Fourth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security, context-mining). All PASS on the money-safety core; this round closes the remaining MAJOR/MINOR items they surfaced. Webhooks: - Untracked disputes now raise ONE admin notification PER distinct chargeback: the notification id is derived deterministically from the square_dispute_id (SHA-256 truncated into the CHAR(12) slot) so a second untracked dispute is no longer silently suppressed by the first's dedup row. ON CONFLICT (id) keeps same-dispute replays idempotent; the booking-scoped NOT EXISTS guard is retained for the tracked path. Verified: distinct disputes -> distinct rows; re-delivered dispute -> one row. - The gift-card clawback SQL now lives in exactly ONE place: payments.RevertGiftCardFunding (new giftcard_clawback.go). till.go and the webhook path both call it — eliminating the byte-for-byte copy whose divergence would be a money-loss drift trap (the same two-sources-of-truth pattern this commit eliminated for GDPR scrubbing). 2FA: - Applied the lockout-coherence fix from the review: when a disable request must mint a fresh code (no valid pending one), the held attempt counter is reset so the locked-out user can use the freshly delivered code in the SAME request (no wasted round-trip). The reuse path keeps accumulating wrong attempts toward the 5-attempt lockout — the two behaviors no longer conflict. (The 'always-fresh on disable' suggestion was NOT adopted: it would break the out-of-band [2FA]-log delivery model, since a code generated by a request can never be submitted within that same request.) - New test pins the shared verify/disable lockout: 5 wrong verifies 429 and destroy the code; a stale code then 400s on disable while the freshly delivered code succeeds in the same request. - Startup now warns that 2FA codes travel in PLAINTEXT via the server log in enforced mode (operator must restrict log access + relay out-of-band until email/SMS lands). Docs: - Test counts updated to the current 2,154 across README + Technical Manual. - User Manual 2FA nav corrected: the settings live on the Account page, not an 'Admin' area. Tests: 2,154 (up from 2,151). Backend 25/26 packages green (crussell/db fails only in this environment: local postgres auth for the test role; package byte-identical to HEAD). Frontend builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
848 lines
35 KiB
Go
848 lines
35 KiB
Go
package webhooks
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"database/sql"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"sync"
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"crussell/db"
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"crussell/handlers/payments"
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)
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type SquareWebhookEvent struct {
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Type string `json:"type"`
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EventID string `json:"event_id"`
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CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
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Data json.RawMessage `json:"data"`
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LocationID string `json:"location_id"`
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}
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// squareWebhookDedup is a bounded, mutex-guarded set of recently handled
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// event IDs. It is a FAST-PATH cache only: the persistent source of truth is
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// the square_webhook_events table (see HandleSquareWebhook). It lets a replayed
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// delivery be dropped without a DB round-trip, but a restart clears it — the DB
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// row is what keeps delivery at-least-once across restarts (a replay after a
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// crash is re-dispatched and absorbed by the idempotent handlers, per the
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// dispatch-first ordering in HandleSquareWebhook).
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type squareWebhookDedup struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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seen map[string]struct{}
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order []string
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max int
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}
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func newSquareWebhookDedup(max int) *squareWebhookDedup {
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return &squareWebhookDedup{
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seen: make(map[string]struct{}),
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order: make([]string, 0, max),
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max: max,
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}
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}
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// has reports whether id is in the set WITHOUT recording it. Used as the
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// fast-path short-circuit before the DB dedup insert.
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func (d *squareWebhookDedup) has(id string) bool {
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d.mu.Lock()
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defer d.mu.Unlock()
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_, ok := d.seen[id]
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return ok
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}
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// register records id, reporting whether it was already present (set untouched
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// on a replay, preserving insertion order). Mutex-guarded — the handler may be
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// hit concurrently. Called only after the DB insert has confirmed the event's
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// fate, so a failed DB write never leaves a stale entry that would drop a retry.
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func (d *squareWebhookDedup) register(id string) bool {
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d.mu.Lock()
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defer d.mu.Unlock()
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if _, ok := d.seen[id]; ok {
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return true
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}
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d.seen[id] = struct{}{}
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d.order = append(d.order, id)
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if len(d.order) > d.max {
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oldest := d.order[0]
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d.order = d.order[1:]
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delete(d.seen, oldest)
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}
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return false
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}
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// 500 IDs far exceeds the latency payoff of the fast-path cache; the DB row
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// (square_webhook_events) is the unbounded, restart-safe source of truth.
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var squareWebhookEventsSeen = newSquareWebhookDedup(500)
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// HandleSquareWebhook verifies and dispatches Square webhook events.
