Files
Crussell/backend/auth/jwt_test.go
T
popertots 7c424b28b8 fix: loop-B adversarial findings — tip-type double-charge, tip-refund capacity, loyalty stamp farming, gate ordering, auth amplification, admin audit log
Loop B restart (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) fixes:
- CRITICAL: CreateTerminalPayment rejects payment_type='tip' (mirrors CreateBookingPayment) — a tip-typed admin charge no longer records the FULL amount as a tip and double-collects (all is-paid computations exclude tip rows)
- HIGH: tip refunds can no longer re-open booking capacity — refunded_total subqueries filter payment_type <> 'tip' (service.go) and RefundPayment rejects tip rows
- MEDIUM: loyalty-stamp farming closed — stamp award once-per-booking via loyalty_stamp_awarded_at column (init-script.sql) + existing same-day guard
- MEDIUM: CreateTipPayment/CreateBookingPayment 2FA gates moved AFTER the idempotency completed-dedup (code consumed only on new money paths; terminal path already correct) — lost-response retries return the completed payment instead of 400
- MEDIUM: replayRescueLowerBoundSkew widened to 5m (DB-clock-skew stranded originals now rescued)
- MEDIUM-1: verifyFamilyAlive DB amplification reduced via 30s bounded family-alive cache; admin route group rate-limited
- MEDIUM-3: admin saved-card charges now write admin_audit_log (handlers.go helper + till); [2FA] log line decoupled from user identity
- LOW-1: logout scoped to the presented token's family (no cross-session kill)
- LOW-2: refresh-reuse grace widened for same-IP replays
- LOW-4: squareEnvironmentMismatch enforced for empty env
- LOW-5: uuid.ts hard-fails on Math.random fallback (crypto.randomUUID)
- Cash/giftcard tip-enabled overflow mirrors the card-terminal carve

26/26 backend packages; 72/72 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00

875 lines
29 KiB
Go

//go:build test
package auth
// Package auth contains tests for JWT generation, verification, and JTI revocation.
//
// Test Coverage:
// - generateJTI: UUID v4 format validation, uniqueness
// - GenerateToken: returns non-empty token and JTI, JTI matches claim
// - VerifyToken: returns correct user_id/role/JTI, rejects revoked/missing JTI
// - RevokeJTI: adds to revoked set, IsJTIRevoked reflects changes
// - CleanupRevokedJTIs: removes expired JTIs, keeps valid ones
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"crussell/clock"
"crussell/db"
"crussell/testutils/fixtures"
"crussell/testutils/testtx"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// =============================================================================
// generateJTI Tests
// =============================================================================
// TestGenerateJTI_Format verifies that generateJTI returns a valid UUID v4 string
// in the format: 8-4-4-4-12 hexadecimal digits with version and variant bits set.
func TestGenerateJTI_Format(t *testing.T) {
jti, err := generateJTI()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generateJTI() failed: %v", err)
}
// UUID v4 format: xxxxxxxx-xxxx-4xxx-yxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx
parts := strings.Split(jti, "-")
if len(parts) != 5 {
t.Errorf("expected 5 parts in UUID, got %d: %s", len(parts), jti)
}
// Check each part length: 8-4-4-4-12
expectedLengths := []int{8, 4, 4, 4, 12}
for i, part := range parts {
if len(part) != expectedLengths[i] {
t.Errorf("part %d expected length %d, got %d (jti=%s)", i, expectedLengths[i], len(part), jti)
}
}
// Check version nibble (4xxx) in the third group
if len(parts[2]) > 0 && parts[2][0] != '4' {
t.Errorf("expected version 4 UUID, got version %c in jti=%s", parts[2][0], jti)
}
// Check variant bits (8xxx, 9xxx, axxx, or bxxx) in the fourth group
if len(parts[3]) > 0 {
c := parts[3][0]
if c != '8' && c != '9' && c != 'a' && c != 'b' {
t.Errorf("expected variant bits 10xx, got %c in jti=%s", c, jti)
}
}
}
// TestGenerateJTI_Unique generates 100 JTIs and verifies all are unique.
func TestGenerateJTI_Unique(t *testing.T) {
seen := make(map[string]bool)
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
jti, err := generateJTI()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generateJTI() failed at iteration %d: %v", i, err)
}
if seen[jti] {
t.Errorf("duplicate JTI generated at iteration %d: %s", i, jti)
}
seen[jti] = true
}
if len(seen) != 100 {
t.Errorf("expected 100 unique JTIs, got %d", len(seen))
}
}
// =============================================================================
// GenerateToken Tests
// =============================================================================
// TestGenerateToken_ReturnsJTI verifies that GenerateToken returns both a
// non-empty token string and a non-empty JTI string.
