Sixth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security, context-mining). QA FAILED the deposit-required new-card flow; the P0 root cause was backend + frontend, now fixed. All 20 packages green. P0 money-safety: - Deposit-required bookings now actually charge the deposit on new-card payment. Two-part fix: (1) CreateBookingHandler re-reads the trigger-maintained total_amount/total_duration_minutes from the DB after the booking_services insert (the INSERT..RETURNING row predates the recalc trigger, so TotalAmount serialized as 0 and DepositPaid computed TRUE on an unpaid booking — the frontend gate trusted deposit_paid:true, never charged, and confirmed the booking with zero payment rows); (2) BookingFlow.svelte gates the confirmation view on depositPaid and guards against re-creating a booking on retry. Regression test TestBookings_Create_DepositPaidFalseOnUnpaidBooking. Payments (idempotency + money): - deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey: no-client-key fallback now advances a sequence for repeatable types (partial) and rotates past refunded completed rows, so refund-then-repay and equal-amount partials diverge onto distinct keys; an un-refunded completed row keeps its key (double-charge protection holds). Dedup hits on refunded rows now 409, never stale success. - chargeFailureStatus default is 503 (ambiguous), never 402; table test. - Flaky TestBookingPayment_FullPayment_SplitsIntoDepositAndBalance fixed (ORDER BY payment_type). - resolveChargeSource: orphaned card-on-file disabled via DeleteCardOnFile when SaveCardForUser fails (best-effort, redacted log); retry path preserved. Square client: - Dev builds HARD-FAIL (panic) on SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=production without SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API=1; sandbox routes with a loud banner. - Mock fault-injection FailAfterCommit (commit-then-5xx) exercises the exact lost-response same-key retry; SimulateCardTokenUsed; 45-char idempotency-key cap parity; SquareEnvironment/SquareLocationID shared env helpers used by the sweep (env contract no longer comment-only). - listRefunds truncation now errors (money-sensitive reconcile retries instead of over-refunding); getCardsOnFile truncation loudly logged. Webhooks + 2FA: - square-environment header checked fail-closed (403) when configured env is production/sandbox; dispatch DB work bounded by 30s timeout contexts. - 2FA codes HMAC-SHA256 pepper'd (TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER) with legacy-hash migration + upgrade-on-verify; disable-flow mint cooldown (1/min, 429) caps the brute-force loop; in-lockout records never LRU-evicted. Repo hygiene: - env-docs CI gate green again (FRONTEND_ORIGIN + SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API + TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER documented; Vite DEV built-in allowlisted). - Dead square_deposits schema dropped; obsidian/README/legal-page drift fixed (consumeradvice.scot signposting, CORS allowlist, p11 R3/P13, T1). - 2FA disable residual documented; P6 email/SMS delivery and P12 sandbox smoke test remain the pre-go-live gates. Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (20/20 ok), go build ./... + -tags dev, go vet clean, svelte-check 0 errors, env-docs gate OK, live deposit-required flow re-verified end-to-end (deposit £11 charged, square_payment_id recorded).
189 lines
9.0 KiB
Go
189 lines
9.0 KiB
Go
package payments
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"crussell/db"
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"crussell/internal/square"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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)
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// resolveChargeSource resolves the Square payment source for a card charge,
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// shared by CreateBookingPayment, CreateTipPayment, BuyGiftCard, and the
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// CreateTerminalPayment saved-card branch (which passes the booking user's id
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// and a nil new-card token).
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//
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// New-card path (cnon: nonce): the nonce is used DIRECTLY for one-off charges
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// (no card-on-file is created — the old tokenize-then-charge flow left orphan
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// cards at Square). When saveCard is true the user's Square customer is
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// provisioned FIRST and the card is tokenized against it (a ccof: source MUST
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// carry its customer — R6), then saved via SaveCardForUser.
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//
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// Saved-card path (ccof:): a saved-card row predating P14 has an empty
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// square_customer_id; the user's Square customer is lazily provisioned and
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// persisted on the row BEFORE charging (a ccof: source can never be charged
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// without a CustomerID).
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//
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// On any error the helper writes the HTTP response and returns ok=false — the
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// caller must return immediately.
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func resolveChargeSource(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, svc *PaymentService, userID string, newCardToken, cardID *string, saveCard bool, notFoundMsg string) (sourceID string, savedCardID *string, squareCustomerID string, ok bool) {
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if newCardToken != nil && *newCardToken != "" {
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if saveCard {
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sqCustomerID, custErr := svc.EnsureSquareCustomer(ctx, userID)
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if custErr != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to provision Square customer for user %s: %v", userID, custErr)
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http.Error(w, "Failed to process card", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return "", nil, "", false
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}
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cardOnFile, err := SquareClient.CreateCardOnFile(ctx, userID, *newCardToken, sqCustomerID)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to create card on file: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "Failed to process card", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return "", nil, "", false
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}
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sourceID = cardOnFile.CardID
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squareCustomerID = sqCustomerID
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// CreateCardOnFile runs before the charge. If the subsequent payment
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// fails, this card-on-file is intentionally NOT deleted: the pending
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// record's retry re-creates it via the deterministic sha256
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// idempotency key (the SAVE path), and Square returns the same card —
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// deleting it would break that retry.
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savedRowID, saveErr := svc.SaveCardForUser(ctx, userID, sqCustomerID, cardOnFile.CardID, cardOnFile.Brand, cardOnFile.Last4, cardOnFile.ExpMonth, cardOnFile.ExpYear, cardOnFile.Fingerprint)
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if saveErr != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to save card: %v", saveErr)
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// The Square card was JUST created by this call (CreateCardOnFile
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// above) but the local DB save failed, so the card-on-file is
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// orphaned at Square — no user_saved_cards row references it, yet
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// it is a live, chargeable card. Best-effort cleanup: disable it
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// so it cannot be charged without a DB row. This is deliberately
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// NOT the payment-failure path below — that path intentionally
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// keeps the card so the pending record's retry re-creates it via
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// the deterministic sha256 idempotency key. Here the save never
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// landed, so there is no retry to preserve. A cleanup failure must
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// never fail the charge: log the redacted card id so the orphan is
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// auditable for manual cleanup.
