Files
Crussell/backend/internal/twofa/twofa_test.go
T
popertots 4e398a7a2b fix: round-2 loop-B adversarial (503c326 baseline) — B1 webhook race, APPROVED refund semantics, notification cap single-source, 2FA cooldown/StateFor hardening, register bcrypt semaphore
Round 2 Loop B red-team (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) findings on the full payments overhaul:

MONEY:
- HIGH: webhook COMPLETED promotion now resolves the B1 parent row (mirrors the re-poll resolveB1ParentFailed + till-sale clawback) — the sweep no longer re-replays an expired key into stacked unauthorized charges
- HIGH: A6 deposit-with-discount clamp — chargeAmount capped to max(0, remaining-discount) for ALL discount cases; overflow guard compares against the discounted remaining
- MED-HIGH: APPROVED refunds treated as NON-terminal at the webhook (event-driven, may still fail); payments call sites aligned; FAILED can now demote an APPROVED-then-failed row
- MED: B1 refund transport-error fails the row + CRITICAL immediately (no 3-charge stacking)
- MED: till_sales capped-fail surfaces the outstanding funding (gift_card_transactions trace) for manual reversal
- MED: guest-bookings cash/gift-card terminal charges now audited (NULL target); audit reordered post-commit; cancellation refunds audited
- MED: A6 no-discount skip-path returns campaign_fully_redeemed 400 (no success-shaped no-op); skip-path writes a marker row for idempotency

SECURITY:
- HIGH: notification cap centralized in adminnotify (MaxUnacknowledgedCriticalLogs) + applied at ALL insert sites (webhooks x2, jwt refresh_token_reuse, account erasure, sweep, twofa) with suppressed-insert logging; per-issue bucket for reissue alerts
- MED-HIGH: twofa.StateFor saturated state made IMMUTABLE (LastMintAt writes are no-ops; no cross-user throttling); eviction never drops in-window count>0 records
- MED: /register now uses the shared bcrypt semaphore (authBcryptSlots, 20) — botnet CPU burn bounded
- MED: NAT collateral reduced (429-reject only at top progressive tier; lower tiers sleep)
- MED: ClearMintCooldownForUser exposed for fresh-charge success; reissue cooldown-skip raises a capped alert
- LOW: audit coverage gaps (reschedule fee forgiveness, gift-card transfer, clawback) closed

DUP/MOD:
- Frontend deposit-percent literals -> POLICY constants (10 sites); LOYALTY_DISCOUNT_RATE single-sourced; generateUUID adopted; admin PaymentModal overflow-tip confirm path added; £500 gift-card cap named

Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod (CI condition), both vet tags, frontend tests+build, env-docs 42/42.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00