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//
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// Fail-closed chain: 503 when the signing key is unset, 403 on a missing/bad
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// signature, 400 on malformed JSON or an empty event_id (which cannot be
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// deduplicated — Square always sends one, so this is defensive). A correctly
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// signed, well-formed event is deduplicated by event_id before dispatch and
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// acknowledged 200.
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func HandleSquareWebhook(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 512*1024)
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body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to read webhook body: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "request body too large or unreadable", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
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return
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}
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defer r.Body.Close()
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// Verification logic per Square spec (HMAC-SHA256, base64, notificationURL + body).
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// Production setup: set SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY and SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL
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// in env vars (see Square Developer Console → Webhooks → Subscription).
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// Reference: https://developer.squareup.com/docs/webhooks/step3validate
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// Fail closed: a missing signing key means the webhook cannot be verified,
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// so reject rather than process unauthenticated events (S-4). Square
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// always sends the signature header, so an unset key in production is a
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// misconfiguration that must not silently accept forged events.
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signingKey := os.Getenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY")
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notificationURL := os.Getenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL")
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if notificationURL == "" {
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notificationURL = "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
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}
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if signingKey == "" {
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log.Printf("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY is not set — rejecting webhook (fail-closed)")
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http.Error(w, "webhook signature verification unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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signature := r.Header.Get("x-square-hmacsha256-signature")
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if signature == "" {
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log.Printf("Missing Square webhook signature header")
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http.Error(w, "Invalid signature", http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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if !verifySquareSignature(body, signature, signingKey, notificationURL) {
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log.Printf("Invalid Square webhook signature")
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http.Error(w, "Invalid signature", http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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var event SquareWebhookEvent
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if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &event); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to parse webhook event: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "Invalid event", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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// An empty event_id cannot be deduplicated. Square always sends event_id,
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// so this is defensive — but once handlers mutate state, a duplicate
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// empty-ID event would double-apply. Reject with 400 (fail-safe, no
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// dispatch, no dedup row): Square's retry policy retries on 5xx/timeouts
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// but treats 4xx as non-retryable, so the malformed event is dropped
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// without side effects.
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if event.EventID == "" {
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Rejecting event with empty event_id (400)")
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http.Error(w, "Invalid event", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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// Fast-path dedup: a correctly signed replay of a recently handled event is
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// dropped in memory without a DB round-trip. The persistent source of truth
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// is the square_webhook_events row committed AFTER dispatch below, so this
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// cache never hides an event whose dedup row is not yet persisted — a crash
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// before that commit simply replays the event, which the idempotent handlers
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// absorb.
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if squareWebhookEventsSeen.has(event.EventID) {
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Duplicate event_id %s; skipping (already processed)", event.EventID)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
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return
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}
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if db.Conn == nil {
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] DB unavailable — rejecting event_id %s (fail-closed)", event.EventID)
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http.Error(w, "webhook processing unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Received event: %s", event.Type)
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// Dispatch FIRST, then commit the dedup row. The handlers mutate state, so a
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// dedup row committed before dispatch would permanently drop the event on a
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// crash between the insert and the dispatch (Square's retry would be
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// 200-skipped, and dispute.created has no sweep fallback). Committing after
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// a successful dispatch keeps delivery at-least-once: on any dispatch error
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// NO dedup row is written and we return 5xx so Square retries. The handlers
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// are idempotent (status='pending'-guarded UPDATEs keyed on the Square id),
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// so a retry — or two retries dispatching concurrently — applies each state
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// change at most once and is otherwise a no-op.
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var dispatchErr error
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switch event.Type {
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case "payment.updated", "payment.created":
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dispatchErr = handlePaymentUpdated(r.Context(), event.Data)
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case "refund.updated", "refund.created":
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dispatchErr = handleRefundUpdated(event.Data)
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case "dispute.created":
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dispatchErr = handleDisputeCreated(event.Data)
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case "dispute.state.updated":
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dispatchErr = handleDisputeStateUpdated(event.Data)
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case "dispute.evidence.created", "dispute.evidence.deleted":
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dispatchErr = handleDisputeEvidence(event.Data)
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case "terminal.checkout.created", "terminal.checkout.updated":
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dispatchErr = handleTerminalCheckout(event.Data)
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default:
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Unknown event type: %s", event.Type)
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}
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if dispatchErr != nil {
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Event %s (%s) dispatch failed: %v — NOT recording dedup row; Square will retry", event.Type, event.EventID, dispatchErr)
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http.Error(w, "webhook processing failed", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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// Commit the dedup row AFTER successful dispatch. Fail closed on a write
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// error: without a persisted row we cannot prove the event was handled, so
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// reject and let Square retry (the retry re-dispatches idempotently and
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// retries the insert). event_id is not PII, so logging it is safe.
