Crussell/backend/handlers/payments/handlers.go

package payments

import (
	"context"
	"crussell/clock"
	"crussell/db"
	"crussell/internal/square"
	"crussell/internal/twofa"
	"crussell/internal/validators"
	"crussell/mw"
	"crypto/rand"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"database/sql"
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"log"
	"log/slog"
	"math"
	"net/http"
	"strconv"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
)

// InsertAdminAuditCharge records an admin-initiated money action in
// admin_audit_log (MEDIUM-3a). Mirrors the balance_check audit in
// giftcards.go:1239-1243 — same table, same columns, same best-effort
// non-fatal failure handling. The insert runs in its OWN transaction (a
// savepoint in the test harness) so an audit-write failure — e.g. a synthetic
// admin id in tests violating the admin_id FK — rolls back only the audit
// write and can never abort the caller's transaction or a completed charge.
// Exported so the user package (handlers/user/twofa.go) records admin 2FA
// code mints through this SAME helper instead of keeping a byte-identical
// cross-package copy.
func InsertAdminAuditCharge(ctx context.Context, adminID, targetUserID, action string, details map[string]any) {
	detailsJSON, err := json.Marshal(details)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to marshal admin_audit_log details (non-critical): %v", err)
		return
	}
	var target any
	if targetUserID != "" {
		target = targetUserID
	}
	auditTx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to record admin_audit_log (non-critical): %v", err)
		return
	}
	defer func() {
		if err := auditTx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
			slog.Error("failed to rollback admin audit transaction", "err", err)
		}
	}()
	if _, err := auditTx.Exec(ctx, `
		INSERT INTO admin_audit_log (admin_id, action_type, target_user_id, details)
		VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4::jsonb)
	`, adminID, action, target, string(detailsJSON)); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to record admin_audit_log (non-critical): %v", err)
		return
	}
	if err := auditTx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to record admin_audit_log (non-critical): %v", err)
	}
}

// insertTwoFAFallbackAudit records that a saved-card charge was authorized by
// the homegrown 2FA BACKUP because SCA was unavailable (the charge carried no
// Square verification_token). It is the strict-audit half of the SCA-primary /
// 2FA-backup decision model: every 2FA-fallback authorization of a saved-card
// charge must land an admin_audit_log row (action_type '2fa_fallback_charge',
// details {sca_performed:false, fallback_reason:"verification_unavailable"}) so
// the operator can distinguish SCA-authorized charges from fallback-authorized
// ones. Since C6 the row also captures the customer's versioned consent to the
// fallback (consent_version, consent_accepted, consent_versioned_at) — the
// exact values the server validated before the charge — so an operator/GDPR
// export can reconstruct which dialog version was shown, that it was accepted,
// when, and on which charge. Mirrors InsertAdminAuditCharge's best-effort,
// own-transaction, non-fatal failure handling (a failed audit write can never
// abort a completed charge). For customer-initiated online charges the actor
// (adminID) is the customer's own userID; for admin surfaces it is the admin
// from request context — the caller passes accordingly. cardLast4 and
// referenceID are filled by the caller at charge success
// (paymentResult.CardLast4, booking/till/payment id), where they are actually
// known.
func insertTwoFAFallbackAudit(ctx context.Context, adminID, userID, cardLast4, referenceID, notes string, consentVersion string, consentAccepted bool) {
	InsertAdminAuditCharge(ctx, adminID, userID, "2fa_fallback_charge", map[string]any{
		"sca_performed":        false,
		"fallback_reason":      "verification_unavailable",
		"card_last4":           cardLast4,
		"reference_id":         referenceID,
		"notes":                notes,
		"consent_version":      consentVersion,
		"consent_accepted":     consentAccepted,
		"consent_versioned_at": clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
	})
}

// logVerificationTokenProvenance records the charge context a legacy SCA
// verification_token arrived with (saved-card reference + booking) so an
// operator can correlate a minted token with the exact charge it authorized.
// The length-only ValidateVerificationToken is deliberately not extended:
// Square mints and validates these tokens server-side, binding them to the
// card + amount, and any stale/reused/mis-bound token is definitively rejected
// by Square with VERIFICATION_TOKEN_INVALID / CARD_DECLINED_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED
// (errors.go classifies those), so Square being the sole arbiter is acceptable
// — the charge fails closed on any mismatch. This log is the minimum provenance
// trace; the token is redacted to a prefix because it is a sensitive credential.
// A no-op for token-less charges (the SCA tokenize-result wire contract sends
// no verification_token at all).
func logVerificationTokenProvenance(flow, bookingID string, savedCardRef *string, token string) {
	if token == "" {
		return
	}
	ref := "(new-card)"
	if savedCardRef != nil && *savedCardRef != "" {
		ref = *savedCardRef
	}
	log.Printf("SCA verification_token present on %s charge for booking %s (saved card %s) — token %q forwarded to Square", flow, bookingID, ref, square.TokenPrefix(token))
}

type CreateTerminalPaymentRequest struct {
	Amount         int64   `json:"amount" validate:"required,gt=0"`
	PaymentType    string  `json:"payment_type" validate:"required"`
	OverrideAmount *int64  `json:"override_amount,omitempty"`
	TipEnabled     bool    `json:"tip_enabled"`
	PaymentMethod  *string `json:"payment_method,omitempty"`
	GiftCardID     *string `json:"gift_card_id,omitempty"`
	// saved_card_id: the user's saved card (user_saved_cards.id) to charge
	// directly, bypassing the terminal. The frontend sends this for the admin
	// "Charge Saved Card" action.
	UserSavedCardID *string `json:"saved_card_id,omitempty"`
	// verification_code: the customer's current 2FA one-time code (B10). An
	// enforced environment charges a saved card only when this matches the
	// customer's pending code; the operator relays it from the [2FA] log/email.
	VerificationCode string `json:"verification_code,omitempty"`
	// verification_token: Square 3DS/SCA verification token returned by the
	// frontend's buyer-verification flow (tokenizeWithVerification). When a
	// saved-card charge carries one, SCA has been performed by the issuer and
	// the homegrown 2FA gate is SKIPPED (SCA is primary). Forwarded verbatim
	// to Square on the CreatePaymentReq.
	VerificationToken *string `json:"verification_token,omitempty"`
	// idempotency_key: optional client-generated per-attempt UUID for saved-card
	// charges. The frontend generates one per distinct charge and reuses it
	// across retries of the SAME charge, so two DISTINCT identical charges on
	// one booking (e.g. a second £50 'full' charge for a second service) get
	// different keys and never collapse on the deterministic fallback key.
	// When absent, the handler falls back to the deterministic booking+type+
	// amount+card key for no-client-key retry safety. Cap ≤45 (Square's
	// idempotency-key limit for /v2/payments — this key feeds CreatePayment).
	IdempotencyKey string `json:"idempotency_key,omitempty" validate:"omitempty,max=45"`
	// ConsentVersion / ConsentAccepted: the customer's explicit versioned
	// consent to the SCA-unavailable → 2FA fallback (C6). The frontend sends
	// consent_version:"v1" + consent_accepted:true (scaFallbackConsentFields)
	// when the ScaFallbackConsentDialog was accepted; the server enforces it
	// (403 consent_required) before a fallback charge can reach Square and
	// records it on the 2fa_fallback_charge audit row.
	ConsentVersion  *string `json:"consent_version,omitempty"`
	ConsentAccepted bool    `json:"consent_accepted"`
}

type CreateBookingPaymentRequest struct {
	Amount      int64   `json:"amount" validate:"required,gt=0"`
	PaymentType string  `json:"payment_type" validate:"required"`
	CardID      *string `json:"card_id,omitempty"`
	// UserSavedCardID (saved_card_id) is the SCA path's reference to the stored
	// saved card (user_saved_cards.id). It coexists with NewCardToken when the
	// frontend sends the SCA tokenize-result — card.tokenize(verificationDetails,
	// cardId) — as new_card_token: the tokenize-result token is a fresh
	// one-time source_id and the saved-card row supplies the Square customer.
	// Without a token it behaves exactly like card_id (legacy/2FA-fallback).
	UserSavedCardID   *string `json:"saved_card_id,omitempty"`
	NewCardToken      *string `json:"new_card_token,omitempty"`
	SaveCard          bool    `json:"save_card"`
	IdempotencyKey    string  `json:"idempotency_key,omitempty" validate:"omitempty,max=45"`
	VerificationToken *string `json:"verification_token,omitempty"`
	// VerificationCode is the customer's current 2FA one-time code (B10): an
	// enforced environment charges a saved card only when this matches the
	// customer's pending code.
	VerificationCode string `json:"verification_code,omitempty"`
	// ConsentVersion / ConsentAccepted: the customer's explicit versioned
	// consent to the SCA-unavailable → 2FA fallback (C6), enforced server-side
	// (403 consent_required) and recorded on the 2fa_fallback_charge audit row.
	ConsentVersion  *string `json:"consent_version,omitempty"`
	ConsentAccepted bool    `json:"consent_accepted"`
	// ConfirmOverflowTip acknowledges that an overpayment beyond the booking's
	// remaining balance will be recorded as a tip (M7). Tips cannot be paid in
	// advance, so a pre-start overpayment is rejected with 400
	// overflow_tip_confirmation_required unless the client sets this flag; the
	// frontend prompts and resends with it. B12: post-start overpayments
	// require the flag too.
	ConfirmOverflowTip bool `json:"confirm_overflow_tip"`
}

type RefundRequest struct {
	Amount int64  `json:"amount"`
	Reason string `json:"reason"`
	// Optional client-generated idempotency key. Two DISTINCT refunds of the
	// same amount against the same payment must not collide on the default
	// amount-derived key (the dedup lookup would swallow the second refund).
	// The frontend sends a UUID generated per refund attempt and reuses it on
	// retry, mirroring the tip-flow pattern. Cap ≤45 (Square's /v2/refunds limit).
	IdempotencyKey string `json:"idempotency_key,omitempty" validate:"omitempty,max=45"`
}

type CreateTipPaymentRequest struct {
	Amount            int64   `json:"amount" validate:"required,gt=0"`
	CardID            *string `json:"card_id,omitempty"`
	NewCardToken      *string `json:"new_card_token,omitempty"`
	SaveCard          bool    `json:"save_card"`
	IdempotencyKey    string  `json:"idempotency_key,omitempty" validate:"omitempty,max=45"`
	VerificationToken *string `json:"verification_token,omitempty"`
	// VerificationCode is the customer's current 2FA one-time code (B10): an
	// enforced environment charges a saved card only when this matches the
	// customer's pending code.
	VerificationCode string `json:"verification_code,omitempty"`
	// ConsentVersion / ConsentAccepted: the customer's explicit versioned
	// consent to the SCA-unavailable → 2FA fallback (C6), enforced server-side
	// (403 consent_required) and recorded on the 2fa_fallback_charge audit row.
	ConsentVersion  *string `json:"consent_version,omitempty"`
	ConsentAccepted bool    `json:"consent_accepted"`
}

type CheckoutResponse struct {
	CheckoutID string `json:"checkout_id"`
	Status     string `json:"status"`
}

type PaymentStatusResponse struct {
	Status     string `json:"status"`
	PaymentID  string `json:"payment_id,omitempty"`
	Amount     int64  `json:"amount,omitempty"`
	CardBrand  string `json:"card_brand,omitempty"`
	CardLast4  string `json:"card_last4,omitempty"`
	ReceiptURL string `json:"receipt_url,omitempty"`
}

type PaymentResponse struct {
	ID          string `json:"id"`
	BookingID   string `json:"booking_id"`
	PaymentType string `json:"payment_type"`
	Status      string `json:"status"`
	Amount      int64  `json:"amount"`
	CardBrand   string `json:"card_brand,omitempty"`
	CardLast4   string `json:"card_last4,omitempty"`
	ReceiptURL  string `json:"receipt_url,omitempty"`
	CreatedAt   string `json:"created_at"`
}

type RefundResponse struct {
	ID        string `json:"id"`
	PaymentID string `json:"payment_id"`
	Amount    int64  `json:"amount"`
	Status    string `json:"status"`
	Reason    string `json:"reason"`
	CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
}

type PaymentSummaryResponse struct {
	TotalAmount     int64             `json:"total_amount"`
	PaidAmount      int64             `json:"paid_amount"`
	RefundedAmount  int64             `json:"refunded_amount"`
	RemainingAmount int64             `json:"remaining_amount"`
	TotalVATAmount  int64             `json:"total_vat_amount"`
	TotalNetAmount  int64             `json:"total_net_amount"`
	Payments        []PaymentResponse `json:"payments"`
	Refunds         []RefundResponse  `json:"refunds"`
}

// DiscountPreviewResponse describes eligible discounts for a booking.
type DiscountPreviewResponse struct {
	Eligible        bool              `json:"eligible"`
	Discounts       []DiscountPreview `json:"discounts"`
	OriginalTotal   float64           `json:"original_total"`
	DiscountedTotal float64           `json:"discounted_total"`
}

// DiscountPreview describes a single eligible discount.
type DiscountPreview struct {
	Source  string  `json:"source"`
	Name    string  `json:"name"`
	Percent float64 `json:"percent"`
	Amount  float64 `json:"amount"`
}

// isAdminRequest is a defense-in-depth role check for admin-only payment
// handlers. The routes are mounted under mw.RequireAdmin, but this in-handler
// guard keeps admin-only actions (refunds, terminal charges, till sales)
// protected even if a route is ever re-registered on a non-admin router (S-1).
func isAdminRequest(r *http.Request) bool {
	role, ok := r.Context().Value(mw.UserRoleKey).(string)
	return ok && role == "admin"
}

// isVerifiedRole reports whether the authenticated user may save cards
// (account_role in ('verified_email','admin')). Guests, unverified accounts,
// and affiliates may still pay but must never persist a card.
func isVerifiedRole(r *http.Request) bool {
	role, ok := r.Context().Value(mw.UserRoleKey).(string)
	return ok && (role == "verified_email" || role == "admin")
}

// rejectSaveCardForUnverified enforces the save-card product rule at the
// handler level for charge endpoints. When a charge request carries
// save_card=true for a non-verified user it responds 403 and returns true so
// the caller aborts BEFORE resolveChargeSource (where the card would be
// persisted), the pending payment record insert, or the Square call — failing
// closed with no side effects. A non-verified user may still pay; only card
// persistence is blocked. The dedicated save endpoints are additionally
// protected by mw.RequireVerified middleware (main.go).
func rejectSaveCardForUnverified(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, saveCard bool) bool {
	if saveCard && !isVerifiedRole(r) {
		http.Error(w, "Only verified accounts can save a card", http.StatusForbidden)
		return true
	}
	return false
}

// GetDiscountPreviewHandler returns eligible discounts for a booking without applying them.
// GET /api/bookings/{id}/discount-preview
func GetDiscountPreviewHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	bookingID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
	if !validators.IsValidID(bookingID) {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid booking ID", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}
	userRole, _ := r.Context().Value(mw.UserRoleKey).(string)

	service := NewPaymentService()

	// Fail closed (R5): a non-admin request must own the booking. The previous
	// handler computed the discount preview for ANY booking id the caller
	// supplied — leaking another user's booking total and eligible discounts
	// (IDOR). Mirror GetBookingPaymentSummary's ownership check exactly: a
	// request with no user context gets 401, and a non-owner gets 403.
	if userRole != "admin" {
		if userID == "" {
			http.Error(w, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
			return
		}
		bookingUserID, err := service.GetBookingUserID(r.Context(), bookingID)
		if err != nil {
			if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
				http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
				return
			}
			log.Printf("Failed to get booking user: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		if bookingUserID != userID {
			http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusForbidden)
			return
		}
	}

	preview := calculateDiscountPreview(r.Context(), bookingID, userID)

	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(preview); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

// calculateDiscountPreview runs the same eligibility queries as
// applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment (via ComputeEligibleDiscounts) but returns
// the results without inserting any records.
func calculateDiscountPreview(ctx context.Context, bookingID string, userID string) DiscountPreviewResponse {
	resp := DiscountPreviewResponse{
		Discounts: []DiscountPreview{},
	}

	var bookingTotal float64
	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
		SELECT total_amount FROM bookings WHERE id = $1
	`, bookingID).Scan(&bookingTotal); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to query booking total for discount preview %s: %v", bookingID, err)
	}

	if bookingTotal <= 0 {
		return resp
	}

	resp.OriginalTotal = bookingTotal
	discountTotal := 0.0

	// Shared with the apply-at-payment path so the preview shows exactly what
	// payment will apply — including the global in-person milestone discount
	// that was previously only computed at payment time.
	for _, d := range ComputeEligibleDiscounts(ctx, db.Conn, bookingID, userID, bookingTotal) {
		resp.Discounts = append(resp.Discounts, DiscountPreview{
			Source:  d.Source,
			Name:    d.Name,
			Percent: d.Percent,
			Amount:  d.Amount,
		})
		discountTotal += d.Amount
	}

	resp.Eligible = len(resp.Discounts) > 0
	resp.DiscountedTotal = roundTo2(bookingTotal - discountTotal)
	return resp
}

// maxTerminalTipPence caps the gratuity portion of a tip-enabled terminal
// checkout (B3): the frontend embeds the tip in the charge amount, so the
// booking portion must still not exceed the remaining obligation. £50 is a
// generous single-tip bound for this business; the total charge is capped at
// remaining + this bound.
const maxTerminalTipPence = int64(5000) // £50

// clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance caps a requested terminal charge at the
// booking's remaining obligation (B3). The admin "Take Payment" PaymentModal
// sends subtotal - discounts - campaignDiscountPence, which ignores PRIOR
// payments; recording that verbatim would overcharge the customer (or carve
// the excess into an unintended tip). The clamp keeps the recorded/charged
// money within the actual obligation and returns whether the amount was
// reduced. Callers MUST have serialized the attempt (advisory lock or the
// booking FOR UPDATE row lock) so the remaining-balance read races no
// concurrent same-booking payment. The frontend must handle the discrepancy
// between the amount it displayed and the clamped amount that was charged.
//
// A fully-paid booking (remaining <= 0) is clamped to 0 (clamped=true,
// effective=0): no obligation remains, so recording the requested amount
// verbatim would overcharge a customer who already paid in full. The callers
// reject the resulting zero-charge with 400 "already fully paid" — the only
// legitimate money on a fully-paid booking is an EXPLICIT tip, which the
// tip-enabled terminal path handles separately (it caps the total at
// remaining + maxTerminalTipPence instead of clamping here).
func clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance(ctx context.Context, bookingID string, amount int64) (effective, remaining int64, clamped bool, err error) {
	remaining, err = NewPaymentService().GetBookingRemainingBalancePence(ctx, bookingID)
	if err != nil {
		return amount, 0, false, err
	}
	if amount > remaining && remaining > 0 {
		return remaining, remaining, true, nil
	}
	if remaining <= 0 {
		return 0, remaining, true, nil
	}
	return amount, remaining, false, nil
}

func CreateTerminalPayment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	// Defense-in-depth admin check (S-1) — the route is mounted under
	// mw.RequireAdmin; this keeps terminal charges admin-only regardless.
	if !isAdminRequest(r) {
		http.Error(w, "Admin access required", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	bookingID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
	if bookingID == "" || !validators.IsValidID(bookingID) {
		http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	adminID, ok := r.Context().Value(mw.UserIDKey).(string)
	if !ok || adminID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var req CreateTerminalPaymentRequest
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to decode terminal payment request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := validators.Validate.Struct(&req); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidateAmount(req.Amount); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidatePaymentType(req.PaymentType); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidateVerificationToken(req.VerificationToken); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// A3 (mirror of CreateBookingPayment at handlers.go:1596): tips have a
	// dedicated endpoint (POST /api/bookings/{id}/tip, CreateTipPayment) which
	// enforces the M4 "tips only after the service starts" gate, and the
	// tip-enabled terminal overflow carve (B3, tip_enabled) records explicit
	// gratuity as its own payment_type='tip' row. A bare payment_type='tip'
	// here would record the ENTIRE charge as a tip — and every "is paid"
	// computation excludes tip rows (paid_total, GetBookingPaymentInfo,
	// bookingIsFullyPaid, GetBookingRefundableAmountPence) — so the booking
	// would never be credited and a later legitimate charge would double-collect.
	// Reject it BEFORE any charge-path branch (cash/giftcard, saved_card,
	// terminal checkout) so all four sub-paths are closed at once.
	if req.PaymentType == "tip" {
		log.Printf("Payment rejected: booking %s payment_type 'tip' is not allowed via /payment — tips use the dedicated /tip endpoint", bookingID)
		http.Error(w, "Tips can only be added via the dedicated tip endpoint after the booking has started", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	service := NewPaymentService()

	amount := req.Amount
	if req.OverrideAmount != nil {
		amount = *req.OverrideAmount
	}

	// C2: the struct validation above checks req.Amount only, and the override
	// substitution happens after. A negative override would flip the gift-card
	// balance deduction into a credit (money minting) and a zero override would
	// record a free payment, so the EFFECTIVE amount must be validated here.
	if err := ValidateAmount(amount); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid override amount: "+err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Idempotency key for the payment. Cash/giftcard terminal payments are
	// always fresh admin actions (not network-retryable), and the request has
	// no client key — so a deterministic booking+type+amount key would wrongly
	// dedup two legitimate identical payments (e.g. two £50 cash receipts on
	// one booking). Use a unique key per payment: retries of a lost response
	// are handled by the Square-side key for card payments, and cash/giftcard
	// are DB-committed synchronously. There is deliberately NO idempotency
	// dedup check here — each request inserts its own row, and two identical
	// cash receipts are legitimate distinct payments.
	idempotencyKey := uniqueChargeKey("till-")

	// Route based on payment method
	if req.PaymentMethod != nil && (*req.PaymentMethod == "cash" || *req.PaymentMethod == "giftcard") {
		// C2: serialize this till cash/giftcard charge under the SAME
		// crussell:payment:<bookingID> advisory lock the online booking payment
		// path (CreateBookingPayment) and the saved-card/terminal paths take.
		// The bookings-row FOR UPDATE below only serializes against OTHER
		// transactions that take the same row lock — the online path reads the
		// remaining balance under the advisory lock with NO FOR UPDATE, so the
		// two primitives do NOT serialize against each other: a concurrent
		// online charge + till cash/giftcard charge could both pass their
		// remaining-balance checks and both record money (the overflow carved
		// into a non-refundable tip by buildSplitRecords). Holding the same
		// advisory lock here makes every money-mutating path contend on one
		// primitive; the FOR UPDATE stays as a harmless double-guard against
		// concurrent cancellations. The bounded try-lock (R6) gives an
		// in-flight online charge ~3s to finish, then fails this fast with 409.
		pinConn, lockOK := acquireBookingPaymentLock(r.Context(), w, "crussell:payment:"+bookingID, "Payment in progress, try again")
		if !lockOK {
			return
		}
		defer releaseBookingPaymentLock(pinConn, "crussell:payment:"+bookingID)

		// Start transaction before the status and idempotency checks so they
		// are atomic with the payment insert.
		tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		defer func() {
			if err := tx.Rollback(r.Context()); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
				slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
			}
		}()

		// Check booking status inside the transaction. FOR UPDATE (C5): the
		// payment insert below commits in this same transaction, so a
		// concurrent cancellation (which takes the same row lock) must not be
		// able to commit a cancelled status between this read and the commit —
		// otherwise the payment would land on a cancelled booking with no
		// refund ever generated.
		var status string
		if err := tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT status FROM bookings WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE`, bookingID).Scan(&status); err != nil {
			if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
				http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
				return
			}
			log.Printf("Failed to get booking status: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		if status != "in_progress" && status != "completed" {
			http.Error(w, "Booking must be in_progress or completed to create payment", http.StatusBadRequest)
			return
		}

		// B3: clamp the recorded amount to the booking's remaining obligation
		// unless the customer explicitly requested a tip (tip_enabled) — mirror
		// the card-terminal tip bound below: the booking portion can never
		// exceed what is owed, and the tip portion can never exceed
		// maxTerminalTipPence. The booking row FOR UPDATE lock above serializes
		// concurrent cash/giftcard payments on this booking, so this read races
		// no same-method payment. A fully-paid no-tip booking is rejected below
		// (nothing left to record).
		var remaining int64
		if req.TipEnabled {
			remainingPence, remErr := service.GetBookingRemainingBalancePence(r.Context(), bookingID)
			if remErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to compute remaining balance for tip-enabled terminal %s payment on booking %s: %v", *req.PaymentMethod, bookingID, remErr)
				http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
				return
			}
			remaining = remainingPence
			maxChargePence := remainingPence + maxTerminalTipPence
			if amount > maxChargePence {
				log.Printf("Terminal %s payment for booking %s clamped from %d to %d pence (remaining obligation %d + max tip bound £%.2f) — the requested total exceeded the booking remainder plus the tip cap", *req.PaymentMethod, bookingID, amount, maxChargePence, remainingPence, float64(maxTerminalTipPence)/100.0)
				amount = maxChargePence
			}
		} else {
			effectiveAmount, remaining, clamped, cErr := clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance(r.Context(), bookingID, amount)
			if cErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to compute remaining balance for terminal %s payment on booking %s: %v", *req.PaymentMethod, bookingID, cErr)
				http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
				return
			}
			if clamped && effectiveAmount <= 0 {
				// B3: the clamp zeroed the amount because the booking is fully paid
				// (remaining <= 0). Reject rather than record a phantom £0 payment —
				// an overpayment is handled manually at the counter, not minted
				// into the ledger.
				log.Printf("Terminal %s payment on booking %s rejected: booking already fully paid (remaining %d pence, requested %d pence)", *req.PaymentMethod, bookingID, remaining, amount)
				http.Error(w, "Booking is already fully paid", http.StatusBadRequest)
				return
			}
			if clamped {
				log.Printf("Terminal %s payment on booking %s clamped from %d to %d pence (remaining obligation) — the frontend PaymentModal sent an amount that ignored prior payments; the customer is charged the remaining obligation only", *req.PaymentMethod, bookingID, amount, effectiveAmount)
				amount = effectiveAmount
			}
		}

		// M4 (mirror of the card-terminal carve at sweep.go): when the customer
		// explicitly requested a tip, any part of the charged amount beyond the
		// remaining booking value is gratuity and must be recorded as its own
		// payment_type='tip' row — never absorbed into the booking payment
		// (which would over-credit the booking) nor rejected. The booking
		// portion keeps the requested payment type, exactly as the non-tip
		// cash/giftcard flow records it.
		tipPortion := int64(0)
		bookingPortion := amount
		if req.TipEnabled && remaining < amount {
			tipPortion = amount - remaining
			bookingPortion = remaining
		}

		amountPounds := float64(amount) / 100.0
		bookingPortionPounds := float64(bookingPortion) / 100.0
		tipPounds := float64(tipPortion) / 100.0
		var paymentID string
		// auditTargetUserID is the booking's customer for the MEDIUM-3a audit
		// row (empty = guest booking, audited with a NULL target). Captured per
		// branch and used AFTER the money commits below.
		var auditTargetUserID string

		if *req.PaymentMethod == "cash" {
			if bookingPortionPounds > roundingEpsilon {
				err = tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
					INSERT INTO payments (
						booking_id, payment_type, payment_method, status, amount, idempotency_key, created_by, created_at, updated_at
					) VALUES ($1, $2, 'cash', 'completed', $3, $4, $5, NOW(), NOW())
					RETURNING id
				`, bookingID, req.PaymentType, bookingPortionPounds, idempotencyKey, adminID).Scan(&paymentID)
				if err != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to create cash payment record: %v", err)
					http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
					return
				}
				ApplyVATToBookingPayment(r.Context(), tx, paymentID)
			}
			// The tip carve is recorded as its own 'tip' row so the booking
			// portion is the only money that counts toward the obligation.
			// When the charge is tip-only (fully-paid booking), the tip row is
			// the ONLY record and its id is returned as the checkout id,
			// mirroring the card-terminal carve (primary := records[0]).
			if tipPounds > roundingEpsilon {
				tipKey := splitIdempotencyKey(idempotencyKey, "-split-tip")
				tipID, tipErr := service.CreatePaymentRecordTx(r.Context(), tx, PaymentRecord{
					BookingID:      bookingID,
					PaymentType:    "tip",
					PaymentMethod:  "cash",
					Status:         "completed",
					Amount:         tipPounds,
					IdempotencyKey: &tipKey,
					CreatedBy:      &adminID,
					CreatedAt:      clock.Now(),
					UpdatedAt:      clock.Now(),
				}, nil)
				if tipErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to create cash tip payment record: %v", tipErr)
					http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
					return
				}
				if paymentID == "" {
					paymentID = tipID
				}
			}

