Files
Crussell/backend/handlers/webhooks/square.go
T
popertots 78e6d00dc5 fix: payments review rounds — money-safety, GDPR, security, gift-card cancel, modal stacking
Money-safety:
- Deterministic till idempotency fallback (Square-charging only); cash/on_the_house keep unique keys; £250 till gift-card cap; 45-char key validation
- Gift-card admin caps £250/tx + £5,000/day; user buy £500/day; BuyGiftCard allowlist unchanged
- CancelGiftCard: CCR 2013 14-day right with partial-spend refund of the unspent balance (spend verified via payments.gift_card_id); atomic vs redeem/transfer; refunds stay pending until reversal commits; admin cancel surface (AdminCancelGiftCard)
- Sweep: cancelled-booking charges failed+notified instead of silently completed; source-override replay uses live square_source_id; legacy square-less refund sweep; snapshot refresh on pending reuse
- Refund lock consolidation; recordTerminalPaymentTx shared recorder; structured Square error codes; terminal checkout CustomerID

GDPR / security:
- Notes retained as de-identified medical/safety record at erasure (single field treated as health data; rest of record wiped, no re-identification map) + comments updated per UK GDPR/Art 9/Equality Act 2010
- square_request_snapshot PII scrubbed on all erasure paths; delete_guest_user FK unlinks; verification codes + dispute reasons handled; idle/stale-guest erasure deletes Square cards/customers + CardDAV/R2
- Durable square-erasure outbox job (retry-square-erasures); 2FA dev/prod build split, pepper fail-closed, no prod code-in-log; prod 2FA delivery fail-loud without a channel
- Webhook unknown-type family split (non-money acked, money retried); untracked dispute notifications; rate-limit CF/X-Real-IP trust gating; nginx CSP nonce + api_limit

Frontend:
- Dynamic z-index stack (ui/dialog/zindex.ts) claimed in open order via data-state observer; re-claims on every reopen; removes stale !z-* overrides — nested modals (booking→user→booking) always paint newest-on-top (browser-verified 3-level + reopen)
- Mobile: iOS zoom fixes, bottom-sheet dialogs, 44px touch targets, inputmode decimal, dvh
- Gift-card buy/cancel UI, admin £250 + daily limits, cancellation/privacy/terms policy accuracy

S3:
- Connect() creates buckets before probing; in-memory fallback only on genuine unreachability; health reports degraded; stale S3_PUBLIC_URL documented (host-specific)

Tests/docs:
- 2263 test functions; all 22 backend packages green; round8/9/10 regression suites; NextEditWindowTime removes wall-clock flake; docs reconciled (notes retention, gift-card partial-use, modal T15 future work)
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00

1085 lines
49 KiB
Go

package webhooks
import (
"context"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"database/sql"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"crussell/db"
"crussell/handlers/payments"
)
type SquareWebhookEvent struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
EventID string `json:"event_id"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
Data json.RawMessage `json:"data"`
LocationID string `json:"location_id"`
}
// squareWebhookDedup is a bounded, mutex-guarded set of recently handled
// event IDs. It is a FAST-PATH cache only: the persistent source of truth is
// the square_webhook_events table (see HandleSquareWebhook). It lets a replayed
// delivery be dropped without a DB round-trip, but a restart clears it — the DB
// row is what keeps delivery at-least-once across restarts (a replay after a
// crash is re-dispatched and absorbed by the idempotent handlers, per the
// dispatch-first ordering in HandleSquareWebhook).
type squareWebhookDedup struct {
mu sync.Mutex
seen map[string]struct{}
order []string
max int
}
func newSquareWebhookDedup(max int) *squareWebhookDedup {
return &squareWebhookDedup{
seen: make(map[string]struct{}),
order: make([]string, 0, max),
max: max,
}
}
// has reports whether id is in the set WITHOUT recording it. Used as the
// fast-path short-circuit before the DB dedup insert.
func (d *squareWebhookDedup) has(id string) bool {
d.mu.Lock()
defer d.mu.Unlock()
_, ok := d.seen[id]
return ok
}
// register records id, reporting whether it was already present (set untouched
// on a replay, preserving insertion order). Mutex-guarded — the handler may be
// hit concurrently. Called only after the DB insert has confirmed the event's
// fate, so a failed DB write never leaves a stale entry that would drop a retry.
func (d *squareWebhookDedup) register(id string) bool {
d.mu.Lock()
defer d.mu.Unlock()
if _, ok := d.seen[id]; ok {
return true
}
d.seen[id] = struct{}{}
d.order = append(d.order, id)
if len(d.order) > d.max {
oldest := d.order[0]
d.order = d.order[1:]
delete(d.seen, oldest)
}
return false
}
// 500 IDs far exceeds the latency payoff of the fast-path cache; the DB row
// (square_webhook_events) is the unbounded, restart-safe source of truth.
var squareWebhookEventsSeen = newSquareWebhookDedup(500)
// errWebhookParseFailure marks a dispatch error caused by a KNOWN money event
// whose payload could not be parsed or extracted (as opposed to a DB failure).