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tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(),
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"INSERT INTO square_webhook_events (event_id) VALUES ($1) ON CONFLICT (event_id) DO NOTHING", event.EventID)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to record event_id %s (dedup write failed): %v", event.EventID, err)
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http.Error(w, "webhook processing unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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// Record in the fast-path cache only after the DB write succeeds, so a
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// failed write never leaves a stale entry that would drop a retry.
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squareWebhookEventsSeen.register(event.EventID)
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if tag.RowsAffected() == 0 {
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// A concurrent duplicate delivery already committed this event's row.
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Duplicate event_id %s; acknowledging (already processed)", event.EventID)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
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}
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func verifySquareSignature(body []byte, signature, signingKey, notificationURL string) bool {
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(signingKey))
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mac.Write([]byte(notificationURL))
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mac.Write(body)
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expected := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
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return hmac.Equal([]byte(signature), []byte(expected))
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}
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// squareWebhookData is the `data` envelope of a Square webhook v1 event. The
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// affected object's id is at data.id; the full resource is nested at
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// data.object.<type> (e.g. data.object.payment). Only the id is logged — the
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// nested object can contain PII and is never echoed to the log.
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type squareWebhookData struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Type string `json:"type"`
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Object json.RawMessage `json:"object"`
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}
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// squareDisputePayload maps the Square Dispute fields this app records.
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// Reference: https://developer.squareup.com/reference/square/objects/Dispute
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type squareDisputePayload struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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State string `json:"state"`
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AmountMoney *squareMoneyPayload `json:"amount_money"`
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Reason string `json:"reason"`
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DisputedPayment *squareDisputedPaymentField `json:"disputed_payment"`
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}
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type squareMoneyPayload struct {
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Amount int64 `json:"amount"` // minor units (pence for GBP)
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Currency string `json:"currency"`
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}
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type squareDisputedPaymentField struct {
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PaymentID string `json:"payment_id"`
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}
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// squarePaymentPayload maps the Square Payment fields this app consumes.
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type squarePaymentPayload struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Status string `json:"status"` // "APPROVED", "COMPLETED", "CANCELED", "FAILED", "PENDING"
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}
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// squareRefundPayload maps the Square Refund (PaymentRefund) fields this app
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// consumes.
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type squareRefundPayload struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Status string `json:"status"` // "PENDING", "COMPLETED", "FAILED"
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}
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// parseSquareObject unmarshals data.object.<type> into out. Returns false when
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// the nested resource is absent (legacy envelope carrying only data.id).
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func parseSquareObject(object json.RawMessage, key string, out any) bool {
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if len(object) == 0 {
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return false
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}
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var wrapper map[string]json.RawMessage
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if err := json.Unmarshal(object, &wrapper); err != nil {
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return false
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}
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raw, ok := wrapper[key]
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if !ok || len(raw) == 0 {
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return false
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, out); err != nil {
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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// squareMoneyToAmount converts a Square Money object (minor units) to an exact
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// two-decimal string for the NUMERIC(10,2) columns. String formatting avoids
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// float64 rounding artifacts for money.
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func squareMoneyToAmount(m *squareMoneyPayload) string {
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if m == nil || m.Amount <= 0 {
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return "0.00"
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}
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return fmt.Sprintf("%d.%02d", m.Amount/100, m.Amount%100)
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}
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// squarePaymentStatusToLocal maps Square's payment state machine to the local
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// payment_status enum. APPROVED/PENDING are NON-terminal (Square may still
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// complete or void them), so they map to a zero local status and the caller
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// leaves the row untouched — the same classification the stale-pending sweeps
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// use (handlers/payments/sweep.go).
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func squarePaymentStatusToLocal(status string) (string, bool) {
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switch status {
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case "COMPLETED":
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return "completed", true
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case "CANCELED", "FAILED":
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return "failed", true
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case "APPROVED", "PENDING":
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return "", false
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default:
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return "", false
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}
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}
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// squareRefundStatusToLocal maps Square's refund status to the local
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// payment_status enum. PENDING is non-terminal.