			// MEDIUM-3a: the admin-initiated CASH charge is audited in
			// admin_audit_log AFTER the money commits below (best-effort,
			// non-fatal). Capture the booking's customer now for the audit; a
			// guest booking has no user_id and audits with a NULL target.
			var cashCustomerID sql.NullString
			if cuErr := tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), "SELECT user_id FROM bookings WHERE id = $1", bookingID).Scan(&cashCustomerID); cuErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to query booking user for cash charge audit: %v", cuErr)
			}
			if cashCustomerID.Valid {
				auditTargetUserID = cashCustomerID.String
			}
		} else { // giftcard
			var customerID sql.NullString
			err = tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), "SELECT user_id FROM bookings WHERE id = $1", bookingID).Scan(&customerID)
			if err != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to query booking user: %v", err)
				http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
				return
			}

			usedBalance := false
			if customerID.Valid {
				var balance float64
				err = tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), "SELECT balance FROM user_giftcard_balances WHERE user_id = $1 FOR UPDATE", customerID.String).Scan(&balance)
				if err == nil {
					if balance < amountPounds {
						http.Error(w, "Insufficient gift card balance on user account", http.StatusBadRequest)
						return
					}
					// Deduct from account balance
					_, err = tx.Exec(r.Context(), "UPDATE user_giftcard_balances SET balance = balance - $1, updated_at = NOW() WHERE user_id = $2", amountPounds, customerID.String)
					if err != nil {
						log.Printf("Failed to deduct user balance: %v", err)
						http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
						return
					}
					usedBalance = true
				} else if !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
					log.Printf("Failed to query user balance: %v", err)
					http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
					return
				}
			}

			var cardVoucherType string // voucher_type_at_purchase from the gift card
			// giftCardPaymentID records the source of funds on the payment row:
			// the gift_card_id for a direct card redemption, or nil when the
			// payment came from the user's account balance (usedBalance). The
			// cancellation refund loop reads this column to know where to
			// credit money back (C3).
			var giftCardPaymentID *string
			if !usedBalance {
				// Try direct card redemption (for guests or users without a redeemed balance)
				if req.GiftCardID == nil || *req.GiftCardID == "" {
					http.Error(w, "Gift card ID is required", http.StatusBadRequest)
					return
				}
				cleanCardID := validators.NormalizeGiftCardCode(*req.GiftCardID)

				var gcRemaining float64
				var redeemedBy sql.NullString
				var vtp sql.NullString
				err = tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), "SELECT amount_remaining, redeemed_by, voucher_type_at_purchase FROM gift_cards WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE", cleanCardID).Scan(&gcRemaining, &redeemedBy, &vtp)
				if err != nil {
					if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
						http.Error(w, "Gift card not found", http.StatusNotFound)
						return
					}
					log.Printf("Failed to query gift card: %v", err)
					http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
					return
				}

				if redeemedBy.Valid {
					http.Error(w, "This gift card has already been redeemed to an account. Please pay using the account balance.", http.StatusBadRequest)
					return
				}

				if gcRemaining < amountPounds {
					http.Error(w, "Insufficient balance on gift card", http.StatusBadRequest)
					return
				}

				// Record the voucher_type_at_purchase for later VAT decision.
				// Legacy cards (created before this column existed) have NULL → default to SPV.
				if vtp.Valid {
					cardVoucherType = vtp.String
				} else {
					cardVoucherType = "SPV"
				}

				// Deduct directly from card remaining amount. A payment is a
				// "use" per the rolling-expiry terms — reset the timer.
				gcExpiryMonths, expiryErr := GetGiftCardExpiryMonths(r.Context(), tx)
				if expiryErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to query gift card expiry months (using default %d): %v", defaultGiftCardExpiryMonths, expiryErr)
					gcExpiryMonths = defaultGiftCardExpiryMonths
				}
				_, err = tx.Exec(r.Context(), "UPDATE gift_cards SET amount_remaining = amount_remaining - $1, last_used_at = NOW(), expiry_date = NOW() + ($3 * INTERVAL '1 month') WHERE id = $2", amountPounds, cleanCardID, gcExpiryMonths)
				if err != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to deduct gift card amount: %v", err)
					http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
					return
				}
				giftCardPaymentID = &cleanCardID
			}

			// The gift-card source funds the full charged amount (booking
			// portion + tip). The primary row records the booking portion; the
			// tip carve is recorded as its own 'tip' row sourced from the same
			// gift card (C3 source-of-funds tracking), so the booking portion
			// is the only money that counts toward the obligation.
			bookingPayID := ""
			if bookingPortionPounds > roundingEpsilon {
				err = tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
					INSERT INTO payments (
						booking_id, payment_type, payment_method, status, amount, idempotency_key, created_by, created_at, updated_at, gift_card_id
					) VALUES ($1, $2, 'giftcard', 'completed', $3, $4, $5, NOW(), NOW(), $6)
					RETURNING id
				`, bookingID, req.PaymentType, bookingPortionPounds, idempotencyKey, adminID, giftCardPaymentID).Scan(&bookingPayID)
				if err != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to create giftcard payment record: %v", err)
					http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
					return
				}
				paymentID = bookingPayID
			}
			if tipPounds > roundingEpsilon {
				tipKey := splitIdempotencyKey(idempotencyKey, "-split-tip")
				tipID, tipErr := service.CreatePaymentRecordTx(r.Context(), tx, PaymentRecord{
					BookingID:      bookingID,
					PaymentType:    "tip",
					PaymentMethod:  "giftcard",
					Status:         "completed",
					Amount:         tipPounds,
					IdempotencyKey: &tipKey,
					CreatedBy:      &adminID,
					CreatedAt:      clock.Now(),
					UpdatedAt:      clock.Now(),
				}, giftCardPaymentID)
				if tipErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to create giftcard tip payment record: %v", tipErr)
					http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
					return
				}
				if paymentID == "" {
					paymentID = tipID
				}
			}

			// Apply VAT at redemption only if the gift card was purchased as MPV
			// (VAT deferred to redemption). For SPV, VAT was already paid at sale.
			// For account balance payments (usedBalance=true), VAT was already paid
			// when the original card was purchased. Applied to the booking-portion
			// payment only — a tip record is never VAT-applicable.
			if bookingPayID != "" {
				if usedBalance {
					// VAT already paid at purchase time — nothing to do here.
				} else if cardVoucherType == "MPV" {
					vatCfg, vatErr := GetVATConfig(r.Context(), tx)
					if vatErr == nil && vatCfg.IsVATRegistered {
						if _, vatExecErr := tx.Exec(r.Context(), "SELECT apply_vat_to_payment($1, $2)", bookingPayID, vatCfg.DefaultVATRate); vatExecErr != nil {
							log.Printf("Failed to apply VAT to giftcard payment %s: %v", bookingPayID, vatExecErr)
						}
					}
				}
			}

			// The admin-initiated gift-card payment is audited AFTER the money
			// commits below (best-effort). Capture the customer for the audit
			// row; a guest booking has no user_id and audits with a NULL target.
			if customerID.Valid {
				auditTargetUserID = customerID.String
			}
		}

		if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to commit payment: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}

		// MEDIUM-3a (best-effort, non-fatal — an audit-write failure can never
		// roll back a completed charge). The audit runs AFTER the money commits:
		// the OLD position wrote the row BEFORE tx.Commit, so a failed commit
		// left a false audit row for a charge that never landed. Guest bookings
		// audit with a NULL target_user_id (matching the till flow).
		if *req.PaymentMethod == "cash" {
			InsertAdminAuditCharge(r.Context(), adminID, auditTargetUserID, "admin_cash_charge", map[string]any{
				"booking_id":   bookingID,
				"payment_id":   paymentID,
				"amount":       amountPounds,
				"payment_type": req.PaymentType,
			})
		} else {
			InsertAdminAuditCharge(r.Context(), adminID, auditTargetUserID, "admin_giftcard_payment", map[string]any{
				"booking_id":   bookingID,
				"payment_id":   paymentID,
				"amount":       amountPounds,
				"payment_type": req.PaymentType,
			})
		}

		if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(CheckoutResponse{
			CheckoutID: paymentID,
			Status:     "COMPLETED",
		}); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
		}
		return
	}

	// Admin "Charge Saved Card": charge the customer's saved card directly via
	// Square (no terminal). Pending-first with full idempotency: a deterministic
	// key derived from booking+type+amount+card means a network retry reuses the
	// same key — Square dedups the charge and the pending record is resumed, so
	// a lost-response retry can NEVER double-charge. Mirrors CreateTipPayment.
	if req.PaymentMethod != nil && *req.PaymentMethod == "saved_card" {
		if req.UserSavedCardID == nil || *req.UserSavedCardID == "" {
			http.Error(w, "saved_card_id is required for saved_card payment", http.StatusBadRequest)
			return
		}

		status, err := service.GetBookingStatus(r.Context(), bookingID)
		if err != nil {
			if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
				http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
				return
			}
			log.Printf("Failed to get booking status: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		if status != "in_progress" && status != "completed" {
			http.Error(w, "Booking must be in_progress or completed to create payment", http.StatusBadRequest)
			return
		}

		// The saved card is owned by the booking's user, not the admin.
		var bookingUserID sql.NullString
		if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT user_id FROM bookings WHERE id = $1`, bookingID).Scan(&bookingUserID); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to get booking user: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}

		// SCA verification token (if any) — extracted once, used both by the
		// 2FA gate below (a present token skips the gate: SCA-primary) and
		// forwarded to Square on the CreatePaymentReq.
		terminalVerificationToken := ""
		if req.VerificationToken != nil {
			terminalVerificationToken = *req.VerificationToken
			logVerificationTokenProvenance("admin terminal saved-card", bookingID, req.UserSavedCardID, terminalVerificationToken)
		}

		// Resolve the saved-card Square source for the booking's user (the
		// card's owner, not the admin) — shared new-card-vs-saved-card
		// resolution, see resolveChargeSource for the R6 rationale.
		sourceID, _, savedCardCustomerID, sourceOK := resolveChargeSource(r.Context(), w, service, bookingUserID.String, nil, req.UserSavedCardID, false, "Saved card not found")
		if !sourceOK {
			return
		}

		// Serialize saved-card charges per booking (same lock as online booking
		// payments) so concurrent double-clicks can't both pass the idempotency
		// check. Mirrors the CreateBookingPayment lock (R4). The lock is
		// acquired with a bounded try-lock loop (R6): a blocking pg_advisory_lock
		// would hold the pinned pool connection for the full Square round-trip of
		// whichever request holds the lock, and ~4 concurrent same-booking
		// requests would exhaust the whole pool.
		pinConn, lockOK := acquireBookingPaymentLock(r.Context(), w, "crussell:payment:"+bookingID, "Payment in progress, try again")
		if !lockOK {
			return
		}
		defer releaseBookingPaymentLock(pinConn, "crussell:payment:"+bookingID)

		// Idempotency key — two tiers:
		// 1. Client-supplied per-attempt UUID (preferred): the frontend
		//    generates one per DISTINCT charge and reuses it across retries of
		//    the same charge. Two distinct identical charges on one booking
		//    (e.g. a second £50 'full' charge for a second service) send
		//    different UUIDs → no dedup, each becomes its own payment. The
		//    UUID is globally unique so it is NOT namespaced with the booking
		//    id (the UNIQUE(idempotency_key) constraint is global); the dedup
		//    SELECT matches on booking_id + key, so a same-booking retry of
		//    the same UUID still dedups.
		// 2. Deterministic booking+type+amount+card fallback when the client
		//    sends no key: a no-key network retry derives the same key → dedup,
		//    never a second charge (old-client retry safety).
		// Both stay ≤45 chars for Square's limit (36-char UUID / ~38-char
		// deterministic key).
		//
		// The fallback is derived from the REQUEST amount (before the B3 clamp):
		// a retry sends the same request and must derive the same key to hit the
		// dedup SELECT below, and the clamp runs AFTER that SELECT's
		// short-circuits — so a retry of an already-completed payment on a now
		// fully-paid booking still dedups instead of being clamped/rejected.
		scKey := req.IdempotencyKey
		if scKey == "" {
			// The candidate is built verbatim, then routed through
			// truncateIdempotencyKey so it can never exceed Square's 45-char
			// /v2/payments limit (a 400 would strand the payment). The truncation
			// is deterministic, so identical inputs still derive the SAME key and
			// the dedup SELECT below keeps working; candidates at or under 45
			// chars (the current bookingID+cardID shape) pass through byte-identical.
			scKey = truncateIdempotencyKey("sc", bookingID+"-sc-"+req.PaymentType+"-"+strconv.FormatInt(amount, 10)+"-"+*req.UserSavedCardID)
		}

		// Idempotency switch inside the lock: completed → dedup; pending →
		// reuse (re-attempt Square with the same key, which dedups Square-side);
		// failed → clean rejection. Runs BEFORE the B3 clamp so a same-key
		// retry of a completed payment (on a now fully-paid booking) returns
		// the existing result instead of being clamped/rejected — the money
		// already moved, so the amount is no longer material.
		var existingID, existingStatus sql.NullString
		var existingAmount sql.NullFloat64
		err = db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
			SELECT id, status, amount FROM payments WHERE booking_id = $1 AND idempotency_key = $2
		`, bookingID, scKey).Scan(&existingID, &existingStatus, &existingAmount)

		paymentID := ""
		switch {
		case err == nil && existingStatus.String == "completed":
			// Dedup — return the existing completed payment. First RE-VALIDATE
			// the matched row's refund state (same guard as the CreateBookingPayment
			// completed-dedup branches): a refunded payment's money is no longer
			// live, so reporting it as "success" would let a same-key retry claim
			// a payment that was already returned to the customer.
			if refunded, rErr := paymentHasLiveRefund(r.Context(), db.Conn, existingID.String); rErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to re-validate saved-card dedup hit %s against refunds: %v", existingID.String, rErr)
				http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
				return
			} else if refunded {
				log.Printf("Payment retry rejected: saved-card payment %s (key %q) was refunded — refusing to report a refunded payment as success", existingID.String, scKey)
				http.Error(w, "This payment has been refunded and can no longer be replayed", http.StatusConflict)
				return
			}
			if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(CheckoutResponse{
				CheckoutID: existingID.String,
				Status:     "COMPLETED",
			}); err != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
			}
			return
		case err == nil && existingStatus.String == "pending":
			// Reuse the pending record: a prior attempt's Square outcome is
			// unknown. The amount-match guard runs below, AFTER the clamp, so
			// the clamped retry amount is compared against the original record.
			paymentID = existingID.String
		case err == nil && existingStatus.String == "failed":
			log.Printf("Saved-card payment %s was previously marked failed (swept) — refusing retry", existingID.String)
			http.Error(w, "This payment previously failed and can no longer be retried", http.StatusConflict)
			return
		case err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows):
			log.Printf("Failed to check saved-card idempotency: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}

		// B3: clamp the amount to the booking's remaining obligation. The
		// advisory lock above serializes all same-booking payment attempts, so
		// this read races no concurrent charge. Runs AFTER the idempotency
		// short-circuits so a same-key retry of a completed payment (booking
		// now fully paid) dedups above instead of being rejected here. A fully-
		// paid booking is rejected below (nothing left to charge).
		effectiveAmount, remaining, clamped, cErr := clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance(r.Context(), bookingID, amount)
		if cErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to compute remaining balance for saved-card payment on booking %s: %v", bookingID, cErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		if clamped && effectiveAmount <= 0 {
			// B3: the clamp zeroed the amount because the booking is fully paid
			// (remaining <= 0). Reject before any pending row or Square charge —
			// charging £0 (or the requested overcharge) on a fully-paid booking
			// is never legitimate.
			log.Printf("Saved-card payment on booking %s rejected: booking already fully paid (remaining %d pence, requested %d pence)", bookingID, remaining, amount)
			http.Error(w, "Booking is already fully paid", http.StatusBadRequest)
			return
		}
		if clamped {
			log.Printf("Saved-card payment on booking %s clamped from %d to %d pence (remaining obligation) — the frontend PaymentModal sent an amount that ignored prior payments; the customer is charged the remaining obligation only", bookingID, amount, effectiveAmount)
			amount = effectiveAmount
		}

		// Pending-reuse amount-match guard (moved after the clamp so the
		// CLAMPED retry amount is compared against the original pending record,
		// which was itself created from the clamped amount): a retry with a
		// different effective amount must not reuse the old record's charge.
		if paymentID != "" {
			if int64(math.Round(existingAmount.Float64*100)) != amount {
				log.Printf("Saved-card retry amount mismatch: pending %s has %d pence, request has %d pence", existingID.String, int64(math.Round(existingAmount.Float64*100)), amount)
				http.Error(w, "Amount does not match the pending payment", http.StatusBadRequest)
				return
			}
		}

		// 2FA gating (C5): charging the customer's SAVED card requires 2FA when
		// the feature is enforced. Gate on the card's owner — the booking's
		// user, not the admin. New-card/terminal paths are not gated. Runs
		// AFTER the idempotency dedup/reuse switch above: a same-key retry of
		// an already-completed payment short-circuits there and returns the
		// existing result WITHOUT demanding a fresh code — no new money moves,
		// so no new authorization is needed. consume=!reusePendingRecord
		// (finding 4): a FRESH charge verifies WITH consumption — the code is
		// single-use at the gate, closing the TOCTOU where a verified-but-
		// unconsumed code could authorize a second charge — and a pending-reuse
		// retry verifies WITHOUT consuming, so a retry that fails again keeps
		// its code for one more attempt (the completed-charge transaction
		// consumes it on terminal success).
		reusePendingRecord := paymentID != ""
		// SCA-primary / 2FA-backup gate (C5): charging the customer's SAVED card
		// requires authorization when the feature is enforced. Gate on the
		// card's owner — the booking's user, not the admin. A charge carrying a
		// Square verification_token (SCA performed) passes without 2FA; a
		// token-less charge falls back to the customer's 2FA code (single-use
		// via consume) and the caller records a strict fallback audit row on
		// the charge's success. New-card/terminal paths are not gated. Runs
		// AFTER the idempotency dedup/reuse switch above: a same-key retry of
		// an already-completed payment short-circuits there and returns the
		// existing result WITHOUT demanding a fresh code — no new money moves,
		// so no new authorization is needed. consume=!reusePendingRecord
		// (finding 4): a FRESH charge verifies WITH consumption — the code is
		// single-use at the gate, closing the TOCTOU where a verified-but-
		// unconsumed code could authorize a second charge — and a pending-reuse
		// retry verifies WITHOUT consuming, so a retry that fails again keeps
		// its code for one more attempt (the completed-charge transaction
		// consumes it on terminal success).
		twoFAFallbackUsed := false
		if bookingUserID.Valid {
			var gateOK bool
			gateOK, twoFAFallbackUsed = requireTwoFactorForCardAccess(w, r, service, bookingUserID.String, req.VerificationCode, terminalVerificationToken, !reusePendingRecord)
			if !gateOK {
				return
			}
			// C6: a fallback-authorized charge must carry the customer's
			// accepted consent (403 consent_required otherwise) — the server-side
			// guard that stops a 2FA-path charge reaching Square without it.
			if !enforceSCAFallbackConsent(w, req.ConsentVersion, req.ConsentAccepted, twoFAFallbackUsed) {
				return
			}
		}

		// B13: the pre-charge discount SET for the post-charge apply-time
		// re-check. The online booking path (CreateBookingPayment) keeps the set
		// computed BEFORE the charge so applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment can
		// detect a campaign exhausted by a concurrent redemption between the
		// frontend's preview and the apply-time re-check; the saved-card path
		// snapshots it here, under the same advisory lock, before the Square
		// charge.
		var preChargeDiscounts []EligibleDiscount

		// Pending-first: insert a pending payment record, commit, then charge.
		tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		if paymentID == "" {
			record := PaymentRecord{
				BookingID:       bookingID,
				PaymentType:     req.PaymentType,
				PaymentMethod:   "online_square",
				Status:          "pending",
				Amount:          float64(amount) / 100.0,
				IdempotencyKey:  &scKey,
				UserSavedCardID: req.UserSavedCardID,
				SquareSourceID:  &sourceID,
				CreatedAt:       clock.Now(),
				UpdatedAt:       clock.Now(),
				CreatedBy:       &adminID,
			}
			// M4: the service's record function sets every column the inline
			// INSERT previously left to defaults (fees, VAT fields, etc.), so
			// the pending row is created the same way every other flow creates
			// its payment records.
			var insertErr error
			paymentID, insertErr = service.CreatePaymentRecordTx(r.Context(), tx, record, nil)
			if insertErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to insert pending saved-card payment: %v", insertErr)
				_ = tx.Rollback(r.Context())
				http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
				return
			}
		} else {
			// Reused pending row: same immutability rule as the booking/tip
			// reuse paths. square_source_id is refreshed ONLY for snapshot-less
			// legacy rows; when the row already carries the original
			// square_request_snapshot it is left untouched so the sweep's
			// by-key replay keeps matching the FIRST attempt's body. Saved-card
			// ccof sources are stable, so this is mostly latent, but keeping
			// the snapshot immutable is money-safe (see the booking reuse
			// comment above).
			if _, srcErr := tx.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE payments SET square_source_id = $1 WHERE id = $2 AND (square_request_snapshot IS NULL OR square_request_snapshot = '')`, sourceID, paymentID); srcErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to update square_source_id on reused saved-card payment %s: %v", paymentID, srcErr)
			}
		}
		// B13: snapshot the pre-charge discount set (read-only, under the
		// advisory lock) so the post-charge re-check can surface a campaign
		// exhausted by a concurrent redemption (see the declaration above).
		var bookingTotal float64
		if err := tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT total_amount FROM bookings WHERE id = $1`, bookingID).Scan(&bookingTotal); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to load booking total for discount computation: %v", err)
		}
		preChargeDiscounts = ComputeEligibleDiscounts(r.Context(), tx, bookingID, bookingUserID.String, bookingTotal)
		if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to commit pending saved-card payment: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}

		var buyerEmail string
		if bookingUserID.Valid {
			_ = db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT email FROM users WHERE id = $1`, bookingUserID.String).Scan(&buyerEmail)
		}

		paymentReq := square.CreatePaymentReq{
			Amount:            amount,
			Currency:          "GBP",
			SourceID:          sourceID,
			CustomerID:        savedCardCustomerID,
			IdempotencyKey:    scKey,
			ReferenceID:       bookingID,
			Note:              req.PaymentType,
			BuyerEmail:        buyerEmail,
			VerificationToken: terminalVerificationToken,
			// MIT (merchant-initiated): the admin charging the customer's SAVED
			// card (admin "Charge Saved Card") is a merchant-initiated stored-
			// credential charge — NOT the cardholder. customer_initiated=false
			// classifies it MIT for Square: no SCA is demanded and no liability
			// shift applies, which is the correct treatment for an operator-
			// initiated charge (any issuer challenge is handled via
			// verification_token when the frontend performs one).
			CustomerDetails: &square.CreateCustomerDetails{CustomerInitiated: false},
		}
		// M1: store the verbatim request JSON so the sweep can replay the charge
		// with an IDENTICAL body under the same key — Square compares the whole
		// request on key reuse, and a reconstructed body returns
		// IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED, leaving the row pending forever. The snapshot
		// is written ONLY when the row has none: it records the FIRST attempt's
		// body, which stays immutable so a reused pending row never redirects
		// the sweep's replay away from the original charge (same rule as the
		// booking/tip paths — see the reuse branch above).
		writeChargeSnapshot(r.Context(), db.Conn, "payments", paymentID, paymentReq, "saved-card payment")

		paymentResult, err := SquareClient.CreatePayment(r.Context(), paymentReq)
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to process saved-card payment: %v (error_code=%q)", err, square.ErrorCode(err))
			// The gate consumed the 2FA code for a fresh saved-card charge —
			// re-issue so the same-key retry has a live code to verify
			// (mirrors CreateBookingPayment's post-failure re-issue, finding
			// 4). Only runs for a FRESH charge whose gate consumed a code
			// (!reusePendingRecord): a pending-reuse retry verified WITHOUT
			// consuming, so its code is still live and re-issuing would
			// silently invalidate the one the customer holds.
			if bookingUserID.Valid {
				reissueTwoFACodeAfterFailedCharge(r.Context(), db.Conn, bookingUserID.String, true, twoFAFallbackUsed && !reusePendingRecord, r)
			}
			// SCA-required failures (Square demands buyer verification) must
			// surface the structured verification_required body so the frontend
			// triggers the 3DS challenge instead of treating the payment as a
			// plain decline.
			if isVerificationRequiredError(err) {
				writeVerificationRequiredResponse(w)
				return
			}
			http.Error(w, "Payment failed", chargeFailureStatus(err))
			return
		}

		// Defensive post-charge recheck (R9): the window is tiny — this branch
		// only runs on in_progress/completed bookings and the pending record
		// committed moments ago — but a concurrent cancellation/eviction can
		// still move the booking between the Square call and this record. A
		// charge landing on a cancelled/lapsed booking must not be recorded as
		// completed (the cancellation refund path computes refunds from
		// completed payments). Mark the row failed and alert ops: money was
		// taken at Square and MUST be refunded manually.
		//
		// The recheck and the status write run in ONE transaction so the
		// FOR UPDATE row lock taken inside recheckBookingPayable persists to
		// commit (C5) — a concurrent cancellation cannot commit a cancelled
		// status between the recheck and the payments UPDATE.
		recheckTx, reTxErr := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
		if reTxErr != nil {
			log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square payment %s was processed for booking %s but opening the post-charge recheck transaction failed: %v — manual reconciliation required",
				paymentResult.SquarePayID, bookingID, reTxErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		defer func() {
			if err := recheckTx.Rollback(r.Context()); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
				slog.Error("failed to rollback post-charge recheck transaction", "err", err)
			}
		}()

		payable, err := postChargeRecheck(r.Context(), w, recheckTx, bookingID, paymentID, paymentResult.Status, paymentResult.SquarePayID, "saved-card payment", "This booking is no longer accepting payments")
		if err != nil || !payable {
			return
		}

		// B13: apply eligible campaign discounts at charge time (mirroring the
		// online booking path at CreateBookingPayment). This runs INSIDE the
		// same transaction as the completed flip, BEFORE the flip, so the
		// capDiscountToRemainingObligation headroom still counts the in-flight
		// charge as the pending row (F1 — an over-credit can never be minted)
		// and ComputeEligibleDiscounts' 2+-payments guard sees the same
		// completed-payment count the online path sees. The apply is idempotent
		// (ComputeEligibleDiscounts excludes already-recorded sources). A
		// campaign exhausted by a concurrent redemption between the frontend's
		// preview and this apply-time re-check surfaces the same
		// campaignExhaustedAtApplyError → campaign_fully_redeemed path the
		// booking path returns, instead of silently skipping the discount and
		// leaving the booking underpaid. The completion side-effects
		// (completeFullyPaidBooking → ApplyBookingCompletionSideEffects) skip
		// re-application via their already-recorded guards.
		campaignLostPence := int64(0)
		var campaignLostID string
		if applyErr := applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment(r.Context(), recheckTx, bookingID, bookingUserID.String, preChargeDiscounts); applyErr != nil {
			var exErr *campaignExhaustedAtApplyError
			if errors.As(applyErr, &exErr) {
				campaignLostPence = exErr.lostPence
				campaignLostID = exErr.campaignID
				log.Printf("B13: campaign %s exhausted between preview and apply for booking %s — lost discount %d pence; payment will complete and the difference will be returned to the customer", campaignLostID, bookingID, campaignLostPence)
			} else {
				log.Printf("Failed to apply eligible campaigns for booking %s: %v", bookingID, applyErr)
			}
		}

		if _, upErr := recheckTx.Exec(r.Context(),
			`UPDATE payments SET status = 'completed', square_payment_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`,
			paymentResult.SquarePayID, paymentID,
		); upErr != nil {
			log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square payment %s succeeded but saved-card payment %s update failed: %v — manual reconciliation required", paymentResult.SquarePayID, paymentID, upErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		// MEDIUM-2 / finding 1: the charge reached its terminal SUCCESS state.
		// For a FRESH charge the gate already consumed the code (consume=true
		// at verify time — single-use), so nothing is left to do here. A
		// PENDING-REUSE retry verified WITHOUT consuming, so THIS is where its
		// code is burned — inside the transaction that records the completed
		// charge. A failure here fails the whole transaction (the row stays
		// pending and the sweep reconciles), which is the same known failure
		// mode as any other post-charge tx error.
		if bookingUserID.Valid && reusePendingRecord {
			if consErr := twofa.ConsumePendingCode(r.Context(), recheckTx, bookingUserID.String); consErr != nil {
				log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square payment %s succeeded but consuming the 2FA code for user %s failed: %v — manual reconciliation required", paymentResult.SquarePayID, bookingUserID.String, consErr)
				http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
				return
			}
		}
		// B14: apply VAT to the saved-card terminal charge, inside the same
		// transaction as the completed flip (like the booking path at 2021-2028
		// and the cash path at 397). Without this the saved-card branch never
		// called apply_vat_to_payment and the row kept is_vat_applicable=FALSE
		// with no vat_rate/vat_amount/net_amount — a real VAT-reporting loss for
		// a VAT-registered business. ApplyVATToBookingPayment reads config and
		// skips discount/on_the_house/tip rows defensively.
		ApplyVATToBookingPayment(r.Context(), recheckTx, paymentID)
		if cErr := recheckTx.Commit(r.Context()); cErr != nil {
			log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square payment %s succeeded but committing the post-charge status update for payment %s failed: %v — manual reconciliation required",
				paymentResult.SquarePayID, paymentID, cErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}