306 lines
13 KiB
Go

//go:build test
package twofa
// Tests for the shared 2FA verification core (the package the payments
// card-access gate — B6/B10 — imports for real-challenge verification).
// The pepper provider is never registered here (handlers/user's build-tagged
// files register it), so Hash falls back to the legacy plain SHA-256 digest —
// which is exactly what the seeded pending-code hashes use.
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"testing"
"time"
"crussell/clock"
"crussell/db"
"crussell/testutils"
"crussell/testutils/fixtures"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func seedPending(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, tx db.Querier, userID, code string) {
t.Helper()
_, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users
SET two_factor_method = 'email',
two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2,
two_factor_pending_code_expires = $3
WHERE id = $1`, userID, Hash(code), clock.Now().Add(10*time.Minute))
require.NoError(t, err)
}
func TestVerifyForUser_CorrectAndWrongCode(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
// consume=false (interactive setup/disable path): a success keeps the
// pending code valid, so a wrong follow-up code reports ErrIncorrect.
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", DeferredConsume), "correct code must verify")
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", DeferredConsume), ErrIncorrect)
// consume=true (payments saved-card gate path): a success DESTROYS the
// pending code, so re-verifying the same code reports ErrMissingOrExpired
// — a verified code is single-use and cannot authorize a second charge.
userID2, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID2, "123456")
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456", ConsumeOnVerify), "correct code must verify")
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456", ConsumeOnVerify), ErrMissingOrExpired, "a consumed code must be single-use")
var pendingHash sql.NullString
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID2).Scan(&pendingHash))
require.False(t, pendingHash.Valid, "a consumed code must be NULLed in the DB")
}
func TestVerifyForUser_LockoutAndMissing(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
// Wrong code #1 → ErrIncorrect; four more reach the 5-attempt cap.
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", ConsumeOnVerify), ErrIncorrect)
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
_ = VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", ConsumeOnVerify)
}
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", ConsumeOnVerify), ErrLockedOut)
// A fresh user with no pending code → ErrMissingOrExpired.
userID2, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456", ConsumeOnVerify), ErrMissingOrExpired)
}
// TestVerifyForUser_ConsumeOnVerifyConcurrency pins the finding-1 contract: a
// code verified with ConsumeOnVerify authorizes exactly ONE operation. Even
// though the per-user mutex serializes the critical section (so no test can
// actually race it), the observable guarantee is that the first verify burns the
// code and any subsequent verify of the same code fails with
// ErrMissingOrExpired — two concurrent charge gates can never both pass.
func TestVerifyForUser_ConsumeOnVerifyConcurrency(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "424242")
// Two "concurrent" charge-gate verifies of the same code, serialized by
// StateFor's per-user mutex exactly as the payments gate would experience
// them. Only the first may succeed.
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "424242", ConsumeOnVerify), "first charge gate must verify")
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "424242", ConsumeOnVerify), ErrMissingOrExpired,
"second charge gate with the same code must fail — one code, one charge")
}
// TestVerifyForUser_SuccessClearsLoginLockout pins LOW 6b: a successful 2FA
// verify lifts any password-guessing login lockout (users.failed_attempts /
// locked_until) because a correct code proves control of the second factor.
func TestVerifyForUser_SuccessClearsLoginLockout(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET failed_attempts = 9, locked_until = NOW() + INTERVAL '30 minutes' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", ConsumeOnVerify))
var failedAttempts int
var lockedUntil *time.Time
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT failed_attempts, locked_until FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&failedAttempts, &lockedUntil))
require.Zero(t, failedAttempts, "successful 2FA verify must reset the login lockout counter")
require.Nil(t, lockedUntil, "successful 2FA verify must clear locked_until")
}
// TestConsumePendingCode pins the MEDIUM-2 contract: ConsumePendingCode NULLs
// the stored pending-code digest and expiry (idempotently), and is the ONLY
// place a verified-but-unconsumed code dies on the saved-card charge path.
func TestConsumePendingCode(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
// A code verified WITHOUT consuming stays valid (the saved-card charge gate
// path, MEDIUM-2) — re-verification must keep working until consumption.
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", false), "verify-without-consume must pass")
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", false), "an unconsumed code must still verify on a same-key retry")
require.NoError(t, ConsumePendingCode(ctx, tx, userID), "explicit consumption at charge success must succeed")
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", false), ErrMissingOrExpired, "a consumed code must no longer verify")
// Consumption is idempotent — a second call (e.g. a retried completed
// charge) is a no-op, never an error.
require.NoError(t, ConsumePendingCode(ctx, tx, userID), "consuming an already-consumed code must be a no-op")
// An unknown user is a no-op too.
require.NoError(t, ConsumePendingCode(ctx, tx, "000000000000"))
}
// TestVerifyForUser_AttemptStateMapPersists exercises the shared per-user