// HandleSquareWebhook distinguishes it from other dispatch errors to log the
// failure at ERROR level with the event_id and type — and, like every dispatch
// error, it returns 5xx WITHOUT committing the dedup row, so Square re-delivers
// the event instead of the money state being lost forever.
var errWebhookParseFailure = errors.New("webhook payload parse failure")
// isSquareMoneyFamily reports whether an event type belongs to a money-state
// family (payment.*, refund.*, dispute.*, terminal.*, plus money-adjacent
// cash_drawer.*, gift_card.* and transaction.*). Unknown events in these
// families MUST NOT be 200-acked — see the default-branch split in
// HandleSquareWebhook.
func isSquareMoneyFamily(eventType string) bool {
for _, prefix := range []string{
"payment.", "refund.", "dispute.", "terminal.",
"cash_drawer.", "gift_card.", "transaction.",
} {
if strings.HasPrefix(eventType, prefix) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// isSquareNonMoneyFamily reports whether an event type belongs to a known
// non-money family this app will never process (customer.*, card.*, order.*,
// invoice.*, booking.* and the other Square families below, none of which
// carry money state this app tracks). These are deliberately acked 200 WITH a
// dedup row so Square stops retrying them — see the default-branch split in
// HandleSquareWebhook.
func isSquareNonMoneyFamily(eventType string) bool {
for _, prefix := range []string{
"customer.", "card.", "order.", "invoice.", "booking.",
"appointment.", "availability.", "loyalty.", "merchant.",
"location.", "labor.", "inventory.", "site.", "device.",
"team_member.", "subscription.", "webhook.",
} {
if strings.HasPrefix(eventType, prefix) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// webhookDBTimeout bounds the DB work performed while dispatching a webhook.
// The work runs on a Background-derived context — so a client disconnect cannot
// cancel it (the at-least-once delivery contract must survive) — but is
// timeout-bound so a hung DB call cannot hold a pgx pool connection forever;
// repeated hangs would otherwise exhaust the pool. 30s is the same
// post-request DB budget used elsewhere in the backend (handlers/user).
const webhookDBTimeout = 30 * time.Second
// webhookDBContext returns a timeout-bound, Background-derived context for
// webhook dispatch DB work.
func webhookDBContext() (context.Context, context.CancelFunc) {
return context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), webhookDBTimeout)
}
// squareEnvironmentMismatch reports whether the webhook's square-environment
// header conflicts with the deployment's configured SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT.
//
// The check is enforced ONLY when the configured environment is a known real
// Square environment (production/sandbox): those are the deployments where a
// mis-pointed subscription (e.g. a sandbox subscription posting to the
// production URL + signing key) would process events against the wrong state.
// In dev/mock deployments — or an empty/unknown SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT, which the
// rest of the backend treats as fail-closed production but is not a specific
// real environment to compare against — the header is informational and a
// mismatch is not rejectable, mirroring IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv
// (handlers/payments/twofa.go) so the interpretation cannot diverge.
//
// An absent header is allowed through: real Square deliveries always send it,
// so a missing header in an enforced deployment is a non-Square client (which
// already failed signature verification) or a local mock/dev poster — both
// safely handled downstream. Rejection is 403 (non-retryable for Square):
// a square-environment mismatch is a PERMANENT configuration error that a
// retry could never resolve, so a 5xx would make Square retry forever; a 4xx
// stops the retry loop and forces the operator to fix the subscription or the
// environment setting.
func squareEnvironmentMismatch(headerEnv string) bool {
headerEnv = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(headerEnv))
if headerEnv == "" {
return false
}
switch configured := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT"))); configured {
case "production", "sandbox":
return headerEnv != configured
default:
// Empty/unknown/dev/mock configured environment — no specific real
// environment to enforce against.
return false
}
}
// HandleSquareWebhook verifies and dispatches Square webhook events.
//
// Fail-closed chain: 503 when the signing key is unset, 403 on a missing/bad
// signature, 400 on malformed JSON or an empty event_id (which cannot be
// deduplicated — Square always sends one, so this is defensive). A correctly
// signed, well-formed event is deduplicated by event_id before dispatch and
// acknowledged 200. Unknown event types are split by family: money-state
// families (payment.*, refund.*, dispute.*, terminal.* and money-adjacent
// prefixes) and truly unknown prefixes get 501 (Square retries, no dedup row),
// while known non-money families (customer.*, card.*, order.*, invoice.*,
// booking.*, ...) are acked 200 WITH the dedup row so the subscription is
// never flooded into suspension.
func HandleSquareWebhook(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 512*1024)
body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to read webhook body: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "request body too large or unreadable", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
return
}
defer r.Body.Close()
// Verification logic per Square spec (HMAC-SHA256, base64, notificationURL + body).
// Production setup: set SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY and SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL
// in env vars (see Square Developer Console → Webhooks → Subscription).
// Reference: https://developer.squareup.com/docs/webhooks/step3validate
// Fail closed: a missing signing key means the webhook cannot be verified,
// so reject rather than process unauthenticated events (S-4). Square
// always sends the signature header, so an unset key in production is a
// misconfiguration that must not silently accept forged events.
signingKey := os.Getenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY")
notificationURL := os.Getenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL")
if notificationURL == "" {
notificationURL = "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
}
if signingKey == "" {
log.Printf("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY is not set — rejecting webhook (fail-closed)")
http.Error(w, "webhook signature verification unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
signature := r.Header.Get("x-square-hmacsha256-signature")
if signature == "" {
log.Printf("Missing Square webhook signature header")
http.Error(w, "Invalid signature", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
if !verifySquareSignature(body, signature, signingKey, notificationURL) {
log.Printf("Invalid Square webhook signature")
http.Error(w, "Invalid signature", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// Fail-closed environment check: a sandbox subscription mis-pointed at the
// production URL + key would otherwise process sandbox events against
// production state. 403 (non-retryable for Square) is correct because a
// square-environment mismatch is a permanent config error — a 5xx would
// make Square retry a condition no retry can fix. See
// squareEnvironmentMismatch for the exact enforcement conditions.
if squareEnvironmentMismatch(r.Header.Get("square-environment")) {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Rejecting event: square-environment header %q does not match configured SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT %q (403)",
r.Header.Get("square-environment"), os.Getenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT"))
http.Error(w, "square environment mismatch", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
var event SquareWebhookEvent
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &event); err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to parse webhook event: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "Invalid event", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// An empty event_id cannot be deduplicated. Square always sends event_id,
// so this is defensive — but once handlers mutate state, a duplicate
// empty-ID event would double-apply. Reject with 400 (fail-safe, no
// dispatch, no dedup row): Square's retry policy retries on 5xx/timeouts
// but treats 4xx as non-retryable, so the malformed event is dropped
// without side effects.