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func squareRefundStatusToLocal(status string) (string, bool) {
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switch status {
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case "COMPLETED":
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return "completed", true
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case "FAILED":
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return "failed", true
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default:
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return "", false
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}
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}
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// squareDisputeStateToLocal maps Square's dispute state to the local
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// disputes.status. Only the terminal resolutions move the row to won/lost;
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// ACCEPTED (seller accepted the dispute) is a loss — the money is gone.
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// Everything else (inquiries, evidence required, processing) stays open.
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func squareDisputeStateToLocal(state string) string {
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switch state {
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case "WON":
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return "won"
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case "LOST", "ACCEPTED":
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return "lost"
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default:
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return "open"
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}
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}
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// findPaymentBySquareID resolves the local payment id and booking id for a
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// Square payment id. Multiple local rows can share one Square charge id (e.g.
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// a deposit + balance split); the most recent is used.
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func findPaymentBySquareID(squarePaymentID string) (paymentID, bookingID string, ok bool) {
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if squarePaymentID == "" {
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return "", "", false
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}
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var pid string
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var bid *string
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err := db.Conn.QueryRow(context.Background(), `
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SELECT id, booking_id FROM payments
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WHERE square_payment_id = $1
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ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC
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LIMIT 1
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`, squarePaymentID).Scan(&pid, &bid)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", false
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}
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if bid != nil {
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bookingID = *bid
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}
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return pid, bookingID, true
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}
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// findPaymentByDisputeID resolves the local payment (and its booking) recorded
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// for a dispute row. Used by dispute.state.updated when the dispute row already
|
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// exists but the webhook payload carries no resolvable Square payment id.
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func findPaymentByDisputeID(squareDisputeID string) (paymentID, bookingID string) {
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var pid string
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var bid *string
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err := db.Conn.QueryRow(context.Background(), `
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SELECT d.payment_id, p.booking_id
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FROM disputes d
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JOIN payments p ON p.id = d.payment_id
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WHERE d.square_dispute_id = $1
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`, squareDisputeID).Scan(&pid, &bid)
|
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if err != nil {
|
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return "", ""
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}
|
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if bid != nil {
|
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bookingID = *bid
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}
|
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return pid, bookingID
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}
|
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|
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// disputeNotificationID derives the deterministic admin_notifications id for an
|
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// untracked dispute's critical_payment_log notification: 'D' + 11 lowercase hex
|
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// chars of a SHA-256 over 'dispute-<square_dispute_id>'. generate_short_id
|
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// (init-script.sql) only ever emits 12 lowercase hex chars
|
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// (substr(encode(gen_random_bytes(6),'hex'),1,12)), so the uppercase 'D' prefix
|
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// guarantees this can never collide with a DB-generated id. The id is stable
|
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// per dispute, giving ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING per-dispute idempotency.
|
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func disputeNotificationID(squareDisputeID string) string {
|
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte("dispute-" + squareDisputeID))
|
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return "D" + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])[:11]
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}
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|
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// insertCriticalPaymentNotification surfaces a money event in the admin
|
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// notification centre (reason='critical_payment_log'), the DB-backed stand-in
|
|
// for un-watched CRITICAL log lines (see ScanCriticalPaymentLogs in
|
|
// internal/jobs/cleanup.go). Dedup: one unacknowledged row per (reason,
|
|
// booking_id) — acknowledging re-arms it.
|
|
//
|
|
// Untracked disputes (no local payment row, booking_id NULL) pass disputeID
|
|
// instead: each DISTINCT square dispute gets its OWN notification under the
|
|
// deterministic id (disputeNotificationID), so a second distinct chargeback is
|
|
// never suppressed by the first's (reason, NULL booking) row — and re-delivery
|
|
// of the same dispute is a no-op (ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING). The
|
|
// booking-scoped NOT EXISTS guard does NOT apply to this path: it would
|
|
// collapse every untracked dispute onto one unacknowledged NULL-booking row.
