Files
Crussell/backend/handlers/webhooks/webhooks_test.go
T
popertots 67cf5b9a45 fix: review round 6 — P0 deposit charge, idempotency rotation, dev-safety guard, 2FA/webhook hardening
Sixth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security,
context-mining). QA FAILED the deposit-required new-card flow; the P0 root
cause was backend + frontend, now fixed. All 20 packages green.

P0 money-safety:
- Deposit-required bookings now actually charge the deposit on new-card
  payment. Two-part fix: (1) CreateBookingHandler re-reads the
  trigger-maintained total_amount/total_duration_minutes from the DB after the
  booking_services insert (the INSERT..RETURNING row predates the recalc
  trigger, so TotalAmount serialized as 0 and DepositPaid computed TRUE on an
  unpaid booking — the frontend gate trusted deposit_paid:true, never charged,
  and confirmed the booking with zero payment rows); (2) BookingFlow.svelte
  gates the confirmation view on depositPaid and guards against re-creating a
  booking on retry. Regression test
  TestBookings_Create_DepositPaidFalseOnUnpaidBooking.

Payments (idempotency + money):
- deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey: no-client-key fallback now advances a
  sequence for repeatable types (partial) and rotates past refunded completed
  rows, so refund-then-repay and equal-amount partials diverge onto distinct
  keys; an un-refunded completed row keeps its key (double-charge protection
  holds). Dedup hits on refunded rows now 409, never stale success.
- chargeFailureStatus default is 503 (ambiguous), never 402; table test.
- Flaky TestBookingPayment_FullPayment_SplitsIntoDepositAndBalance fixed
  (ORDER BY payment_type).
- resolveChargeSource: orphaned card-on-file disabled via DeleteCardOnFile
  when SaveCardForUser fails (best-effort, redacted log); retry path preserved.

Square client:
- Dev builds HARD-FAIL (panic) on SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=production without
  SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API=1; sandbox routes with a loud banner.
- Mock fault-injection FailAfterCommit (commit-then-5xx) exercises the exact
  lost-response same-key retry; SimulateCardTokenUsed; 45-char idempotency-key
  cap parity; SquareEnvironment/SquareLocationID shared env helpers used by
  the sweep (env contract no longer comment-only).
- listRefunds truncation now errors (money-sensitive reconcile retries
  instead of over-refunding); getCardsOnFile truncation loudly logged.

Webhooks + 2FA:
- square-environment header checked fail-closed (403) when configured env is
  production/sandbox; dispatch DB work bounded by 30s timeout contexts.
- 2FA codes HMAC-SHA256 pepper'd (TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER) with legacy-hash
  migration + upgrade-on-verify; disable-flow mint cooldown (1/min, 429) caps
  the brute-force loop; in-lockout records never LRU-evicted.

Repo hygiene:
- env-docs CI gate green again (FRONTEND_ORIGIN + SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API +
  TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER documented; Vite DEV built-in allowlisted).
- Dead square_deposits schema dropped; obsidian/README/legal-page drift fixed
  (consumeradvice.scot signposting, CORS allowlist, p11 R3/P13, T1).
- 2FA disable residual documented; P6 email/SMS delivery and P12 sandbox
  smoke test remain the pre-go-live gates.

Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (20/20 ok),
go build ./... + -tags dev, go vet clean, svelte-check 0 errors, env-docs
gate OK, live deposit-required flow re-verified end-to-end (deposit £11
charged, square_payment_id recorded).
