php/$1 break;
# Pass to PHP-FPM in sabredav container
fastcgi_pass sabredav:9000;
fastcgi_index server.php;
fastcgi_split_path_info ^(.+\.php)(/.+)$;
include fastcgi_params;
fastcgi_param SCRIPT_FILENAME /var/www/dav/server.php;
fastcgi_param PATH_INFO $fastcgi_path_info;
fastcgi_param REQUEST_URI $request_uri;
# Required for DAV
fastcgi_param HTTPS $https if_not_empty;
fastcgi_read_timeout 300;
fastcgi_buffering off;
# Disable caching for DAV
proxy_cache off;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate";
# Allow DAV methods
if ($request_method = 'OPTIONS') {
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' '$http_origin';
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods' 'GET, POST, OPTIONS, PUT, DELETE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, REPORT, MKCOL, MOVE, COPY';
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Headers' 'DNT,User-Agent,X-Requested-With,If-None-Match,If-Modified-Since,Cache-Control,Content-Type,Range,Depth,Authorization,If-Match,Destination,Overwrite,Lock-Token,Timeout';
add_header 'Access-Control-Max-Age' 1728000;
add_header 'Content-Type' 'text/plain; charset=utf-8';
add_header 'Content-Length' 0;
return 204;
}
# Remove security headers that interfere with DAV
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "" always;
add_header X-Frame-Options "" always;
add_header X-XSS-Protection "" always;
}
# Legacy CardDAV endpoint (backward compatibility)
location /carddav/ {
return 301 $scheme://$host/dav/addressbooks$request_uri;
}
# Legacy CalDAV endpoint (backward compatibility)
location /caldav/ {
return 301 $scheme://$host/dav/calendars$request_uri;
}
}
# Port 443: production TLS, adds HSTS
server {
listen 443 ssl http2;
server_name _;
# TLS certs (you'll mount them into /etc/nginx/certs)
ssl_certificate /etc/nginx/certs/fullchain.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/nginx/certs/privkey.pem;
# Security headers
add_header X-Content-Type-Options nosniff;
add_header X-Frame-Options DENY;
add_header X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block";
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
# Square Web Payments SDK: script from *.squarecdn.com, card-entry iframe
# from js.squareup.com (frame-src; without it the payment form cannot
# tokenize behind this proxy). connect-src allows the SDK's own network calls.
# The SvelteKit SPA emits one inline bootstrap <script> in index.html whose
# content changes every build, so a static 'sha256-...' would break rebuilds.
# sub_filter injects a per-request nonce ($request_id, unique per request)
# into that inline script, and the same nonce appears in script-src below.
sub_filter '<script>' '<script nonce="$request_id">';
sub_filter_once on;
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-$request_id' https://*.squarecdn.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' https://*.squareup.com https://*.squarecdn.com; frame-src https://js.squareup.com https://*.squareup.com; frame-ancestors 'none';" always;
# Serve static frontend
root /usr/share/nginx/html;
index index.html;
# Cache immutable assets aggressively
location ~ ^/_app/immutable/ {
expires 1y;
add_header Cache-Control "public, immutable";
}
# Normal frontend routes (SPA fallback)
location / {
try_files $uri /index.html;
}
# Square webhook — registered at the root in the Go app, NOT under /api/.
# Exact match takes precedence over the static location / fallback.
location = /webhooks/square {
limit_req zone=webhook_limit burst=10 nodelay;
proxy_pass http://backend:8080;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
# Forward the real client IP as CF-Connecting-IP: $remote_addr has
# already been rewritten by the real_ip module from Cloudflare's
# CF-Connecting-IP (validated against the set_real_ip_from ranges
# above), or is the genuine peer address when no trusted edge is in
# front. Any client-supplied value is overwritten with the validated
# $remote_addr, so a direct client cannot spoof it. The backend
# additionally only honors it with TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true.
proxy_set_header CF-Connecting-IP $remote_addr;
}
# Proxy API requests to backend. No response caching here: the backend sends
# no Cache-Control headers, so a shared cache keyed on URI alone would serve
# one user's authenticated GETs to any caller.
location /api/ {
limit_req zone=api_limit burst=20 nodelay;
proxy_pass http://backend:8080;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
# Forward the real client IP as CF-Connecting-IP: $remote_addr has
# already been rewritten by the real_ip module from Cloudflare's
# CF-Connecting-IP (validated against the set_real_ip_from ranges
# above), or is the genuine peer address when no trusted edge is in
# front. Any client-supplied value is overwritten with the validated
# $remote_addr, so a direct client cannot spoof it. The backend
# additionally only honors it with TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true.
proxy_set_header CF-Connecting-IP $remote_addr;
}
# SabreDAV - CardDAV and CalDAV
location /dav/ {
limit_req zone=dav_limit burst=20 nodelay;
# Important: rewrite to remove /dav prefix for PHP processing
rewrite ^/dav/(.*)$ /server.php/$1 break;
# Pass to PHP-FPM in sabredav container
fastcgi_pass sabredav:9000;
fastcgi_index server.php;
fastcgi_split_path_info ^(.+\.php)(/.+)$;
include fastcgi_params;
fastcgi_param SCRIPT_FILENAME /var/www/dav/server.php;
fastcgi_param PATH_INFO $fastcgi_path_info;
fastcgi_param REQUEST_URI $request_uri;
# Required for DAV
fastcgi_param HTTPS $https if_not_empty;
fastcgi_read_timeout 300;
fastcgi_buffering off;
# Disable caching for DAV
proxy_cache off;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate";
# Allow DAV methods
if ($request_method = 'OPTIONS') {
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' '$http_origin';
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Methods' 'GET, POST, OPTIONS, PUT, DELETE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, REPORT, MKCOL, MOVE, COPY';
add_header 'Access-Control-Allow-Headers' 'DNT,User-Agent,X-Requested-With,If-None-Match,If-Modified-Since,Cache-Control,Content-Type,Range,Depth,Authorization,If-Match,Destination,Overwrite,Lock-Token,Timeout';
add_header 'Access-Control-Max-Age' 1728000;
add_header 'Content-Type' 'text/plain; charset=utf-8';
add_header 'Content-Length' 0;
return 204;
}
# Remove security headers that interfere with DAV
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "" always;
add_header X-Frame-Options "" always;
add_header X-XSS-Protection "" always;
}
# Legacy CardDAV endpoint (backward compatibility)
location /carddav/ {
return 301 $scheme://$host/dav/addressbooks$request_uri;
}
# Legacy CalDAV endpoint (backward compatibility)
location /caldav/ {
return 301 $scheme://$host/dav/calendars$request_uri;
}
}