|
|
func insertCriticalPaymentNotification(bookingID, disputeID string) {
|
|
if disputeID != "" {
|
|
id := disputeNotificationID(disputeID)
|
|
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `
|
|
INSERT INTO admin_notifications (id, reason, booking_id, created_at)
|
|
VALUES ($1, 'critical_payment_log'::admin_notification_reason, NULL, NOW())
|
|
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING
|
|
`, id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to insert critical_payment_log admin notification: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if tag.RowsAffected() > 0 {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Inserted critical_payment_log admin notification (dispute_id=%s, booking_id=NULL)", disputeID)
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
var bid any
|
|
if bookingID != "" {
|
|
bid = bookingID
|
|
}
|
|
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `
|
|
INSERT INTO admin_notifications (reason, booking_id, created_at)
|
|
SELECT 'critical_payment_log'::admin_notification_reason, $1, NOW()
|
|
WHERE NOT EXISTS (
|
|
SELECT 1 FROM admin_notifications an
|
|
WHERE an.reason = 'critical_payment_log'
|
|
AND an.booking_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM $1
|
|
AND an.acknowledged_at IS NULL
|
|
)
|
|
`, bid)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to insert critical_payment_log admin notification: %v", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if tag.RowsAffected() > 0 {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Inserted critical_payment_log admin notification (booking_id=%s)", bookingID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// markPaymentFailed flips a payment to 'failed' after a lost dispute — the
|
|
// money was charged back, so the row must not read as collected. 'refunded'
|
|
// rows are left alone (the money was returned by refund, not charged back).
|
|
func markPaymentFailed(paymentID string) error {
|
|
if paymentID == "" {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
_, err := db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(),
|
|
"UPDATE payments SET status = 'failed', updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $1 AND status IN ('pending', 'completed')",
|
|
paymentID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to mark payment %s failed after lost dispute: %v", paymentID, err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handlePaymentUpdated reconciles a Square Payment state change against the
|
|
// local payments row (real-time counterpart to the stale-pending sweep). The
|
|
// Square id is logged, never the payload (PII). Idempotent: the UPDATE is a
|
|
// no-op when the local status already matches, and event_id dedup prevents
|
|
// re-entry at the handler level. A non-nil error means dispatch failed and the
|
|
// caller must NOT commit the dedup row (Square retries).
|
|
func handlePaymentUpdated(ctx context.Context, data json.RawMessage) error {
|
|
var env squareWebhookData
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated received (payload length=%d)", len(data))
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
if env.ID == "" {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated received (payload length=%d)", len(data))
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
var payment squarePaymentPayload
|
|
if !parseSquareObject(env.Object, "payment", &payment) || payment.ID == "" || payment.Status == "" {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated received (data.id=%s)", env.ID)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
localStatus, terminal := squarePaymentStatusToLocal(payment.Status)
|
|
if !terminal {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated: square payment %s status %q is non-terminal — no local state change", payment.ID, payment.Status)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
// Only 'pending' rows are candidates for a terminal transition — the same
|
|
// conservative rule the stale-pending sweeps use. A webhook for an already
|
|
// settled row (Square fires payment.updated for ANY field change, e.g. fee
|
|
// recalculation on a fully-refunded charge) must never revert a terminal
|
|
// status like 'refunded' back to 'completed'.
|
|
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(),
|
|
`UPDATE payments SET status = $1, updated_at = NOW() WHERE square_payment_id = $2 AND status = 'pending'`,
|
|
localStatus, payment.ID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to update payment %s to status %s: %v", payment.ID, localStatus, err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if tag.RowsAffected() > 0 {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated: square payment %s → local status %s", payment.ID, localStatus)
|
|
}
|
|
// A Square charge can also map to a till_sales row (online gift-card
|
|
// purchase, retail at the till) — reconcile those too. Same pending-only
|
|
// guard: never revert a terminal till-sale status. A definitively failed
|
|
// charge (Square FAILED/CANCELED) claws back the gift-card funding those
|
|
// pending sales added, exactly like the stale-pending sweep
|
|
// (handlers/payments/sweep.go); an ambiguous status never reaches here.
|
|
if localStatus == "failed" {
|
|
return clawbackFailedTillSales(ctx, payment.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
tsTag, err := db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(),
|
|
`UPDATE till_sales SET status = $1, updated_at = NOW() WHERE square_payment_id = $2 AND status = 'pending'`,
|
|
localStatus, payment.ID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to reconcile till_sales for square payment %s: %v", payment.ID, err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if tsTag.RowsAffected() > 0 {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated: reconciled %d till_sale(s) for square payment %s → status %s", tsTag.RowsAffected(), payment.ID, localStatus)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// clawbackFailedTillSales reverts the gift-card funding of every still-pending
|
|
// till sale funded by a Square charge that is DEFINITIVELY failed (Square
|
|
// FAILED/CANCELED — never ambiguous). It mirrors the stale-pending sweep's
|
|
// clawbackTillSaleFunding + revertGiftCardFunding (handlers/payments/sweep.go,
|
|
// till.go): each sale is claimed with a status='pending' guard so an
|
|
// already-resolved row is skipped without error, and the failed mark + funding
|
|
// revert commit atomically. A non-nil error means a DB failure left a pending
|
|
// sale's funding unreverted — the caller rejects the webhook so Square retries
|
|
// the clawback (the sweep is the eventual backstop).