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00

758 lines
26 KiB
Go

//go:build test
package webhooks
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"unicode/utf8"
"crussell/db"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
)
// =============================================================================
// Unit tests — verifySquareSignature (pure function)
// =============================================================================
func TestVerifySquareSignature_ValidSignature(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_1"}`)
key := "test-signing-key"
notificationURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
payload := notificationURL + string(body)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
mac.Write([]byte(payload))
expectedSig := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
if !verifySquareSignature(body, expectedSig, key, notificationURL) {
t.Error("expected valid signature to verify")
}
}
func TestVerifySquareSignature_InvalidSignature(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated"}`)
key := "test-signing-key"
notificationURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
if verifySquareSignature(body, "invalid-signature", key, notificationURL) {
t.Error("expected invalid signature to fail")
}
}
func TestVerifySquareSignature_WrongKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated"}`)
notificationURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
payload := notificationURL + string(body)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte("correct-key"))
mac.Write([]byte(payload))
sig := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
// Verify with a different key
if verifySquareSignature(body, sig, "wrong-key", notificationURL) {
t.Error("expected wrong key to produce failing verification")
}
}
func TestVerifySquareSignature_EmptyBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
key := "test-signing-key"
notificationURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
payload := notificationURL + string([]byte{})
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
mac.Write([]byte(payload))
expectedSig := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
if !verifySquareSignature([]byte{}, expectedSig, key, notificationURL) {
t.Error("expected empty body verification to succeed with matching signature")
}
}
func TestVerifySquareSignature_TamperedBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_1"}`)
key := "test-signing-key"
notificationURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
payload := notificationURL + string(body)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
mac.Write([]byte(payload))
sig := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
// Verify with a tampered body
tamperedBody := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_2"}`)
if verifySquareSignature(tamperedBody, sig, key, notificationURL) {
t.Error("expected tampered body to fail verification")
}
}
func TestTruncateDisputeReason_RuneSafe(t *testing.T) {
// 191 ASCII bytes + a 4-byte emoji: byte-slicing at 192 would split the
// emoji into an incomplete rune (invalid UTF-8). Rune-safe truncation must
// keep the whole emoji and stay valid UTF-8.
edge := strings.Repeat("a", 191) + "\U0001F600"
got := truncateDisputeReason(edge)
if !utf8.ValidString(got) {
t.Errorf("expected valid UTF-8 after truncation, got %q", got)
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(got, "\U0001F600") {
t.Errorf("expected the 4-byte rune to be preserved intact, got %q", got)
}
if len(got) != 195 { // 191 ASCII + 4-byte emoji
t.Errorf("expected 195 bytes (191 ASCII + 4-byte emoji), got %d", len(got))
}
// An over-long multi-byte reason truncates to exactly 192 runes.
got = truncateDisputeReason(strings.Repeat("界", 300))
if r := []rune(got); len(r) != 192 {
t.Errorf("expected exactly 192 runes after truncation, got %d", len(r))
}
if !utf8.ValidString(got) {
t.Errorf("expected valid UTF-8 after truncation, got %q", got)
}
// Short and ASCII reasons pass through untouched.
if got := truncateDisputeReason("NO_KNOWLEDGE"); got != "NO_KNOWLEDGE" {
t.Errorf("expected short reason unchanged, got %q", got)
}
}
// =============================================================================
// Integration tests — HandleSquareWebhook
// =============================================================================
func makeWebhookRequest(body []byte, signature string, ctx context.Context) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/webhooks/square", bytes.NewReader(body))
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if signature != "" {
req.Header.Set("x-square-hmacsha256-signature", signature)
}
HandleSquareWebhook(w, req)
return w
}
// makeWebhookRequestWithEnv is makeWebhookRequest plus an explicit
// square-environment header (Square sends one on every real delivery).
func makeWebhookRequestWithEnv(body []byte, signature, env string, ctx context.Context) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/webhooks/square", bytes.NewReader(body))
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if signature != "" {
req.Header.Set("x-square-hmacsha256-signature", signature)
}
if env != "" {
req.Header.Set("square-environment", env)
}
HandleSquareWebhook(w, req)
return w
}
// webhookTestEnv sets a signing key and returns a valid signature for the body
// (the fail-closed handler requires a verifiable signature on every request).
func webhookTestEnv(t *testing.T, body []byte) (signature string) {
t.Helper()
tKey := "test-signing-key"
tURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(tKey))
mac.Write([]byte(tURL))
mac.Write(body)
t.Setenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY", tKey)
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
}
// countWebhookEvents returns how many dedup rows exist for an event_id. The
// handler commits its dedup insert to the pool (no per-test transaction), so a
// fresh query sees it.
func countWebhookEvents(t *testing.T, eventID string) int {
t.Helper()
var n int
if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(context.Background(),
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM square_webhook_events WHERE event_id = $1", eventID).Scan(&n); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to count square_webhook_events rows: %v", err)
}
return n
}
// testDBHost mirrors testdb.dbHost so the broken-pool test can reach the same
// Postgres instance without importing testdb internals.