if event.EventID == "" {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Rejecting event with empty event_id (400)")
http.Error(w, "Invalid event", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Fast-path dedup: a correctly signed replay of a recently handled event is
// dropped in memory without a DB round-trip. The persistent source of truth
// is the square_webhook_events row committed AFTER dispatch below, so this
// cache never hides an event whose dedup row is not yet persisted — a crash
// before that commit simply replays the event, which the idempotent handlers
// absorb.
if squareWebhookEventsSeen.has(event.EventID) {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Duplicate event_id %s; skipping (already processed)", event.EventID)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
return
}
if db.Conn == nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] DB unavailable — rejecting event_id %s (fail-closed)", event.EventID)
http.Error(w, "webhook processing unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Received event: %s", event.Type)
// Dispatch FIRST, then commit the dedup row. The handlers mutate state, so a
// dedup row committed before dispatch would permanently drop the event on a
// crash between the insert and the dispatch (Square's retry would be
// 200-skipped, and dispute.created has no sweep fallback). Committing after
// a successful dispatch keeps delivery at-least-once: on any dispatch error
// NO dedup row is written and we return 5xx so Square retries. The handlers
// are idempotent (status='pending'-guarded UPDATEs keyed on the Square id),
// so a retry — or two retries dispatching concurrently — applies each state
// change at most once and is otherwise a no-op.
var dispatchErr error
switch event.Type {
// Square fires payment.completed and payment.canceled as SEPARATE event
// types from payment.updated, but all of them carry the same full Payment
// object in data.object.payment, and handlePaymentUpdated reconciles purely
// from the payload's id/status (squarePaymentStatusToLocal maps COMPLETED/
// CANCELED/FAILED). Routing all four here closes the silent gap where a
// completed or canceled charge was previously acked 200 and never
// reconciled against the local pending row.
case "payment.updated", "payment.created", "payment.completed", "payment.canceled":
dispatchErr = handlePaymentUpdated(event.Data)
// Same reasoning for refunds: refund.completed/refund.canceled are distinct
// event types carrying the full PaymentRefund object in data.object.refund,
// which handleRefundUpdated reconciles by status.
case "refund.updated", "refund.created", "refund.completed", "refund.canceled":
dispatchErr = handleRefundUpdated(event.Data)
case "dispute.created":
dispatchErr = handleDisputeCreated(event.Data)
case "dispute.state.updated":
dispatchErr = handleDisputeStateUpdated(event.Data)
case "dispute.evidence.created", "dispute.evidence.deleted":
dispatchErr = handleDisputeEvidence(event.Data)
case "terminal.checkout.created", "terminal.checkout.updated":
dispatchErr = handleTerminalCheckout(event.Data)
default:
// Unknown-type handling is SPLIT by event family so Square's retry
// policy (it re-delivers 5xx responses) can never flood the
// subscription into suspension — a suspended subscription silently
// kills money-event delivery (payment.created/updated).
//
// • MONEY-STATE families (any payment.*, refund.*, dispute.*,
// terminal.*, cash_drawer.*, gift_card.*, transaction.* not
// explicitly handled above, plus future money-adjacent prefixes):
// keep 501 so Square retries. A money event this app does not yet
// handle is NEVER a safe 200-ack (the caller would commit the dedup
// row and the event would be dropped forever); no dedup row is
// written and a later retry re-dispatches idempotently if code
// support for the type lands before the retry window closes.
// • KNOWN NON-MONEY families (customer.*, card.*, order.*, invoice.*,
// booking.* — plus appointment.*, availability.*, loyalty.*,
// merchant.*, location.*, labor.*, inventory.*, site.*, device.*,
// team_member.*, subscription.*, webhook.* — and anything else
// Square can emit that this app will never process): deliberately
// acked 200 WITH the dedup row committed so Square stops retrying.
// They carry no money state this app tracks, so acking loses
// nothing — and retrying them at any regularity would fill the
// subscription's retry queue until Square suspends it, silently
// killing money-event delivery. Logged at WARN.
// • TRULY unknown prefixes (matching neither list): conservative
// 501 — the type could be a new money family Square just added.
switch {
case isSquareMoneyFamily(event.Type):
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] CRITICAL: unhandled money-family Square event type %q (event_id=%s) — not acknowledged; returning 501 so Square retries", event.Type, event.EventID)
http.Error(w, "unhandled webhook event type", http.StatusNotImplemented)
return
case isSquareNonMoneyFamily(event.Type):
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] WARNING: acknowledged unhandled non-money event %q (event_id=%s) — committed dedup row; Square stops retrying", event.Type, event.EventID)
default:
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] CRITICAL: unhandled Square event type %q (event_id=%s) — not acknowledged; returning 501 so Square retries", event.Type, event.EventID)
http.Error(w, "unhandled webhook event type", http.StatusNotImplemented)
return
}
}
if dispatchErr != nil {
// A parse failure on a known money event is logged at ERROR with the
// event_id and type so operators can see exactly which delivery was
// unparseable and is being retried (rather than silently lost). Every
// dispatch error — parse failure or DB failure — returns 5xx WITHOUT
// committing the dedup row, so Square re-delivers the event.
if errors.Is(dispatchErr, errWebhookParseFailure) {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] ERROR: known money event %s (event_id=%s) payload failed to parse: %v — NOT recording dedup row; Square will retry", event.Type, event.EventID, dispatchErr)
} else {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Event %s (%s) dispatch failed: %v — NOT recording dedup row; Square will retry", event.Type, event.EventID, dispatchErr)
}
http.Error(w, "webhook processing failed", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
// Commit the dedup row AFTER successful dispatch. Fail closed on a write
// error: without a persisted row we cannot prove the event was handled, so
// reject and let Square retry (the retry re-dispatches idempotently and
// retries the insert). event_id is not PII, so logging it is safe.