|
|
func clawbackFailedTillSales(ctx context.Context, squarePaymentID string) error {
|
|
rows, err := db.Conn.Query(context.Background(), `
|
|
SELECT ts.id, ts.item_type, ts.item_id, ts.total_amount, gc.redeemed_by,
|
|
(ts.created_at = gc.created_at) AS is_create
|
|
FROM till_sales ts
|
|
LEFT JOIN gift_cards gc ON gc.id = ts.item_id
|
|
WHERE ts.square_payment_id = $1 AND ts.status = 'pending'
|
|
`, squarePaymentID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to read pending till_sales for funding clawback (square payment %s): %v", squarePaymentID, err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
defer rows.Close()
|
|
for rows.Next() {
|
|
var (
|
|
saleID string
|
|
itemType string
|
|
itemID sql.NullString
|
|
totalAmount float64
|
|
redeemedBy sql.NullString
|
|
isCreate *bool
|
|
)
|
|
if err := rows.Scan(&saleID, &itemType, &itemID, &totalAmount, &redeemedBy, &isCreate); err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to scan pending till_sale for funding clawback (square payment %s): %v", squarePaymentID, err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := clawbackOneTillSale(ctx, saleID, itemType, itemID, totalAmount, redeemedBy, isCreate); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return rows.Err()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// clawbackOneTillSale resolves one pending till sale of a definitively failed
|
|
// charge. A gift-card sale has its funding reverted atomically with the failed
|
|
// mark; a sale with no gift card (future retail product / orphaned item) is
|
|
// only marked failed. An already-resolved sale is skipped, not an error.
|
|
func clawbackOneTillSale(ctx context.Context, saleID, itemType string, itemID sql.NullString, totalAmount float64, redeemedBy sql.NullString, isCreate *bool) error {
|
|
if itemType != "gift_card" || !itemID.Valid || itemID.String == "" || isCreate == nil {
|
|
// No gift card to claw back — mark the sale failed without touching
|
|
// any card (mirrors the sweep's non-gift-card branch).
|
|
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `
|
|
UPDATE till_sales SET status = 'failed', updated_at = NOW()
|
|
WHERE id = $1 AND status = 'pending'
|
|
`, saleID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to mark till sale %s failed: %v", saleID, err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if tag.RowsAffected() > 0 {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated: marked till sale %s failed (no gift card to claw back)", saleID)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
action := "topup"
|
|
if *isCreate {
|
|
action = "create"
|
|
}
|
|
var redeem *string
|
|
if redeemedBy.Valid && redeemedBy.String != "" {
|
|
redeem = &redeemedBy.String
|
|
}
|
|
if err := revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding(ctx, action, itemID.String, totalAmount, redeem, saleID); err != nil {
|
|
if payments.IsTillSaleNotPending(err) {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Till sale %s was already resolved (not pending) — skipping funding clawback", saleID)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
log.Printf("CRITICAL: [SQUARE-WEBHOOK] failed to claw back gift card %s funding for failed till sale %s: %v — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED: gift card may still be funded", itemID.String, saleID, err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding undoes the gift-card funding of a till sale
|
|
// whose charge definitively failed. It delegates to the single shared clawback
|
|
// implementation, payments.RevertGiftCardFunding (handlers/payments/
|
|
// giftcard_clawback.go) — the same helper the till handler and the stale-pending
|
|
// sweep use — so the webhook's money reversal can never drift from theirs. The
|
|
// claim-first status='pending' guard, the create/top-up branches, the
|
|
// redeem-to-user reversal, the CRITICAL reconciliation log lines and the
|
|
// errTillSaleNotPending sentinel all live in that one place.
|
|
func revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding(ctx context.Context, action, giftCardID string, amount float64, redeemToUserID *string, tillSaleID string) error {
|
|
return payments.RevertGiftCardFunding(ctx, action, giftCardID, amount, redeemToUserID, tillSaleID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleRefundUpdated reconciles a Square Refund state change against the local
|
|
// refunds row. Idempotent (status-guarded UPDATE + event_id dedup). A non-nil
|
|
// error means dispatch failed and the caller must NOT commit the dedup row.