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if delErr := SquareClient.DeleteCardOnFile(ctx, cardOnFile.CardID); delErr != nil {
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log.Printf("WARN: created Square card %s not disabled after local save failed — orphan card-on-file requires manual cleanup: %v", square.TokenPrefix(cardOnFile.CardID), delErr)
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}
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} else {
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savedCardID = &savedRowID
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}
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} else {
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// One-off new-card charge: use the cnon: nonce DIRECTLY as the
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// source. No card-on-file is created (nothing to orphan, no
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// customer needed).
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sourceID = *newCardToken
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}
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if savedCardID == nil && saveCard {
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// sourceID is cardOnFile.CardID on this branch (the ccof card).
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log.Printf("Card was not saved despite save_card=true for user %s (card %s)", userID, square.TokenPrefix(sourceID))
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}
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return sourceID, savedCardID, squareCustomerID, true
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}
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if cardID != nil {
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card, err := svc.GetCardByID(ctx, *cardID, userID)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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http.Error(w, notFoundMsg, http.StatusNotFound)
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return "", nil, "", false
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}
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log.Printf("Failed to get card: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return "", nil, "", false
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}
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if card.SquareCustomerID == "" {
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if userID == "" {
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// Defensive parity with the original saved-card block: a card
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// with no bookable owner cannot be provisioned. Unreachable in
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// practice — GetCardByID above filters on user_id and would
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// have 404'd for an empty owner.
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http.Error(w, "Saved card has no owner and cannot be charged", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return "", nil, "", false
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}
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provisioned, provErr := svc.EnsureSquareCustomerForSavedCard(ctx, *cardID, userID)
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if provErr != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to provision Square customer for saved card %s (user %s): %v", *cardID, userID, provErr)
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http.Error(w, "Failed to process card", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return "", nil, "", false
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}
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card.SquareCustomerID = provisioned
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}
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return card.SquareCardID, cardID, card.SquareCustomerID, true
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}
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// Neither a new-card token nor a saved card — validation upstream
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// (ValidateCardInfo) guarantees one of them is present.
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return "", nil, "", false
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}
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// acquireBookingPaymentLock acquires a pinned pool connection and a bounded
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// try-lock (R6) on lockKey, serializing payment attempts per booking (the core
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// defence against the two-tab double-payment race). A blocking pg_advisory_lock
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// would hold the pinned pool connection for the full Square round-trip of
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// whichever request holds the lock; the bounded try-lock loop gives up after
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// ~3s and surfaces a 409 instead of exhausting the pool. On any failure the
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// helper writes the HTTP response and returns ok=false — the caller must
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// return. On success the caller MUST defer releaseBookingPaymentLock(pinConn,
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// lockKey): the lock and connection stay held for the whole handler so
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// pg_advisory_unlock runs on the SAME session that acquired the lock.
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func acquireBookingPaymentLock(ctx context.Context, w http.ResponseWriter, lockKey, conflictMsg string) (*pgxpool.Conn, bool) {
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pinConn, err := db.Conn.Acquire(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to acquire connection for payment lock (%s): %v", lockKey, err)
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http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return nil, false
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}
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lockOK, err := acquireAdvisoryLock(ctx, pinConn, lockKey)
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if err != nil {
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pinConn.Release()
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log.Printf("Failed to acquire payment serialization lock %s: %v", lockKey, err)
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http.Error(w, "internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return nil, false
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}
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if !lockOK {
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pinConn.Release()
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log.Printf("Payment serialization lock %s not acquired within bound — a payment is already in progress", lockKey)
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http.Error(w, conflictMsg, http.StatusConflict)
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return nil, false
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}
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return pinConn, true
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}
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// releaseBookingPaymentLock releases the advisory lock acquired by
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// acquireBookingPaymentLock and returns the pinned connection to the pool.
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// Both run on the same session that holds the lock.
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func releaseBookingPaymentLock(pinConn *pgxpool.Conn, lockKey string) {
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if _, err := pinConn.Exec(context.Background(), `
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SELECT pg_advisory_unlock(hashtext($1))
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`, lockKey); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to release payment serialization lock %s: %v", lockKey, err)
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}
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pinConn.Release()
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}
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// recheckBookingPayable re-reads the booking status after a Square charge
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// succeeded (R9): a concurrent cancellation/eviction can move the booking out
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// of a payable state between the pre-charge status check and the charge
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// completing. A charge landing on a cancelled/lapsed/no-show booking must NOT
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// be recorded as a completed payment — the cancellation refund path computes
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// refunds from completed payments and would silently exclude it. Returns the
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// re-read status and whether a completed payment is still allowed; the caller
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// owns the CRITICAL logging, the mark-failed write (whose target and
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// transaction semantics differ per path), and the 409 conflict response.
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func recheckBookingPayable(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, bookingID string) (string, bool, error) {
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var status string
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// FOR UPDATE (C5): a concurrent cancellation takes the same row lock and
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// commits before this transaction commits, so the recheck cannot observe a
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// status that changes between the read and the commit. Without the lock a
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// cancellation could slip in between, leaving a completed payment on a
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// cancelled booking with no refund.
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if err := q.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT status FROM bookings WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE`, bookingID).Scan(&status); err != nil {
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return "", false, err
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}
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return status, bookingStatusAllowsCompletedPayment(status), nil
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}
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