func TestGenerateToken_ReturnsJTI(t *testing.T) {
token, jti, err := GenerateToken("user-001", "verified_email")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateToken() failed: %v", err)
}
if token == "" {
t.Error("expected non-empty token")
}
if jti == "" {
t.Error("expected non-empty JTI")
}
}
// TestGenerateToken_JTIInClaims decodes the generated token and verifies
// the "jti" claim matches the returned JTI value.
func TestGenerateToken_JTIInClaims(t *testing.T) {
token, jti, err := GenerateToken("user-002", "admin")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateToken() failed: %v", err)
}
decoded, err := TokenAuth.Decode(token)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode token: %v", err)
}
var claimJTI string
if err := decoded.Get("jti", &claimJTI); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to get jti claim: %v", err)
}
if claimJTI != jti {
t.Errorf("expected jti claim %q, got %q", jti, claimJTI)
}
}
// =============================================================================
// VerifyToken Tests
// =============================================================================
// TestVerifyToken_ReturnsJTI creates a token, verifies it, and checks the
// returned user_id, role, and JTI match the expected values.
func TestVerifyToken_ReturnsJTI(t *testing.T) {
ctx, _ := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
token, jti, err := GenerateToken("user-003", "verified_email")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateToken() failed: %v", err)
}
userID, role, returnedJTI, err := VerifyToken(token, ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("VerifyToken() failed: %v", err)
}
if userID != "user-003" {
t.Errorf("expected userID 'user-003', got %q", userID)
}
if role != "verified_email" {
t.Errorf("expected role 'verified_email', got %q", role)
}
if returnedJTI != jti {
t.Errorf("expected JTI %q, got %q", jti, returnedJTI)
}
}
// TestVerifyToken_RevokedJTI creates a token, revokes its JTI, and verifies
// that VerifyToken returns an error containing "token revoked".
func TestVerifyToken_RevokedJTI(t *testing.T) {
ctx, _ := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
token, jti, err := GenerateToken("user-004", "verified_email")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateToken() failed: %v", err)
}
if err := RevokeJTI(ctx, jti, clock.Now().Add(30*24*time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RevokeJTI() failed: %v", err)
}
_, _, _, err = VerifyToken(token, ctx)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for revoked JTI, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "token revoked") {
t.Errorf("expected 'token revoked' error, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestVerifyToken_ExpiredToken creates a token whose "exp" claim is in the past
// and verifies that VerifyToken rejects it with an error containing "expired".
func TestVerifyToken_ExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
_, tokenString, err := TokenAuth.Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"user_id": "user-expired",
"role": "verified_email",
"jti": "test-jti-expired",
"exp": clock.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour).Unix(),
})
require.NoError(t, err)
_, _, _, err = VerifyToken(tokenString, context.Background())
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "expired")
}
// TestVerifyToken_MissingJTI creates a token without a "jti" claim (using
// TokenAuth.Encode directly) and verifies that VerifyToken returns an error
// containing "invalid jti claim".
func TestVerifyToken_MissingJTI(t *testing.T) {
_, tokenString, err := TokenAuth.Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"user_id": "user-005",
"role": "verified_email",
"exp": clock.Now().Add(30 * 24 * time.Hour).Unix(),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create token without JTI: %v", err)
}
_, _, _, err = VerifyToken(tokenString, context.Background())
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for missing JTI, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid jti claim") {
t.Errorf("expected 'invalid jti claim' error, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestIsJTIRevoked_QueryError verifies that IsJTIRevoked returns false when
// the context is cancelled (causing the QueryRow to fail).
func TestIsJTIRevoked_QueryError(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
cancel()
if IsJTIRevoked(ctx, "test-jti") {
t.Error("expected false on cancelled context query error")
}
}
// =============================================================================
// RevokeJTI / IsJTIRevoked Tests
// =============================================================================
// TestRevokeJTI_AddsToSet verifies that calling RevokeJTI adds the JTI to the
// revoked set, and IsJTIRevoked returns true for it.
func TestRevokeJTI_AddsToSet(t *testing.T) {
ctx, _ := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
_, jti, err := GenerateToken("user-006", "verified_email")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateToken() failed: %v", err)
}
if IsJTIRevoked(ctx, jti) {
t.Fatal("JTI should not be revoked before calling RevokeJTI")
}
if err := RevokeJTI(ctx, jti, clock.Now().Add(30*24*time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RevokeJTI() failed: %v", err)
}
if !IsJTIRevoked(ctx, jti) {
t.Error("expected IsJTIRevoked to return true after RevokeJTI")
}
}
// TestIsJTIRevoked_NonExistent verifies that checking a non-existent JTI
// returns false.
