Files
Crussell/backend/handlers/payments/twofa.go
T
popertots 9bb812669e fix: fresh-review round — 2FA deliverability, disable re-verification, GDPR batch scrub, dispute alerting, docs accuracy
Second fresh-eyes review pass (7 agents: goal, security, code-quality,
context-mining, webhooks+2FA, client+mock+sweep, refunds/giftcards/handlers).
Money-safety core verified sound (identical-body replay byte-lossless, clawback
gated on definitive proof, no double-charge window). This round fixes the
issues the fresh pass surfaced:

2FA:
- Setup now DELIVERS the code via the [2FA] server log in ALL modes (was:
  nothing in enforced mode -> production 2FA was an unbreakable dead-end and
  saved-card charges were permanently 403). Enforced mode still withholds the
  code from the API response; the log line is the fake delivery channel until
  email/SMS lands (P6).
- Disabling 2FA now requires a fresh verification code when enforcement is ON
  (previously ignored the code -> a password-only attacker could lift the gate).
  Shares the 5-attempt lockout and timing-safe compare. Dev bypass retained.
- REQUIRE_2FA parsing normalized (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive);
  startup warning extended to the empty-env/mock-client/enforced-2FA confusion.

GDPR:
- anonymize_user() SQL now scrubs two_factor_* columns + staff notes, so the
  idle-account batch cleanup (CleanupIdleAccounts) is erasure-clean, not just
  the user-initiated delete path.

Webhooks:
- dispute.created for an untracked Square payment now raises a
  critical_payment_log admin notification (chargeback the app can't reconcile
  is never silent). Reason strings truncated on rune boundaries (valid UTF-8).
  Stale at-most-once comment corrected; revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding
  duplication noted.

Sweep/mock parity:
- Mock CreatePayment dedup is now source-aware (IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED on
  source mismatch) matching ReplayPaymentByKey and real Square.
- COMPLETED-but-never-polled terminal till-sale checkouts are now recorded by
  the sweep (previously only booking checkouts were; till charges were
  invisible until the 24h blind-fail WARN).
- Legacy snapshot-less minimal-body replay, SQUARE_LOCATION_ID drift, and
  in-memory-mock-restart limitations documented.

Docs:
- Webhook path corrected everywhere (/webhooks/square, not /api/webhooks/square
  - a deployer following the old path would 404 and silently lose all webhook
  reconciliation).
- 2FA enforcement semantics + code-delivery mechanism documented accurately
  (fail-closed default; log-delivery channel; disable re-verification).
- README/User Manual note the 2FA requirement on online saved-card payments.

Tests: 2,151 (up from 2,142). Backend 26/27 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres doesn't offer scram-sha-256 for the
test role; package is byte-identical to HEAD and untouched here). Frontend
builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00

108 lines
3.9 KiB
Go

package payments
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"crussell/db"
"crussell/mw"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
)
// require2FADisabled reports whether REQUIRE_2FA explicitly disables 2FA
// enforcement. The parse is case-insensitive and alias-tolerant (false/0/off/no),
// so a value like "False", "OFF" or "off" never silently leaves the gate ON.
// Any other value — including empty or unknown — keeps enforcement ON
// (fail-closed).
func require2FADisabled() bool {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("REQUIRE_2FA"))) {
case "false", "0", "off", "no":
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// twoFactorEnforced reports whether 2FA is required for online card payments.
// It is fail-closed: enforcement is ON unless 2FA has been explicitly disabled
// (REQUIRE_2FA=false/0/off/no, case-insensitive — see require2FADisabled) or
// SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT explicitly selects the dev/mock stack
// (mock/dev/development/test). Empty or unknown SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT values are
// treated as production-enforced, so a mistyped env var can never silently
// disarm the gate — main.go logs a startup warning for that misconfiguration.
func twoFactorEnforced() bool {
return !require2FADisabled() && !IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv()
}
// IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv reports whether SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT explicitly selects
// the dev/mock Square stack. Only these exact values are treated as dev; an
// empty or unknown value is NOT dev (fail-closed), because in production an
// unset/mistyped env var must never bypass the 2FA gate.
func IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv() bool {
switch os.Getenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT") {
case "mock", "dev", "development", "test":
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// TwoFactorEnforced is the exported form of twoFactorEnforced, so the user
// package (settings endpoints) and the profile handler can report whether 2FA
// is currently required without re-implementing the env logic.
func (s *PaymentService) TwoFactorEnforced() bool {
return twoFactorEnforced()
}
// UserTwoFactorEnabled reports whether the user has completed 2FA setup
// (users.two_factor_enabled). It is the source of truth for the card-access
// gate: an enforced environment blocks online card access for users who have
// not enabled 2FA.
func (s *PaymentService) UserTwoFactorEnabled(ctx context.Context, userID string) (bool, error) {
var enabled bool
err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&enabled)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return enabled, nil
}
// requireTwoFactorForCardAccess gates the saved-card online payment paths
// (PSD2 SCA stand-in until real SCA infra lands). It returns true when the
// request may proceed:
//
// - 2FA is not enforced (dev/mock), OR
// - the user has completed 2FA setup (two_factor_enabled).
//
// When 2FA is enforced and the user has not enabled it, a 403 JSON error is
// written (parseable by the frontend via extractErrorMessage) and false is
// returned — the caller must abort the charge.
func requireTwoFactorForCardAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, service *PaymentService, userID string) bool {
if !twoFactorEnforced() {
return true
}
if service == nil {
service = &PaymentService{}
}
enabled, err := service.UserTwoFactorEnabled(r.Context(), userID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
mw.RespondError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Two-factor authentication is required to use online card payments. Enable it in your account settings.")
return false
}
log.Printf("failed to check two-factor status for user %s: %v", userID, err)
mw.RespondError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to check two-factor status")
return false
}
if enabled {
return true
}
mw.RespondError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "Two-factor authentication is required to use online card payments. Enable it in your account settings.")
return false
}