		// MEDIUM-3a: record the admin-initiated saved-card charge in
		// admin_audit_log (mirroring giftcards.go's balance_check audit). Runs
		// best-effort AFTER the money transaction commits so an audit-write
		// failure can never roll back a completed charge.
		if bookingUserID.Valid {
			InsertAdminAuditCharge(r.Context(), adminID, bookingUserID.String, "saved_card_charge", map[string]any{
				"booking_id":        bookingID,
				"payment_id":        paymentID,
				"amount":            float64(amount) / 100.0,
				"card_last4":        paymentResult.CardLast4,
				"square_payment_id": paymentResult.SquarePayID,
			})
			// The 2FA BACKUP authorized this token-less saved-card charge
			// (SCA was unavailable) — record the strict fallback audit row.
			if twoFAFallbackUsed {
				insertTwoFAFallbackAudit(r.Context(), adminID, bookingUserID.String, paymentResult.CardLast4, bookingID, "admin saved-card charge authorized via 2FA fallback (SCA unavailable)", consentVersionValue(req.ConsentVersion), req.ConsentAccepted)
			}
		}

		// F6: a fully-paid saved-card charge completes the booking exactly like
		// the terminal path (recordTerminalPaymentTx → completeFullyPaidBooking,
		// sweep.go:1632). Runs in its OWN transaction after the status commit
		// above, so the completion side-effects (loyalty, deposits_required) are
		// atomic and a booking paid in full by a saved-card charge leaves the
		// admin's Current Appointment view. Campaign discounts were already
		// applied at charge time above (B13); the completion side-effects skip
		// re-application via their already-recorded guards.
		completeFullyPaidBooking(r.Context(), bookingID)

		// B13: a campaign the frontend showed as eligible at preview was
		// exhausted by a concurrent redemption before this charge applied it.
		// The charge already succeeded at Square and the payment is committed —
		// mirror the online booking path: honour the promised discount (a
		// gift-card balance credit when the full price was charged) and return
		// campaign_fully_redeemed so the frontend does not show the discount as
		// applied. The booking-completion flow above ran regardless, exactly
		// like the online path's in-transaction completion.
		if campaignLostPence > 0 {
			credited := refundLostCampaignAsBalanceCredit(r.Context(), bookingID, bookingUserID.String, campaignLostPence)
			log.Printf("B13: campaign %s fully redeemed before payment %s applied it — lost discount %d pence (%s), returning 400 campaign_fully_redeemed to the frontend", campaignLostID, paymentID, campaignLostPence, credited)
			mw.RespondJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{
				"error": "The discount campaign has been fully redeemed. The full amount applies.",
				"code":  "campaign_fully_redeemed",
			})
			return
		}

		// Return the card details the frontend reads for the success state
		// (MINOR-R2) — CheckoutResponse alone leaves card_brand/card_last4 blank.
		if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
			"payment_id": paymentID,
			"status":     "COMPLETED",
			"card_brand": paymentResult.CardBrand,
			"card_last4": paymentResult.CardLast4,
		}); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
		}
		return
	}

	// For Square checkout (terminal card reader), validate booking status.
	// No DB transaction is needed for the Square call itself; the in-flight
	// guard below serializes checkout creation per booking and records the
	// checkout's payment type for GetCheckoutStatus to read back.
	status, err := service.GetBookingStatus(r.Context(), bookingID)
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
			http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("Failed to get booking status: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if status != "in_progress" && status != "completed" {
		http.Error(w, "Booking must be in_progress or completed to create payment", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Serialize terminal-checkout creation per booking. This is the backend
	// half of the double-submit fix: a lost-response retry must not create a
	// second live Square checkout for the same booking while the first is in
	// flight. Bounded try-lock (R6) so a contended lock never blocks the pool
	// across the Square round-trip.
	pinConn, lockOK := acquireBookingPaymentLock(r.Context(), w, "crussell:payment:"+bookingID, "Payment in progress, try again")
	if !lockOK {
		return
	}
	defer releaseBookingPaymentLock(pinConn, "crussell:payment:"+bookingID)

	if existing := activeTerminalCheckoutID(r.Context(), bookingID); existing != "" {
		if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(CheckoutResponse{
			CheckoutID: existing,
			Status:     "PENDING",
		}); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
		}
		return
	}

	// Insert the tracked terminal_checkouts row FIRST with a provisional
	// (pre-Square) checkout_id, THEN create the checkout at Square, THEN update
	// the row with the real checkout_id (R3). A hard crash between the insert
	// and the Square call leaves a visible PENDING row the in-flight guard and
	// sweep can resolve as failed — the old order (CreateCheckout first) left a
	// live untracked checkout the sweep could not see. The provisional id is
	// synthetic ("tmp-<idempotency key>") because the column is a NOT NULL
	// PRIMARY KEY; a row carrying one is provably pre-Square (no checkout was
	// ever created for it).
	provisionalID := "tmp-" + idempotencyKey

	// B3: clamp the terminal checkout amount to the booking's remaining
	// obligation UNLESS the customer explicitly requested a tip (tip_enabled).
	// An accidental overpayment must never be presented to the card reader as a
	// charge that the record path would later carve into an unintended tip. The
	// advisory lock above serializes this read against concurrent same-booking
	// payments. A fully-paid booking is rejected below (nothing left to charge).
	checkoutAmount := amount
	if req.TipEnabled {
		// The tip is embedded in the amount (totalWithTip) and its value is
		// unknown server-side, so cap the TOTAL at the remaining obligation
		// plus a generous max tip bound: the booking portion can never exceed
		// what is owed, and the tip portion can never exceed £50.
		remainingPence, remErr := service.GetBookingRemainingBalancePence(r.Context(), bookingID)
		if remErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to compute remaining balance for tip-enabled terminal checkout on booking %s: %v", bookingID, remErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		maxChargePence := remainingPence + maxTerminalTipPence
		if checkoutAmount > maxChargePence {
			log.Printf("Terminal checkout for booking %s clamped from %d to %d pence (remaining obligation %d + max tip bound £%.2f) — the requested total exceeded the booking remainder plus the tip cap", bookingID, amount, maxChargePence, remainingPence, float64(maxTerminalTipPence)/100.0)
			checkoutAmount = maxChargePence
		}
	} else {
		effectiveAmount, remaining, clamped, cErr := clampTerminalChargeToRemainingBalance(r.Context(), bookingID, amount)
		if cErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to compute remaining balance for terminal checkout on booking %s: %v", bookingID, cErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		if clamped && effectiveAmount <= 0 {
			// B3: the clamp zeroed the amount because the booking is fully paid
			// (remaining <= 0). Reject rather than present a £0 (or overpaid)
			// checkout to the card reader.
			log.Printf("Terminal checkout for booking %s rejected: booking already fully paid (remaining %d pence, requested %d pence)", bookingID, remaining, amount)
			http.Error(w, "Booking is already fully paid", http.StatusBadRequest)
			return
		}
		if clamped {
			log.Printf("Terminal checkout for booking %s clamped from %d to %d pence (remaining obligation) — the frontend PaymentModal sent an amount that ignored prior payments; the card reader will present the remaining obligation only", bookingID, amount, effectiveAmount)
			checkoutAmount = effectiveAmount
		}
	}
	// tip_enabled is persisted on the checkout row so recordTerminalPaymentTx
	// knows whether an overflow beyond the remaining value was an EXPLICIT tip
	// (split into a tip record) or an accidental overpayment (kept on the
	// booking record, refundable).
	if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
		INSERT INTO terminal_checkouts (checkout_id, booking_id, payment_type, status, amount, tip_enabled)
		VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'PENDING', $4, $5)
	`, provisionalID, bookingID, req.PaymentType, float64(checkoutAmount)/100.0, req.TipEnabled); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to record provisional terminal checkout for booking %s: %v", bookingID, err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Attach the booking customer's Square customer id (if any) so the terminal
	// checkout is associated with their Square profile. Read-only lookup
	// mirroring ensureSquareCustomer's read, but NEVER provisioning — a
	// terminal checkout also serves walk-ins, and minting a customer profile
	// for a terminal tap would create an unowned customer. No id → empty.
	var checkoutCustomerID string
	var bookingUserID sql.NullString
	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT user_id FROM bookings WHERE id = $1`, bookingID).Scan(&bookingUserID); err == nil && bookingUserID.Valid {
		_ = db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
			SELECT square_customer_id FROM user_saved_cards
			WHERE user_id = $1 AND square_customer_id IS NOT NULL AND square_customer_id <> ''
			ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1
		`, bookingUserID.String).Scan(&checkoutCustomerID)
	}

	checkoutReq := square.CreateCheckoutReq{
		Amount:         checkoutAmount,
		Currency:       "GBP",
		IdempotencyKey: idempotencyKey,
		ReferenceID:    bookingID,
		// The tip (if any) is already embedded in `amount` by the frontend
		// (totalWithTip), so the terminal must NOT prompt for a second tip —
		// setting AllowTipping here would double-count the tip in production.
		AllowTipping: false,
		CustomerID:   checkoutCustomerID,
	}

	checkout, err := SquareClient.CreateCheckout(r.Context(), checkoutReq)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to create checkout: %v", err)
		// The provisional row is pre-Square and can never produce a charge —
		// mark it failed so a retry can proceed (best-effort; log CRITICAL if
		// the row update itself fails, since the row would then wedge the
		// booking's in-flight guard).
		if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
			UPDATE terminal_checkouts SET status = 'failed', updated_at = NOW()
			WHERE checkout_id = $1 AND status = 'PENDING'
		`, provisionalID); upErr != nil {
			log.Printf("CRITICAL: failed to mark provisional terminal checkout %s failed after CreateCheckout error (%v): %v — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", provisionalID, err, upErr)
		}
		http.Error(w, "Failed to create payment", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Attach the real Square checkout id to the tracked row (the provisional
	// id was never seen by the client, so no poller can race this).
	tag, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
		UPDATE terminal_checkouts SET checkout_id = $1, updated_at = NOW()
		WHERE checkout_id = $2
	`, checkout.ID, provisionalID)
	if upErr != nil {
		log.Printf("CRITICAL: terminal checkout %s was created at Square but the tracking UPDATE (from provisional %s) failed: %v — manual reconciliation required", checkout.ID, provisionalID, upErr)
		// The checkout is live at Square but untracked — best-effort cancel so
		// a customer cannot complete a charge the backend can't record.
		if cErr := SquareClient.CancelCheckout(r.Context(), checkout.ID); cErr != nil {
			log.Printf("CRITICAL: failed to cancel orphaned terminal checkout %s after the tracking UPDATE failed: %v — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED: the checkout may still be live at Square", checkout.ID, cErr)
		}
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if tag.RowsAffected() == 0 {
		// The provisional row vanished while the Square call was in flight
		// (the sweep resolved it as stale) — the checkout is now live at
		// Square but untracked.
		log.Printf("CRITICAL: terminal checkout %s was created at Square but provisional row %s was already resolved — the checkout is untracked; MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", checkout.ID, provisionalID)
		if cErr := SquareClient.CancelCheckout(r.Context(), checkout.ID); cErr != nil {
			log.Printf("CRITICAL: failed to cancel untracked terminal checkout %s: %v — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", checkout.ID, cErr)
		}
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(CheckoutResponse{
		CheckoutID: checkout.ID,
		Status:     checkout.Status,
	}); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

// activeTerminalCheckoutID returns the checkout_id of an in-flight terminal
// checkout for the booking, or "" if none. Called under the
// crussell:payment:<booking> advisory lock. A PENDING/IN_PROGRESS row is
// resolved against Square: an already-completed checkout must not block a new
// charge, while one still live at Square is returned so a lost-response retry
// reuses it instead of creating a second live checkout.
//
// A checkout in a definitively terminal state (CANCELED / CANCEL_REQUESTED, or
// NOT_FOUND for an expired checkout) is ALSO resolved: it can never complete,
// so it must not wedge the booking. Such a checkout surfaces as a GetCheckout
// error (the HTTP client returns an error for any non-COMPLETED, non-PENDING
// status) and would otherwise be treated as "still in flight" forever, blocking
// every future terminal charge on the booking. Only ErrCheckoutPending and
// ambiguous transport errors keep the checkout in flight — a second live
// checkout must never be created while the first one's money state is unknown.
func activeTerminalCheckoutID(ctx context.Context, bookingID string) string {
	var checkoutID string
	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
		SELECT checkout_id FROM terminal_checkouts
		WHERE booking_id = $1 AND status IN ('PENDING', 'IN_PROGRESS')
		ORDER BY created_at ASC LIMIT 1
	`, bookingID).Scan(&checkoutID); err != nil {
		if !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
			log.Printf("Failed to query active terminal checkout for booking %s: %v", bookingID, err)
		}
		return ""
	}

	// A provisional (pre-Square) row carries a synthetic "tmp-" checkout_id (or
	// an empty one for legacy rows). It is no longer PROVABLY not live (H4): a
	// hard crash between the terminal_checkouts insert and the provisional→real
	// UPDATE leaves a LIVE checkout at Square (created under the idempotency
	// key embedded in the tmp id) while the row still carries the synthetic id.
	// Resolving it to failed unconditionally would let a lost-response retry
	// create a SECOND live checkout (C2) while C1 can still complete at the
	// terminal into an untracked charge. Query Square first to disambiguate.
	if checkoutID == "" || strings.HasPrefix(checkoutID, "tmp-") {
		if checkoutID != "" {
			result, err := SquareClient.GetCheckout(ctx, checkoutID)
			switch {
			case err == nil && result.Status == "COMPLETED":
				// C1 actually completed at the terminal. The payment MUST be
				// recorded now — the old code only marked the row COMPLETED and
				// relied on GetCheckoutStatus (the poll path) to record it, but a
				// checkout that is never polled (abandoned booking / lost poll)
				// would leave the charge permanently untracked:
				// SweepStaleTerminalCheckouts only re-examines PENDING/IN_PROGRESS
				// rows, so a row already marked COMPLETED here is never revisited
				// and the money stays unrecorded and unrefundable via the app.
				// Mirror the sweep's recordUntrackedTerminalPayment: the same
				// crussell:terminal:<squarePayID> advisory lock (serializes
				// against a concurrent poll), the same dedup by booking_id +
				// square_payment_id, the same PaymentRecord shape, the same
				// deposit/balance/tip split, and the same fully-paid completion.
				recorded := recordUntrackedTerminalPayment(ctx, checkoutID, bookingID, result)
				if recorded {
					log.Printf("Provisional terminal checkout %s for booking %s is COMPLETED at Square — payment recorded", checkoutID, bookingID)
					return ""
				}
				// Recording failed (transient DB/lock contention) — keep the
				// in-flight guard UP so a second live checkout is never created
				// while the charge is unrecorded. The row stays PENDING, so the
				// stale-terminal sweep re-runs recordUntrackedTerminalPayment on
				// it; once recorded, this guard releases on the next attempt.
				log.Printf("Provisional terminal checkout %s for booking %s is COMPLETED at Square but payment recording failed — keeping it in flight; no second checkout until the charge is recorded", checkoutID, bookingID)
				return checkoutID
			case errors.Is(err, square.ErrCheckoutPending):
				// C1 is still live at Square — reuse it instead of creating C2.
				log.Printf("Provisional terminal checkout %s for booking %s is live at Square — reusing it", checkoutID, bookingID)
				return checkoutID
			case isTerminalCheckoutError(err):
				// NOT_FOUND (no checkout was ever created — the crash happened
				// before the Square call) or CANCELED — safe to resolve failed
				// and create a fresh checkout.
				log.Printf("Provisional (pre-Square) terminal checkout row %q for booking %s resolved as failed — no live checkout at Square", checkoutID, bookingID)
				if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
					UPDATE terminal_checkouts SET status = 'failed', updated_at = NOW() WHERE checkout_id = $1
				`, checkoutID); upErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to mark provisional terminal checkout %s failed: %v", checkoutID, upErr)
				}
				return ""
			default:
				// Ambiguous error — the checkout's money state at Square is
				// unknown. Keep it in flight rather than spawning a second live
				// checkout.
				return checkoutID
			}
		}
		log.Printf("Legacy empty checkout_id row for booking %s resolved as failed — no live checkout at Square", bookingID)
		return ""
	}

	// Resolve against Square: once the terminal charge finished, the checkout
	// is COMPLETED and its payment may already be recorded — it must not
	// block a subsequent charge on the same booking.
	result, err := SquareClient.GetCheckout(ctx, checkoutID)
	if err == nil && result.Status == "COMPLETED" {
		if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
			UPDATE terminal_checkouts SET status = 'COMPLETED', updated_at = NOW() WHERE checkout_id = $1
		`, checkoutID); upErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to mark terminal checkout %s completed: %v", checkoutID, upErr)
		}
		return ""
	}
	// A definitively terminal checkout (cancelled / cancel-requested /
	// expired-NOT_FOUND) can never complete — mark the row failed and allow a
	// new checkout instead of wedging the booking forever.
	if isTerminalCheckoutError(err) {
		log.Printf("Terminal checkout %s is definitively terminal at Square (%v) — allowing a new checkout for booking %s", checkoutID, err, bookingID)
		if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
			UPDATE terminal_checkouts SET status = 'failed', updated_at = NOW() WHERE checkout_id = $1
		`, checkoutID); upErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to mark terminal checkout %s failed after terminal state: %v", checkoutID, upErr)
		}
		return ""
	}
	// ErrCheckoutPending or any ambiguous error: treat the checkout as still
	// in flight. Never create a second live checkout while the first one's
	// money state at Square is unknown.
	return checkoutID
}

func GetCheckoutStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	// Defense-in-depth admin check (S-1) — terminal completion records a
	// payment, so it must stay admin-only.
	if !isAdminRequest(r) {
		http.Error(w, "Admin access required", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	checkoutID := chi.URLParam(r, "checkout_id")
	if checkoutID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Checkout ID is required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if !validators.IsValidSquareCheckoutID(checkoutID) {
		http.Error(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}
	// Reject provisional "tmp-" checkout ids: CreateTerminalPayment stores a
	// synthetic "tmp-<idempotency key>" id in terminal_checkouts until Square
	// returns the real checkout id (provisional-row design), so such an id was
	// never a real checkout — resolving it against Square would come back
	// NOT_FOUND and surface as a 500. Answer 404 instead (mirrors the guard in
	// CreateTerminalPayment and the sweep).
	if strings.HasPrefix(checkoutID, "tmp-") {
		http.Error(w, "Checkout not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	bookingID := r.URL.Query().Get("booking_id")
	if bookingID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "booking_id query parameter is required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if !validators.IsValidID(bookingID) {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid booking ID", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	paymentResult, err := SquareClient.GetCheckout(r.Context(), checkoutID)
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, square.ErrCheckoutPending) {
			if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PaymentStatusResponse{Status: "PENDING"}); err != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
			}
			return
		}
		log.Printf("Failed to get checkout status: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Failed to get checkout status", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Ownership check: the terminal checkout must reference THIS booking.
	// CreateTerminalPayment sets reference_id = bookingID; without this check,
	// polling the wrong checkout ID would attach its payment to a different
	// booking (admin-only route, but a mis-scoped charge is a data-integrity
	// bug worth rejecting). An EMPTY reference_id is also rejected: a checkout
	// created outside this app with no reference must not be attachable to a
	// booking (S-1) — fail closed on anything that is not exactly this booking.
	if paymentResult.ReferenceID == "" || paymentResult.ReferenceID != bookingID {
		log.Printf("Checkout %s does not reference booking %s (reference_id=%q) — refusing to record", checkoutID, bookingID, paymentResult.ReferenceID)
		http.Error(w, "Checkout does not belong to this booking", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if paymentResult.Status == "COMPLETED" {
		// Serialize terminal-completion records per Square payment ID. Two
		// concurrent polls of the same checkout could otherwise BOTH pass the
		// dedup SELECT and BOTH INSERT, with the second dying on the
		// idempotency_key UNIQUE constraint after the customer already paid —
		// the same double-record race every other payment path guards against.
		// Bounded try-lock (R6) so a contended lock never blocks the pool.
		terminalLockKey := paymentResult.SquarePayID
		pinConn, err := db.Conn.Acquire(r.Context())
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to acquire connection for terminal-completion lock: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		defer pinConn.Release()
		lockOK, err := acquireAdvisoryLock(r.Context(), pinConn, "crussell:terminal:"+terminalLockKey)
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to acquire terminal-completion serialization lock for %s: %v", terminalLockKey, err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		if !lockOK {
			log.Printf("Terminal-completion serialization lock for %s not acquired within bound — a poll is already recording this checkout", terminalLockKey)
			http.Error(w, "Payment in progress, try again", http.StatusConflict)
			return
		}
		defer releasePaymentLock(pinConn, "crussell:terminal:"+terminalLockKey)

		// Begin the transaction BEFORE the dedup lookup so it's atomic with the
		// payment insert. The shared money-recording core
		// (recordTerminalPaymentTx, sweep.go) runs inside this transaction,
		// commits it, and completes a now-fully-paid booking; this handler
		// maps the result to the HTTP response.
		tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		defer func() {
			if err := tx.Rollback(r.Context()); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
				slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
			}
		}()

		paymentID, recErr := recordTerminalPaymentTx(r.Context(), tx, checkoutID, bookingID, paymentResult)
		if recErr != nil {
			if errors.Is(recErr, errTerminalBookingNotPayable) {
				// The core already committed the checkout's 'failed' mark:
				// money was taken at Square on a booking that is no longer
				// payable and MUST be refunded manually.
				http.Error(w, "This booking is no longer accepting payments", http.StatusConflict)
				return
			}
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}

		if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PaymentStatusResponse{
			Status:     "COMPLETED",
			PaymentID:  paymentID,
			Amount:     paymentResult.Amount,
			CardBrand:  paymentResult.CardBrand,
			CardLast4:  paymentResult.CardLast4,
			ReceiptURL: paymentResult.ReceiptURL,
		}); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
		}
		return
	}

	// No non-COMPLETED fallthrough here: GetCheckout (via getCheckoutHTTP)
	// only returns a nil error for a COMPLETED checkout — a non-COMPLETED
	// status or an expired/cancelled checkout surfaces as an error, which was
	// already handled above (ErrCheckoutPending → PENDING, everything else →
	// 500). The previous trailing `http.Error(w, "Payment failed", 402)` was
	// unreachable dead code and has been removed.
}

// IsValidBookingStatusForPayment returns true if the booking status allows
// accepting payments. This guard prevents racing with CleanupExpiredDeposits —
// once a booking's slot has been released (deposit_lapsed, etc.),
// we must reject the payment before hitting Square's API.
func IsValidBookingStatusForPayment(status string) bool {
	switch status {
	case "confirmed", "pending", "pending_release", "in_progress":
		return true
	default:
		return false
	}
}

// bookingStatusAllowsCompletedPayment reports whether a charge that already
// went through Square can still be recorded as a completed payment. It differs
// from IsValidBookingStatusForPayment: a booking that legitimately completed
// ('completed') must still accept the recorded payment, while a cancelled,
// lapsed, or no-show booking must NOT — the money would bypass the
// cancellation refund system, which computes refunds from completed payments.
func bookingStatusAllowsCompletedPayment(status string) bool {
	switch status {
	case "confirmed", "pending", "pending_release", "in_progress", "completed":
		return true
	default:
		return false
	}
}

func CreateBookingPayment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	bookingID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
	if bookingID == "" || !validators.IsValidID(bookingID) {
		http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	userID, ok := r.Context().Value(mw.UserIDKey).(string)
	if !ok || userID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var req CreateBookingPaymentRequest
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to decode booking payment request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := validators.Validate.Struct(&req); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Product rule (security): only verified accounts may save cards. An
	// unverified/guest/affiliate user may still pay, but save_card=true is
	// rejected here — before any charge source resolution or payment record.
	if rejectSaveCardForUnverified(w, r, req.SaveCard) {
		return
	}

	service := NewPaymentService()

	// Resolve buyer email for Square receipt delivery (failure is non-fatal).
	var bookingBuyerEmail string
	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT email FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&bookingBuyerEmail); err != nil {
		log.Printf("[SQUARE-PROD] Failed to resolve buyer email for user %s: %v (Square receipts will not be emailed)", userID, err)
	}

	if err := ValidateAmount(req.Amount); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidatePaymentType(req.PaymentType); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// A3: tips have a dedicated endpoint (POST /api/bookings/{id}/tip,
	// CreateTipPayment) which enforces the M4 "tips only after the service
	// starts" gate. A 'tip' payment_type on the booking payment endpoint would
	// bypass that gate — the overflow/tip guard below explicitly skips tip-type
	// requests and buildSplitRecords would carve the charge as a deposit or
	// balance (or silently overflow into a tip record) — so it is rejected
	// outright here, before any charge source resolution or payment record.
	if req.PaymentType == "tip" {
		log.Printf("Payment rejected: booking %s payment_type 'tip' is not allowed via /payment — tips use the dedicated /tip endpoint", bookingID)
		http.Error(w, "Tips can only be added via the dedicated tip endpoint after the booking has started", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidateCardInfo(req.CardID, req.NewCardToken); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidateVerificationToken(req.VerificationToken); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// M1: when the client sends NO idempotency key, a DETERMINISTIC fallback
	// is derived (booking_id + payment_type + amount + card_id) so a
	// lost-response no-key retry reuses the same key instead of minting a
	// second charge. The derivation deliberately runs INSIDE the transaction
	// under the per-booking advisory lock (below): the helper advances a
	// sequence past "spent" key slots, and that scan must not race a
	// concurrent same-booking charge. See deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey
	// for how the fallback distinguishes "same live operation retried" (dedup)
	// from "new operation that happens to have equal amount" (new charge).
	if req.PaymentType == "partial" {
		remainingPence, err := service.GetBookingRemainingBalancePence(r.Context(), bookingID)
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to get remaining balance: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		if err := ValidatePartialAmount(req.Amount, remainingPence); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
			return
		}
	}

	bookingUserID, err := service.GetBookingUserID(r.Context(), bookingID)
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
			http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("Failed to get booking user: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if bookingUserID != userID {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}

	// savedCardRef is the effective saved-card reference for this request:
	// the legacy card_id field OR the SCA path's saved_card_id (they are the
	// same user_saved_cards.id; card_id wins when both are sent). When a
	// NEW-card token arrives alongside it (SCA tokenize-result wire contract),
	// the token is the one-time charge source and this row supplies the
	// customer. ValidateCardInfo above already rejected card_id + new_card_token
	// together, so a coexistence can only be new_card_token + saved_card_id.
	savedCardRef := req.CardID
	if savedCardRef == nil || *savedCardRef == "" {
		savedCardRef = req.UserSavedCardID
	}
	scaTokenizedSavedCard := req.NewCardToken != nil && *req.NewCardToken != "" && savedCardRef != nil && *savedCardRef != ""

