Files
Crussell/backend/handlers/payments/charge_helpers.go
T
popertots 67cf5b9a45 fix: review round 6 — P0 deposit charge, idempotency rotation, dev-safety guard, 2FA/webhook hardening
Sixth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security,
context-mining). QA FAILED the deposit-required new-card flow; the P0 root
cause was backend + frontend, now fixed. All 20 packages green.

P0 money-safety:
- Deposit-required bookings now actually charge the deposit on new-card
  payment. Two-part fix: (1) CreateBookingHandler re-reads the
  trigger-maintained total_amount/total_duration_minutes from the DB after the
  booking_services insert (the INSERT..RETURNING row predates the recalc
  trigger, so TotalAmount serialized as 0 and DepositPaid computed TRUE on an
  unpaid booking — the frontend gate trusted deposit_paid:true, never charged,
  and confirmed the booking with zero payment rows); (2) BookingFlow.svelte
  gates the confirmation view on depositPaid and guards against re-creating a
  booking on retry. Regression test
  TestBookings_Create_DepositPaidFalseOnUnpaidBooking.

Payments (idempotency + money):
- deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey: no-client-key fallback now advances a
  sequence for repeatable types (partial) and rotates past refunded completed
  rows, so refund-then-repay and equal-amount partials diverge onto distinct
  keys; an un-refunded completed row keeps its key (double-charge protection
  holds). Dedup hits on refunded rows now 409, never stale success.
- chargeFailureStatus default is 503 (ambiguous), never 402; table test.
- Flaky TestBookingPayment_FullPayment_SplitsIntoDepositAndBalance fixed
  (ORDER BY payment_type).
- resolveChargeSource: orphaned card-on-file disabled via DeleteCardOnFile
  when SaveCardForUser fails (best-effort, redacted log); retry path preserved.

Square client:
- Dev builds HARD-FAIL (panic) on SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=production without
  SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API=1; sandbox routes with a loud banner.
- Mock fault-injection FailAfterCommit (commit-then-5xx) exercises the exact
  lost-response same-key retry; SimulateCardTokenUsed; 45-char idempotency-key
  cap parity; SquareEnvironment/SquareLocationID shared env helpers used by
  the sweep (env contract no longer comment-only).
- listRefunds truncation now errors (money-sensitive reconcile retries
  instead of over-refunding); getCardsOnFile truncation loudly logged.

Webhooks + 2FA:
- square-environment header checked fail-closed (403) when configured env is
  production/sandbox; dispatch DB work bounded by 30s timeout contexts.
- 2FA codes HMAC-SHA256 pepper'd (TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER) with legacy-hash
  migration + upgrade-on-verify; disable-flow mint cooldown (1/min, 429) caps
  the brute-force loop; in-lockout records never LRU-evicted.

Repo hygiene:
- env-docs CI gate green again (FRONTEND_ORIGIN + SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API +
  TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER documented; Vite DEV built-in allowlisted).
- Dead square_deposits schema dropped; obsidian/README/legal-page drift fixed
  (consumeradvice.scot signposting, CORS allowlist, p11 R3/P13, T1).
- 2FA disable residual documented; P6 email/SMS delivery and P12 sandbox
  smoke test remain the pre-go-live gates.

Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (20/20 ok),
go build ./... + -tags dev, go vet clean, svelte-check 0 errors, env-docs
gate OK, live deposit-required flow re-verified end-to-end (deposit £11
charged, square_payment_id recorded).
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00