// Commit the dedup row AFTER successful dispatch. Fail closed on a write
// error: without a persisted row we cannot prove the event was handled, so
// reject and let Square retry (the retry re-dispatches idempotently and
// retries the insert). event_id is not PII, so logging it is safe. A
// bounded Background context keeps this post-dispatch write alive across a
// client disconnect without letting a hung insert hold the pool forever.
dedupCtx, dedupCancel := webhookDBContext()
defer dedupCancel()
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(dedupCtx,
"INSERT INTO square_webhook_events (event_id) VALUES ($1) ON CONFLICT (event_id) DO NOTHING", event.EventID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to record event_id %s (dedup write failed): %v", event.EventID, err)
http.Error(w, "webhook processing unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
// Record in the fast-path cache only after the DB write succeeds, so a
// failed write never leaves a stale entry that would drop a retry.
squareWebhookEventsSeen.register(event.EventID)
if tag.RowsAffected() == 0 {
// A concurrent duplicate delivery already committed this event's row.
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Duplicate event_id %s; acknowledging (already processed)", event.EventID)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
}
func verifySquareSignature(body []byte, signature, signingKey, notificationURL string) bool {
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(signingKey))
mac.Write([]byte(notificationURL))
mac.Write(body)
expected := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
return hmac.Equal([]byte(signature), []byte(expected))
}
// squareWebhookData is the `data` envelope of a Square webhook v1 event. The
// affected object's id is at data.id; the full resource is nested at
// data.object.<type> (e.g. data.object.payment). Only the id is logged — the
// nested object can contain PII and is never echoed to the log.
type squareWebhookData struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Type string `json:"type"`
Object json.RawMessage `json:"object"`
}
// squareDisputePayload maps the Square Dispute fields this app records.
// Reference: https://developer.squareup.com/reference/square/objects/Dispute
type squareDisputePayload struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
State string `json:"state"`
AmountMoney *squareMoneyPayload `json:"amount_money"`
Reason string `json:"reason"`
DisputedPayment *squareDisputedPaymentField `json:"disputed_payment"`
}
type squareMoneyPayload struct {
Amount int64 `json:"amount"` // minor units (pence for GBP)
Currency string `json:"currency"`
}
type squareDisputedPaymentField struct {
PaymentID string `json:"payment_id"`
}
// squarePaymentPayload maps the Square Payment fields this app consumes.
type squarePaymentPayload struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Status string `json:"status"` // "APPROVED", "COMPLETED", "CANCELED", "FAILED", "PENDING"
}
// squareRefundPayload maps the Square Refund (PaymentRefund) fields this app
// consumes.
type squareRefundPayload struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Status string `json:"status"` // "PENDING", "COMPLETED", "FAILED"
}
// parseSquareObject unmarshals data.object.<type> into out. Returns false when
// the nested resource is absent (legacy envelope carrying only data.id).
func parseSquareObject(object json.RawMessage, key string, out any) bool {
if len(object) == 0 {
return false
}
var wrapper map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(object, &wrapper); err != nil {
return false
}
raw, ok := wrapper[key]
if !ok || len(raw) == 0 {
return false
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, out); err != nil {
return false
}
return true
}
// squareMoneyToAmount converts a Square Money object (minor units) to an exact
// two-decimal string for the NUMERIC(10,2) columns. String formatting avoids
// float64 rounding artifacts for money.
func squareMoneyToAmount(m *squareMoneyPayload) string {
if m == nil || m.Amount <= 0 {
return "0.00"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%d.%02d", m.Amount/100, m.Amount%100)
}
// squarePaymentStatusToLocal maps Square's payment state machine to the local
// payment_status enum. APPROVED/PENDING are NON-terminal (Square may still
// complete or void them), so they map to a zero local status and the caller
// leaves the row untouched — the same classification the stale-pending sweeps
// use (handlers/payments/sweep.go).
func squarePaymentStatusToLocal(status string) (string, bool) {
switch status {
case "COMPLETED":
return "completed", true
case "CANCELED", "FAILED":
return "failed", true
case "APPROVED", "PENDING":
return "", false
default:
return "", false
}
}
// squareRefundStatusToLocal maps Square's refund status to the local
// payment_status enum. PENDING is non-terminal.
func squareRefundStatusToLocal(status string) (string, bool) {
switch status {
case "COMPLETED":
return "completed", true
case "FAILED":
return "failed", true
default:
return "", false
}
}
// squareDisputeStateToLocal maps Square's dispute state to the local
// disputes.status. Only the terminal resolutions move the row to won/lost;
// ACCEPTED (seller accepted the dispute) is a loss — the money is gone.
// Everything else (inquiries, evidence required, processing) stays open.
func squareDisputeStateToLocal(state string) string {
switch state {
case "WON":
return "won"
case "LOST", "ACCEPTED":
return "lost"
default:
return "open"
}
}
// findPaymentBySquareID resolves the local payment id and booking id for a
// Square payment id. Multiple local rows can share one Square charge id (e.g.