	// Serialize payment attempts for this booking to prevent concurrent payments
	// across browser tabs or duplicate requests. Uses a PostgreSQL session-level
	// advisory lock so that only one goroutine processes payment for a given
	// booking at a time, even if two requests pass the optimistic status check below.
	//
	// We acquire a dedicated connection from the pool and hold it for the
	// duration of the handler so that lock and unlock use the same connection.
	// Using db.Conn.Exec() for both would be unsafe — each call may get a
	// different pool connection, and pg_advisory_unlock on a different session
	// is a silent no-op, leaking the lock.
	//
	// R6: the lock is acquired with a bounded try-lock loop rather than the
	// blocking pg_advisory_lock. A blocking lock would pin the pool connection
	// for the whole Square round-trip (~30s), so ~4 concurrent same-booking
	// payments would exhaust the default pool and hang every request.
	pinConn, lockOK := acquireBookingPaymentLock(r.Context(), w, "crussell:payment:"+bookingID, "Payment in progress, try again")
	if !lockOK {
		return
	}
	defer releaseBookingPaymentLock(pinConn, "crussell:payment:"+bookingID)

	// Now that we hold the serialization lock, begin a transaction and re-check
	// the booking status inside it. If another request (e.g. from a different tab)
	// already processed a payment and promoted the booking while we were waiting,
	// we see that here.
	tx, txErr := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
	if txErr != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction: %v", txErr)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	defer func() {
		if err := tx.Rollback(r.Context()); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
			slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
		}
	}()

	// M1: derive the deterministic no-client-key fallback INSIDE the
	// transaction under the advisory lock so the spent-slot scan below races
	// no concurrent charge (two equal partials must get distinct keys even
	// when they arrive back-to-back). The scan itself does the idempotency
	// re-validation: a completed row that has been refunded never blocks a new
	// equal-amount charge, while an un-refunded completed row keeps its key so
	// the dedup lookup below returns it (double-charge protection).
	if req.IdempotencyKey == "" {
		cardPart := "new"
		if savedCardRef != nil && *savedCardRef != "" {
			cardPart = *savedCardRef
		}
		key, keyErr := deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey(r.Context(), tx, bookingID, req.PaymentType, req.Amount, cardPart)
		if keyErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to derive deterministic idempotency key for booking %s: %v", bookingID, keyErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		req.IdempotencyKey = key
	}

	var status string
	if err := tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT status FROM bookings WHERE id = $1`, bookingID).Scan(&status); err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
			http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("Failed to get booking status for payment check: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if !IsValidBookingStatusForPayment(status) {
		// A fully-paid booking auto-completes ('completed') and can no longer
		// accept new payments. But a same-key retry of a payment that already
		// went through must still dedup to the existing completed row —
		// otherwise a client retrying after a lost response gets a 409 even
		// though the charge succeeded. Any other payment attempt on a
		// completed booking falls through and is rejected below.
		if status == "completed" {
			var existingID sql.NullString
			var existingBookingID sql.NullString
			var existingPaymentType sql.NullString
			var existingStatus sql.NullString
			var existingAmount sql.NullFloat64
			var existingCreatedAt sql.NullTime
			if err := tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
				SELECT id, booking_id, payment_type, status, amount, created_at
				FROM payments
				WHERE booking_id = $1 AND idempotency_key = $2 AND status = 'completed'
			`, bookingID, req.IdempotencyKey).Scan(&existingID, &existingBookingID, &existingPaymentType, &existingStatus, &existingAmount, &existingCreatedAt); err == nil {
				// A12: re-validate the matched row's refund state exactly like
				// the general dedup path below. A refunded payment's money is
				// no longer live, so reporting it as success here would let a
				// same-key retry claim a payment that was already returned to
				// the customer (money collected for the booking was refunded,
				// yet the retry shows paid).
				if refunded, rErr := paymentHasLiveRefund(r.Context(), tx, existingID.String); rErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to re-validate completed-booking dedup hit %s against refunds: %v", existingID.String, rErr)
					http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
					return
				} else if refunded {
					log.Printf("Payment retry rejected: completed-booking payment %s (key %q) was refunded — refusing to report a refunded payment as success", existingID.String, req.IdempotencyKey)
					http.Error(w, "This payment has been refunded and can no longer be replayed", http.StatusConflict)
					return
				}
				if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PaymentResponse{
					ID:          existingID.String,
					BookingID:   existingBookingID.String,
					PaymentType: existingPaymentType.String,
					Status:      existingStatus.String,
					Amount:      int64(math.Round(existingAmount.Float64 * 100)),
					CreatedAt:   existingCreatedAt.Time.Format(time.RFC3339),
				}); err != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
				}
				return
			}
		}
		log.Printf("Payment rejected: booking %s is in status %q (no longer accepting payments)", bookingID, status)
		http.Error(w, "This booking is no longer accepting payments. The slot may have been released.", http.StatusConflict)
		return
	}
	if status == "pending" {
		log.Printf("Payment rejected: booking %s is 'pending' — must be confirmed first", bookingID)
		http.Error(w, "This booking has not been confirmed yet. Please wait for the booking to be confirmed before making a payment.", http.StatusConflict)
		return
	}

	// Authoritative remaining-balance re-check for 'partial' payments, inside
	// the advisory lock. The cheap pre-lock ValidatePartialAmount above can
	// race a concurrent partial payment on the same booking: both pass against
	// the same remaining balance, then both charge at Square, and the overflow
	// is silently recorded as a tip by buildSplitRecords. The lock serializes
	// payment attempts, so by the time we re-read here a competing payment has
	// already committed — reject before any pending record is inserted or
	// Square is hit.
	if req.PaymentType == "partial" {
		remainingPence, err := service.GetBookingRemainingBalancePence(r.Context(), bookingID)
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to get remaining balance: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		if err := ValidatePartialAmount(req.Amount, remainingPence); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Payment rejected: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "Partial amount exceeds remaining balance", http.StatusConflict)
			return
		}
	}

	// Check idempotency inside the transaction.
	// Only short-circuit when the existing record is 'completed'. A 'pending'
	// record means the previous Square call failed — returning it as 200 would
	// show a success toast without ever charging. Re-attempt the charge below
	// with the same idempotency key (Square dedups safely) and reuse the
	// existing record. This mirrors CreateTipPayment exactly.
	var existingID sql.NullString
	var existingBookingID sql.NullString
	var existingPaymentType sql.NullString
	var existingStatus sql.NullString
	var existingAmount sql.NullFloat64
	var existingCreatedAt sql.NullTime

	err = tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
		SELECT id, booking_id, payment_type, status, amount, created_at
		FROM payments
		WHERE booking_id = $1 AND idempotency_key = $2
	`, bookingID, req.IdempotencyKey).Scan(&existingID, &existingBookingID, &existingPaymentType, &existingStatus, &existingAmount, &existingCreatedAt)

	paymentID := ""
	reusePendingRecord := false
	// pendingStoredAmountPence is the amount the pending row's first attempt
	// was charged at (the row stores chargeAmount — see the HIGH-2 note in the
	// pending-reuse case). The retry's own chargeAmount (recomputed below) is
	// compared against it after the A4 computation.
	pendingStoredAmountPence := int64(0)
	switch {
	case err == nil && existingStatus.String == "completed":
		// Idempotent dedup — return the already-completed payment. First
		// RE-VALIDATE the matched row's state: a refunded completed payment's
		// money is no longer live, so returning it as "success" would silently
		// swallow a new equal-amount charge (the booking shows paid with no
		// money collected). The no-client-key deterministic path already
		// rotates the key past refunded rows (deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey),
		// so this guard primarily covers client-keyed retries and is
		// defense-in-depth for the deterministic path.
		if refunded, rErr := paymentHasLiveRefund(r.Context(), tx, existingID.String); rErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to re-validate dedup hit %s against refunds: %v", existingID.String, rErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		} else if refunded {
			log.Printf("Payment retry rejected: payment %s (key %q) was refunded — refusing to report a refunded payment as success", existingID.String, req.IdempotencyKey)
			http.Error(w, "This payment has been refunded and can no longer be replayed", http.StatusConflict)
			return
		}
		if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PaymentResponse{
			ID:          existingID.String,
			BookingID:   existingBookingID.String,
			PaymentType: existingPaymentType.String,
			Status:      existingStatus.String,
			Amount:      int64(math.Round(existingAmount.Float64 * 100)),
			CreatedAt:   existingCreatedAt.Time.Format(time.RFC3339),
		}); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
		}
		return
	case err == nil && existingStatus.String == "pending":
		// Previous Square call failed — reuse the pending record and re-attempt.
		// The amount guard is DELAYED until chargeAmount is computed below
		// (HIGH-2): the pending row stores the CHARGE amount — for a
		// deposit-with-discount, chargeAmount (req.Amount minus the campaign
		// credit) differs from req.Amount, so comparing req.Amount here would
		// 400 every legitimate deposit-with-discount retry forever. The retry's
		// chargeAmount (recomputed under the same advisory lock) is compared
		// against the row's stored amount after the A4 computation, in pence
		// via math.Round (int64(pounds*100) truncation would reject legitimate
		// same-amount retries for non-exact values — see CreateTipPayment).
		paymentID = existingID.String
		reusePendingRecord = true
		pendingStoredAmountPence = int64(math.Round(existingAmount.Float64 * 100))
	case err == nil && existingStatus.String == "failed":
		// Swept as stale (>24h) or definitively rejected — a retry would risk a
		// second Square charge. Reject cleanly instead of 500-ing on the
		// idempotency_key UNIQUE constraint (R2).
		log.Printf("Payment retry rejected: record %s was marked failed", existingID.String)
		http.Error(w, "This payment previously failed and can no longer be retried", http.StatusConflict)
		return
	case err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows):
		log.Printf("Failed to check idempotency: %v", err)
	}

	// 2FA gating (C5): persisting a card requires 2FA when the feature is
	// enforced. This runs AFTER the idempotency dedup's completed
	// short-circuit (Loop B MEDIUM): a same-key lost-response retry returns the
	// already-completed payment above without re-entering the gate, so its
	// single-use code (already consumed by the original attempt) is never
	// re-rejected as "expired". Pending-reuse and fresh paths still gate — a
	// new charge may move at Square. The gate also runs before
	// resolveChargeSource below, so an un-2FA'd request never persists a card.
	// SCA-primary (auth-F1): the SAVE surface never forwards the client's
	// verification_token to Square (the card is persisted via CreateCardOnFile,
	// which takes no token), so a non-empty token is client-asserted and must
	// NOT skip the gate — a token-less save falls back to the customer's 2FA
	// code, and twoFAFallbackUsed records that the 2FA BACKUP authorized the
	// operation (the caller audits it). Only the call-site's
	// scaTokenizedSavedCard tokenize-result flow skips the save gate (the
	// combined path never persists a card and Square validates the token as the
	// source_id).
	twoFAFallbackUsed := false
	bookingVerificationToken := ""
	if req.VerificationToken != nil {
		bookingVerificationToken = *req.VerificationToken
		logVerificationTokenProvenance("booking", bookingID, savedCardRef, bookingVerificationToken)
	}
	// scaTokenizedSavedCard (an SCA tokenize-result token charging a saved
	// card) skips BOTH 2FA gates exactly like a present verification_token: the
	// token only exists after the issuer completed buyer verification for this
	// card + amount (SCA-primary), so no homegrown fallback authorization is
	// needed. The SAVE gate is skipped because the combined path never persists
	// a card (resolveChargeSource uses the token as a one-time source, no
	// card-on-file is created).
	if req.SaveCard && !scaTokenizedSavedCard {
		var gateOK bool
		gateOK, twoFAFallbackUsed = requireTwoFactorForCardAccessWithTokenValidation(w, r, service, userID, req.VerificationCode, bookingVerificationToken, true, false)
		if !gateOK {
			return
		}
		// C6: a fallback-authorized save/charge must carry the customer's
		// accepted consent (403 consent_required otherwise).
		if !enforceSCAFallbackConsent(w, req.ConsentVersion, req.ConsentAccepted, twoFAFallbackUsed) {
			return
		}
	}

	// After the idempotency check (which handles same-key retries), verify
	// that no completed payment of the same non-partial type already exists.
	// buildSplitRecords converts 'full' and 'deposit' input types into a
	// 'deposit' PB record, so we also check for an existing deposit when the
	// incoming type is 'full' or 'deposit'. Together with the advisory lock,
	// this prevents the two-tab race where different idempotency keys allow
	// concurrent payments of the same type.
	if req.PaymentType != "partial" {
		var existingCount int
		if err := tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
			SELECT COUNT(*) FROM payments
			WHERE booking_id = $1
			  AND status = 'completed'
			  AND payment_method NOT IN ('discount', 'on_the_house')
			  AND (
				  payment_type = $2
				  OR ($2 IN ('full', 'deposit') AND payment_type = 'deposit')
			  )
		`, bookingID, req.PaymentType).Scan(&existingCount); err == nil && existingCount > 0 {
			log.Printf("Payment rejected: booking %s already has a completed %q payment", bookingID, req.PaymentType)
			http.Error(w, "A payment of this type has already been processed for this booking", http.StatusConflict)
			return
		}
	}

	// A4: compute the campaign credit this payment will receive. Running the
	// read-only ComputeEligibleDiscounts here (before the pending insert,
	// under the advisory lock) returns exactly the discounts
	// applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment will create for the booking inside the
	// post-charge transaction — no completed payment or booking_discounts row
	// exists yet, so both runs see the same state. The credit is used below to
	// (a) keep the overflow→tip guard honest about what the customer actually
	// owes and (b) reduce the amount charged for a deposit payment, which the
	// frontend always sends RAW (no client-side discount).
	var bookingTotal float64
	if err := tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT total_amount FROM bookings WHERE id = $1`, bookingID).Scan(&bookingTotal); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to load booking total for discount computation: %v", err)
	}
	// B13: keep the pre-charge discount SET (not just the sum) so
	// applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment can detect a campaign exhausted by a
	// concurrent redemption between this computation and the apply-time re-run.
	preChargeDiscounts := ComputeEligibleDiscounts(r.Context(), tx, bookingID, userID, bookingTotal)
	var eligibleDiscountPence int64
	for _, d := range preChargeDiscounts {
		eligibleDiscountPence += int64(math.Round(d.Amount * 100))
	}

	// M4/M7: cap pay-early at 100%. A payment that exceeds the booking's
	// remaining balance overflows into a tip record via buildSplitRecords, but a
	// tip is gratuity for service already rendered — an unconfirmed pre-start
	// overpayment is therefore rejected instead of silently becoming a tip.
	// Post-start overpayments proceed (gratuity is legitimate once the service
	// has started), and a pre-start overpayment with ConfirmOverflowTip set
	// proceeds after the frontend's explicit confirmation prompt. Placed AFTER
	// the idempotency dedup: a same-key retry of an already-completed payment
	// short-circuits above and must not hit this guard (the booking is fully
	// paid by then). 'tip'-type requests are excluded — tips are charged via
	// CreateTipPayment (which enforces its own start-time gate).
	// The overflow comparison runs against chargeAmount — the amount that will
	// actually be charged at Square and split by buildSplitRecords — NOT
	// req.Amount. A pending campaign credit inflated the old comparison
	// (req.Amount > remaining + discount): a full/balance payment carries its
	// discount client-side (chargeAmount == req.Amount), so req.Amount beyond
	// the REAL remaining would pass the inflated guard and silently mint a
	// pre-start tip (HIGH-1). A deposit, by contrast, is charged net of the
	// server-side campaign credit (chargeAmount = req.Amount − discount), so a
	// deposit charge can never exceed the real remaining while req.Amount
	// stays within it — comparing chargeAmount keeps the guard honest for both.
	// remainingPence is the booking's tip-excluded outstanding balance
	// (total - completed real payments, refunds re-open capacity). It is
	// computed once here — before any pending row exists — and reused by both
	// the overflow guard below and the A6 clamp-up cap on the deposit charge.
	var remainingPence int64
	if req.PaymentType != "tip" {
		var err error
		remainingPence, err = service.GetBookingRemainingBalancePence(r.Context(), bookingID)
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to get remaining balance: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
	}

	// A4: the amount actually charged at Square. The frontend's full/balance
	// payments already subtract the campaign credit client-side (handlePayFull
	// sends amount_due minus the discount preview), so re-subtracting here
	// would double-discount those — and the full discounted payment must keep
	// the full record amount so bookingIsFullyPaid (real money + discount
	// row == booking total) still completes. A deposit payment, however, is
	// charged RAW by the frontend (handlePayDeposit sends the deposit amount
	// with no discount), so the campaign credit is applied to the deposit
	// charge here: the deposit is charged at req.Amount minus the discount and
	// the residual balance payment settles the rest, so the total across the
	// deposit→balance flow is the discounted price.
	//
	// ADMIN-FLOW ASYMMETRY (F1): the admin "Take Payment" PaymentModal sends
	// payment_type='full' with the FULL amount (subtotal minus discounts
	// ALREADY applied, no client-side campaign preview) — it does NOT
	// pre-subtract an eligible campaign. That means a full admin charge is NOT
	// reduced below, and applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment would auto-apply the
	// campaign → ledger £55 vs £50 total, orphaned £5 credit. The frontend
	// PaymentModal MUST therefore send the discounted amount exactly like the
	// customer modal (amount_due minus the eligible-campaign preview) so the
	// full ledger reconciles to the booking total; the server-side over-credit
	// guard (capDiscountToRemainingObligation in completion.go) protects
	// against a client that does not.
	chargeAmount := req.Amount
	if req.PaymentType == "deposit" && eligibleDiscountPence > 0 {
		// A6: the deposit is charged net of the eligible campaign credit, then
		// clamped DOWN to the discounted obligation max(0, remainingPence -
		// eligibleDiscountPence). The OLD clamp only fired when chargeAmount<=0;
		// a raw deposit between remaining and remaining+discount was charged at
		// the discounted RAW amount while the headroom computation
		// (discountHeadroomPence, which counts this in-flight charge) truncated
		// the discount — the booking auto-completed with the customer overpaying
		// by the truncated difference (Loop-B finding). Clamping ALWAYS to the
		// discounted obligation guarantees the headroom always fits the full
		// discount: the customer can never be charged beyond the discounted
		// price, and no discount is ever truncated.
		discounted := req.Amount - eligibleDiscountPence
		obligation := remainingPence - eligibleDiscountPence
		if obligation < 0 {
			obligation = 0
		}
		if discounted > obligation {
			chargeAmount = obligation
		} else {
			chargeAmount = discounted
		}
	}

	// B12: an overflow that would become a tip ALWAYS requires the customer's
	// explicit confirmation (confirm_overflow_tip) — both pre-start AND
	// post-start. Previously only a pre-start overflow required the flag and a
	// post-start overflow became a tip silently; the frontend's stale amount_due
	// + discount preview could then mint an unintended tip. When the flag is
	// absent the request is rejected with overflow_tip_confirmation_required so
	// the frontend can prompt, regardless of booking state. The comparison is
	// the RAW req.Amount vs the obligation: for a full/balance/partial charge
	// (chargeAmount == req.Amount) the obligation is the REAL remaining (see the
	// M4/M7 note above), so a charge beyond it requires confirmation. For a
	// deposit-with-discount the discounted obligation is remainingPence -
	// eligibleDiscountPence — the A6 clamp has already capped chargeAmount to it,
	// so the guard compares req.Amount against it (Loop-B finding: a raw deposit
	// between remaining and remaining+discount used to slip past the old
	// chargeAmount-vs-remaining guard and silently truncate the discount). A
	// chargeAmount of 0 (fully discount-covered deposit — the skip path below)
	// has no money at all and never overflows. On confirmation the charge is the
	// full req.Amount so buildSplitRecords carves the excess beyond the booking's
	// real remaining as a tip record — the excess is never absorbed as service
	// revenue.
	if req.PaymentType != "tip" && chargeAmount > 0 {
		overflowThreshold := remainingPence
		if req.PaymentType == "deposit" && eligibleDiscountPence > 0 {
			overflowThreshold = remainingPence - eligibleDiscountPence
			if overflowThreshold < 0 {
				overflowThreshold = 0
			}
		}
		if req.Amount > overflowThreshold {
			if !req.ConfirmOverflowTip {
				log.Printf("Overflow requires confirmation: requested %d exceeds obligation %d for booking %s (discount credit %d pence)", req.Amount, overflowThreshold, bookingID, eligibleDiscountPence)
				mw.RespondJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{
					"error": "The extra amount will be recorded as a tip. Confirm to continue.",
					"code":  "overflow_tip_confirmation_required",
				})
				return
			}
			chargeAmount = req.Amount
			log.Printf("Overflow accepted as tip: requested %d exceeds obligation %d for booking %s (discount credit %d pence, confirmed=%v)", req.Amount, overflowThreshold, bookingID, eligibleDiscountPence, req.ConfirmOverflowTip)
		}
	}

	// HIGH-2: a pending-reuse retry must match the CHARGE amount stored on the
	// pending row (the discounted deposit charge, e.g. £40 — what the first
	// attempt charged at Square), not req.Amount (£50 — the raw deposit the
	// frontend resends). A mismatch proves the retry would charge a different
	// amount than the row's first attempt under the same idempotency key
	// (Square would reject the dedup anyway), so reject cleanly instead of
	// 400-ing a legitimate deposit-with-discount retry forever.
	if reusePendingRecord && pendingStoredAmountPence != chargeAmount {
		log.Printf("Payment retry amount mismatch: pending record %s has %d pence, retry would charge %d pence (request %d pence)", paymentID, pendingStoredAmountPence, chargeAmount, req.Amount)
		http.Error(w, "Amount does not match the pending payment", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// A6 (money): when the eligible campaign credit covers the ENTIRE
	// remaining obligation, the deposit charge clamps to £0. Charging £0 at
	// Square is a provable INVALID_REQUEST_ERROR in production (the pending
	// row + Square call would fail forever and block the flow), and the dev
	// mock used to ACCEPT £0 and mint a completed £0 deposit that consumed
	// the discount — leaving the booking unpaid and the 'full' balance
	// charge to overcharge later. There is nothing to charge, so skip the
	// Square call entirely. CRITICAL: the eligible campaign discount rows
	// must be applied IMMEDIATELY (in this transaction) — the OLD deferral to
	// the next real charge let the promised discount go unrecorded: the next
	// balance/terminal charge F1-skipped it (discountHeadroomPence already
	// spent by the real money) and the booking completed at the FULL price
	// with no discount row, overcharging the customer (finding A6).
	if chargeAmount <= 0 {
		discountBefore := bookingDiscountPence(r.Context(), tx, bookingID)
		if applyErr := applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment(r.Context(), tx, bookingID, userID, preChargeDiscounts); applyErr != nil {
			var exErr *campaignExhaustedAtApplyError
			if errors.As(applyErr, &exErr) {
				// B13 (Loop-B finding): the campaign was exhausted between the
				// preview and the apply — the deposit is NOT discount-covered.
				// The old code logged B13 and returned a success-shaped 200
				// (status=completed, amount=0) with no discount row, so the
				// frontend treated the deposit as PAID and a same-key retry
				// could charge the full deposit. The exhaustion reserved nothing
				// (the reservation is atomic and matched zero rows), so rolling
				// back is clean. Mirror the real-charge path's 400
				// (campaign_fully_redeemed) so the frontend prompts for the
				// full amount.
				log.Printf("B13: campaign %s exhausted between preview and apply for booking %s — the deposit is NOT discount-covered; no charge issued; returning 400 campaign_fully_redeemed", exErr.campaignID, bookingID)
				mw.RespondJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{
					"error": "The discount campaign has been fully redeemed. The full amount applies.",
					"code":  "campaign_fully_redeemed",
				})
				return
			}
			log.Printf("Failed to apply eligible campaigns on the discount-covered deposit for booking %s: %v", bookingID, applyErr)
		}
		discountAfter := bookingDiscountPence(r.Context(), tx, bookingID)
		discountApplied := discountAfter > discountBefore
		// A fully discount-covered deposit can settle the booking: run the same
		// fully-paid completion the real charge path runs, so a booking whose
		// obligation is entirely covered by discount + real money completes
		// instead of staying active but unpayable.
		if bookingIsFullyPaid(r.Context(), tx, bookingID) {
			completeActiveBookingFromPayment(r.Context(), tx, bookingID)
		}
		// Loop-B finding (idempotency): the skip path writes no row bound to the
		// request's idempotency key, so a lost-response same-key retry re-runs
		// the handler — and if the campaign has since exhausted, the retry would
		// charge the FULL deposit. Attach the request key to the applied
		// discount row (the ledger-correct record of the covered deposit) so the
		// retry's completed-idempotency short-circuit dedups cleanly. Every
		// 200-success skip path applied at least one discount row; when none
		// exists nothing was credited and the idempotency gap is benign (the
		// retry re-evaluates the same no-charge state).
		if _, upErr := tx.Exec(r.Context(), `
			UPDATE payments SET idempotency_key = $1
			WHERE id = (SELECT id FROM payments
			            WHERE booking_id = $2 AND status = 'completed'
			              AND payment_method = 'discount' AND idempotency_key IS NULL
			            ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1)
		`, req.IdempotencyKey, bookingID); upErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to attach idempotency key %q to the discount-covered deposit row for booking %s: %v", req.IdempotencyKey, bookingID, upErr)
		}
		// Commit the discount rows (and any completion) — the deferred
		// rollback must not undo them.
		if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("Deposit for booking %s fully covered by %d pence of eligible campaign credit — skipping the Square charge (discount applied: %v)", bookingID, eligibleDiscountPence, discountApplied)
		mw.RespondJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
			"id":                          "",
			"booking_id":                  bookingID,
			"payment_type":                req.PaymentType,
			"status":                      "completed",
			"amount":                      0,
			"deposit_covered_by_discount": discountApplied,
		})
		return
	}

	var sourceID string
	var savedCardID *string
	var savedCardCustomerID string
	// 2FA gating (C5): charging a SAVED card requires 2FA when the feature is
	// enforced. New-card (nonce) charges are not gated. consume=!reusePendingRecord
	// (LOW 6a): a FRESH charge verifies WITH consumption — the code is single-use
	// at the gate, closing the TOCTOU where a verified-but-unconsumed code could
	// authorize a second charge within its lifetime — and a failed Square charge
	// re-issues a fresh code (reissueTwoFACodeAfterFailedCharge). A pending-reuse
	// retry verifies WITHOUT consuming: the code was re-issued for exactly this
	// retry and the completed-charge transaction consumes it on terminal success,
	// so a retry that fails again keeps its code for one more attempt. A charge
	// carrying a Square verification_token (SCA performed) skips the gate; a
	// token-less charge falls back to 2FA and twoFAFallbackUsed is set for the
	// charge-success audit.
	if savedCardRef != nil && *savedCardRef != "" && !scaTokenizedSavedCard {
		var gateOK bool
		gateOK, twoFAFallbackUsed = requireTwoFactorForCardAccess(w, r, service, userID, req.VerificationCode, bookingVerificationToken, !reusePendingRecord)
		if !gateOK {
			return
		}
		// C6: a fallback-authorized charge must carry the customer's accepted
		// consent (403 consent_required otherwise).
		if !enforceSCAFallbackConsent(w, req.ConsentVersion, req.ConsentAccepted, twoFAFallbackUsed) {
			return
		}
	}
	// Resolve the new-card-vs-saved-card Square source (shared with
	// CreateTipPayment, BuyGiftCard, and the saved-card branch of
	// CreateTerminalPayment — see resolveChargeSource for the R6 rationale).
	// savedCardRef (card_id OR saved_card_id) is passed as the card reference;
	// when an SCA tokenize-result token rides along in NewCardToken,
	// resolveChargeSource uses the token as the source and the card row for the
	// customer.
	sourceID, savedCardID, savedCardCustomerID, sourceOK := resolveChargeSource(r.Context(), w, service, userID, req.NewCardToken, savedCardRef, req.SaveCard, "Card not found")
	if !sourceOK {
		return
	}