func testDBHost() string {
if h := os.Getenv("TEST_DB_HOST"); h != "" {
return h
}
if h := os.Getenv("POSTGRES_HOST"); h != "" {
return h
}
return "localhost"
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_PaymentUpdated(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_payment_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if w.Body.String() != "ok" {
t.Errorf("expected body 'ok', got %q", w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_RefundUpdated(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "refund.updated",
EventID: "evt_refund_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"refund_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_DisputeCreated(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "dispute.created",
EventID: "evt_dispute_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"dispute_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200 for dispute.created, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_UnknownEventType(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "invoice.created",
EventID: "evt_unknown_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"inv_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200 for unknown event type, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_InvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
body := []byte(`{invalid json}`)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400 for invalid JSON, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestHandleSquareWebhook_EmptyEventID_Rejected verifies a signed event with an
// empty event_id is rejected with 400 — fail-safe: no dispatch, no dedup row.
// Square's retry policy treats 4xx as non-retryable, so the malformed event is
// dropped without side effects.
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_EmptyEventID_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"","data":{"id":"payment_empty_id"}}`)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
var buf bytes.Buffer
oldOutput := log.Writer()
log.SetOutput(&buf)
defer log.SetOutput(oldOutput)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400 for empty event_id, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
out := buf.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "Rejecting event with empty event_id (400)") {
t.Errorf("expected empty event_id rejection log, got:\n%s", out)
}
if strings.Contains(out, "Received event: payment.updated") {
t.Errorf("expected empty event_id to skip dispatch, got:\n%s", out)
}
// No dedup row may be written for an empty event_id.
if n := countWebhookEvents(t, ""); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected no dedup row for empty event_id, got %d", n)
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_BodyTooLarge(t *testing.T) {
// 600KB body exceeds the 512KB limit
largeBody := []byte(strings.Repeat("a", 600*1024))
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, largeBody)
w := makeWebhookRequest(largeBody, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("expected 413 for oversized body, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_ValidSignatureWithEnvKey(t *testing.T) {
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_1"}`)
key := "env-signing-key"
notificationURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
payload := notificationURL + string(body)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
mac.Write([]byte(payload))
sig := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
t.Setenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY", key)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200 with valid signature, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_InvalidSignatureWithEnvKey(t *testing.T) {
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_1"}`)
t.Setenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY", "env-signing-key")
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, "bad-signature", context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("expected 403 with invalid signature, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_NoSignatureWhenKeySet(t *testing.T) {
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_1"}`)
t.Setenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY", "env-signing-key")
// No x-square-signature header at all
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, "", context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("expected 403 when signature key is set but header missing, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_RejectedWhenKeyEmpty(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY", "")
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_1"}`)
// Fail-closed: an unset signing key means the webhook cannot be verified,
// so the request is rejected rather than accepted with a bad signature.
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, "some-signature", context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
t.Errorf("expected 503 when no key configured (fail-closed), got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_NoRawPayloadInLogs(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_pii_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_pii_1","buyer_email_address":"secret@example.com",
"card_details":{"card":{"brand":"VISA","last_4":"1234","cardholder_name":"Jane Doe"}}}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
var buf bytes.Buffer
oldOutput := log.Writer()
log.SetOutput(&buf)
defer log.SetOutput(oldOutput)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
out := buf.String()
for _, pii := range []string{"secret@example.com", "VISA", "1234", "Jane Doe", "payment_pii_1_full"} {
if strings.Contains(out, pii) {
t.Errorf("log output leaked PII %q:\n%s", pii, out)
}
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "data.id=payment_pii_1") {
t.Errorf("expected log to include object id, got:\n%s", out)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "Received event: payment.updated") {
t.Errorf("expected log to reference event type, got:\n%s", out)
}
}
// =============================================================================
// Dedup — event_id replay protection
// =============================================================================
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_DuplicateEventID(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_http_dup_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_dup_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
// First delivery processes the event.