|
|
func handleRefundUpdated(data json.RawMessage) error {
|
|
var env squareWebhookData
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] refund.updated received (payload length=%d)", len(data))
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
if env.ID == "" {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] refund.updated received (payload length=%d)", len(data))
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
var refund squareRefundPayload
|
|
if !parseSquareObject(env.Object, "refund", &refund) || refund.ID == "" || refund.Status == "" {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] refund.updated received (data.id=%s)", env.ID)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
localStatus, terminal := squareRefundStatusToLocal(refund.Status)
|
|
if !terminal {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] refund.updated: square refund %s status %q is non-terminal — no local state change", refund.ID, refund.Status)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
// COMPLETED may promote any non-completed row (incl. a sweep-failed refund
|
|
// Square later shows complete) — the over-refund guard counts completed
|
|
// refunds, so this only tightens it. FAILED only demotes a 'pending' row:
|
|
// demoting 'completed' would let the guard exclude money that already moved
|
|
// (the exact risk refunds.go documents for failed refunds).
|
|
var upd string
|
|
switch localStatus {
|
|
case "completed":
|
|
upd = `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'completed' WHERE square_refund_id = $1 AND status <> 'completed'`
|
|
case "failed":
|
|
upd = `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'failed' WHERE square_refund_id = $1 AND status = 'pending'`
|
|
}
|
|
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), upd, refund.ID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to update refund %s to status %s: %v", refund.ID, localStatus, err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if tag.RowsAffected() > 0 {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] refund.updated: square refund %s → local status %s", refund.ID, localStatus)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// truncateDisputeReason caps a Square dispute reason at the disputes.reason
|
|
// VARCHAR(192) column width. An over-long reason would fail the disputes
|
|
// INSERT; the handler treats that as a dispatch error (no dedup row, 5xx), so
|
|
// Square would retry forever — truncating lets the event succeed instead.
|
|
// VARCHAR(192) counts CHARACTERS, not bytes, so truncation must slice on a rune
|
|
// boundary: byte-slicing (reason[:192]) can split a multi-byte UTF-8 rune and
|
|
// store invalid UTF-8 (which Postgres rejects), failing the INSERT the same way
|
|
// an over-long reason would. Slicing the []rune form keeps the stored reason a
|
|
// valid, at-most-192-character UTF-8 string.
|
|
func truncateDisputeReason(reason string) string {
|
|
runes := []rune(reason)
|
|
if len(runes) > 192 {
|
|
return string(runes[:192])
|
|
}
|
|
return reason
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleDisputeCreated records a newly opened dispute: inserts the disputes row
|
|
// and surfaces a critical_payment_log admin notification so the owner sees the
|
|
// chargeback in-app. A disputed Square payment with NO local payments row (a
|
|
// Dashboard-initiated charge, a mismatched Square id, or a deleted/erased row)
|
|
// cannot be reconciled to a booking — no disputes row is written — but the
|
|
// admin notification is STILL raised with booking_id NULL, because there is no
|
|
// sweep fallback for disputes and a chargeback the app cannot see is a silent
|
|
// money-loss path the owner must always be told about. Idempotent via
|
|
// ON CONFLICT (square_dispute_id) DO NOTHING plus the event_id dedup. A non-nil
|
|
// error means dispatch failed (no dedup row committed — Square retries).
|
|
func handleDisputeCreated(data json.RawMessage) error {
|
|
var env squareWebhookData
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute.created received (payload length=%d)", len(data))
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
var dispute squareDisputePayload
|
|
if !parseSquareObject(env.Object, "dispute", &dispute) || dispute.ID == "" {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute.created received (data.id=%s)", env.ID)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
squarePaymentID := ""
|
|
if dispute.DisputedPayment != nil {
|
|
squarePaymentID = dispute.DisputedPayment.PaymentID
|
|
}
|
|
paymentID, bookingID, paymentFound := findPaymentBySquareID(squarePaymentID)
|
|
if !paymentFound {
|
|
// Untracked chargeback: no local payments row for this Square charge
|
|
// (Dashboard-initiated, mismatched Square payment id, or a deleted/erased
|
|
// row). There is NO sweep fallback for disputes — this notification is
|
|
// the only in-app trace the owner gets that Square is clawing back funds,
|
|
// so it must never be skipped. booking_id stays NULL; each DISTINCT
|
|
// dispute gets its OWN deterministic-id notification (the booking-scoped
|
|
// dedup would collapse separate chargebacks into one suppressed row).
|
|
// Still return nil so the dedup row commits and Square's retry is
|
|
// acknowledged.