	// If there is no pending record to reuse, insert one NOW and commit the
	// transaction BEFORE calling Square. The committed pending row binds the
	// idempotency key in the DB, so a post-charge insert/commit failure leaves
	// a retryable pending record instead of an unbound key (a same-key retry
	// would otherwise re-charge). It also releases the DB transaction before
	// the ~30s Square round-trip instead of holding it open across the call.
	if !reusePendingRecord {
		// MEDIUM-HIGH: the pending row stores the CHARGE amount, not the
		// requested amount — a deposit-with-discount charge (chargeAmount =
		// req.Amount - eligibleDiscountPence) differs from req.Amount, and the
		// sweep's replayMatchesRowAmount (sweep.go) compares the replayed
		// Square charge against this column. Storing req.Amount here would
		// misclassify the ORIGINAL charge as a new expired-key replay and
		// auto-refund the customer's legitimate payment (B1).
		fees := service.CalculateFees(req.Amount, "online")
		pendingRecord := PaymentRecord{
			BookingID:       bookingID,
			PaymentType:     req.PaymentType,
			PaymentMethod:   "online_square",
			Status:          "pending",
			Amount:          float64(chargeAmount) / 100.0,
			IdempotencyKey:  &req.IdempotencyKey,
			Fees:            float64(fees) / 100.0,
			UserSavedCardID: savedCardID,
			SquareSourceID:  &sourceID,
			CreatedAt:       clock.Now(),
			UpdatedAt:       clock.Now(),
			CreatedBy:       &userID,
		}
		paymentID, err = service.CreatePaymentRecordTx(r.Context(), tx, pendingRecord, nil)
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to create pending payment record: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		// Apply VAT to the pending record inside the same transaction — same
		// pattern as CreateTipPayment.
		ApplyVATToBookingPayment(r.Context(), tx, paymentID)
	} else {
		// Reused pending row. The stored square_request_snapshot is the FIRST
		// attempt's charge body and MUST remain immutable across nonce-changing
		// retries: if that original charge actually landed at Square (the row
		// is pending only because the post-charge outcome is unknown), the
		// by-key sweep replay must match the original body so Square's
		// idempotency dedup returns the landed payment and the sweep rescues
		// the row. Overwriting the snapshot's SourceID with this retry's fresh
		// nonce — or refreshing the square_source_id column the sweep overrides
		// the replay source with — would make the sweep replay the NEW source,
		// Square would return IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED, and the landed charge
		// would never be rescued (stranded until the 24h blind-fail). A retry
		// that changed nonce gets IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED at charge time; the
		// sweep's replay/manual-reconcile path (sweep.go:573-584) resolves the
		// row's true state from the immutable first-attempt body instead. The
		// column is refreshed ONLY for snapshot-less legacy rows, whose
		// fallback replay body is rebuilt from it (and which get a fresh
		// snapshot from the post-commit write below).
		if _, srcErr := tx.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE payments SET square_source_id = $1 WHERE id = $2 AND (square_request_snapshot IS NULL OR square_request_snapshot = '')`, sourceID, paymentID); srcErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to update square_source_id on reused payment %s: %v", paymentID, srcErr)
		}
	}

	// Always commit the transaction. In the reuse path no rows were written,
	// but the commit is required in the test harness: there the context carries
	// an outer test tx, so Begin creates a nested savepoint whose deferred
	// rollback would otherwise undo the post-charge UPDATE executed later on
	// the same connection. In production Begin is a plain tx and this commit is
	// a harmless no-op that keeps both paths identical.
	if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Step 2: DB transaction committed — safe to call Square now. If Square
	// fails, the record stays 'pending' and a same-key retry reuses it.

	paymentReq := square.CreatePaymentReq{
		Amount:            chargeAmount,
		Currency:          "GBP",
		SourceID:          sourceID,
		CustomerID:        savedCardCustomerID,
		IdempotencyKey:    req.IdempotencyKey,
		ReferenceID:       bookingID,
		Note:              req.PaymentType,
		BuyerEmail:        bookingBuyerEmail,
		VerificationToken: bookingVerificationToken,
		// C3: every online charge here is cardholder-initiated — a saved-card
		// (ccof) source MUST carry customer_details for Square's stored-
		// credential rules, and a new-card (cnon) nonce is entered by the
		// buyer present at the keyboard, so the flag is true either way.
		CustomerDetails: &square.CreateCustomerDetails{CustomerInitiated: true},
	}

	// M1: store the verbatim request JSON so the sweep can replay the charge
	// with an IDENTICAL body under the same key — Square compares the whole
	// request on key reuse, and a reconstructed body returns
	// IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED, leaving the row pending forever. The snapshot is
	// written ONLY when the row has none: it records the FIRST attempt's body,
	// which stays immutable so a nonce-changing retry can never redirect the
	// sweep's replay away from the original charge (see the reuse branch above).
	writeChargeSnapshot(r.Context(), db.Conn, "payments", paymentID, paymentReq, "payment")

	paymentResult, err := SquareClient.CreatePayment(r.Context(), paymentReq)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to create payment: %v (error_code=%q)", err, square.ErrorCode(err))
		// The gate consumed the 2FA code for a fresh saved-card charge —
		// re-issue so the same-key retry has a live code to verify. A NEW-CARD
		// (cnon) charge with save_card=false never gated and involves no code:
		// re-issuing there would overwrite the customer's standing pending code
		// with a fresh undelivered one, silently burning the code the operator
		// relayed (finding 5). But a NEW-CARD charge with save_card=true DID
		// gate — the SAVE gate above consumed the code before the charge — so
		// the code must be re-issued there too or every retry hits "Verification
		// code expired" forever (finding: save-gate burned code never re-issued).
		// A pending-reuse retry verified WITHOUT consuming, so its code is still
		// live and no re-issue runs (a re-issue would invalidate the code the
		// customer already holds).
		if (savedCardRef != nil && *savedCardRef != "") || req.SaveCard {
			reissueTwoFACodeAfterFailedCharge(r.Context(), db.Conn, userID, true, twoFAFallbackUsed && !reusePendingRecord, r)
		}
		// SCA-required failures must surface the structured verification_required
		// body so the frontend triggers the 3DS challenge, not a plain decline.
		if isVerificationRequiredError(err) {
			writeVerificationRequiredResponse(w)
			return
		}
		http.Error(w, "Payment failed", chargeFailureStatus(err))
		return
	}

	paymentAmount := float64(chargeAmount) / 100.0

	// Step 3: Square succeeded — record the completed payment state in a NEW
	// transaction (split records, VAT, deposit promotion, campaigns). The
	// pending row committed in step 1 already holds the primary idempotency
	// key, so it IS the primary record: update it to 'completed' with the
	// Square payment ID, then insert only the additional -split-N records.
	tx2, txErr := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
	if txErr != nil {
		log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square payment %s (ID=%s) was processed but opening the post-charge transaction failed: %v — manual reconciliation required",
			paymentResult.Status, paymentResult.SquarePayID, txErr)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	defer func() {
		if err := tx2.Rollback(r.Context()); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
			slog.Error("failed to rollback post-charge transaction", "err", err)
		}
	}()

	// Re-check the booking status under the advisory lock: a concurrent
	// cancellation/eviction can move the booking out of a payable state between
	// the pending commit (step 1) and the Square charge completing. A charge
	// landing on a cancelled/lapsed/no-show booking must not be recorded as a
	// completed payment — the cancellation refund path computes refunds from
	// completed payments and would silently exclude this deposit. Mark it
	// failed and alert ops: money was taken at Square and MUST be refunded
	// manually. The pending row is marked 'failed' in the tx below, so
	// idempotency dedup still blocks a second Square charge, but the row no
	// longer shows pending — the frontend's retry gets a 409 Conflict.
	payable, err := postChargeRecheck(r.Context(), w, tx2, bookingID, paymentID, paymentResult.Status, paymentResult.SquarePayID, "payment", "This booking is no longer accepting payments")
	if err != nil || !payable {
		return
	}

	// Apply eligible campaign discounts BEFORE the split records are inserted
	// (C1): ComputeEligibleDiscounts refuses to apply NEW discounts once a
	// booking has 2+ completed real payments, and the split below would
	// otherwise count deposit + balance as exactly those 2 payments — a full
	// discounted payment would never get its discount row and the booking
	// would never auto-complete. Running the discount first means the guard
	// only sees payments that existed before this transaction, so the
	// discounted total is applied and bookingIsFullyPaid (which counts
	// discount rows) completes the booking. The call is idempotent: discounts
	// already recorded for the booking are skipped by the duplicate check.
	// B13: the apply-time re-check can discover that a campaign the customer
	// was promised at preview was exhausted by a concurrent redemption — the
	// lost discount must not be silently swallowed (see the error handling
	// after the commit below).
	campaignLostPence := int64(0)
	var campaignLostID string
	if applyErr := applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment(r.Context(), tx2, bookingID, userID, preChargeDiscounts); applyErr != nil {
		var exErr *campaignExhaustedAtApplyError
		if errors.As(applyErr, &exErr) {
			campaignLostPence = exErr.lostPence
			campaignLostID = exErr.campaignID
			log.Printf("B13: campaign %s exhausted between preview and apply for booking %s — lost discount %d pence; payment will complete and the difference will be returned to the customer", campaignLostID, bookingID, campaignLostPence)
		} else {
			log.Printf("Failed to apply eligible campaigns for booking %s: %v", bookingID, applyErr)
		}
	}

	// Build payment records — may split a single Square charge into
	// a deposit portion (up to 50% of booking total) plus a balance
	// portion, so the refund system can correctly track deposit vs
	// non-deposit money per the deposit protection policy.
	bookingInfo, bErr := service.GetBookingPaymentInfo(r.Context(), bookingID)
	fees := service.CalculateFees(chargeAmount, "online")
	primaryRecord := PaymentRecord{
		BookingID:       bookingID,
		PaymentType:     req.PaymentType,
		PaymentMethod:   "online_square",
		Status:          "completed",
		Amount:          paymentAmount,
		SquarePaymentID: &paymentResult.SquarePayID,
		IdempotencyKey:  &req.IdempotencyKey,
		Fees:            float64(fees) / 100.0,
		UserSavedCardID: savedCardID,
		CreatedAt:       clock.Now(),
		UpdatedAt:       clock.Now(),
		CreatedBy:       &userID,
	}

	var records []PaymentRecord
	if bErr == nil && bookingInfo != nil {
		records = buildSplitRecords(primaryRecord, req.PaymentType, bookingInfo, paymentAmount)
	} else {
		if bErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to get booking info for split: %v — using single record", bErr)
		}
		records = []PaymentRecord{primaryRecord}
	}

	// The primary split record (records[0]) is the committed pending row. Its
	// amount/payment_type may differ from the pending insert (deposit carving
	// in buildSplitRecords), so align the row to the computed values. The VAT
	// fields are cleared so apply_vat_to_payment recomputes on the final amount
	// — the pending record had VAT applied at the pre-split amount.
	primary := records[0]
	if _, upErr := tx2.Exec(r.Context(), `
		UPDATE payments SET
			status = 'completed',
			square_payment_id = $1,
			amount = $2,
			payment_type = $3,
			fees = $4,
			is_vat_applicable = FALSE,
			vat_rate = NULL,
			vat_amount = NULL,
			net_amount = NULL,
			updated_at = NOW()
		WHERE id = $5
	`, paymentResult.SquarePayID, primary.Amount, primary.PaymentType, primary.Fees, paymentID); upErr != nil {
		log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square payment %s (ID=%s) was processed but updating payment %s to completed failed: %v — manual reconciliation required",
			paymentResult.Status, paymentResult.SquarePayID, paymentID, upErr)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// MEDIUM-2 / finding 1: a saved-card charge reached its terminal SUCCESS
	// state. For a FRESH charge the gate already consumed the code
	// (consume=true at verify time — single-use), so no write happens here.
	// For a PENDING-REUSE retry (gate passed consume=false — the code was
	// re-issued for this retry) this is where it is burned, so a retry that
	// fails again keeps its code for one more attempt. Only runs for
	// saved-card charges — the gate only ran for those, and new-card
	// charges have no code to consume.
	if savedCardRef != nil && *savedCardRef != "" && reusePendingRecord {
		if consErr := twofa.ConsumePendingCode(r.Context(), tx2, userID); consErr != nil {
			log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square payment %s (ID=%s) was processed but consuming the 2FA code for user %s failed: %v — manual reconciliation required",
				paymentResult.Status, paymentResult.SquarePayID, userID, consErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
	}

	// Insert the additional split records. They carry the derived -split-N
	// idempotency keys, which are new rows; if the split produced only one
	// record, there is nothing more to insert.
	var paymentIDs []string
	for i, rec := range records[1:] {
		pid, cErr := service.CreatePaymentRecordTx(r.Context(), tx2, rec, nil)
		if cErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to create split payment record %d/%d: %v", i+2, len(records), cErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		paymentIDs = append(paymentIDs, pid)
	}

	// Apply VAT to all split records if the business is VAT-registered.
	// Must be inside the transaction so VAT updates are atomic with inserts.
	vatCfg, vatErr := GetVATConfig(r.Context(), tx2)
	if vatErr == nil && vatCfg.IsVATRegistered {
		vatIDs := append([]string{paymentID}, paymentIDs...)
		for _, pid := range vatIDs {
			if _, execErr := tx2.Exec(r.Context(), "SELECT apply_vat_to_payment($1, $2)", pid, vatCfg.DefaultVATRate); execErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to apply VAT to payment %s: %v", pid, execErr)
			}
		}
	}

	// Promote deposit to confirmed if total paid meets the 20% threshold.
	// Check is inside the transaction so it sees the just-completed primary.
	// Tip rows are excluded (they are gratuity, not payment toward the booking)
	// as are discount/on_the_house rows (no real money moved).
	var depositMet bool
	if err := tx2.QueryRow(r.Context(), fmt.Sprintf(`
		WITH booking_total AS (
			SELECT total_amount * 100 AS total_pence FROM bookings WHERE id = $1
		),
		paid_total AS (
			SELECT COALESCE(SUM(amount), 0) * 100 AS paid_pence
			FROM payments
			WHERE booking_id = $1 AND status = 'completed'
			  AND payment_type != 'tip'
			  AND payment_method NOT IN ('discount', 'on_the_house')
		)
		SELECT pt.paid_pence >= ROUND(bt.total_pence * %f)
		FROM booking_total bt, paid_total pt
	`, depositPromotionMinPct), bookingID).Scan(&depositMet); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to check deposit threshold for booking %s: %v", bookingID, err)
	}

	if depositMet {
		if _, err := tx2.Exec(r.Context(), `
			UPDATE bookings SET status = 'confirmed', updated_at = NOW()
			WHERE id = $1 AND status = 'pending_release'
		`, bookingID); err != nil {
			log.Printf("ALERT: payment recorded but failed to promote booking %s from pending_release: %v", bookingID, err)
		}
	}

	// Fully-paid completion: if total paid (excluding tips/discounts) now
	// covers 100% of the booking total, transition an active booking to
	// 'completed' so it leaves the admin's Current Appointment view. The
	// completion side-effects (loyalty, campaigns, deposits_required) are the
	// same as the admin progress endpoint.
	if bookingIsFullyPaid(r.Context(), tx2, bookingID) {
		completeActiveBookingFromPayment(r.Context(), tx2, bookingID)
	}

	if cErr := tx2.Commit(r.Context()); cErr != nil {
		log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square payment %s (ID=%s) was processed but DB transaction commit failed: %v — manual reconciliation required",
			paymentResult.Status, paymentResult.SquarePayID, cErr)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// The 2FA BACKUP authorized this token-less saved-card charge (SCA was
	// unavailable) — record the strict fallback audit row AFTER the money
	// transaction commits (a failed audit write must never roll back a
	// completed charge). The actor is the customer's own userID
	// (customer-initiated online charge).
	if twoFAFallbackUsed {
		insertTwoFAFallbackAudit(r.Context(), userID, userID, paymentResult.CardLast4, bookingID, "saved-card charge authorized via 2FA fallback (SCA unavailable)", consentVersionValue(req.ConsentVersion), req.ConsentAccepted)
	}

	// B13: a campaign was exhausted between the preview and the apply-time
	// re-check. The charge already succeeded at Square and the payment record
	// is committed, so the customer's promised discount must not silently
	// vanish. If the real money now covers the full booking obligation (the
	// full price was charged), return the lost discount value to the customer
	// as a gift-card account balance credit — the merchant honours the
	// discount it quoted. If the booking is NOT fully covered (the customer
	// was charged the discounted amount), no credit is due: the shortfall stays
	// on the booking and the 400 below tells the frontend the campaign ended so
	// it can prompt for the difference. In both cases the 400
	// (campaign_fully_redeemed) prevents the frontend from showing the discount
	// as applied.
	if campaignLostPence > 0 {
		credited := refundLostCampaignAsBalanceCredit(r.Context(), bookingID, userID, campaignLostPence)
		log.Printf("B13: campaign %s fully redeemed before payment %s applied it — lost discount %d pence (%s), returning 400 campaign_fully_redeemed to the frontend", campaignLostID, paymentID, campaignLostPence, credited)
		mw.RespondJSON(w, http.StatusBadRequest, map[string]string{
			"error": "The discount campaign has been fully redeemed. The full amount applies.",
			"code":  "campaign_fully_redeemed",
		})
		return
	}

	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PaymentResponse{
		ID:          paymentID,
		BookingID:   bookingID,
		PaymentType: req.PaymentType,
		Status:      "completed",
		Amount:      chargeAmount,
		CardBrand:   paymentResult.CardBrand,
		CardLast4:   paymentResult.CardLast4,
		ReceiptURL:  paymentResult.ReceiptURL,
		CreatedAt:   clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
	}); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

// campaignExhaustedAtApplyError reports that a discount campaign the customer
// was shown as eligible at preview time was exhausted (times_redeemed reached
// max_redemptions) by the time the payment applied it (B13). lostPence is the
// discount the customer was promised but can no longer receive.
type campaignExhaustedAtApplyError struct {
	campaignID string
	lostPence  int64
}

func (e *campaignExhaustedAtApplyError) Error() string {
	return fmt.Sprintf("discount campaign %s was fully redeemed before the payment applied it (lost %d pence)", e.campaignID, e.lostPence)
}

// refundLostCampaignAsBalanceCredit honours a discount the customer was
// promised but a concurrently-exhausted campaign could not apply (B13): when
// the booking's real-money ledger already covers the full obligation (the full
// price was charged at Square), the lost discount value is credited to the
// user's gift-card account balance so the merchant keeps the price it quoted.
// When the booking is NOT fully covered (the customer was charged the
// discounted amount), no credit is due — the shortfall stays on the booking.
// Returns a human-readable outcome for the caller's log line.
func refundLostCampaignAsBalanceCredit(ctx context.Context, bookingID, userID string, lostPence int64) string {
	var totalPence, realPaidPence int64
	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
		SELECT COALESCE(ROUND((SELECT total_amount FROM bookings WHERE id = $1) * 100), 0),
		       COALESCE(ROUND((SELECT SUM(amount) FROM payments WHERE booking_id = $1 AND status = 'completed'
				AND payment_type != 'tip' AND payment_method NOT IN ('discount', 'on_the_house')) * 100), 0)
	`, bookingID).Scan(&totalPence, &realPaidPence)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("B13: failed to read booking ledger for campaign-loss credit on booking %s: %v", bookingID, err)
		return "no credit (ledger unreadable)"
	}
	if realPaidPence < totalPence {
		return "no credit (booking not fully paid by real money)"
	}
	creditPounds := float64(lostPence) / 100.0
	if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
		INSERT INTO user_giftcard_balances (user_id, balance, updated_at)
		VALUES ($1, $2, NOW())
		ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO UPDATE SET
			balance = user_giftcard_balances.balance + EXCLUDED.balance,
			updated_at = NOW()
	`, userID, creditPounds); err != nil {
		log.Printf("CRITICAL: B13 campaign-loss credit of £%.2f to user %s (booking %s) failed: %v — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", creditPounds, userID, bookingID, err)
		insertCriticalPaymentNotification(ctx, &bookingID, &userID)
		return fmt.Sprintf("credit of £%.2f FAILED (manual reconciliation required)", creditPounds)
	}
	// Track the credit in gift_card_transactions (reference_type
	// 'b13_campaign_loss', reference_id = booking) so a later cancellation can
	// reverse it (clawbackB13CampaignCredit). The row is anchored to a real
	// gift card of the user because the table requires one; a user with no gift
	// card still gets the balance credit but no audit row — the clawback then
	// has nothing to reverse.
	var anchorCardID string
	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
		SELECT id FROM gift_cards
		WHERE created_by = $1 OR redeemed_by = $1
		ORDER BY COALESCE(redeemed_at, created_at) DESC, created_at DESC
		LIMIT 1
	`, userID).Scan(&anchorCardID); err == nil && anchorCardID != "" {
		if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
			INSERT INTO gift_card_transactions (gift_card_id, transaction_type, amount, reference_type, reference_id, user_id, notes)
			VALUES ($1, 'balance_credit', $2, 'b13_campaign_loss', $3, $4, $5)
		`, anchorCardID, creditPounds, bookingID, userID, "B13 campaign-loss balance credit"); err != nil {
			log.Printf("B13: failed to record gift_card_transactions credit for user %s (booking %s): %v", userID, bookingID, err)
		}
	}
	return fmt.Sprintf("credited £%.2f to gift-card account balance", creditPounds)
}

// applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment checks and applies any eligible discount
// campaigns to the booking. Uses the provided transaction so that discount
// writes are atomic with the caller's payment transaction — if the payment
// commit fails, the discount writes roll back with it.
// Skips if the booking already has 2+ completed non-discount payments — this
// prevents applying new discounts after a customer has already paid, which
// would create a credit balance or require a refund.
//
// expected is the set of discounts the caller computed BEFORE the charge (under
// the same booking advisory lock). If any of those campaigns has since been
// exhausted by a CONCURRENT redemption on another booking (times_redeemed hit
// max_redemptions between the preview computation and the apply-time re-check —
// the max_redemptions race), the customer would be charged full price with no
// discount row and the booking would silently not complete. In that case a
// *campaignExhaustedAtApplyError is returned so the handler can surface a clear
// "campaign fully redeemed" error and return the promised discount value.
// The pre-check loop below is a fast-fail only; the RACE is closed inside
// ApplyEligibleDiscount, whose atomic conditional increment (guarded by
// max_redemptions) is the real enforcement point — the loser of a concurrent
// same-campaign redemption gets a zero-row result there and the same error
// surfaces from the apply loop.
// bookingDiscountPence returns the total of completed discount payment rows on
// a booking, in pence. The A6 discount-covered deposit skip path (chargeAmount
// <= 0) measures this BEFORE and AFTER applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment to learn
// whether a discount was actually applied — the deposit_covered_by_discount
// response flag must only be true when a discount row really was recorded (a
// campaign exhausted between preview and apply records nothing).
func bookingDiscountPence(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingID string) int64 {
	var pence int64
	if err := q.QueryRow(ctx, `
		SELECT COALESCE(ROUND(SUM(amount) * 100), 0)
		FROM payments
		WHERE booking_id = $1 AND status = 'completed' AND payment_method = 'discount'
	`, bookingID).Scan(&pence); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to read applied discount total for booking %s: %v", bookingID, err)
		return 0
	}
	return pence
}

func applyEligibleCampaignsAtPayment(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingID, userID string, expected []EligibleDiscount) error {
	for _, d := range expected {
		if d.Source != "campaign" {
			continue
		}
		var exhausted bool
		err := q.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT COALESCE(times_redeemed >= max_redemptions, FALSE) FROM discount_campaigns WHERE id = $1`, d.SourceID).Scan(&exhausted)
		if err == nil && exhausted {
			return &campaignExhaustedAtApplyError{campaignID: d.SourceID, lostPence: int64(math.Round(d.Amount * 100))}
		}
	}

	var bookingTotal float64
	if err := q.QueryRow(ctx, `
		SELECT total_amount FROM bookings WHERE id = $1
	`, bookingID).Scan(&bookingTotal); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to calculate booking total for campaign check: %v", err)
		return nil
	}

	for _, d := range ComputeEligibleDiscounts(ctx, q, bookingID, userID, bookingTotal) {
		// F1: never over-credit. This runs inside the post-charge transaction
		// BEFORE the charge's split records are written, so the paid ledger
		// visible here is real money + discounts already on the booking plus
		// the in-flight charge (the pending row read inside
		// discountHeadroomPence). Capping each discount to the uncovered
		// obligation keeps the admin "Take Payment" full-amount flow from
		// creating an orphaned credit when a campaign is eligible: the correct
		// fix is the frontend PaymentModal sending the discounted amount (like
		// the customer modal does); this guard is the server-side money-safety
		// half.
		capped, ok := capDiscountToRemainingObligation(ctx, q, bookingID, d.Amount)
		if !ok {
			log.Printf("Skipping %s discount %s for booking %s — booking obligation already covered by real money (would over-credit)", d.Source, d.SourceID, bookingID)
			continue
		}
		d.Amount = capped
		if applyErr := ApplyEligibleDiscount(ctx, q, bookingID, userID, bookingTotal, d); applyErr != nil {
			var exErr *campaignExhaustedAtApplyError
			if errors.As(applyErr, &exErr) {
				return applyErr
			}
			log.Printf("Failed to apply %s discount %s for booking %s: %v", d.Source, d.SourceID, bookingID, applyErr)
		}
	}
	return nil
}

// buildSplitRecords determines whether to split a single Square charge into
// multiple payment records. Before the booking start time, the first 50% of
// the total is recorded as 'deposit' (protected under the deposit policy) and
//
// The first 50% of the booking total (minus any already deposited) is always
// carved out as a 'deposit' record, regardless of the payment size. The
// remainder first covers the booking balance then overflows into a 'tip' record.
//
// The primary record carries the Square payment ID for refund routing; split
// records share the same SquarePaymentID so the refund loop can avoid duplicate
// Square API calls while still creating audit records.
//
// MONEY INVARIANT (deliberately kept exact): the returned records always
// partition paymentAmount — deposit + balance + tip === paymentAmount exactly
// (every component is rounded to the pence and the parts are derived from one
// another, so no rounding residue exists). The sum of the split records can
// therefore never exceed the amount actually charged at Square. When deposit
// AND balance are both zero (booking already fully paid) the tip record alone
// carries the whole payment — the primary must NOT be appended as well, or the
// amount would be recorded twice (see the tip block below).
//
// Discounts do NOT change this: a discount is applied at payment time as a
// SEPARATE ledger payment row (payment_method='discount'), and GetBookingPaymentInfo
// excludes those rows from TotalPaid (as do the refund and deposit-threshold
// computations). buildSplitRecords therefore runs against the full booking
// total and the REAL money already paid, so a discounted booking can at worst
// over-allocate toward balance and under-allocate toward tip (a bookkeeping
// simplification, not an overcharge) — the partition still equals the charged
// amount. See TestBuildSplitRecords_DiscountBooking_TipOverflow_SumNeverExceedsCharge.
func buildSplitRecords(primary PaymentRecord, reqPaymentType string, info *BookingPaymentInfo, paymentAmount float64) []PaymentRecord {
	// After the booking starts there is no deposit protection window, but an
	// overpayment beyond the remaining booking value is still gratuity and must
	// be carved out as its own payment_type='tip' record (F3) — mirroring
	// buildTerminalSplitRecords' post-start carve. A post-start charge AT OR
	// BELOW the remaining value records as a single entry with its original
	// type, exactly as before; only the overflow becomes a tip. The tip record
	// zeroes fees and derives a -split-tip idempotency key, and the records
	// still partition paymentAmount exactly (booking portion + tip).
	if clock.Now().After(info.StartTime) {
		remaining := math.Max(0, info.TotalAmount-info.TotalPaid)
		bookingPortion := math.Min(paymentAmount, remaining)
		bookingPortion = math.Round(bookingPortion*100) / 100
		tipPortion := math.Round((paymentAmount-bookingPortion)*100) / 100
		if tipPortion > roundingEpsilon {
			records := []PaymentRecord{primary}
			records[0].Amount = bookingPortion
			tip := primary
			tip.PaymentType = "tip"
			tip.Amount = tipPortion
			tip.Fees = 0
			if primary.IdempotencyKey != nil {
				k := *primary.IdempotencyKey + "-split-tip"
				tip.IdempotencyKey = &k
			}
			return append(records, tip)
		}
		return []PaymentRecord{primary}
	}

	// 1. Deposit portion: up to 50% of total, minus what's already been paid.
	maxDeposit := info.TotalAmount * ProtectedDepositMaxPct
	remainingDepositRoom := math.Max(0, maxDeposit-info.TotalPaid)
	depositAmount := math.Min(paymentAmount, remainingDepositRoom)
	depositAmount = math.Round(depositAmount*100) / 100

	// 2. Remaining after deposit.
	remainingAfterDeposit := math.Round((paymentAmount-depositAmount)*100) / 100

	// 3. Balance portion: covers whatever is still owed on the booking.
	bookingRemaining := math.Max(0, info.TotalAmount-info.TotalPaid-depositAmount)
	balancePortion := math.Min(remainingAfterDeposit, bookingRemaining)
	balancePortion = math.Round(balancePortion*100) / 100