189 lines
9.0 KiB
Go

package payments
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log"
"net/http"
"crussell/db"
"crussell/internal/square"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
)
// resolveChargeSource resolves the Square payment source for a card charge,
// shared by CreateBookingPayment, CreateTipPayment, BuyGiftCard, and the
// CreateTerminalPayment saved-card branch (which passes the booking user's id
// and a nil new-card token).
//
// New-card path (cnon: nonce): the nonce is used DIRECTLY for one-off charges
// (no card-on-file is created — the old tokenize-then-charge flow left orphan
// cards at Square). When saveCard is true the user's Square customer is
// provisioned FIRST and the card is tokenized against it (a ccof: source MUST
// carry its customer — R6), then saved via SaveCardForUser.
//
// Saved-card path (ccof:): a saved-card row predating P14 has an empty
// square_customer_id; the user's Square customer is lazily provisioned and
// persisted on the row BEFORE charging (a ccof: source can never be charged
// without a CustomerID).
//
// On any error the helper writes the HTTP response and returns ok=false — the
// caller must return immediately.
func resolveChargeSource(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, svc *PaymentService, userID string, newCardToken, cardID *string, saveCard bool, notFoundMsg string) (sourceID string, savedCardID *string, squareCustomerID string, ok bool) {
if newCardToken != nil && *newCardToken != "" {
if saveCard {
sqCustomerID, custErr := svc.EnsureSquareCustomer(ctx, userID)
if custErr != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to provision Square customer for user %s: %v", userID, custErr)
http.Error(w, "Failed to process card", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return "", nil, "", false
}
cardOnFile, err := SquareClient.CreateCardOnFile(ctx, userID, *newCardToken, sqCustomerID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to create card on file: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "Failed to process card", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return "", nil, "", false
}
sourceID = cardOnFile.CardID
squareCustomerID = sqCustomerID
// CreateCardOnFile runs before the charge. If the subsequent payment
// fails, this card-on-file is intentionally NOT deleted: the pending
// record's retry re-creates it via the deterministic sha256
// idempotency key (the SAVE path), and Square returns the same card —
// deleting it would break that retry.
savedRowID, saveErr := svc.SaveCardForUser(ctx, userID, sqCustomerID, cardOnFile.CardID, cardOnFile.Brand, cardOnFile.Last4, cardOnFile.ExpMonth, cardOnFile.ExpYear, cardOnFile.Fingerprint)
if saveErr != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to save card: %v", saveErr)
// The Square card was JUST created by this call (CreateCardOnFile
// above) but the local DB save failed, so the card-on-file is
// orphaned at Square — no user_saved_cards row references it, yet
// it is a live, chargeable card. Best-effort cleanup: disable it
// so it cannot be charged without a DB row. This is deliberately
// NOT the payment-failure path below — that path intentionally
// keeps the card so the pending record's retry re-creates it via
// the deterministic sha256 idempotency key. Here the save never
// landed, so there is no retry to preserve. A cleanup failure must
// never fail the charge: log the redacted card id so the orphan is
// auditable for manual cleanup.
if delErr := SquareClient.DeleteCardOnFile(ctx, cardOnFile.CardID); delErr != nil {
log.Printf("WARN: created Square card %s not disabled after local save failed — orphan card-on-file requires manual cleanup: %v", square.TokenPrefix(cardOnFile.CardID), delErr)
}
} else {
savedCardID = &savedRowID
}
} else {
// One-off new-card charge: use the cnon: nonce DIRECTLY as the
// source. No card-on-file is created (nothing to orphan, no
// customer needed).
sourceID = *newCardToken
}
if savedCardID == nil && saveCard {
// sourceID is cardOnFile.CardID on this branch (the ccof card).
log.Printf("Card was not saved despite save_card=true for user %s (card %s)", userID, square.TokenPrefix(sourceID))
}
return sourceID, savedCardID, squareCustomerID, true
}
if cardID != nil {
card, err := svc.GetCardByID(ctx, *cardID, userID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
http.Error(w, notFoundMsg, http.StatusNotFound)
return "", nil, "", false
}
log.Printf("Failed to get card: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return "", nil, "", false
}
if card.SquareCustomerID == "" {
if userID == "" {
// Defensive parity with the original saved-card block: a card
// with no bookable owner cannot be provisioned. Unreachable in
// practice — GetCardByID above filters on user_id and would
// have 404'd for an empty owner.
http.Error(w, "Saved card has no owner and cannot be charged", http.StatusBadRequest)
return "", nil, "", false
}
provisioned, provErr := svc.EnsureSquareCustomerForSavedCard(ctx, *cardID, userID)
if provErr != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to provision Square customer for saved card %s (user %s): %v", *cardID, userID, provErr)
http.Error(w, "Failed to process card", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return "", nil, "", false
}
card.SquareCustomerID = provisioned
}
return card.SquareCardID, cardID, card.SquareCustomerID, true
}
// Neither a new-card token nor a saved card — validation upstream
// (ValidateCardInfo) guarantees one of them is present.
return "", nil, "", false
}
// acquireBookingPaymentLock acquires a pinned pool connection and a bounded
// try-lock (R6) on lockKey, serializing payment attempts per booking (the core
// defence against the two-tab double-payment race). A blocking pg_advisory_lock
// would hold the pinned pool connection for the full Square round-trip of
// whichever request holds the lock; the bounded try-lock loop gives up after
// ~3s and surfaces a 409 instead of exhausting the pool. On any failure the
// helper writes the HTTP response and returns ok=false — the caller must
// return. On success the caller MUST defer releaseBookingPaymentLock(pinConn,
// lockKey): the lock and connection stay held for the whole handler so
// pg_advisory_unlock runs on the SAME session that acquired the lock.
func acquireBookingPaymentLock(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, lockKey, conflictMsg string) (*pgxpool.Conn, bool) {
pinConn, err := db.Conn.Acquire(ctx)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to acquire connection for payment lock (%s): %v", lockKey, err)
http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return nil, false
}
lockOK, err := acquireAdvisoryLock(ctx, pinConn, lockKey)
if err != nil {
pinConn.Release()
log.Printf("Failed to acquire payment serialization lock %s: %v", lockKey, err)
http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return nil, false
}
if !lockOK {
pinConn.Release()
log.Printf("Payment serialization lock %s not acquired within bound — a payment is already in progress", lockKey)
http.Error(w, conflictMsg, http.StatusConflict)
return nil, false
}
return pinConn, true
}
// releaseBookingPaymentLock releases the advisory lock acquired by
// acquireBookingPaymentLock and returns the pinned connection to the pool.
// Both run on the same session that holds the lock.
func releaseBookingPaymentLock(pinConn *pgxpool.Conn, lockKey string) {
if _, err := pinConn.Exec(context.Background(), `
SELECT pg_advisory_unlock(hashtext($1))
`, lockKey); err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to release payment serialization lock %s: %v", lockKey, err)
}
pinConn.Release()
}
// recheckBookingPayable re-reads the booking status after a Square charge
// succeeded (R9): a concurrent cancellation/eviction can move the booking out
// of a payable state between the pre-charge status check and the charge
// completing. A charge landing on a cancelled/lapsed/no-show booking must NOT
// be recorded as a completed payment — the cancellation refund path computes
// refunds from completed payments and would silently exclude it. Returns the
// re-read status and whether a completed payment is still allowed; the caller
// owns the CRITICAL logging, the mark-failed write (whose target and
// transaction semantics differ per path), and the 409 conflict response.
func recheckBookingPayable(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingID string) (string, bool, error) {
var status string
// FOR UPDATE (C5): a concurrent cancellation takes the same row lock and
// commits before this transaction commits, so the recheck cannot observe a
// status that changes between the read and the commit. Without the lock a
// cancellation could slip in between, leaving a completed payment on a
// cancelled booking with no refund.
if err := q.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT status FROM bookings WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE`, bookingID).Scan(&status); err != nil {
return "", false, err
}
return status, bookingStatusAllowsCompletedPayment(status), nil
}