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected first delivery 200, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
// Replay of the same signed event returns 200 but skips dispatch.
w2 := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w2.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected replay 200, got %d. body: %s", w2.Code, w2.Body.String())
}
if w2.Body.String() != "ok" {
t.Errorf("expected replay body 'ok', got %q", w2.Body.String())
}
// The persistent dedup row is written exactly once despite both deliveries.
if n := countWebhookEvents(t, event.EventID); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected exactly 1 persisted dedup row, got %d", n)
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_DistinctEventIDs(t *testing.T) {
for _, id := range []string{"evt_distinct_1", "evt_distinct_2"} {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: id,
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"p"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 for %s, got %d. body: %s", id, w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
}
func TestSquareWebhookDedup_FirstThenDuplicate(t *testing.T) {
d := newSquareWebhookDedup(1000)
if d.register("evt_dedup_1") {
t.Error("expected first occurrence to register as new")
}
if !d.register("evt_dedup_1") {
t.Error("expected second occurrence to register as duplicate")
}
}
func TestSquareWebhookDedup_CapEvictsOldest(t *testing.T) {
d := newSquareWebhookDedup(3)
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
if d.register(fmt.Sprintf("evt_cap_%d", i)) {
t.Errorf("expected evt_cap_%d to register as new", i)
}
}
// The 4th distinct ID pushes out the oldest (evt_cap_0).
if d.register("evt_cap_3") {
t.Errorf("expected evt_cap_3 to register as new")
}
// Survivors still dedupe (register returns true without mutating the set).
for _, id := range []string{"evt_cap_1", "evt_cap_2", "evt_cap_3"} {
if !d.register(id) {
t.Errorf("expected %s to still be a duplicate", id)
}
}
// The evicted ID is treated as new again.
if d.register("evt_cap_0") {
t.Errorf("expected evt_cap_0 to be evicted and treated as new")
}
}
func TestSquareWebhookDedup_HasDoesNotRecord(t *testing.T) {
d := newSquareWebhookDedup(3)
if d.has("evt_has_1") {
t.Error("expected has() on empty set to return false")
}
if d.register("evt_has_1") {
t.Error("expected first register to report new")
}
if !d.has("evt_has_1") {
t.Error("expected has() to observe a registered id")
}
}
// TestHandleSquareWebhook_DedupDispatchOnce verifies the handler body runs
// exactly once across a delivery + replay, with a single persisted dedup row.
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_DedupDispatchOnce(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_dispatch_once_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_dispatch_once_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
var buf bytes.Buffer
oldOutput := log.Writer()
log.SetOutput(&buf)
defer log.SetOutput(oldOutput)
w1 := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w1.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected first delivery 200, got %d. body: %s", w1.Code, w1.Body.String())
}
w2 := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w2.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected replay 200, got %d. body: %s", w2.Code, w2.Body.String())
}
if w2.Body.String() != "ok" {
t.Errorf("expected replay body 'ok', got %q", w2.Body.String())
}
out := buf.String()
if got := strings.Count(out, "Received event: payment.updated"); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected dispatch to run exactly once, saw %d 'Received event' log lines:\n%s", got, out)
}
if n := countWebhookEvents(t, event.EventID); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected exactly 1 persisted dedup row, got %d", n)
}
}
// TestHandleSquareWebhook_DedupPersistsAcrossRestart simulates a restart: the
// event was handled by a previous process whose in-memory cache is gone, but
// the dedup row survived in the DB. The dedup row now commits AFTER dispatch
// (at-least-once delivery), so a replayed delivery is re-dispatched — the
// idempotent status-guarded handlers are a no-op the second time — and is
// acknowledged 200 without duplicating the persisted dedup row.
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_DedupPersistsAcrossRestart(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_restart_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_restart_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(context.Background(),
"INSERT INTO square_webhook_events (event_id) VALUES ($1) ON CONFLICT (event_id) DO NOTHING", event.EventID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to seed dedup row: %v", err)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
oldOutput := log.Writer()
log.SetOutput(&buf)
defer log.SetOutput(oldOutput)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 for replayed event, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if w.Body.String() != "ok" {
t.Errorf("expected body 'ok', got %q", w.Body.String())
}
if out := buf.String(); !strings.Contains(out, "Received event: payment.updated") {
t.Errorf("expected replayed event to be re-dispatched (at-least-once), got:\n%s", out)
}
if n := countWebhookEvents(t, event.EventID); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected still exactly 1 dedup row, got %d", n)
}
}
// TestHandleSquareWebhook_DedupInsertFails_FailsClosed verifies the handler
// rejects (503) when the dedup INSERT cannot be persisted, so Square retries.