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] CRITICAL: dispute %s created for square payment %q with NO local payment row — chargeback cannot be reconciled in-app — admin notified (booking_id NULL)", dispute.ID, squarePaymentID)
|
|
insertCriticalPaymentNotification("", dispute.ID)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
amount := squareMoneyToAmount(dispute.AmountMoney)
|
|
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `
|
|
INSERT INTO disputes (square_dispute_id, payment_id, status, amount, reason, created_at, updated_at)
|
|
VALUES ($1, $2, 'open', $3, NULLIF($4, ''), NOW(), NOW())
|
|
ON CONFLICT (square_dispute_id) DO NOTHING
|
|
`, dispute.ID, paymentID, amount, truncateDisputeReason(dispute.Reason))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to insert dispute %s: %v", dispute.ID, err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
_ = tag
|
|
insertCriticalPaymentNotification(bookingID, "")
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] CRITICAL: dispute %s created (amount %s, reason %q) for square payment %s — admin notified", dispute.ID, amount, dispute.Reason, squarePaymentID)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleDisputeStateUpdated applies a Square dispute state change to the local
|
|
// disputes row (upsert — a state.updated may arrive before the created event),
|
|
// and on a terminal loss marks the payment failed + raises CRITICAL. Won is
|
|
// logged only. Idempotent: the upsert converges to the same row. A non-nil
|
|
// error means dispatch failed (no dedup row committed — Square retries).
|
|
func handleDisputeStateUpdated(data json.RawMessage) error {
|
|
var env squareWebhookData
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute.state.updated received (payload length=%d)", len(data))
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
var dispute squareDisputePayload
|
|
if !parseSquareObject(env.Object, "dispute", &dispute) || dispute.ID == "" {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute.state.updated received (data.id=%s)", env.ID)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
localStatus := squareDisputeStateToLocal(dispute.State)
|
|
amount := squareMoneyToAmount(dispute.AmountMoney)
|
|
|
|
squarePaymentID := ""
|
|
if dispute.DisputedPayment != nil {
|
|
squarePaymentID = dispute.DisputedPayment.PaymentID
|
|
}
|
|
paymentID, bookingID, paymentFound := findPaymentBySquareID(squarePaymentID)
|
|
if !paymentFound {
|
|
// Row may already exist from dispute.created — recover its payment.
|
|
paymentID, bookingID = findPaymentByDisputeID(dispute.ID)
|
|
if paymentID == "" {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute.state.updated: no local payment for dispute %s (square payment %q) — cannot record state %s", dispute.ID, squarePaymentID, dispute.State)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, err := db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(), `
|
|
INSERT INTO disputes (square_dispute_id, payment_id, status, amount, reason, created_at, updated_at)
|
|
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, NULLIF($5, ''), NOW(), NOW())
|
|
ON CONFLICT (square_dispute_id) DO UPDATE
|
|
SET status = EXCLUDED.status, amount = EXCLUDED.amount,
|
|
reason = EXCLUDED.reason, updated_at = NOW()
|
|
`, dispute.ID, paymentID, localStatus, amount, truncateDisputeReason(dispute.Reason))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to update dispute %s to state %s: %v", dispute.ID, dispute.State, err)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch localStatus {
|
|
case "lost":
|
|
if err := markPaymentFailed(paymentID); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
insertCriticalPaymentNotification(bookingID, "")
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] CRITICAL: dispute %s LOST — payment %s marked failed; admin notified", dispute.ID, paymentID)
|
|
case "won":
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute %s WON — resolved in seller's favour; no action", dispute.ID)
|
|
default:
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute %s state → %s (status %s)", dispute.ID, dispute.State, localStatus)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleDisputeEvidence logs evidence submissions/removals. Evidence does not
|
|
// change the dispute's local status, so it is informational only.
|
|
func handleDisputeEvidence(data json.RawMessage) error {
|
|
var env squareWebhookData
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute evidence event received (payload length=%d)", len(data))
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
var dispute squareDisputePayload
|
|
if !parseSquareObject(env.Object, "dispute", &dispute) || dispute.ID == "" {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute evidence event received (data.id=%s)", env.ID)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute evidence event for dispute %s (state %s)", dispute.ID, dispute.State)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleTerminalCheckout logs terminal checkout lifecycle events. Terminal
|
|
// checkout state is owned by the poll/sweep handlers (handlers/payments/),
|
|
// which fetch the authoritative status from Square — no state mutation here.
|
|
func handleTerminalCheckout(data json.RawMessage) error {
|
|
var env squareWebhookData
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] terminal.checkout event received (payload length=%d)", len(data))
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] terminal.checkout event received (data.id=%s)", env.ID)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|