// a deposit + balance split); the most recent is used. The caller supplies a
// bounded context (webhookDBContext) so this post-dispatch DB work survives a
// client disconnect without holding a pool connection forever.
func findPaymentBySquareID(ctx context.Context, squarePaymentID string) (paymentID, bookingID string, ok bool) {
if squarePaymentID == "" {
return "", "", false
}
var pid string
var bid *string
err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
SELECT id, booking_id FROM payments
WHERE square_payment_id = $1
ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC
LIMIT 1
`, squarePaymentID).Scan(&pid, &bid)
if err != nil {
return "", "", false
}
if bid != nil {
bookingID = *bid
}
return pid, bookingID, true
}
// findPaymentByDisputeID resolves the local payment (and its booking) recorded
// for a dispute row. Used by dispute.state.updated when the dispute row already
// exists but the webhook payload carries no resolvable Square payment id. The
// caller supplies a bounded context (webhookDBContext).
func findPaymentByDisputeID(ctx context.Context, squareDisputeID string) (paymentID, bookingID string) {
var pid string
var bid *string
err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
SELECT d.payment_id, p.booking_id
FROM disputes d
JOIN payments p ON p.id = d.payment_id
WHERE d.square_dispute_id = $1
`, squareDisputeID).Scan(&pid, &bid)
if err != nil {
return "", ""
}
if bid != nil {
bookingID = *bid
}
return pid, bookingID
}
// disputeNotificationID derives the deterministic admin_notifications id for an
// untracked dispute's critical_payment_log notification: 'D' + 11 lowercase hex
// chars of a SHA-256 over 'dispute-<square_dispute_id>'. generate_short_id
// (init-script.sql) only ever emits 12 lowercase hex chars
// (substr(encode(gen_random_bytes(6),'hex'),1,12)), so the uppercase 'D' prefix
// guarantees this can never collide with a DB-generated id. The id is stable
// per dispute, giving ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING per-dispute idempotency.
func disputeNotificationID(squareDisputeID string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte("dispute-" + squareDisputeID))
return "D" + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])[:11]
}
// insertCriticalPaymentNotification surfaces a money event in the admin
// notification centre (reason='critical_payment_log'), the DB-backed stand-in
// for un-watched CRITICAL log lines (see ScanCriticalPaymentLogs in
// internal/jobs/cleanup.go). Dedup: one unacknowledged row per (reason,
// booking_id) — acknowledging re-arms it.
//
// Untracked disputes (no local payment row, booking_id NULL) pass disputeID
// instead: each DISTINCT square dispute gets its OWN notification under the
// deterministic id (disputeNotificationID), so a second distinct chargeback is
// never suppressed by the first's (reason, NULL booking) row — and re-delivery
// of the same dispute is a no-op (ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING). The
// booking-scoped NOT EXISTS guard does NOT apply to this path: it would
// collapse every untracked dispute onto one unacknowledged NULL-booking row.
// The caller supplies a bounded context (webhookDBContext).
func insertCriticalPaymentNotification(ctx context.Context, bookingID, disputeID string) {
if disputeID != "" {
id := disputeNotificationID(disputeID)
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
INSERT INTO admin_notifications (id, reason, booking_id, created_at)
VALUES ($1, 'critical_payment_log'::admin_notification_reason, NULL, NOW())
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING
`, id)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to insert critical_payment_log admin notification: %v", err)
return
}
if tag.RowsAffected() > 0 {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Inserted critical_payment_log admin notification (dispute_id=%s, booking_id=NULL)", disputeID)
}
return
}
var bid any
if bookingID != "" {
bid = bookingID
}
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
INSERT INTO admin_notifications (reason, booking_id, created_at)
SELECT 'critical_payment_log'::admin_notification_reason, $1, NOW()
WHERE NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM admin_notifications an
WHERE an.reason = 'critical_payment_log'
AND an.booking_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM $1
AND an.acknowledged_at IS NULL
)
`, bid)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to insert critical_payment_log admin notification: %v", err)
return
}
if tag.RowsAffected() > 0 {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Inserted critical_payment_log admin notification (booking_id=%s)", bookingID)
}
}
// markPaymentFailed flips a payment to 'failed' after a lost dispute — the
// money was charged back, so the row must not read as collected. 'refunded'
// rows are left alone (the money was returned by refund, not charged back).
// The caller supplies a bounded context (webhookDBContext).
func markPaymentFailed(ctx context.Context, paymentID string) error {
if paymentID == "" {
return nil
}
_, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx,
"UPDATE payments SET status = 'failed', updated_at = NOW() WHERE id = $1 AND status IN ('pending', 'completed')",
paymentID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to mark payment %s failed after lost dispute: %v", paymentID, err)
return err
}
return nil
}
// handlePaymentUpdated reconciles a Square Payment state change against the
// local payments row (real-time counterpart to the stale-pending sweep). The
// Square id is logged, never the payload (PII). Idempotent: the UPDATE is a
// no-op when the local status already matches, and event_id dedup prevents
// re-entry at the handler level. A non-nil error means dispatch failed and the
// caller must NOT commit the dedup row (Square retries). All DB work runs on a
// bounded Background context (webhookDBContext): a client disconnect must not
// cancel the state mutation, and a hung DB call must not hold the pool forever.
func handlePaymentUpdated(data json.RawMessage) error {
ctx, cancel := webhookDBContext()
defer cancel()
var env squareWebhookData
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
// Parse failure on a known money event: the caller returns 5xx without
// committing the dedup row (errWebhookParseFailure), so Square
// re-delivers and the payment state change is not permanently lost.
return fmt.Errorf("payment event data envelope: %v: %w", err, errWebhookParseFailure)
}
if len(env.Object) == 0 {
// Legacy envelope carrying only data.id — no nested payment object to
// reconcile, so there is nothing to apply; acknowledge as received.
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated received (data.id=%s)", env.ID)
return nil
}
var payment squarePaymentPayload
if !parseSquareObject(env.Object, "payment", &payment) || payment.ID == "" || payment.Status == "" {
// A payment object is present but unusable (malformed, or missing the
// id/status reconciliation needs): cannot apply money state — retry.
return fmt.Errorf("payment.updated payload for data.id=%q missing/invalid payment object (id=%q status=%q): %w", env.ID, payment.ID, payment.Status, errWebhookParseFailure)
}
localStatus, terminal := squarePaymentStatusToLocal(payment.Status)
if !terminal {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated: square payment %s status %q is non-terminal — no local state change", payment.ID, payment.Status)
return nil
}
// Only 'pending' rows are candidates for a terminal transition — the same
// conservative rule the stale-pending sweeps use. A webhook for an already
// settled row (Square fires payment.updated for ANY field change, e.g. fee
// recalculation on a fully-refunded charge) must never revert a terminal
// status like 'refunded' back to 'completed'.