	// 4. Tip: anything beyond the booking total.
	tipPortion := math.Round((remainingAfterDeposit-balancePortion)*100) / 100

	var records []PaymentRecord
	splitIdx := 0

	// 1. Deposit portion (always present when there's deposit room left).
	if depositAmount > roundingEpsilon {
		dep := primary
		dep.PaymentType = "deposit"
		dep.Amount = depositAmount
		records = append(records, dep)
		splitIdx++
	}

	// 2. Balance / partial / full record — covers the remaining booking total.
	if balancePortion > roundingEpsilon {
		bal := primary
		bal.Amount = balancePortion
		bal.Fees = 0
		if primary.IdempotencyKey != nil {
			k := *primary.IdempotencyKey + fmt.Sprintf("-split-%d", splitIdx)
			bal.IdempotencyKey = &k
		}
		totalPaidAfterBalance := info.TotalPaid + depositAmount + balancePortion
		switch {
		case totalPaidAfterBalance >= info.TotalAmount && totalPaidAfterBalance-balancePortion > 0:
			bal.PaymentType = "balance"
		case totalPaidAfterBalance >= info.TotalAmount:
			bal.PaymentType = "full"
		default:
			bal.PaymentType = "partial"
		}
		records = append(records, bal)
		splitIdx++
	}

	// 3. Tip record — overflow beyond the booking total. Appended BEFORE the
	// primary fallback below: when BOTH the deposit and balance portions are
	// zero (deposit room exhausted AND the booking already fully paid — e.g. a
	// discounted booking whose TotalPaid, which excludes discount rows, has
	// reached the full total), the tip record carries the ENTIRE payment.
	// Appending the primary first would double-count the charged amount
	// (primary at the full amount + tip at the same full amount).
	if tipPortion > roundingEpsilon {
		tip := primary
		tip.PaymentType = "tip"
		tip.Amount = tipPortion
		tip.Fees = 0
		splitIdx++
		if primary.IdempotencyKey != nil {
			k := *primary.IdempotencyKey + fmt.Sprintf("-split-%d", splitIdx)
			tip.IdempotencyKey = &k
		}
		records = append(records, tip)
	}

	// Defensive fallback: nothing was appended (deposit, balance, AND tip all
	// zero — impossible given paymentAmount is validated > 0 upstream, so this
	// is a pure safety net). The primary is still a valid single record.
	if len(records) == 0 {
		primary.Fees = 0
		records = append(records, primary)
	}
	return records
}

// buildTerminalSplitRecords splits a completed terminal checkout charge that
// included a tip into deposit + balance + tip payment records. Square charges
// a single amount (booking portion + tip); the booking portion is split like
// buildSplitRecords — deposit up to 50% of the booking total (minus already
// deposited), balance covering the rest — and the tip becomes its own
// payment_type='tip' record with a derived -split-tip idempotency key. Unlike
// buildSplitRecords this always carves the deposit/balance split (the terminal
// flow runs after the booking started, where buildSplitRecords' start-time
// short-circuit would collapse everything into one record): only deposit +
// balance are refundable on cancellation, while the tip is recorded for
// accounting (total_tips) and excluded from the refund computation. The MONEY
// INVARIANT from buildSplitRecords holds: the records always partition
// bookingPortion + tipAmount exactly.
func buildTerminalSplitRecords(primary PaymentRecord, info *BookingPaymentInfo, bookingPortion, tipAmount float64) []PaymentRecord {
	maxDeposit := info.TotalAmount * ProtectedDepositMaxPct
	remainingDepositRoom := math.Max(0, maxDeposit-info.TotalPaid)
	depositAmount := math.Min(bookingPortion, remainingDepositRoom)
	depositAmount = math.Round(depositAmount*100) / 100
	balancePortion := math.Round((bookingPortion-depositAmount)*100) / 100

	var records []PaymentRecord
	splitIdx := 0

	if depositAmount > roundingEpsilon {
		dep := primary
		dep.PaymentType = "deposit"
		dep.Amount = depositAmount
		records = append(records, dep)
		splitIdx++
	}

	if balancePortion > roundingEpsilon {
		bal := primary
		bal.PaymentType = "balance"
		bal.Amount = balancePortion
		bal.Fees = 0
		if primary.IdempotencyKey != nil {
			k := splitIdempotencyKey(*primary.IdempotencyKey, fmt.Sprintf("-split-%d", splitIdx))
			bal.IdempotencyKey = &k
		}
		records = append(records, bal)
	}

	if tipAmount > roundingEpsilon {
		tip := primary
		tip.PaymentType = "tip"
		tip.Amount = tipAmount
		tip.Fees = 0
		if primary.IdempotencyKey != nil {
			k := splitIdempotencyKey(*primary.IdempotencyKey, "-split-tip")
			tip.IdempotencyKey = &k
		}
		records = append(records, tip)
	}

	if len(records) == 0 {
		primary.Fees = 0
		records = append(records, primary)
	}
	return records
}

// splitIdempotencyKey derives a bounded-length idempotency key for a split
// record. The terminal base key (booking + amount + Square payment ID) can be
// long enough that appending a -split-tip suffix would exceed the
// payments.idempotency_key VARCHAR(64) limit (e.g. the dev mock's 28-char
// "pay_mock_<nanosecond>" payment IDs); the base is truncated so the suffix
// always fits. Uniqueness is preserved: the truncated base still embeds the
// booking ID and Square payment ID, and the suffix differs per split record.
func splitIdempotencyKey(base, suffix string) string {
	maxBase := 64 - len(suffix)
	if len(base) > maxBase {
		base = base[:maxBase]
	}
	return base + suffix
}

func GetUserPaymentMethods(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID, ok := r.Context().Value(mw.UserIDKey).(string)
	if !ok || userID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	service := NewPaymentService()
	cards, err := service.GetUserPaymentMethods(r.Context(), userID)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to get payment methods: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(cards); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

func AdminGetUserPaymentMethods(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	// Defense-in-depth admin check (S-1) — exposing another user's saved cards
	// must stay admin-only.
	if !isAdminRequest(r) {
		http.Error(w, "Admin access required", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	userID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
	if userID == "" || !validators.IsValidID(userID) {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid user ID", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	service := NewPaymentService()
	cards, err := service.GetUserPaymentMethods(r.Context(), userID)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to get payment methods for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(cards); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

func DeletePaymentMethod(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	cardID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
	if cardID == "" || !validators.IsValidID(cardID) {
		http.Error(w, "Payment method not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	userID, ok := r.Context().Value(mw.UserIDKey).(string)
	if !ok || userID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	service := NewPaymentService()
	err := service.DeletePaymentMethod(r.Context(), cardID, userID)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to delete payment method: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{"status": "deleted"}); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

type CreatePaymentMethodRequest struct {
	CardToken string `json:"card_token" validate:"required"`
	// VerificationCode is the customer's current 2FA one-time code (B10): an
	// enforced environment persists a card only when this matches the
	// customer's pending code.
	VerificationCode string `json:"verification_code,omitempty"`
	// VerificationToken is a Square 3DS/SCA verification token. On the add-card
	// SAVE surface it is CLIENT-ASSERTED and never forwarded to Square
	// (CreateCardOnFile takes no verification_token), so the 2FA gate IGNORES it
	// (auth-F1 — a forged value cannot authorise a save; see twofa.go). It is
	// carried on the wire for parity with the charge surfaces and passed through
	// to the gate, whose save variant applies the token-less SCA-only refusal
	// when a genuine SCA proof is absent. The genuine proof for a SAVE is the
	// STORE-intent tokenize-result submitted as card_token (see
	// isSCATokenizeResultCardToken).
	VerificationToken *string `json:"verification_token,omitempty"`
	// ConsentVersion / ConsentAccepted mirror the charge structs (C6): the
	// add-card endpoint never charges, so they are recorded on the fallback
	// audit row (when the client sends them) but not enforced here.
	ConsentVersion  *string `json:"consent_version,omitempty"`
	ConsentAccepted bool    `json:"consent_accepted"`
}

func CreatePaymentMethod(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID, ok := r.Context().Value(mw.UserIDKey).(string)
	if !ok || userID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var req CreatePaymentMethodRequest
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := validators.Validate.Struct(&req); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if req.CardToken == "" {
		http.Error(w, "card_token is required — use a Square Web Payments nonce", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	service := NewPaymentService()

	// SCA-only compliance (M11): the add-card surface's SCA proof is the card
	// token itself. The frontend performs the STORE-intent SCA at tokenization
	// (SquareCardInput.tokenizeForStore) — the tokenize-result IS the card
	// token, and Square validates it as a card-on-file source when
	// CreateCardOnFile persists it. A save that carries a genuine SCA
	// tokenize-result as card_token is therefore SCA-compliant and skips the
	// 2FA gate at the call site — exactly like the charge surfaces'
	// scaTokenizedSavedCard skip: the STORE-intent SCA performed at tokenization
	// IS the verification (PSR 2017 reg 100 compliant), so no homegrown fallback
	// authorization is needed and no fallback audit is written.
	//
	// Every other save stays gated through the save-surface variant
	// (tokenForwardedToSquare=false): a verification_token is client-asserted
	// and NEVER forwarded to Square on a SAVE surface, so it must NOT skip the
	// gate (auth-F1 — a forged value cannot authorise a save, and no 2FA code
	// can either, SCA-only). A token-less legacy save (a raw card.tokenize()
	// nonce, or a token the backend cannot recognize as a genuine SCA
	// tokenize-result) is refused 402 verification_required in an enforced
	// deployment.
	saveVerificationToken := ""
	if req.VerificationToken != nil {
		saveVerificationToken = *req.VerificationToken
	}
	twoFAFallbackUsed := false
	if !isSCATokenizeResultCardToken(req.CardToken) {
		var gateOK bool
		gateOK, twoFAFallbackUsed = requireTwoFactorForCardAccessWithTokenValidation(w, r, service, userID, req.VerificationCode, saveVerificationToken, true, false)
		if !gateOK {
			return
		}
	}

	card, err := service.CreatePaymentMethodFromToken(r.Context(), userID, req.CardToken)
	if err != nil {
		if isDefinitiveCardSaveFailure(err) {
			log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("Failed to create payment method: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Failed to add card", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// The 2FA BACKUP authorized persisting this card (no SCA was performed on
	// the add-card endpoint); the actor is the customer's own userID. Unreachable
	// under SCA-only (the gate never sets fallbackUsed), retained for parity
	// with the charge surfaces.
	if twoFAFallbackUsed && card != nil {
		insertTwoFAFallbackAudit(r.Context(), userID, userID, card.Last4, "", "card persisted via 2FA fallback (SCA unavailable)", consentVersionValue(req.ConsentVersion), req.ConsentAccepted)
	}

	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(card); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

// isSCATokenizeResultCardToken reports whether a card token submitted to the
// add-card save surface is a GENUINE Square tokenizeWithVerification result —
// the STORE-intent tokenize-result the account page's tokenizeForStore
// produces (the SCA challenge runs at tokenization, so the returned token is
// the SCA-verified source the backend stores). Real Square returns opaque cnon:
// tokens, so the dev mock's contract marks a genuine tokenize-result with
// "sca-" immediately after the cnon: prefix (internal/square's
// isSCATokenizeResultSource) — the enforcement-parity stand-in the charge
// paths also rely on (money-F2). A raw card.tokenize() nonce or any other
// shape is NOT an SCA proof and never skips the gate.
func isSCATokenizeResultCardToken(cardToken string) bool {
	return strings.HasPrefix(cardToken, "cnon:sca-")
}

// isDefinitiveCardSaveFailure reports whether a CreatePaymentMethod error is a
// definitive client rejection — an expired/invalid/already-used card source or
// a declined card that can never be saved — as opposed to an ambiguous
// transport/server failure. It matches the structured Square error Code
// (square.ErrorCode) exactly against the codes this codebase already recognizes
// for card failures (till.go's definitivePaymentDeclineCodes via
// isDefinitiveChargeFailure, plus the card-on-file creation codes SOURCE_USED /
// CARD_TOKEN_USED / CARD_TOKEN_EXPIRED / INVALID_CARD), and additionally treats
// any error carrying Square's INVALID_REQUEST_ERROR CATEGORY as definitive —
// real 400 card-save failures (e.g. MISSING_REQUIRED_PARAMETER) arrive with
// that category and a specific code, so checking the category catches them all.
// INVALID_REQUEST_ERROR is a category, NOT a code: it must be matched via
// square.ErrorCategory, never as a code. Errors carrying no structured code
// (transport errors, the dev mock's plain errors, 5xx) are ambiguous and stay
// 500 — retrying with the same inputs might succeed.
func isDefinitiveCardSaveFailure(err error) bool {
	if err == nil {
		return false
	}
	if isDefinitiveChargeFailure(err) {
		return true
	}
	switch square.ErrorCode(err) {
	case "SOURCE_USED", "CARD_TOKEN_USED", "CARD_TOKEN_EXPIRED", "INVALID_CARD":
		return true
	}
	return square.ErrorCategory(err) == "INVALID_REQUEST_ERROR"
}

func RefundPayment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	// Defense-in-depth: the route is mounted under mw.RequireAdmin, but this
	// in-handler check keeps refund access admin-only even if the route is ever
	// re-registered on a non-admin router (S-1).
	if !isAdminRequest(r) {
		http.Error(w, "Admin access required", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	paymentID := chi.URLParam(r, "payment_id")
	if paymentID == "" || !validators.IsValidID(paymentID) {
		http.Error(w, "Payment not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	adminID, ok := r.Context().Value(mw.UserIDKey).(string)
	if !ok || adminID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var req RefundRequest
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to decode refund request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// N4: Square's refund-reason limit is 192 chars — a longer reason 400s at
	// Square and would be misclassified as a definitive decline. Reject early.
	if len(req.Reason) > 192 {
		http.Error(w, "Refund reason must be 192 characters or less", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidateAmount(req.Amount); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidateRefundReason(req.Reason); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Client-supplied idempotency key feeds Square /v2/refunds (45-char cap).
	// This handler decodes into RefundRequest without running the struct
	// validator, so enforce the limit explicitly — a longer key would 400 at
	// Square and be misclassified as a definitive refund decline.
	if len(req.IdempotencyKey) > maxIdempotencyKeyLength {
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request: idempotency_key exceeds 45 characters", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	service := NewPaymentService()

	payment, err := service.GetPaymentByID(r.Context(), paymentID)
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
			http.Error(w, "Payment not found", http.StatusNotFound)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("Failed to get payment: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if payment.Status != "completed" {
		http.Error(w, "Can only refund completed payments", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// A discount/on_the_house payment row is a ledger entry, not real money
	// (the customer never paid it). Refunding it would pay money out of
	// nothing. The NULL-square_payment_id guard below would also catch it, but
	// an explicit check is defense-in-depth: if a discount row ever gains a
	// square_payment_id, this still blocks the refund.
	if payment.PaymentMethod == "discount" || payment.PaymentMethod == "on_the_house" {
		http.Error(w, "Cannot refund a discount or complimentary payment", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// A tip payment is gratuity, not booking money: every refund computation
	// excludes tip rows (GetBookingRefundableAmountPence, refunds.go, and the
	// AdminRefundBooking query at handlers.go:3597). Refunding a tip here would
	// pay the gratuity back while GetBookingRemainingBalancePence's refunded
	// total re-opens booking charge capacity (a tip refund counts as "returned
	// money") — a fully-paid booking would accept a second legitimate charge,
	// double-collecting the balance. Tips are deliberately not refundable via
	// this handler. Tip split rows share the charge's square_payment_id, so the
	// Square reference guard below cannot catch them — this explicit check must
	// run before it.
	if payment.PaymentType == "tip" {
		http.Error(w, "Cannot refund a tip payment", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Money-safety guard (M7): a payments row with NO booking is a gift-card
	// purchase (BuyGiftCard inserts without a booking — the same discriminator
	// the sweep uses in sweep.go). Refunding such a payment at Square returns
	// the cash while the issued gift card and its balance credit stay live:
	// £N paid out with the £N card still spendable = money created from
	// nothing. The reversal alternative (delete the card + debit the pooled
	// balance) is unsafe: a self-purchase is auto-redeemed into the account
	// balance which may already be partially spent, and gift_card_transactions
	// rows reference the card. Reject with a clear message directing the admin
	// to the gift-card section, BEFORE any Square call or pending-refund row
	// (this also blocks the dedup/resume paths below, which re-issue at
	// Square).
	if payment.BookingID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Cannot refund a gift-card purchase via payment refund. Refund gift-card purchases by cancelling the card in the gift-card section.", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if payment.SquarePaymentID == nil {
		http.Error(w, "Payment has no Square reference", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Idempotency key for the refund. When the client supplies one (a UUID
	// generated per distinct refund attempt and REUSED on retry), the key is
	// hashed and truncated: Square's idempotency-key limit is 45 chars, and
	// paymentID (12) + "-refund-" (8) + a full 36-char UUID (56 total) would
	// be rejected with a 400. The hash stays deterministic, so a same-key
	// retry still dedups.
	//
	// When the client sends NO key, the fallback must be UNIQUE per refund
	// attempt: the old amount-derived key (paymentID + "-refund-" + amount)
	// collided on two DISTINCT partial refunds of the same amount, and the
	// dedup lookup silently swallowed the second. The fallback appends a fresh
	// crypto/rand hex suffix so distinct same-amount refunds never collide;
	// a lost-response no-key retry still resumes via the (payment_id, amount)
	// pending fallback below. 6 random bytes (12 hex chars) keeps the full key
	// ≤45 chars even for a 9-digit pence amount.
	idempotencyKey := paymentID + "-refund-" + strconv.FormatInt(req.Amount, 10) + "-" + randomHexSuffix(6)
	if req.IdempotencyKey != "" {
		ikHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(req.IdempotencyKey))
		idempotencyKey = paymentID + "-refund-" + fmt.Sprintf("%x", ikHash)[:24]
	}

	// Serialize refund attempts per payment to prevent two concurrent refunds
	// both passing the over-refund guard and both charging Square. Mirrors the
	// tip/gift-card advisory-lock pattern. Bounded try-lock (R6) so a
	// contended lock never blocks the pool across the Square round-trip.
	refundLockKey := paymentID
	pinConn, err := db.Conn.Acquire(r.Context())
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to acquire connection for refund lock: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	defer pinConn.Release()
	lockOK, err := acquireAdvisoryLock(r.Context(), pinConn, "crussell:refund:"+refundLockKey)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to acquire refund serialization lock for %s: %v", paymentID, err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if !lockOK {
		log.Printf("Refund serialization lock for %s not acquired within bound — a refund is already in progress", paymentID)
		http.Error(w, "Refund in progress, try again", http.StatusConflict)
		return
	}
	defer releasePaymentLock(pinConn, "crussell:refund:"+refundLockKey)

	// Dedup/resume (inside the lock): a same-key retry of a completed or
	// in-flight (pending) refund must not create a second Square refund. Runs
	// BEFORE the over-refund guard so a resuming refund never evaluates its own
	// pending row against the guard.
	var existingRefundID sql.NullString
	var existingRefundStatus sql.NullString
	var existingRefundAmount sql.NullFloat64
	var existingRefundOrigin sql.NullString
	var existingRefundReason sql.NullString
	var existingRefundCreatedAt sql.NullTime
	var existingRefundKey sql.NullString
	err = db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
		SELECT id, status, amount, origin, reason, created_at, idempotency_key FROM refunds WHERE idempotency_key = $1
	`, idempotencyKey).Scan(&existingRefundID, &existingRefundStatus, &existingRefundAmount, &existingRefundOrigin, &existingRefundReason, &existingRefundCreatedAt, &existingRefundKey)
	switch {
	case err == nil && existingRefundStatus.String == "completed":
		// C4: same-key dedup must report the STORED refund, never the newly
		// requested amount — echoing req.Amount on a different-amount retry
		// misleads the admin into believing the new amount was refunded.
		createdAt := clock.Now()
		if existingRefundCreatedAt.Valid {
			createdAt = existingRefundCreatedAt.Time
		}
		if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(RefundResponse{
			ID:        existingRefundID.String,
			PaymentID: paymentID,
			Amount:    int64(math.Round(existingRefundAmount.Float64 * 100)),
			Status:    "completed",
			Reason:    existingRefundReason.String,
			CreatedAt: createdAt.Format(time.RFC3339),
		}); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
		}
		return
	case err == nil && existingRefundStatus.String == "pending":
		// Resume the in-flight refund: the DB row was committed but the Square
		// call never completed (network timeout, crash, etc.). Retry Square with
		// the row's OWN stored idempotency key so Square returns the original
		// refund if one exists, never a second one.
		resumeManualPendingRefund(w, r, paymentID, payment, existingRefundID.String, existingRefundAmount.Float64, existingRefundReason.String, existingRefundKey.String)
		return
	case err == nil && existingRefundStatus.String == "failed":
		// A failed row with origin='manual' may actually have moved money at
		// Square (response loss after a definitive decline). Reconcile FIRST —
		// an exact-amount COMPLETED refund resolves the row to completed.
		// Otherwise the reconcile proves money did NOT move, so re-issuing with
		// the stored key/amount is safe (Square dedups same-key retries).
		if existingRefundOrigin.String == "manual" {
			refundSqPaymentID := *payment.SquarePaymentID
			resumeAmount := int64(math.Round(existingRefundAmount.Float64 * 100))
			var reconcileTime time.Time
			if existingRefundCreatedAt.Valid {
				reconcileTime = existingRefundCreatedAt.Time
			}
			sqRefundID, rcErr := reconcileRefundAtSquare(r.Context(), refundSqPaymentID, resumeAmount, reconcileTime)
			switch {
			case rcErr != nil:
				// Reconcile failed — unknown whether Square refunded. Do NOT
				// re-issue on an unknown state: re-issuing would be safe
				// against Square's key dedup, but if money already moved the
				// over-refund guard would lose sight of it. Surface a retry.
				log.Printf("Failed to reconcile refund %s against Square before re-issue (%v) — not re-issuing, ask the admin to retry", existingRefundID.String, rcErr)
				http.Error(w, "Unable to verify refund status with Square, please retry", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
				return
			case sqRefundID != nil:
				if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'completed', square_refund_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`, *sqRefundID, existingRefundID.String); upErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to mark refund %s completed after Square reconcile: %v", existingRefundID.String, upErr)
				}
				if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(RefundResponse{
					ID:        existingRefundID.String,
					PaymentID: paymentID,
					Amount:    resumeAmount,
					Status:    "completed",
					Reason:    existingRefundReason.String,
					CreatedAt: existingRefundCreatedAt.Time.Format(time.RFC3339),
				}); err != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
				}
				return
			}
			// Persist a fallback key (legacy NULL-key rows) before re-issuing so
			// a lost-response retry reuses it — see ensureRefundKey.
			reissueKey, keyErr := ensureRefundKey(r.Context(), existingRefundID.String, paymentID, resumeAmount, existingRefundKey.String)
			if keyErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to ensure refund key for refund %s before re-issue: %v", existingRefundID.String, keyErr)
				http.Error(w, "Unable to verify refund status with Square, please retry", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
				return
			}
			reissueReq := square.RefundPaymentReq{
				PaymentID:      refundSqPaymentID,
				Amount:         resumeAmount,
				IdempotencyKey: reissueKey,
				Reason:         existingRefundReason.String,
			}
			reissueResult, reissueErr := SquareClient.RefundPayment(r.Context(), reissueReq)
			switch {
		case reissueErr == nil:
			// Resolve by Square's status: terminal COMPLETED resolves,
			// FAILED/REJECTED is definitive; non-terminal states (PENDING — sweep
			// reconciles — APPROVED, CANCELED, unknown) leave the refund pending.
			reissueStatus, reissueTerminal := SquareRefundStatusToLocal(reissueResult.Status)
			if reissueResult.Status == "APPROVED" {
				// Loop-B finding (MED-HIGH): APPROVED is NON-terminal — a later
				// FAILED/CANCELED must still be able to demote the row.
				reissueTerminal = false
			}
			if !reissueTerminal {
				if reissueResult.Status == "APPROVED" {
					if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET square_refund_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`, reissueResult.ID, existingRefundID.String); upErr != nil {
						log.Printf("Failed to record square refund id %s on pending refund %s: %v", reissueResult.ID, existingRefundID.String, upErr)
					}
				}
				log.Printf("Square reissue %s is non-terminal (%s) — leaving refund %s pending for the sweep", reissueResult.ID, reissueResult.Status, existingRefundID.String)
			} else if reissueStatus == "failed" {
				log.Printf("Square reissue %s FAILED — marking refund %s failed", reissueResult.ID, existingRefundID.String)
			}
				if reissueTerminal {
					if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(),
						`UPDATE refunds SET status = $1, square_refund_id = $2 WHERE id = $3`,
						reissueStatus, reissueResult.ID, existingRefundID.String,
					); upErr != nil {
						log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square refund committed (%s) but DB update for refund %s failed — manual reconciliation required: %v", reissueResult.ID, existingRefundID.String, upErr)
						http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
						return
					}
				} else {
					reissueStatus = "pending"
				}
				if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(RefundResponse{
					ID:        existingRefundID.String,
					PaymentID: paymentID,
					Amount:    resumeAmount,
					Status:    reissueStatus,
					Reason:    existingRefundReason.String,
					CreatedAt: clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
				}); err != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
				}
				return
			case errors.Is(reissueErr, square.ErrRefundAlreadyProcessed):
				if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'completed' WHERE id = $1`, existingRefundID.String); upErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to resolve refund %s completed after PAYMENT_ALREADY_REFUNDED: %v", existingRefundID.String, upErr)
				}
				if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(RefundResponse{
					ID:        existingRefundID.String,
					PaymentID: paymentID,
					Amount:    resumeAmount,
					Status:    "completed",
					Reason:    existingRefundReason.String,
					CreatedAt: clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
				}); err != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
				}
				return
			case errors.Is(reissueErr, square.ErrRefundDeclined):
				if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'failed' WHERE id = $1`, existingRefundID.String); upErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to mark refund %s failed after re-issue rejection: %v", existingRefundID.String, upErr)
				}
				log.Printf("Refund %s re-issued with stored key definitively declined by Square: %v", existingRefundID.String, reissueErr)
				http.Error(w, "Refund failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
				return
			default:
				// Ambiguous re-issue — put the row back to 'pending' so the
				// sweep's manual retry pass can re-attempt it.
				if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'pending' WHERE id = $1`, existingRefundID.String); upErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to mark refund %s pending after ambiguous re-issue: %v", existingRefundID.String, upErr)
				}
				log.Printf("Refund %s re-issue left pending (ambiguous): %v", existingRefundID.String, reissueErr)
				http.Error(w, "Refund failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
				return
			}
		}
		// Previously definitively rejected (non-manual) — a same-key retry cannot
		// succeed and the UNIQUE key would block re-insertion. Surface the
		// failure instead of 500-ing on a duplicate.
		log.Printf("Refund %s was previously marked failed — same-key retry rejected", existingRefundID.String)
		http.Error(w, "Refund failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	case err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows):
		log.Printf("Failed to check refund idempotency: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Pending-resume fallback: the exact-key lookup missed, but a pending
	// refund for this (payment, amount) may exist from a prior attempt whose
	// Square call failed ambiguously. If the admin reopened the refund modal,
	// the frontend generated a NEW idempotency key, so the exact-key dedup
	// above cannot find the row. A pending row means the prior attempt's money
	// state at Square is UNKNOWN — re-issuing with a fresh key would double-
	// refund once the sweep processes both pending rows. Resume the existing
	// pending row with ITS OWN stored key instead, never creating a second one
	// while money state is unknown. Distinct COMPLETED refunds of the same
	// amount (the P2 equal-partial case) are untouched — they are not pending.
	var pendingResumeID sql.NullString
	var pendingResumeAmount sql.NullFloat64
	var pendingResumeReason sql.NullString
	var pendingResumeKey sql.NullString
	err = db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
		SELECT id, amount, reason, idempotency_key FROM refunds
		WHERE payment_id = $1 AND amount = $2 AND status = 'pending'
		ORDER BY created_at LIMIT 1
	`, paymentID, float64(req.Amount)/100.0).Scan(&pendingResumeID, &pendingResumeAmount, &pendingResumeReason, &pendingResumeKey)
	if err == nil {
		log.Printf("Refund exact-key lookup missed but found pending row %s for payment %s amount %.2f — resuming with its stored key", pendingResumeID.String, paymentID, pendingResumeAmount.Float64)
		resumeManualPendingRefund(w, r, paymentID, payment, pendingResumeID.String, pendingResumeAmount.Float64, pendingResumeReason.String, pendingResumeKey.String)
		return
	}
	if !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
		log.Printf("Failed to check pending-refund fallback: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Different-amount pending guard: no pending row matches this amount, but a
	// pending refund for a DIFFERENT amount may still be in flight. Creating a
	// second pending row would let the sweep process both (e.g. pending £20,
	// retry £30 on a £50 payment → £50 moves when the admin intended £30). A
	// pending row means the payment's money state at Square is unknown, so any
	// new refund of any amount is unsafe until it resolves. Reject with 409 —
	// the same policy as the tip-flow amount-mismatch guard.
	var anyPendingID string
	err = db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
		SELECT id FROM refunds
		WHERE payment_id = $1 AND status = 'pending'
		LIMIT 1
	`, paymentID).Scan(&anyPendingID)
	if err == nil {
		log.Printf("Refund %s rejected: payment %s has an in-flight pending refund (row %s) for a different amount — refusing a second pending row", req.IdempotencyKey, paymentID, anyPendingID)
		http.Error(w, "A refund is already being processed for this payment — please wait for it to complete", http.StatusConflict)
		return
	}
	if !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
		log.Printf("Failed to check in-flight pending refund: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Over-refund guard (inside the lock so concurrent refunds can't both pass).
	// GetAlreadyRefundedAmount counts completed AND pending refunds.
	alreadyRefunded, err := service.GetAlreadyRefundedAmount(r.Context(), paymentID)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to get already refunded amount: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if req.Amount+alreadyRefunded > int64(math.Round(payment.Amount*100)) {
		http.Error(w, "Refund amount exceeds payment amount", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Begin a transaction. Insert the refund record as 'pending' first, commit,
	// then call Square — so a Square failure leaves a retryable pending refund
	// (reprocessed by the scheduler in refunds.go).
	tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction for refund: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	defer func() {
		if err := tx.Rollback(r.Context()); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
			slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
		}
	}()