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_DedupInsertFails_FailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_db_down_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_db_down_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
orig := db.Conn
defer func() { db.Conn = orig }()
// A pool whose database does not exist fails every Exec — simulating a DB
// that is unreachable or down.
badDSN := fmt.Sprintf("postgres://myuser:mypassword@%s:5432/crussell_test_webhooks_nonexistent?sslmode=disable", testDBHost())
badPool, err := pgxpool.New(context.Background(), badDSN)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create broken pool: %v", err)
}
defer badPool.Close()
db.Conn = db.NewPoolProxy(badPool)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
t.Fatalf("expected 503 when dedup write fails, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestHandleSquareWebhook_DedupNilConn_FailsClosed verifies the handler also
// rejects (503) when the DB was never wired at all (defensive fail-closed).
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_DedupNilConn_FailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_nil_conn_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_nil_conn_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
orig := db.Conn
db.Conn = nil
defer func() { db.Conn = orig }()
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
t.Fatalf("expected 503 when DB is not wired, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// =============================================================================
// square-environment header validation (finding a)
// =============================================================================
// TestHandleSquareWebhook_EnvMismatch_Rejected verifies fail-closed behavior: a
// correctly-signed event carrying a square-environment header that contradicts
// the configured SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT (e.g. a sandbox subscription mis-pointed at
// the production URL + key) is rejected with 403. 403 is correct here because
// the mismatch is a permanent configuration error — Square treats 4xx as
// non-retryable, so the retry loop stops instead of hammering a condition no
// retry can fix. No dispatch and no dedup row.
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_EnvMismatch_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT", "production")
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_env_mismatch_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_env_mismatch_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequestWithEnv(body, sig, "sandbox", context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("expected 403 on environment mismatch, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if n := countWebhookEvents(t, event.EventID); n != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected no dedup row for a rejected event, got %d", n)
}
}
// TestHandleSquareWebhook_EnvMatch_Accepted verifies a matching environment
// header passes the check and dispatches normally.
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_EnvMatch_Accepted(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT", "production")
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_env_match_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_env_match_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequestWithEnv(body, sig, "production", context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 on matching environment, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if n := countWebhookEvents(t, event.EventID); n != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected 1 dedup row after successful dispatch, got %d", n)
}
}
// TestHandleSquareWebhook_EnvHeaderAbsent_Allowed verifies an absent header is
// allowed through (local mock/dev posting), even in an enforced deployment —
// the signature check remains the authentication gate.
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_EnvHeaderAbsent_Allowed(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT", "production")
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_env_absent_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_env_absent_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequestWithEnv(body, sig, "", context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 when the environment header is absent, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// TestHandleSquareWebhook_EnvMismatch_DevNotEnforced verifies the header check
// is NOT enforced when the configured SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT is a dev/mock value
// (the same interpretation IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv uses elsewhere), so a header
// carrying "sandbox" against an explicit "mock" config still dispatches.
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_EnvMismatch_DevNotEnforced(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT", "mock")
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_env_dev_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_env_dev_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequestWithEnv(body, sig, "sandbox", context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 in dev mode (check not enforced), got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// =============================================================================
// Bounded post-dispatch DB contexts (finding b)
// =============================================================================
// TestWebhookDBContext_HasTimeout verifies webhookDBContext returns a
// Background-derived context with a deadline, so a hung DB call cannot hold a
// pgx pool connection forever while still surviving a client disconnect.
func TestWebhookDBContext_HasTimeout(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := webhookDBContext()
defer cancel()
deadline, ok := ctx.Deadline()
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected webhookDBContext to carry a deadline")
}
if remaining := time.Until(deadline); remaining <= 0 || remaining > webhookDBTimeout {
t.Errorf("expected remaining budget within (0, %v], got %v", webhookDBTimeout, remaining)
}
if got := ctx.Err(); got != nil {
t.Errorf("expected a fresh context to be active, got %v", got)
}
}