// attempt map directly (the state the payments gate shares with the interactive
// endpoints): the map is bounded and a locked-out record is never evicted.
// Round 2 Loop A finding 3: when the map is full of in-window locked-out
// records, a new untracked user gets the SHARED permanently-locked state —
// treated as locked out, not handed a fresh 5-guess budget per request.
func TestVerifyForUser_AttemptStateMapPersists(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(func() {
MapMu.Lock()
Map = make(map[string]*AttemptState)
MaxTrackedAttempts = 10_000
MapMu.Unlock()
})
MapMu.Lock()
Map = make(map[string]*AttemptState)
MaxTrackedAttempts = 2
MapMu.Unlock()
// Fill the map with locked-out records; a new key must NOT evict one.
now := clock.Now()
for _, id := range []string{"victim_a", "victim_b"} {
st := &AttemptState{}
st.SetLastActive(now)
st.Count.Store(MaxAttempts)
Map[id] = st
}
st := StateFor("new_user") // saturated — shared permanently-locked state
require.True(t, st.LockedOut(clock.Now()), "an untracked user under map saturation must be treated as locked out")
MapMu.Lock()
defer MapMu.Unlock()
require.Len(t, Map, 2, "locked-out records must survive the cap pressure")
}
// TestVerifyForUser_SuccessPreservesMintCooldownStamp pins Round 2 Loop A
// finding 2: a successful verify must NOT clear the per-user mint-cooldown
// stamp (LastMintAt), so the payments re-issue path
// (reissueTwoFACodeAfterFailedCharge) can enforce its 60s cooldown against a
// charge-failure loop. Previously Check cleared the stamp on every verify,
// letting a fresh charge that failed at Square mint a new code per iteration
// with no cooldown. The stamp is cleared only at terminal success via
// ConsumePendingCode (see TestConsumePendingCode_ClearsMintCooldownStamp).
func TestVerifyForUser_SuccessPreservesMintCooldownStamp(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
st := StateFor(userID)
st.Mu.Lock()
st.LastMintAt = clock.Now().Add(-10 * time.Second)
st.Mu.Unlock()
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", DeferredConsume), "correct code must verify")
st.Mu.Lock()
defer st.Mu.Unlock()
require.False(t, st.LastMintAt.IsZero(), "a successful verify must preserve the mint-cooldown stamp (finding 2)")
}
// TestConsumePendingCode_ClearsMintCooldownStamp pins the other half of finding
// 2: the mint-cooldown stamp is cleared at TERMINAL SUCCESS — the completed-
// charge consumption path — so a customer who just completed a charge can
// immediately request a fresh code. This is the only charge-path place the
// stamp dies.
func TestConsumePendingCode_ClearsMintCooldownStamp(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
st := StateFor(userID)
st.Mu.Lock()
st.LastMintAt = clock.Now().Add(-10 * time.Second)
st.Mu.Unlock()
require.NoError(t, ConsumePendingCode(ctx, tx, userID), "terminal-success consumption must succeed")
st.Mu.Lock()
defer st.Mu.Unlock()
require.True(t, st.LastMintAt.IsZero(), "terminal-success consumption must clear the mint-cooldown stamp (finding 2)")
}
// TestStateFor_SaturatedMintStampIsNoOp pins Round 2 Loop B finding 3a: the
// SHARED saturated state must never carry a per-user mint-cooldown stamp.
// StateFor returns the package singleton to every untracked user once the map
// is at capacity, so a mint stamped on it would throttle all of them for the
// whole cooldown (one user's mint blocks everyone for 60s) and
// ClearMintCooldownForUser would clear it for everyone. The no-op keeps the
// shared stamp permanently zeroed.
func TestStateFor_SaturatedMintStampIsNoOp(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(func() {
MapMu.Lock()
Map = make(map[string]*AttemptState)
MaxTrackedAttempts = 10_000
MapMu.Unlock()
})
MapMu.Lock()
Map = make(map[string]*AttemptState)
MaxTrackedAttempts = 1
MapMu.Unlock()
now := clock.Now()
MapMu.Lock()
victim := &AttemptState{}
victim.SetLastActive(now)
victim.Count.Store(MaxAttempts) // in-window locked-out — protected from eviction
Map["victim"] = victim
MapMu.Unlock()
st := StateFor("untracked") // saturated — shared permanently-locked state
require.Same(t, st, saturatedLockedState, "a saturated map must return the shared permanently-locked state")
st.SetLastMintAtLocked(clock.Now())
require.True(t, st.LastMintAt.IsZero(), "a mint stamp written to the saturated state must be a no-op (cross-user throttle)")
ClearMintCooldownForUser("untracked")
require.True(t, st.LastMintAt.IsZero(), "clearing the cooldown for one saturated user must not touch the shared stamp")
}
// TestStateFor_NeverEvictsInWindowCounter pins Round 2 Loop B finding 3b: the
// cap-driven eviction must never drop an in-window record carrying a NON-ZERO
// attempt counter — a genuine user mid-window with failed attempts banked.
// Evicting it would silently reset the counter and grant a fresh guessing
// budget, so only count==0 in-window records (idle mint-cooldown stamps / fresh
// lookups) are evictable. When every in-window record is protected, a new key
// falls back to the shared saturated state instead.
func TestStateFor_NeverEvictsInWindowCounter(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(func() {
MapMu.Lock()
Map = make(map[string]*AttemptState)
MaxTrackedAttempts = 10_000
MapMu.Unlock()
})
MapMu.Lock()
Map = make(map[string]*AttemptState)
MaxTrackedAttempts = 2
MapMu.Unlock()
now := clock.Now()
for _, id := range []string{"genuine_a", "genuine_b"} {
st := &AttemptState{}
st.SetLastActive(now)
st.Count.Store(2) // in-progress counter, NOT locked out
Map[id] = st
}
MapMu.Lock()
require.Len(t, Map, 2)
MapMu.Unlock()
st := StateFor("new_user")
require.True(t, st.LockedOut(clock.Now()), "with every in-window record protected, a new key must fall back to the shared locked state")
MapMu.Lock()
defer MapMu.Unlock()
require.Len(t, Map, 2, "in-window records with count>0 must never be evicted (finding 3b)")
for _, id := range []string{"genuine_a", "genuine_b"} {
require.NotNil(t, Map[id], "%s must survive cap pressure", id)
}
}