	var refundID string
	// booking_id is NULL for non-booking payments (gift-card purchase refunds);
	// payments without a booking leave it NULL rather than inserting an empty
	// string that violates the refunds.booking_id FK/NOT NULL.
	var refundBookingID any = payment.BookingID
	if payment.BookingID == "" {
		refundBookingID = nil
	}
	err = tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
		INSERT INTO refunds (payment_id, booking_id, amount, status, reason, idempotency_key, created_by, created_at, origin)
		VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'pending', $4, $5, $6, $7, 'manual')
		RETURNING id
	`,
		paymentID,
		refundBookingID,
		float64(req.Amount)/100.0,
		req.Reason,
		idempotencyKey,
		adminID,
		clock.Now(),
	).Scan(&refundID)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to create pending refund record: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to commit refund transaction: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	refundReq := square.RefundPaymentReq{
		PaymentID:      *payment.SquarePaymentID,
		Amount:         req.Amount,
		IdempotencyKey: idempotencyKey,
		Reason:         req.Reason,
	}

	refundResult, err := SquareClient.RefundPayment(r.Context(), refundReq)
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, square.ErrRefundAlreadyProcessed) {
			// PAYMENT_ALREADY_REFUNDED — money already moved at Square. Resolve
			// to completed (square_refund_id stays NULL) rather than failed so
			// the over-refund guard can never issue money on top of it.
			if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'completed' WHERE id = $1`, refundID); upErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to resolve refund %s completed after PAYMENT_ALREADY_REFUNDED: %v", refundID, upErr)
			}
			log.Printf("Refund %s already processed at Square — marked completed", refundID)
			if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(RefundResponse{
				ID:        refundID,
				PaymentID: paymentID,
				Amount:    req.Amount,
				Status:    "completed",
				Reason:    req.Reason,
				CreatedAt: clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
			}); err != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
			}
			return
		}
		if errors.Is(err, square.ErrRefundDeclined) {
			// Definitive rejection (declined / already refunded / invalid
			// payment) — mark the refund failed so it never retries and never
			// blocks future refunds.
			if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'failed' WHERE id = $1`, refundID); upErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to mark refund %s failed after definitive rejection: %v", refundID, upErr)
			}
			log.Printf("Refund %s definitively declined by Square: %v", refundID, err)
			http.Error(w, "Refund failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		// Ambiguous error — refund record intentionally left as 'pending' for
		// the scheduler to re-attempt (refunds.go ProcessPendingSquareRefunds).
		log.Printf("Failed to refund payment (refund %s left pending): %v", refundID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Refund failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Square succeeded — resolve the refund row by Square's status. A
	// synchronous refund response can be PENDING (money in flight, e.g. an
	// async card network): marking it completed while Square later fails it
	// would permanently block that amount in the over-refund guard. Only a
	// terminal COMPLETED resolves to completed; non-terminal states
	// (PENDING — sweep reconciles — APPROVED, CANCELED, unknown) stay pending;
	// FAILED/REJECTED is a real failure.
	status, terminal := SquareRefundStatusToLocal(refundResult.Status)
	if refundResult.Status == "APPROVED" {
		// Loop-B finding (MED-HIGH): APPROVED is NON-terminal — a later
		// FAILED/CANCELED must still be able to demote the row.
		terminal = false
	}
	if !terminal {
		if refundResult.Status == "APPROVED" {
			if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET square_refund_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`, refundResult.ID, refundID); upErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to record square refund id %s on pending refund %s: %v", refundResult.ID, refundID, upErr)
			}
		}
		log.Printf("Square refund %s is non-terminal (%s) — leaving refund %s pending for the sweep to resolve", refundResult.ID, refundResult.Status, refundID)
	} else if status == "failed" {
		log.Printf("Square refund %s FAILED — marking refund %s failed", refundResult.ID, refundID)
	}

	if terminal {
		if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(),
			`UPDATE refunds SET status = $1, square_refund_id = $2 WHERE id = $3`,
			status, refundResult.ID, refundID,
		); upErr != nil {
			log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square refund committed (%s) but DB update for refund %s failed — manual reconciliation required: %v", refundResult.ID, refundID, upErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		// MEDIUM-3a coverage: a manual refund that completes synchronously at
		// Square (COMPLETED on the first attempt) records the SAME
		// admin_audit_log row the sweep's re-issue writes — reuse the shared
		// insertManualRefundAudit helper (refunds.go) so the row shape is
		// byte-identical: action 'admin_refund', admin actor, payment id, pence
		// amount and reason, best-effort own-tx non-fatal. Written AFTER the
		// row is marked completed so a later sweep pass (which only processes
		// still-pending rows) can never re-resolve this refund and duplicate
		// the audit row.
		insertManualRefundAudit(r.Context(), adminID, paymentID, req.Amount, req.Reason)
	} else {
		status = "pending"
	}

	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(RefundResponse{
		ID:        refundID,
		PaymentID: paymentID,
		Amount:    req.Amount,
		Status:    status,
		Reason:    req.Reason,
		CreatedAt: clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
	}); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

// resumeManualPendingRefund retries Square for a pending manual refund using
// the row's OWN stored idempotency key (never a fresh one), then resolves the
// row. Called from RefundPayment's exact-key dedup and the (payment, amount)
// pending fallback. Using the stored key lets Square return the original
// refund if the prior attempt actually completed (response loss), so no second
// refund can ever be issued for a row whose money state is unknown. A legacy
// NULL-key row gets a fallback key persisted to the row FIRST (ensureRefundKey),
// so a lost-response retry reuses it instead of double-refunding with a fresh
// random suffix.
func resumeManualPendingRefund(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, paymentID string, payment *PaymentRecord, refundID string, refundAmount float64, refundReason, refundKey string) {
	resumeAmount := int64(math.Round(refundAmount * 100))
	resumeKey, keyErr := ensureRefundKey(r.Context(), refundID, paymentID, resumeAmount, refundKey)
	if keyErr != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to ensure refund key for refund %s before resume: %v", refundID, keyErr)
		http.Error(w, "Unable to verify refund status with Square, please retry", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
		return
	}
	resumeReq := square.RefundPaymentReq{
		PaymentID:      *payment.SquarePaymentID,
		Amount:         resumeAmount,
		IdempotencyKey: resumeKey,
		Reason:         refundReason,
	}
	resumeResult, resumeErr := SquareClient.RefundPayment(r.Context(), resumeReq)
	if resumeErr != nil {
		if errors.Is(resumeErr, square.ErrRefundAlreadyProcessed) {
			// PAYMENT_ALREADY_REFUNDED — money already moved at Square.
			// Resolve the pending row to completed (square_refund_id stays
			// NULL) so the guard can never over-refund on top of it.
			if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'completed' WHERE id = $1`, refundID); upErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to resolve refund %s completed after PAYMENT_ALREADY_REFUNDED: %v", refundID, upErr)
			}
			log.Printf("Refund %s already processed at Square — marked completed", refundID)
			if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(RefundResponse{
				ID:        refundID,
				PaymentID: paymentID,
				Amount:    resumeAmount,
				Status:    "completed",
				Reason:    refundReason,
				CreatedAt: clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
			}); err != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
			}
			return
		}
		if errors.Is(resumeErr, square.ErrRefundDeclined) {
			// Definitive rejection — mark failed so it never retries and
			// never blocks future refunds.
			if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'failed' WHERE id = $1`, refundID); upErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to mark refund %s failed after definitive rejection: %v", refundID, upErr)
			}
			log.Printf("Refund %s definitively declined by Square: %v", refundID, resumeErr)
			http.Error(w, "Refund failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		// Ambiguous error — leave pending for the scheduler to retry.
		log.Printf("Failed to resume refund %s (left pending): %v", refundID, resumeErr)
		http.Error(w, "Refund failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	// Resolve by Square's status — a non-terminal resume (PENDING — money in
	// flight — APPROVED, CANCELED, unknown) stays pending for the sweep
	// (marking it completed while Square later fails it would block the amount
	// in the over-refund guard forever); FAILED/REJECTED is definitive.
	status, terminal := SquareRefundStatusToLocal(resumeResult.Status)
	if resumeResult.Status == "APPROVED" {
		// Loop-B finding (MED-HIGH): APPROVED is NON-terminal — a later
		// FAILED/CANCELED must still be able to demote the row.
		terminal = false
	}
	if !terminal {
		if resumeResult.Status == "APPROVED" {
			if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET square_refund_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`, resumeResult.ID, refundID); upErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to record square refund id %s on pending refund %s: %v", resumeResult.ID, refundID, upErr)
			}
		}
		log.Printf("Square refund %s is non-terminal (%s) — leaving refund %s pending for the sweep", resumeResult.ID, resumeResult.Status, refundID)
	} else if status == "failed" {
		log.Printf("Square refund %s FAILED — marking refund %s failed", resumeResult.ID, refundID)
	}

	if terminal {
		if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(),
			`UPDATE refunds SET status = $1, square_refund_id = $2 WHERE id = $3`,
			status, resumeResult.ID, refundID,
		); upErr != nil {
			log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square refund committed (%s) but DB update for refund %s failed — manual reconciliation required: %v", resumeResult.ID, refundID, upErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
	} else {
		status = "pending"
	}
	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(RefundResponse{
		ID:        refundID,
		PaymentID: paymentID,
		Amount:    resumeAmount,
		Status:    status,
		Reason:    refundReason,
		CreatedAt: clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
	}); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

// AdminBookingRefundRequest is the request body for
// POST /api/admin/bookings/{id}/refund.
type AdminBookingRefundRequest struct {
	Amount int64  `json:"amount" validate:"required,gt=0"`
	Reason string `json:"reason" validate:"required"`
}

// AdminBookingRefundResponse reports the result of an admin-initiated
// booking-level refund: the total amount refunded and one entry per affected
// payment.
type AdminBookingRefundResponse struct {
	RefundedAmount int64            `json:"refunded_amount"`
	Refunds        []RefundResponse `json:"refunds"`
}

// AdminRefundBooking is the admin-initiated booking-level refund endpoint
// (separate from cancellation refunds). It refunds up to req.Amount against
// the booking's completed non-tip payments, oldest first, after validating the
// amount against the booking's refundable total (paid minus already refunded,
// excluding tips). Used for post-service refunds (bad application, etc.) at
// admin discretion.
func AdminRefundBooking(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	// Defense-in-depth admin check (S-1) — the route is mounted under
	// mw.RequireAdmin; this keeps booking-level refunds admin-only regardless.
	if !isAdminRequest(r) {
		http.Error(w, "Admin access required", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}
	bookingID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
	if bookingID == "" || !validators.IsValidID(bookingID) {
		http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	adminID, ok := r.Context().Value(mw.UserIDKey).(string)
	if !ok || adminID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var req AdminBookingRefundRequest
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to decode admin booking refund request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if err := validators.Validate.Struct(&req); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	// Square's refund-reason limit is 192 chars (N4) — a longer reason 400s at
	// Square and would be misclassified as a definitive decline.
	if len(req.Reason) > 192 {
		http.Error(w, "Refund reason must be 192 characters or less", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if err := ValidateAmount(req.Amount); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	service := NewPaymentService()

	// Booking user lookup also proves the booking exists.
	var bookingUserID string
	var isGuest bool
	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
		SELECT b.user_id, COALESCE(u.account_role = 'guest', false)
		FROM bookings b
		LEFT JOIN users u ON b.user_id = u.id
		WHERE b.id = $1
	`, bookingID).Scan(&bookingUserID, &isGuest); err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
			http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("Failed to get booking user: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Cap: the refund amount must not exceed the refundable total (completed
	// non-tip payments minus already refunded). Tips are not refundable.
	refundablePence, err := service.GetBookingRefundableAmountPence(r.Context(), bookingID)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to get refundable amount for booking %s: %v", bookingID, err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if req.Amount > refundablePence {
		log.Printf("Admin refund rejected: amount %d exceeds refundable %d for booking %s", req.Amount, refundablePence, bookingID)
		http.Error(w, "Refund amount exceeds the refundable amount for this booking", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Fetch the booking's completed non-tip payments, oldest first, so the
	// requested amount is refunded against the earliest money first.
	rows, err := db.Conn.Query(r.Context(), `
		SELECT id, amount, payment_method, square_payment_id, gift_card_id
		FROM payments
		WHERE booking_id = $1 AND status = 'completed' AND payment_type <> 'tip'
		  AND payment_method NOT IN ('discount', 'on_the_house')
		ORDER BY created_at ASC
	`, bookingID)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to fetch payments for admin booking refund: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	var payments []paymentRow
	for rows.Next() {
		var p paymentRow
		if err := rows.Scan(&p.ID, &p.Amount, &p.PaymentMethod, &p.SquarePaymentID, &p.GiftCardID); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to scan payment row: %v", err)
			continue
		}
		payments = append(payments, p)
	}
	rows.Close()
	if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Payment row iteration error: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if len(payments) == 0 {
		http.Error(w, "No refundable payments found for this booking", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Serialize against the cancellation refund path and the per-payment manual
	// RefundPayment handler — both hold the same crussell:refund:<payment_id>
	// locks — so the residual computation below cannot race an in-flight refund.
	tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction for admin booking refund: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	defer func() {
		if err := tx.Rollback(r.Context()); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
			slog.Error("failed to rollback admin booking refund transaction", "err", err)
		}
	}()

	if err := lockCancellationPayments(r.Context(), tx, payments); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to acquire refund locks for booking %s: %v", bookingID, err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Prior refunds per payment (completed + pending) so a payment is never
	// refunded past its residual.
	priorRefunds := make(map[string]float64)
	prRows, prErr := tx.Query(r.Context(), `
		SELECT payment_id, COALESCE(SUM(amount), 0) FROM refunds
		WHERE booking_id = $1 AND status IN ('completed', 'pending')
		GROUP BY payment_id`, bookingID)
	if prErr != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to query prior refunds for booking %s: %v", bookingID, prErr)
	} else {
		for prRows.Next() {
			var pid string
			var amt float64
			if err := prRows.Scan(&pid, &amt); err == nil {
				priorRefunds[pid] = amt
			}
		}
		prRows.Close()
	}

	// cardRefunds tracks card refunds that need a post-commit Square call.
	type cardRefund struct {
		refundID    string
		amountPence int64
		squareID    string
		reason      string
		key         string
	}
	var cardRefunds []cardRefund
	var refunds []RefundResponse
	remaining := float64(req.Amount) / 100.0

	for _, p := range payments {
		if remaining <= 0 {
			break
		}
		already := priorRefunds[p.ID]
		residual := math.Round((p.Amount-already)*100) / 100
		if residual <= 0 {
			continue
		}
		portion := math.Round(math.Min(residual, remaining)*100) / 100
		remaining -= portion

		var refundStatus string
		var refundKey *string

		switch p.PaymentMethod {
		case "online_square", "in_person_card":
			if p.SquarePaymentID == nil || *p.SquarePaymentID == "" {
				log.Printf("Admin booking refund: card payment %s has no Square reference — marking failed; refund must be arranged manually", p.ID)
				refundStatus = "failed"
				break
			}
			// Unique per-attempt key (same shape as RefundPayment's no-client-key
			// fallback): distinct refunds never collide on the UNIQUE constraint.
			key := p.ID + "-refund-" + strconv.FormatInt(int64(math.Round(portion*100)), 10) + "-" + randomHexSuffix(6)
			refundKey = &key
			refundStatus = "pending"
		case "giftcard":
			if p.GiftCardID != nil && *p.GiftCardID != "" {
				var expired bool
				if err := tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
					SELECT expiry_date IS NOT NULL AND expiry_date < NOW()
					FROM gift_cards WHERE id = $1
				`, *p.GiftCardID).Scan(&expired); err != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to check gift card %s expiry: %v — proceeding with refund", *p.GiftCardID, err)
				} else if expired {
					log.Printf("Gift card %s has expired — money retained by salon, no refund due for booking %s", *p.GiftCardID, bookingID)
					continue
				}
				gcExpiryMonths, expiryErr := GetGiftCardExpiryMonths(r.Context(), tx)
				if expiryErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to query gift card expiry months (using default %d): %v", defaultGiftCardExpiryMonths, expiryErr)
					gcExpiryMonths = defaultGiftCardExpiryMonths
				}
				if _, gcErr := tx.Exec(r.Context(), `
					UPDATE gift_cards SET amount_remaining = amount_remaining + $1, last_used_at = NOW(), expiry_date = NOW() + ($3 * INTERVAL '1 month')
					WHERE id = $2
				`, portion, *p.GiftCardID, gcExpiryMonths); gcErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to refund £%.2f to gift card %s: %v", portion, *p.GiftCardID, gcErr)
					continue
				}
				if _, gcErr := tx.Exec(r.Context(), `
					INSERT INTO gift_card_transactions (gift_card_id, transaction_type, amount, reference_type, reference_id, user_id, notes)
					VALUES ($1, 'refund', $2, 'booking', $3, $4, $5)
				`, *p.GiftCardID, portion, bookingID, bookingUserID, "Refund from admin booking refund"); gcErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to create gift card transaction for refund: %v", gcErr)
				}
			} else {
				if bookingUserID == "" {
					log.Printf("Giftcard payment %s has no gift_card_id and no booking user — cannot refund. Skipping.", p.ID)
					continue
				}
				if _, balErr := tx.Exec(r.Context(), `
					INSERT INTO user_giftcard_balances (user_id, balance, updated_at)
					VALUES ($1, $2, NOW())
					ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO UPDATE SET
						balance = user_giftcard_balances.balance + EXCLUDED.balance,
						updated_at = NOW()
				`, bookingUserID, portion); balErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to credit user %s gift-card balance for refund of booking %s: %v", bookingUserID, bookingID, balErr)
					continue
				}
			}
			refundStatus = "completed"
		case "cash":
			if bookingUserID == "" || isGuest {
				log.Printf("Cash refund: booking %s payment %s amount £%.2f — admin must process cash refund at till", bookingID, p.ID, portion)
			} else {
				if _, balErr := tx.Exec(r.Context(), `
					INSERT INTO user_giftcard_balances (user_id, balance, updated_at)
					VALUES ($1, $2, NOW())
					ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO UPDATE SET
						balance = user_giftcard_balances.balance + EXCLUDED.balance,
						updated_at = NOW()
				`, bookingUserID, portion); balErr != nil {
					log.Printf("Failed to credit user %s balance for cash refund of booking %s: %v", bookingUserID, bookingID, balErr)
					continue
				}
			}
			refundStatus = "completed"
		default:
			log.Printf("Skipping admin booking refund for payment %s with method %q (no money exchanged)", p.ID, p.PaymentMethod)
			continue
		}

		var refundID string
		if refundKey != nil {
			err = tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
				INSERT INTO refunds (payment_id, booking_id, amount, status, reason, idempotency_key, created_by, created_at, origin)
				VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, 'manual')
				RETURNING id
			`, p.ID, bookingID, portion, refundStatus, req.Reason, refundKey, adminID, clock.Now()).Scan(&refundID)
		} else {
			err = tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
				INSERT INTO refunds (payment_id, booking_id, amount, status, reason, created_by, created_at, origin)
				VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, 'manual')
				RETURNING id
			`, p.ID, bookingID, portion, refundStatus, req.Reason, adminID, clock.Now()).Scan(&refundID)
		}
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to create refund record for payment %s: %v", p.ID, err)
			continue
		}

		refunds = append(refunds, RefundResponse{
			ID:        refundID,
			PaymentID: p.ID,
			Amount:    int64(math.Round(portion * 100)),
			Status:    refundStatus,
			Reason:    req.Reason,
			CreatedAt: clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
		})

		if p.PaymentMethod == "online_square" || p.PaymentMethod == "in_person_card" {
			if refundKey != nil && p.SquarePaymentID != nil {
				cardRefunds = append(cardRefunds, cardRefund{
					refundID:    refundID,
					amountPence: int64(math.Round(portion * 100)),
					squareID:    *p.SquarePaymentID,
					reason:      req.Reason,
					key:         *refundKey,
				})
			}
		}
	}

	if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to commit admin booking refund transaction: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Post-commit Square pass for card refunds (mirrors RefundPayment's
	// status resolution). A definitive decline marks the row failed; an
	// ambiguous error leaves it pending for the manual-refund sweep.
	for _, cf := range cardRefunds {
		status := "completed"
		result, rErr := SquareClient.RefundPayment(r.Context(), square.RefundPaymentReq{
			PaymentID:      cf.squareID,
			Amount:         cf.amountPence,
			IdempotencyKey: cf.key,
			Reason:         cf.reason,
		})
		switch {
		case rErr == nil:
			sqStatus, terminal := SquareRefundStatusToLocal(result.Status)
			if result.Status == "APPROVED" {
				// Loop-B finding (MED-HIGH): APPROVED is NON-terminal — a later
				// FAILED/CANCELED must still be able to demote the row.
				terminal = false
			}
			if !terminal {
				if result.Status == "APPROVED" {
					if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET square_refund_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`, result.ID, cf.refundID); upErr != nil {
						log.Printf("Failed to record square refund id %s on pending refund %s: %v", result.ID, cf.refundID, upErr)
					}
				}
				log.Printf("Square refund %s is non-terminal (%s) — leaving refund %s pending for the sweep", result.ID, result.Status, cf.refundID)
			} else if sqStatus == "failed" {
				log.Printf("Square refund %s FAILED — marking refund %s failed", result.ID, cf.refundID)
			}
			if terminal {
				if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET status = $1, square_refund_id = $2 WHERE id = $3`, sqStatus, result.ID, cf.refundID); upErr != nil {
					log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square refund committed (%s) but DB update for refund %s failed — manual reconciliation required: %v", result.ID, cf.refundID, upErr)
				}
			} else {
				sqStatus = "pending"
			}
			status = sqStatus
		case errors.Is(rErr, square.ErrRefundAlreadyProcessed):
			if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'completed' WHERE id = $1`, cf.refundID); upErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to resolve refund %s completed after PAYMENT_ALREADY_REFUNDED: %v", cf.refundID, upErr)
			}
			log.Printf("Refund %s already processed at Square — marked completed", cf.refundID)
		case errors.Is(rErr, square.ErrRefundDeclined):
			if _, upErr := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'failed' WHERE id = $1`, cf.refundID); upErr != nil {
				log.Printf("Failed to mark refund %s failed after definitive rejection: %v", cf.refundID, upErr)
			}
			log.Printf("Refund %s definitively declined by Square: %v", cf.refundID, rErr)
		default:
			log.Printf("Failed to refund payment (refund %s left pending): %v", cf.refundID, rErr)
		}
		for i := range refunds {
			if refunds[i].ID == cf.refundID {
				refunds[i].Status = status
			}
		}
	}

	var totalRefunded int64
	for _, rf := range refunds {
		totalRefunded += rf.Amount
	}

	// MEDIUM-3a coverage: record the admin booking refund in admin_audit_log
	// (best-effort, own transaction — a failed audit write can never undo the
	// refund). One row per action, not per payment, so the operator sees the
	// admin decision that moved money.
	InsertAdminAuditCharge(r.Context(), adminID, bookingUserID, "admin_booking_refund", map[string]any{
		"booking_id":        bookingID,
		"amount":            float64(req.Amount) / 100.0,
		"reason":            req.Reason,
		"refund_count":      len(refunds),
		"refunded_payments": len(cardRefunds),
	})

	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(AdminBookingRefundResponse{
		RefundedAmount: totalRefunded,
		Refunds:        refunds,
	}); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

func CreateTipPayment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	bookingID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
	if bookingID == "" || !validators.IsValidID(bookingID) {
		http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	userID, ok := r.Context().Value(mw.UserIDKey).(string)
	if !ok || userID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var req CreateTipPaymentRequest
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to decode tip payment request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := validators.Validate.Struct(&req); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Product rule (security): only verified accounts may save cards. An
	// unverified/guest/affiliate user may still tip, but save_card=true is
	// rejected here — before any charge source resolution or payment record.
	if rejectSaveCardForUnverified(w, r, req.SaveCard) {
		return
	}

	service := NewPaymentService()

	// 2FA gating (C5): persisting a card requires 2FA when the feature is enforced.
	// consume=true: saving a card is a terminal operation (the card row is
	// created right here), so the verified code is single-use immediately —
	// unlike the saved-card CHARGE gate below, which defers consumption to the
	// charge's terminal success (MEDIUM-2). SCA-primary (auth-F1): the SAVE
	// surface never forwards the client's verification_token to Square (the
	// card is persisted via CreateCardOnFile, which takes no token), so a
	// non-empty token is client-asserted and must NOT skip the gate — a
	// token-less save falls back to 2FA and twoFAFallbackUsed is set for the
	// charge-success audit.
	twoFAFallbackUsed := false
	tipVerificationToken := ""
	if req.VerificationToken != nil {
		tipVerificationToken = *req.VerificationToken
	}
	if req.SaveCard {
		var gateOK bool
		gateOK, twoFAFallbackUsed = requireTwoFactorForCardAccessWithTokenValidation(w, r, service, userID, req.VerificationCode, tipVerificationToken, true, false)
		if !gateOK {
			return
		}
		// C6: a fallback-authorized save/charge must carry the customer's
		// accepted consent (403 consent_required otherwise).
		if !enforceSCAFallbackConsent(w, req.ConsentVersion, req.ConsentAccepted, twoFAFallbackUsed) {
			return
		}
	}

	if err := ValidateAmount(req.Amount); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidateCardInfo(req.CardID, req.NewCardToken); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := ValidateVerificationToken(req.VerificationToken); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to process request: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	bookingUserID, err := service.GetBookingUserID(r.Context(), bookingID)
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
			http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("Failed to get booking user: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if bookingUserID != userID {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}

	// Tips are only accepted on active bookings. A cancelled, lapsed, or
	// no-show booking must not accept tips — money would land on a booking
	// that can no longer pay out the service. Checked early, before any card
	// resolution or Square call.
	bookingStatus, err := service.GetBookingStatus(r.Context(), bookingID)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to get booking status: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if !bookingStatusAllowsCompletedPayment(bookingStatus) {
		log.Printf("Tip rejected: booking %s is in status %q (no longer accepting tips)", bookingID, bookingStatus)
		http.Error(w, "This booking is no longer accepting tips", http.StatusConflict)
		return
	}