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx,
`UPDATE payments SET status = $1, updated_at = NOW() WHERE square_payment_id = $2 AND status = 'pending'`,
localStatus, payment.ID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to update payment %s to status %s: %v", payment.ID, localStatus, err)
return err
}
if tag.RowsAffected() > 0 {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated: square payment %s → local status %s", payment.ID, localStatus)
}
// A Square charge can also map to a till_sales row (online gift-card
// purchase, retail at the till) — reconcile those too. Same pending-only
// guard: never revert a terminal till-sale status. A definitively failed
// charge (Square FAILED/CANCELED) claws back the gift-card funding those
// pending sales added, exactly like the stale-pending sweep
// (handlers/payments/sweep.go); an ambiguous status never reaches here.
if localStatus == "failed" {
return clawbackFailedTillSales(ctx, payment.ID)
}
tsTag, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx,
`UPDATE till_sales SET status = $1, updated_at = NOW() WHERE square_payment_id = $2 AND status = 'pending'`,
localStatus, payment.ID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to reconcile till_sales for square payment %s: %v", payment.ID, err)
return err
}
if tsTag.RowsAffected() > 0 {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated: reconciled %d till_sale(s) for square payment %s → status %s", tsTag.RowsAffected(), payment.ID, localStatus)
}
return nil
}
// clawbackFailedTillSales reverts the gift-card funding of every still-pending
// till sale funded by a Square charge that is DEFINITIVELY failed (Square
// FAILED/CANCELED — never ambiguous). It mirrors the stale-pending sweep's
// clawbackTillSaleFunding + revertGiftCardFunding (handlers/payments/sweep.go,
// till.go): each sale is claimed with a status='pending' guard so an
// already-resolved row is skipped without error, and the failed mark + funding
// revert commit atomically. A non-nil error means a DB failure left a pending
// sale's funding unreverted — the caller rejects the webhook so Square retries
// the clawback (the sweep is the eventual backstop).
func clawbackFailedTillSales(ctx context.Context, squarePaymentID string) error {
rows, err := db.Conn.Query(ctx, `
SELECT ts.id, ts.item_type, ts.item_id, ts.total_amount, gc.redeemed_by,
(ts.created_at = gc.created_at) AS is_create
FROM till_sales ts
LEFT JOIN gift_cards gc ON gc.id = ts.item_id
WHERE ts.square_payment_id = $1 AND ts.status = 'pending'
`, squarePaymentID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to read pending till_sales for funding clawback (square payment %s): %v", squarePaymentID, err)
return err
}
defer rows.Close()
for rows.Next() {
var (
saleID string
itemType string
itemID sql.NullString
totalAmount float64
redeemedBy sql.NullString
isCreate *bool
)
if err := rows.Scan(&saleID, &itemType, &itemID, &totalAmount, &redeemedBy, &isCreate); err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to scan pending till_sale for funding clawback (square payment %s): %v", squarePaymentID, err)
return err
}
if err := clawbackOneTillSale(ctx, saleID, itemType, itemID, totalAmount, redeemedBy, isCreate); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return rows.Err()
}
// clawbackOneTillSale resolves one pending till sale of a definitively failed
// charge. A gift-card sale has its funding reverted atomically with the failed
// mark; a sale with no gift card (future retail product / orphaned item) is
// only marked failed. An already-resolved sale is skipped, not an error.
func clawbackOneTillSale(ctx context.Context, saleID, itemType string, itemID sql.NullString, totalAmount float64, redeemedBy sql.NullString, isCreate *bool) error {
if itemType != "gift_card" || !itemID.Valid || itemID.String == "" || isCreate == nil {
// No gift card to claw back — mark the sale failed without touching
// any card (mirrors the sweep's non-gift-card branch).
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
UPDATE till_sales SET status = 'failed', updated_at = NOW()
WHERE id = $1 AND status = 'pending'
`, saleID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to mark till sale %s failed: %v", saleID, err)
return err
}
if tag.RowsAffected() > 0 {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated: marked till sale %s failed (no gift card to claw back)", saleID)
}
return nil
}
action := "topup"
if *isCreate {
action = "create"
}
var redeem *string
if redeemedBy.Valid && redeemedBy.String != "" {
redeem = &redeemedBy.String
}
if err := revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding(ctx, action, itemID.String, totalAmount, redeem, saleID); err != nil {
if payments.IsTillSaleNotPending(err) {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Till sale %s was already resolved (not pending) — skipping funding clawback", saleID)
return nil
}
log.Printf("CRITICAL: [SQUARE-WEBHOOK] failed to claw back gift card %s funding for failed till sale %s: %v — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED: gift card may still be funded", itemID.String, saleID, err)
return err
}
return nil
}
// revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding undoes the gift-card funding of a till sale
// whose charge definitively failed. It delegates to the single shared clawback
// implementation, payments.RevertGiftCardFunding (handlers/payments/
// giftcard_clawback.go) — the same helper the till handler and the stale-pending
// sweep use — so the webhook's money reversal can never drift from theirs. The
// claim-first status='pending' guard, the create/top-up branches, the
// redeem-to-user reversal, the CRITICAL reconciliation log lines and the
// errTillSaleNotPending sentinel all live in that one place.
func revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding(ctx context.Context, action, giftCardID string, amount float64, redeemToUserID *string, tillSaleID string) error {
return payments.RevertGiftCardFunding(ctx, action, giftCardID, amount, redeemToUserID, tillSaleID)
}
// handleRefundUpdated reconciles a Square Refund state change against the local
// refunds row. Idempotent (status-guarded UPDATE + event_id dedup). A non-nil
// error means dispatch failed and the caller must NOT commit the dedup row. DB
// work runs on a bounded Background context (webhookDBContext).
func handleRefundUpdated(data json.RawMessage) error {
ctx, cancel := webhookDBContext()
defer cancel()
var env squareWebhookData
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
// Parse failure on a known money event: retry via 5xx, no dedup row.
return fmt.Errorf("refund event data envelope: %v: %w", err, errWebhookParseFailure)
}
if len(env.Object) == 0 {
// Legacy envelope carrying only data.id — no nested refund object to
// reconcile; acknowledge as received.
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] refund.updated received (data.id=%s)", env.ID)
return nil
}
var refund squareRefundPayload
if !parseSquareObject(env.Object, "refund", &refund) || refund.ID == "" || refund.Status == "" {
// A refund object is present but unusable: cannot apply money state — retry.
return fmt.Errorf("refund.updated payload for data.id=%q missing/invalid refund object (id=%q status=%q): %w", env.ID, refund.ID, refund.Status, errWebhookParseFailure)
}
localStatus, terminal := squareRefundStatusToLocal(refund.Status)
if !terminal {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] refund.updated: square refund %s status %q is non-terminal — no local state change", refund.ID, refund.Status)
return nil
}
// COMPLETED may promote any non-completed row (incl. a sweep-failed refund
// Square later shows complete) — the over-refund guard counts completed
// refunds, so this only tightens it. FAILED only demotes a 'pending' row:
// demoting 'completed' would let the guard exclude money that already moved
// (the exact risk refunds.go documents for failed refunds).
var upd string
switch localStatus {
case "completed":
upd = `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'completed' WHERE square_refund_id = $1 AND status <> 'completed'`
case "failed":
upd = `UPDATE refunds SET status = 'failed' WHERE square_refund_id = $1 AND status = 'pending'`
}
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, upd, refund.ID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to update refund %s to status %s: %v", refund.ID, localStatus, err)
return err
}
if tag.RowsAffected() > 0 {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] refund.updated: square refund %s → local status %s", refund.ID, localStatus)
}
return nil
}
// truncateDisputeReason caps a Square dispute reason at the disputes.reason
// VARCHAR(192) column width. An over-long reason would fail the disputes
// INSERT; the handler treats that as a dispatch error (no dedup row, 5xx), so
// Square would retry forever — truncating lets the event succeed instead.
// VARCHAR(192) counts CHARACTERS, not bytes, so truncation must slice on a rune
// boundary: byte-slicing (reason[:192]) can split a multi-byte UTF-8 rune and
// store invalid UTF-8 (which Postgres rejects), failing the INSERT the same way
// an over-long reason would. Slicing the []rune form keeps the stored reason a
// valid, at-most-192-character UTF-8 string.
func truncateDisputeReason(reason string) string {
runes := []rune(reason)
if len(runes) > 192 {
return string(runes[:192])
}
return reason
}
// handleDisputeCreated records a newly opened dispute: inserts the disputes row
// and surfaces a critical_payment_log admin notification so the owner sees the
// chargeback in-app. A disputed Square payment with NO local payments row (a
// Dashboard-initiated charge, a mismatched Square id, or a deleted/erased row)
// cannot be reconciled to a booking — no disputes row is written — but the
// admin notification is STILL raised with booking_id NULL, because there is no
// sweep fallback for disputes and a chargeback the app cannot see is a silent
// money-loss path the owner must always be told about. Idempotent via
// ON CONFLICT (square_dispute_id) DO NOTHING plus the event_id dedup. A non-nil
// error means dispatch failed (no dedup row committed — Square retries). DB
// work runs on a bounded Background context (webhookDBContext).
func handleDisputeCreated(data json.RawMessage) error {
ctx, cancel := webhookDBContext()
defer cancel()
var env squareWebhookData
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
// Parse failure on a known money event (chargeback): retry via 5xx, no
// dedup row — disputes have no sweep fallback, so a lost event is a
// silent money-loss path.
return fmt.Errorf("dispute event data envelope: %v: %w", err, errWebhookParseFailure)
}
if len(env.Object) == 0 {
// Legacy envelope carrying only data.id — no nested dispute object to
// record; acknowledge as received.
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute.created received (data.id=%s)", env.ID)
return nil
}
var dispute squareDisputePayload
if !parseSquareObject(env.Object, "dispute", &dispute) || dispute.ID == "" {
// A dispute object is present but unusable: cannot record the
// chargeback — retry.
return fmt.Errorf("dispute.created payload for data.id=%q missing/invalid dispute object (id=%q): %w", env.ID, dispute.ID, errWebhookParseFailure)
}
squarePaymentID := ""
if dispute.DisputedPayment != nil {
squarePaymentID = dispute.DisputedPayment.PaymentID
}
paymentID, bookingID, paymentFound := findPaymentBySquareID(ctx, squarePaymentID)
if !paymentFound {
// Untracked chargeback: no local payments row for this Square charge
// (Dashboard-initiated, mismatched Square payment id, or a deleted/erased
// row). There is NO sweep fallback for disputes — this notification is
// the only in-app trace the owner gets that Square is clawing back funds,
// so it must never be skipped. booking_id stays NULL; each DISTINCT
// dispute gets its OWN deterministic-id notification (the booking-scoped
// dedup would collapse separate chargebacks into one suppressed row).
// Still return nil so the dedup row commits and Square's retry is
// acknowledged.