	// M4: tips are only accepted once the booking has started. A tip is
	// gratuity for service already rendered; accepting it on a 'confirmed'
	// booking whose appointment is still in the future would collect money for
	// a service not yet performed and inflate the total_tips aggregation.
	// Checked against the booking start time (not status) so an early-arriving
	// booking still cannot tip until its slot opens.
	var bookingStartTime time.Time
	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT start_time FROM bookings WHERE id = $1`, bookingID).Scan(&bookingStartTime); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to get booking start time: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if bookingStartTime.After(clock.Now()) {
		log.Printf("Tip rejected: booking %s starts at %s (not yet started)", bookingID, bookingStartTime.Format(time.RFC3339))
		http.Error(w, "Tips can only be added after the booking has started", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	hasCompleted, err := service.HasCompletedPayment(r.Context(), bookingID)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to check for completed payments: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if !hasCompleted {
		http.Error(w, "Booking must have a completed payment before adding tip", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	// Idempotency key: prefer the client-supplied UUID (one per attempt, so
	// two legitimate identical tips on the same booking don't collapse into
	// one). When the client sends NO key, a DETERMINISTIC fallback is derived
	// inside the transaction below (the count query must see the committed
	// rows) — never a random key: a random fallback meant a lost-response
	// no-key retry minted a fresh key, a fresh pending row, and a SECOND
	// Square charge (H2).
	idempotencyKey := req.IdempotencyKey

	// Resolve the card source ID — same pattern as CreateBookingPayment (see
	// resolveChargeSource for the R6 rationale).
	var sourceID string
	var savedCardID *string
	var savedCardCustomerID string
	sourceID, savedCardID, savedCardCustomerID, sourceOK := resolveChargeSource(r.Context(), w, service, userID, req.NewCardToken, req.CardID, req.SaveCard, "Card not found")
	if !sourceOK {
		return
	}

	// Serialize tip attempts for this booking to prevent concurrent duplicate
	// tip payments across browser tabs or retries. Uses a PostgreSQL session-level
	// advisory lock scoped to the booking ID.
	// Bounded try-lock (R6) so a contended lock never blocks the pool across
	// the Square round-trip.
	pinConn, lockOK := acquireBookingPaymentLock(r.Context(), w, "crussell:tip:"+bookingID, "Payment in progress, try again")
	if !lockOK {
		return
	}
	defer releaseBookingPaymentLock(pinConn, "crussell:tip:"+bookingID)

	// Step 1: Insert payment record in 'pending' state inside a DB transaction.
	// Square is NOT called yet — if the tx fails, no harm done.
	tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	defer func() {
		if err := tx.Rollback(r.Context()); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
			slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
		}
	}()

	// No-client-key fallback: derive a deterministic key INSIDE the tx so the
	// count query races no other tip attempt (the tip advisory lock serializes
	// per booking). Money-safety: n counts COMPLETED tips only, so a
	// lost-response retry of a charge whose pending row exists derives the SAME
	// n → the same key → the dedup lookup below reuses the pending row instead
	// of minting a second Square charge, while two genuinely distinct identical
	// tips get n=1, n=2 and never collapse onto one key.
	if idempotencyKey == "" {
		var completedTips int
		if err := tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
			SELECT COUNT(*) FROM payments
			WHERE booking_id = $1 AND payment_type = 'tip' AND status = 'completed'
		`, bookingID).Scan(&completedTips); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to count completed tips for booking %s: %v", bookingID, err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		cardPart := "new"
		if req.CardID != nil && *req.CardID != "" {
			cardPart = *req.CardID
		}
		idempotencyKey = truncateIdempotencyKey("tip", fmt.Sprintf("tip-%s-%d-%s-%d", bookingID, req.Amount, cardPart, completedTips+1))
	}

	// Check idempotency inside the transaction.
	// Only short-circuit when the existing record is 'completed'. A 'pending'
	// record means the previous Square call failed — returning it as 200 would
	// show a success toast without ever charging. Re-attempt the charge below
	// with the same idempotency key (Square dedups safely) and reuse the
	// existing record.
	var existingID sql.NullString
	var existingBookingID sql.NullString
	var existingPaymentType sql.NullString
	var existingStatus sql.NullString
	var existingAmount sql.NullFloat64
	var existingCreatedAt sql.NullTime

	err = tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
		SELECT id, booking_id, payment_type, status, amount, created_at
		FROM payments
		WHERE booking_id = $1 AND idempotency_key = $2
	`, bookingID, idempotencyKey).Scan(&existingID, &existingBookingID, &existingPaymentType, &existingStatus, &existingAmount, &existingCreatedAt)

	paymentID := ""
	reusePendingRecord := false
	switch {
	case err == nil && existingStatus.String == "completed":
		// Idempotent dedup — return the already-completed payment. First
		// RE-VALIDATE the matched row's refund state (same guard as the
		// CreateBookingPayment completed-dedup branches): a refunded payment's
		// money is no longer live, so reporting it as success would let a
		// same-key retry claim money that was already returned.
		if refunded, rErr := paymentHasLiveRefund(r.Context(), tx, existingID.String); rErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to re-validate tip dedup hit %s against refunds: %v", existingID.String, rErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		} else if refunded {
			log.Printf("Tip retry rejected: tip payment %s (key %q) was refunded — refusing to report a refunded payment as success", existingID.String, idempotencyKey)
			http.Error(w, "This payment has been refunded and can no longer be replayed", http.StatusConflict)
			return
		}
		if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PaymentResponse{
			ID:          existingID.String,
			BookingID:   existingBookingID.String,
			PaymentType: existingPaymentType.String,
			Status:      existingStatus.String,
			Amount:      int64(math.Round(existingAmount.Float64 * 100)),
			CreatedAt:   existingCreatedAt.Time.Format(time.RFC3339),
		}); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
		}
		return
	case err == nil && existingStatus.String == "pending":
		// Previous Square call failed — reuse the pending record and re-attempt.
		// Guard the amount: a retry with a different amount must not mutate the
		// original record (books, VAT, refund caps) or silently charge the new
		// amount against the old record. Compare in pence via math.Round — the
		// stored pounds value is float64, so int64(pounds*100) truncation would
		// reject legitimate same-amount retries for non-exact values (e.g. £1.14
		// stored as 1.1399999999999999 → int64 gives 113 ≠ 114).
		if int64(math.Round(existingAmount.Float64*100)) != req.Amount {
			log.Printf("Tip retry amount mismatch: pending record %s has %d pence, request has %d pence", existingID.String, int64(math.Round(existingAmount.Float64*100)), req.Amount)
			http.Error(w, "Amount does not match the pending tip payment", http.StatusBadRequest)
			return
		}
		paymentID = existingID.String
		reusePendingRecord = true
	case err == nil && existingStatus.String == "failed":
		// Swept as stale (>24h, past Square's key retention) or definitively
		// rejected. A retry can no longer be replayed against Square without
		// risking a second charge — reject cleanly instead of inserting a new
		// pending row that 500s on the idempotency_key UNIQUE constraint (R2).
		log.Printf("Tip retry rejected: pending record %s was marked failed", existingID.String)
		http.Error(w, "This tip payment previously failed and can no longer be retried", http.StatusConflict)
		return
	case err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows):
		log.Printf("Failed to check tip idempotency: %v", err)
	}

	// 2FA gating (C5): charging a SAVED card requires 2FA when the feature is
	// enforced. New-card (nonce) charges are not gated. This runs AFTER the
	// idempotency dedup's completed short-circuit (Loop B MEDIUM): a same-key
	// lost-response retry returns the already-completed payment above without
	// re-entering the gate, so its single-use code (already consumed by the
	// original attempt) is never re-rejected as "expired". consume=!reusePendingRecord
	// (finding 4): a FRESH charge verifies WITH consumption — the code is
	// single-use at the gate, closing the TOCTOU where a verified-but-
	// unconsumed code could authorize a second charge — and a pending-reuse
	// retry verifies WITHOUT consuming, so a retry that fails again keeps its
	// code for one more attempt (the completed-charge transaction consumes it
	// on terminal success). A charge carrying a Square verification_token (SCA
	// performed) skips the gate; a token-less charge falls back to 2FA and
	// twoFAFallbackUsed is set for the charge-success audit.
	if req.CardID != nil && *req.CardID != "" {
		var gateOK bool
		gateOK, twoFAFallbackUsed = requireTwoFactorForCardAccess(w, r, service, userID, req.VerificationCode, tipVerificationToken, !reusePendingRecord)
		if !gateOK {
			return
		}
		// C6: a fallback-authorized charge must carry the customer's accepted
		// consent (403 consent_required otherwise).
		if !enforceSCAFallbackConsent(w, req.ConsentVersion, req.ConsentAccepted, twoFAFallbackUsed) {
			return
		}
	}

	if !reusePendingRecord {
		record := PaymentRecord{
			BookingID:       bookingID,
			PaymentType:     "tip",
			PaymentMethod:   "online_square",
			Status:          "pending",
			Amount:          float64(req.Amount) / 100.0,
			IdempotencyKey:  &idempotencyKey,
			Fees:            0,
			UserSavedCardID: savedCardID,
			SquareSourceID:  &sourceID,
			CreatedAt:       clock.Now(),
			UpdatedAt:       clock.Now(),
			CreatedBy:       &userID,
		}

		paymentID, err = service.CreatePaymentRecordTx(r.Context(), tx, record, nil)
		if err != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to create payment record: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		ApplyVATToBookingPayment(r.Context(), tx, paymentID)
	} else {
		// Reused pending row. The stored square_request_snapshot is the FIRST
		// attempt's charge body and MUST remain immutable across nonce-changing
		// retries: if that original charge actually landed at Square (the row
		// is pending only because the post-charge outcome is unknown), the
		// by-key sweep replay must match the original body so Square's
		// idempotency dedup returns the landed payment and the sweep rescues
		// the row. Overwriting the snapshot's SourceID with this retry's fresh
		// nonce — or refreshing the square_source_id column the sweep overrides
		// the replay source with — would make the sweep replay the NEW source,
		// Square would return IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED, and the landed charge
		// would never be rescued (stranded until the 24h blind-fail). A retry
		// that changed nonce gets IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED at charge time; the
		// sweep's replay/manual-reconcile path (sweep.go:573-584) resolves the
		// row's true state from the immutable first-attempt body instead. The
		// column is refreshed ONLY for snapshot-less legacy rows, whose
		// fallback replay body is rebuilt from it (and which get a fresh
		// snapshot from the post-commit write below).
		if _, srcErr := tx.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE payments SET square_source_id = $1 WHERE id = $2 AND (square_request_snapshot IS NULL OR square_request_snapshot = '')`, sourceID, paymentID); srcErr != nil {
			log.Printf("Failed to update square_source_id on reused tip payment %s: %v", paymentID, srcErr)
		}
	}

	// Always commit the transaction. In the reuse path no rows were written,
	// but the commit is required in the test harness: there the context carries
	// an outer test tx, so Begin creates a nested savepoint whose deferred
	// rollback would otherwise undo the status UPDATE executed later on the
	// same connection. In production Begin is a plain tx and this commit is a
	// harmless no-op that keeps both paths identical.
	if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// Step 2: DB transaction committed — safe to call Square now.
	// If Square fails, the record stays 'pending' for manual retry.

	// Resolve the user's email for Square receipt delivery.
	var buyerEmail string
	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT email FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&buyerEmail); err != nil {
		log.Printf("[SQUARE-PROD] Failed to resolve buyer email for user %s: %v (Square receipts will not be emailed)", userID, err)
	}

	paymentReq := square.CreatePaymentReq{
		Amount:            req.Amount,
		Currency:          "GBP",
		SourceID:          sourceID,
		CustomerID:        savedCardCustomerID,
		IdempotencyKey:    idempotencyKey,
		ReferenceID:       bookingID,
		Note:              "tip",
		BuyerEmail:        buyerEmail,
		VerificationToken: tipVerificationToken,
		// C3: the tip charge is cardholder-initiated whether it uses a saved
		// card (ccof — customer_details required) or a freshly entered card
		// (cnon — buyer present), so the flag is true either way.
		CustomerDetails: &square.CreateCustomerDetails{CustomerInitiated: true},
	}

	// M1: store the verbatim request JSON so the sweep can replay the charge
	// with an IDENTICAL body under the same key — Square compares the whole
	// request on key reuse, and a reconstructed body returns
	// IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED, leaving the row pending forever. The snapshot is
	// written ONLY when the row has none: it records the FIRST attempt's body,
	// which stays immutable so a nonce-changing retry can never redirect the
	// sweep's replay away from the original charge (see the reuse branch above).
	writeChargeSnapshot(r.Context(), db.Conn, "payments", paymentID, paymentReq, "tip payment")

	paymentResult, err := SquareClient.CreatePayment(r.Context(), paymentReq)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to create tip payment: %v (error_code=%q)", err, square.ErrorCode(err))
		// Payment record intentionally left as 'pending' for manual retry.
		// The gate consumed the 2FA code for a fresh saved-card charge —
		// re-issue so the same-key retry has a live code to verify (mirrors
		// CreateBookingPayment's post-failure re-issue, finding 4). A NEW-CARD
		// (cnon) charge never gated and involves no code — re-issuing would
		// overwrite a standing pending code with an undelivered one (finding
		// 5). A NEW-CARD charge with save_card=true DID gate (the SAVE gate
		// consumed the code), so the code is re-issued there too (finding:
		// save-gate burned code never re-issued). A pending-reuse retry verified
		// WITHOUT consuming, so its code is still live and no re-issue runs.
		if (req.CardID != nil && *req.CardID != "") || req.SaveCard {
			reissueTwoFACodeAfterFailedCharge(r.Context(), db.Conn, userID, true, twoFAFallbackUsed && !reusePendingRecord, r)
		}
		// SCA-required failures must surface the structured verification_required
		// body so the frontend triggers the 3DS challenge, not a plain decline.
		if isVerificationRequiredError(err) {
			writeVerificationRequiredResponse(w)
			return
		}
		http.Error(w, "Payment failed", chargeFailureStatus(err))
		return
	}

	// Step 3a: post-charge recheck (R9). A concurrent cancellation/eviction
	// can move the booking out of a payable state between the pre-charge
	// status check and the Square charge completing. A tip landing on a
	// cancelled/lapsed booking must NOT be recorded as completed — the
	// cancellation refund path computes refunds from completed payments and
	// would silently exclude it. Mark the tip row failed and alert ops: money
	// was taken at Square and MUST be refunded manually (mirrors
	// CreateBookingPayment's post-charge recheck).
	//
	// The recheck and the status write run in ONE transaction so the
	// FOR UPDATE row lock taken inside recheckBookingPayable persists to
	// commit (C5) — a concurrent cancellation cannot commit a cancelled
	// status between the recheck and the payments UPDATE.
	recheckTx, reTxErr := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
	if reTxErr != nil {
		log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square tip payment %s (ID=%s) was processed but opening the post-charge recheck transaction failed: %v — manual reconciliation required",
			paymentResult.Status, paymentResult.SquarePayID, reTxErr)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	defer func() {
		if err := recheckTx.Rollback(r.Context()); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
			slog.Error("failed to rollback post-charge recheck transaction", "err", err)
		}
	}()

	payable, err := postChargeRecheck(r.Context(), w, recheckTx, bookingID, paymentID, paymentResult.Status, paymentResult.SquarePayID, "tip", "This booking is no longer accepting tips")
	if err != nil || !payable {
		return
	}

	// Step 3: Square succeeded — update the payment record.
	if _, upErr := recheckTx.Exec(r.Context(),
		`UPDATE payments SET status = 'completed', square_payment_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`,
		paymentResult.SquarePayID, paymentID,
	); upErr != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to update payment %s after Square success: %v (square_payment_id=%s)", paymentID, upErr, paymentResult.SquarePayID)
		// Square charge succeeded but status update failed.
		// Record stays 'pending' for manual reconciliation.
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	// MEDIUM-2 / finding 1: a saved-card tip charge reached its terminal
	// SUCCESS state. For a FRESH charge the gate already consumed the code
	// (single-use at verify time); for a PENDING-REUSE retry (gate passed
	// consume=false) this is where its code is burned, inside the transaction
	// that records the completed charge.
	if req.CardID != nil && *req.CardID != "" && reusePendingRecord {
		if consErr := twofa.ConsumePendingCode(r.Context(), recheckTx, userID); consErr != nil {
			log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square tip payment %s (ID=%s) was processed but consuming the 2FA code for user %s failed: %v — manual reconciliation required",
				paymentResult.Status, paymentResult.SquarePayID, userID, consErr)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
	}
	if cErr := recheckTx.Commit(r.Context()); cErr != nil {
		log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square tip payment %s (ID=%s) succeeded but committing the post-charge status update for payment %s failed: %v — manual reconciliation required",
			paymentResult.Status, paymentResult.SquarePayID, paymentID, cErr)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// The 2FA BACKUP authorized this token-less saved-card tip charge (SCA was
	// unavailable) — record the strict fallback audit row. The actor is the
	// customer's own userID (customer-initiated online charge).
	if twoFAFallbackUsed {
		insertTwoFAFallbackAudit(r.Context(), userID, userID, paymentResult.CardLast4, bookingID, "saved-card tip charge authorized via 2FA fallback (SCA unavailable)", consentVersionValue(req.ConsentVersion), req.ConsentAccepted)
	}

	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PaymentResponse{
		ID:          paymentID,
		BookingID:   bookingID,
		PaymentType: "tip",
		Status:      "completed",
		Amount:      req.Amount,
		CardBrand:   paymentResult.CardBrand,
		CardLast4:   paymentResult.CardLast4,
		ReceiptURL:  paymentResult.ReceiptURL,
		CreatedAt:   clock.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
	}); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

func GetBookingPaymentSummary(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	bookingID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
	if bookingID == "" || !validators.IsValidID(bookingID) {
		http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	userID, _ := r.Context().Value(mw.UserIDKey).(string)
	userRole, _ := r.Context().Value(mw.UserRoleKey).(string)

	service := NewPaymentService()

	// Fail closed: a non-admin request must carry a user ID. The previous
	// `userID != ""` guard silently skipped the ownership check for requests
	// with no user context, leaking another user's payment summary.
	if userRole != "admin" {
		if userID == "" {
			http.Error(w, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
			return
		}
		bookingUserID, err := service.GetBookingUserID(r.Context(), bookingID)
		if err != nil {
			if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
				http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
				return
			}
			log.Printf("Failed to get booking user: %v", err)
			http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}

		if bookingUserID != userID {
			http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusForbidden)
			return
		}
	}

	summary, err := service.GetBookingPaymentSummary(r.Context(), bookingID)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to get payment summary: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	payments := make([]PaymentResponse, len(summary.Payments))
	for i, p := range summary.Payments {
		payments[i] = PaymentResponse{
			ID:          p.ID,
			BookingID:   p.BookingID,
			PaymentType: p.PaymentType,
			Status:      p.Status,
			Amount:      int64(math.Round(p.Amount * 100)),
			CardLast4:   p.CardLast4,
			CreatedAt:   p.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339),
		}
	}

	refunds := make([]RefundResponse, len(summary.Refunds))
	for i, rf := range summary.Refunds {
		refunds[i] = RefundResponse{
			ID:        rf.ID,
			PaymentID: rf.PaymentID,
			Amount:    int64(math.Round(rf.Amount * 100)),
			Status:    rf.Status,
			Reason:    rf.Reason,
			CreatedAt: rf.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339),
		}
	}

	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(PaymentSummaryResponse{
		TotalAmount:     int64(math.Round(summary.TotalAmount * 100)),
		PaidAmount:      int64(math.Round(summary.PaidAmount * 100)),
		RefundedAmount:  int64(math.Round(summary.RefundedAmount * 100)),
		RemainingAmount: int64(math.Round(summary.RemainingAmount * 100)),
		TotalVATAmount:  int64(math.Round(summary.TotalVATAmount * 100)),
		TotalNetAmount:  int64(math.Round(summary.TotalNetAmount * 100)),
		Payments:        payments,
		Refunds:         refunds,
	}); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

// PaymentLockDuration is the TTL for a payment-in-flight lock in minutes.
const PaymentLockDuration = 5

// AcquirePaymentLock creates or extends a 5-minute time_blocker for the
// booking's slot so that pending_release eviction is blocked during card
// entry and Square charge processing.
func AcquirePaymentLock(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	bookingID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
	if bookingID == "" || !validators.IsValidID(bookingID) {
		http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	userID, ok := r.Context().Value(mw.UserIDKey).(string)
	if !ok || userID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	// Verify the user owns this booking.
	var bookingUserID string
	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(),
		"SELECT user_id FROM bookings WHERE id = $1", bookingID,
	).Scan(&bookingUserID); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}
	if bookingUserID != userID {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}

	// Before acquiring the lock, double-check the slot is still available.
	// For confirmed/in_progress bookings this is a formality; for
	// pending_release bookings it catches the eviction race before we
	// create a time_blocker — the NOT EXISTS guard in eviction queries
	// handles the sub-5-minute race, this catches the >5-minute gap.
	var currentStatus string
	var startTime time.Time
	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(),
		"SELECT status, start_time FROM bookings WHERE id = $1", bookingID,
	).Scan(&currentStatus, &startTime); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	// If the booking has been evicted (deposit_lapsed) or reached a terminal
	// state, reject the lock — payment cannot proceed.
	if !IsValidBookingStatusForPayment(currentStatus) || currentStatus == "pending" {
		log.Printf("Payment lock rejected: booking %s is in status %q (no longer accepting payments)", bookingID, currentStatus)
		http.Error(w, "This booking is no longer accepting payments. The slot may have been released.", http.StatusConflict)
		return
	}

	// Upsert the time_blocker atomically: delete old PAYMENT_IN_FLIGHT and insert
	// a fresh one in a single transaction. Prevents lock loss if INSERT fails.
	tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to start transaction for payment lock: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	defer func() {
		if err := tx.Rollback(r.Context()); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
			slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
		}
	}()

	if _, err := tx.Exec(r.Context(), `
		DELETE FROM time_blockers
		WHERE description = 'PAYMENT_IN_FLIGHT:' || $1
	`, bookingID); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to clear previous payment lock for booking %s: %v", bookingID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if _, err := tx.Exec(r.Context(), `
		INSERT INTO time_blockers (start_time, duration_minutes, description, created_by)
		VALUES (NOW(), $1, $2, $3)
	`, PaymentLockDuration, "PAYMENT_IN_FLIGHT:"+bookingID, userID); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to acquire payment lock for booking %s: %v", bookingID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Failed to secure payment slot", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to commit payment lock transaction: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
		"status":    "locked",
		"ttl_min":   PaymentLockDuration,
		"bookingID": bookingID,
	}); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

// ReleasePaymentLock removes the PAYMENT_IN_FLIGHT time_blocker for a booking.
func ReleasePaymentLock(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	bookingID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
	if bookingID == "" || !validators.IsValidID(bookingID) {
		http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}

	// Mirror AcquirePaymentLock's ownership check: releasing another user's
	// PAYMENT_IN_FLIGHT blocker would evict their slot mid-payment. The
	// booking's own user (or an admin) may release it.
	userID, ok := r.Context().Value(mw.UserIDKey).(string)
	if !ok || userID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "Authentication required", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	userRole, _ := r.Context().Value(mw.UserRoleKey).(string)
	var bookingUserID string
	if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(),
		"SELECT user_id FROM bookings WHERE id = $1", bookingID,
	).Scan(&bookingUserID); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "Booking not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}
	if userRole != "admin" && bookingUserID != userID {
		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}

	tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	defer func() {
		if err := tx.Rollback(r.Context()); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
			slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
		}
	}()

	if _, err := tx.Exec(r.Context(), `
		DELETE FROM time_blockers
		WHERE description = 'PAYMENT_IN_FLIGHT:' || $1
	`, bookingID); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to release payment lock for booking %s: %v", bookingID, err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction: %v", err)
		http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}

// uniqueChargeKey generates a unique idempotency key under the given prefix
// (e.g. "till-") where the client did not supply one. Client-supplied keys
// handle retry dedup; this fallback only needs uniqueness so two legitimate
// identical requests never collapse on the same key. Deliberately NOT derived
// from request fields — two identical requests would hash to the same key.
// Current callers (A7): the terminal-payment idempotency key in
// CreateTerminalPayment (handlers.go:343, fresh admin actions never
// network-retried) and the till cash/on_the_house no-client-key fallback
// (till.go:406, two identical keyless cash gift-card sales are distinct
// operations). The tip flow no longer uses it — its no-client-key fallback is
// derived deterministically from the completed-tip count (see CreateTipPayment).
func uniqueChargeKey(prefix string) string {
	return prefix + rand.Text()
}

// deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey returns the deterministic fallback
// idempotency key for a no-client-key booking payment:
// "pay-<bookingID>-<paymentType>-<amount>-<cardID>", sha256-truncated when the
// verbatim form exceeds Square's 45-char limit (the hash stays deterministic,
// so a same-key retry still dedups).
//
// The key must distinguish "same live operation retried" (dedup) from "new
// operation that happens to have equal amount" (new charge). The candidate is
// the base key (seq 0) and then the base key with a "-<seq>" suffix (seq ≥ 1)
// until a slot without a COMPLETED payment is found; what makes a completed
// slot "spent" depends on the type:
//
//   - 'partial' (repeatable type): a completed row ALWAYS advances the
//     sequence — two genuine equal-amount partial payments are distinct
//     operations and must diverge onto distinct keys (the dedup lookup would
//     otherwise return the first as success and silently swallow the second).
//   - non-repeatable types (deposit/full/balance): a completed row advances
//     only when its money is no longer live (it has a completed/pending
//     refund). A refunded payment must not be returned as "success" for a new
//     equal-amount charge — the booking would show paid with no money
//     collected (refund-then-repay). An UN-refunded completed row is the SAME
//     live operation retried, so its key is reused and the dedup lookup
//     returns it (paying the same 50% deposit twice on an un-refunded booking
//     MUST still dedup — the double-charge protection).
//
// A PENDING row never occupies a slot (the scan only matches 'completed'), so
// a lost-response retry of an in-flight charge re-derives the same key and
// reuses the pending record. seq 0 is the historical un-sequenced key, so
// legacy deterministic-key rows are still matched.
//
// Must be called inside the transaction holding the per-booking advisory lock
// so the spent-slot scan races no concurrent charge (mirrors the tip flow's
// no-client-key fallback, which counts completed tips under the tip lock).
func deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingID, paymentType string, amount int64, cardPart string) (string, error) {
	baseKey := fmt.Sprintf("pay-%s-%s-%d-%s", bookingID, paymentType, amount, cardPart)
	for seq := 0; ; seq++ {
		// nextIdempotencyCandidate (idempotency_helpers.go) reproduces the
		// historical candidate exactly: the base key at seq 0, "base-seq" at
		// seq ≥ 1, sha256-truncated to the 45-char limit under the "pay-"
		// prefix when the verbatim form overflows — the key stays deterministic
		// so a same-key retry still dedups (A3).
		candidate := nextIdempotencyCandidate(baseKey, seq)
		var completedID string
		err := q.QueryRow(ctx, `
			SELECT id FROM payments
			WHERE booking_id = $1 AND idempotency_key = $2 AND status = 'completed'
		`, bookingID, candidate).Scan(&completedID)
		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
			return candidate, nil
		}
		if err != nil {
			return "", err
		}
		refunded, rErr := paymentHasLiveRefund(ctx, q, completedID)
		if rErr != nil {
			return "", rErr
		}
		if paymentType == "partial" || refunded {
			continue
		}
		return candidate, nil
	}
}

// paymentHasLiveRefund reports whether the payment has a refund in a state
// meaning its money is no longer fully live: a completed refund (money
// returned) or a pending refund (money in flight). Failed refunds never moved
// money and are excluded. Used to re-validate a dedup hit — a refunded payment
// must never be returned as "success" for a new equal-amount charge.
func paymentHasLiveRefund(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, paymentID string) (bool, error) {
	var exists bool
	err := q.QueryRow(ctx, `
		SELECT EXISTS(
			SELECT 1 FROM refunds WHERE payment_id = $1 AND status IN ('completed', 'pending')
		)
	`, paymentID).Scan(&exists)
	if err != nil {
		return false, err
	}
	return exists, nil
}

// randomHexSuffix returns n random bytes hex-encoded (2n hex chars) from
// crypto/rand, used to disambiguate idempotency fallback keys that would
// otherwise collide on deterministic inputs (e.g. the no-client-key refund
// key). Falls back to a masked monotonic timestamp if the OS entropy source
// errors — effectively impossible on Linux (crypto/rand.Read blocks until
// entropy is available) — keeping the same width so the key stays within
// Square's 45-char idempotency-key limit.
func randomHexSuffix(n int) string {
	b := make([]byte, n)
	if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
		return fmt.Sprintf("%0*x", 2*n, time.Now().UnixNano()&(int64(1)<<(8*int64(n))-1))
	}
	return fmt.Sprintf("%x", b)
}