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] CRITICAL: dispute %s created for square payment %q with NO local payment row — chargeback cannot be reconciled in-app — admin notified (booking_id NULL)", dispute.ID, squarePaymentID)
insertCriticalPaymentNotification(ctx, "", dispute.ID)
return nil
}
amount := squareMoneyToAmount(dispute.AmountMoney)
tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
INSERT INTO disputes (square_dispute_id, payment_id, status, amount, reason, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES ($1, $2, 'open', $3, NULLIF($4, ''), NOW(), NOW())
ON CONFLICT (square_dispute_id) DO NOTHING
`, dispute.ID, paymentID, amount, truncateDisputeReason(dispute.Reason))
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to insert dispute %s: %v", dispute.ID, err)
return err
}
_ = tag
insertCriticalPaymentNotification(ctx, bookingID, "")
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] CRITICAL: dispute %s created (amount %s, reason %q) for square payment %s — admin notified", dispute.ID, amount, dispute.Reason, squarePaymentID)
return nil
}
// handleDisputeStateUpdated applies a Square dispute state change to the local
// disputes row (upsert — a state.updated may arrive before the created event),
// and on a terminal loss marks the payment failed + raises CRITICAL. Won is
// logged only. Idempotent: the upsert converges to the same row. A non-nil
// error means dispatch failed (no dedup row committed — Square retries). DB
// work runs on a bounded Background context (webhookDBContext).
func handleDisputeStateUpdated(data json.RawMessage) error {
ctx, cancel := webhookDBContext()
defer cancel()
var env squareWebhookData
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
// Parse failure on a known money event (chargeback): retry via 5xx, no
// dedup row — disputes have no sweep fallback.
return fmt.Errorf("dispute event data envelope: %v: %w", err, errWebhookParseFailure)
}
if len(env.Object) == 0 {
// Legacy envelope carrying only data.id — no nested dispute object;
// acknowledge as received.
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute.state.updated received (data.id=%s)", env.ID)
return nil
}
var dispute squareDisputePayload
if !parseSquareObject(env.Object, "dispute", &dispute) || dispute.ID == "" {
// A dispute object is present but unusable: cannot apply the state
// change — retry.
return fmt.Errorf("dispute.state.updated payload for data.id=%q missing/invalid dispute object (id=%q): %w", env.ID, dispute.ID, errWebhookParseFailure)
}
localStatus := squareDisputeStateToLocal(dispute.State)
amount := squareMoneyToAmount(dispute.AmountMoney)
squarePaymentID := ""
if dispute.DisputedPayment != nil {
squarePaymentID = dispute.DisputedPayment.PaymentID
}
paymentID, bookingID, paymentFound := findPaymentBySquareID(ctx, squarePaymentID)
if !paymentFound {
// Row may already exist from dispute.created — recover its payment.
paymentID, bookingID = findPaymentByDisputeID(ctx, dispute.ID)
if paymentID == "" {
// Untracked chargeback: no local payments row for this Square
// charge AND no dispute row to recover one from. Mirror the
// dispute.created untracked branch — there is NO sweep fallback for
// disputes, so this critical notification is the only in-app trace
// the owner gets that Square is clawing back funds; a state.updated
// arriving without a prior created event must surface it too, never
// drop it silently. booking_id stays NULL; disputeNotificationID
// gives each DISTINCT dispute its own deterministic-id notification
// and makes this insert a no-op if dispute.created already raised
// it. Still return nil so the dedup row commits and Square's retry
// is acknowledged.
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] CRITICAL: dispute %s state change (state %s) for square payment %q with NO local payment row — chargeback cannot be reconciled in-app — admin notified (booking_id NULL)", dispute.ID, dispute.State, squarePaymentID)
insertCriticalPaymentNotification(ctx, "", dispute.ID)
return nil
}
}
_, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
INSERT INTO disputes (square_dispute_id, payment_id, status, amount, reason, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, NULLIF($5, ''), NOW(), NOW())
ON CONFLICT (square_dispute_id) DO UPDATE
SET status = EXCLUDED.status, amount = EXCLUDED.amount,
reason = EXCLUDED.reason, updated_at = NOW()
`, dispute.ID, paymentID, localStatus, amount, truncateDisputeReason(dispute.Reason))
if err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Failed to update dispute %s to state %s: %v", dispute.ID, dispute.State, err)
return err
}
switch localStatus {
case "lost":
if err := markPaymentFailed(ctx, paymentID); err != nil {
return err
}
insertCriticalPaymentNotification(ctx, bookingID, "")
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] CRITICAL: dispute %s LOST — payment %s marked failed; admin notified", dispute.ID, paymentID)
case "won":
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute %s WON — resolved in seller's favour; no action", dispute.ID)
default:
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute %s state → %s (status %s)", dispute.ID, dispute.State, localStatus)
}
return nil
}
// handleDisputeEvidence logs evidence submissions/removals. Evidence does not
// change the dispute's local status, so it is informational only.
func handleDisputeEvidence(data json.RawMessage) error {
var env squareWebhookData
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute evidence event received (payload length=%d)", len(data))
return nil
}
var dispute squareDisputePayload
if !parseSquareObject(env.Object, "dispute", &dispute) || dispute.ID == "" {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute evidence event received (data.id=%s)", env.ID)
return nil
}
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] dispute evidence event for dispute %s (state %s)", dispute.ID, dispute.State)
return nil
}
// handleTerminalCheckout logs terminal checkout lifecycle events. Terminal
// checkout state is owned by the poll/sweep handlers (handlers/payments/),
// which fetch the authoritative status from Square — no state mutation here.
func handleTerminalCheckout(data json.RawMessage) error {
var env squareWebhookData
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &env); err != nil {
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] terminal.checkout event received (payload length=%d)", len(data))
return nil
}
log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] terminal.checkout event received (data.id=%s)", env.ID)
return nil
}