func TestIsJTIRevoked_NonExistent(t *testing.T) {
ctx, _ := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
if IsJTIRevoked(ctx, "nonexistent-jti-12345") {
t.Error("expected IsJTIRevoked to return false for non-existent JTI")
}
}
// =============================================================================
// CleanupRevokedJTIs Tests
// =============================================================================
// TestCleanupRevokedJTIs_RemovesExpired adds a JTI with a past expiry time,
// runs CleanupRevokedJTIs, and verifies the JTI is removed from the set.
func TestCleanupRevokedJTIs_RemovesExpired(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
_, jti, err := GenerateToken("user-007", "verified_email")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateToken() failed: %v", err)
}
// Add with future expiry so IsJTIRevoked sees it
if err := RevokeJTI(ctx, jti, clock.Now().Add(1*time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RevokeJTI() failed: %v", err)
}
if !IsJTIRevoked(ctx, jti) {
t.Fatal("JTI should be in revoked set after RevokeJTI")
}
// Directly update the DB to set expiry in the past
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx,
"UPDATE revoked_jtis SET expires_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '1 hour' WHERE jti = $1", jti)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to expire JTI: %v", err)
}
CleanupRevokedJTIs(ctx)
if IsJTIRevoked(ctx, jti) {
t.Error("expected expired JTI to be removed after cleanup")
}
}
// TestCleanupRevokedJTIs_KeepsValid adds a JTI with a future expiry time,
// runs CleanupRevokedJTIs, and verifies the JTI is still in the set.
func TestCleanupRevokedJTIs_KeepsValid(t *testing.T) {
ctx, _ := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
_, jti, err := GenerateToken("user-008", "verified_email")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateToken() failed: %v", err)
}
// Add with future expiry
if err := RevokeJTI(ctx, jti, clock.Now().Add(30*24*time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RevokeJTI() failed: %v", err)
}
if !IsJTIRevoked(ctx, jti) {
t.Fatal("JTI should be in revoked set before cleanup")
}
CleanupRevokedJTIs(ctx)
if !IsJTIRevoked(ctx, jti) {
t.Error("expected valid (future expiry) JTI to remain after cleanup")
}
}
// =============================================================================
// generateRefreshTokenString Tests
// =============================================================================
// TestGenerateRefreshTokenString_Format verifies that generateRefreshTokenString
// returns a 64-character hex string.
func TestGenerateRefreshTokenString_Format(t *testing.T) {
token, err := generateRefreshTokenString()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generateRefreshTokenString() failed: %v", err)
}
if len(token) != 64 {
t.Errorf("expected 64-character hex string, got length %d: %s", len(token), token)
}
// Verify all characters are valid lowercase hex
for _, c := range token {
if !((c >= '0' && c <= '9') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')) {
t.Errorf("non-hex character %c in token %s", c, token)
break
}
}
}
// TestGenerateRefreshTokenString_Unique generates 100 refresh token strings
// and verifies all are unique.
func TestGenerateRefreshTokenString_Unique(t *testing.T) {
seen := make(map[string]bool)
for i := 0; i < 100; i++ {
token, err := generateRefreshTokenString()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generateRefreshTokenString() failed at iteration %d: %v", i, err)
}
if seen[token] {
t.Errorf("duplicate refresh token at iteration %d: %s", i, token)
}
seen[token] = true
}
if len(seen) != 100 {
t.Errorf("expected 100 unique tokens, got %d", len(seen))
}
}
// =============================================================================
// GenerateRefreshToken Tests
// =============================================================================
// TestGenerateRefreshToken_Success calls GenerateRefreshToken and verifies a
// row was inserted in the refresh_tokens table with the correct user_id and role.
func TestGenerateRefreshToken_Success(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create test user: %v", err)
}
token, _, err := GenerateRefreshToken(ctx, userID, "verified_email")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateRefreshToken() failed: %v", err)
}
if token == "" {
t.Error("expected non-empty token")
}
// Verify row was inserted in refresh_tokens
var dbUserID string
var dbRole string
err = tx.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT user_id, role FROM refresh_tokens WHERE token_hash = encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex')`,
token).Scan(&dbUserID, &dbRole)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to query refresh_tokens: %v", err)
}
if dbUserID != userID {
t.Errorf("expected user_id %q, got %q", userID, dbUserID)
}
if dbRole != "verified_email" {
t.Errorf("expected role 'verified_email', got %q", dbRole)
}
}
// =============================================================================
// VerifyRefreshToken Tests
// =============================================================================
// TestVerifyRefreshToken_Success generates a refresh token, verifies it, and
// asserts the returned userID and role match. Then confirms the token was
// consumed (second call fails with "invalid or expired").
func TestVerifyRefreshToken_Success(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create test user: %v", err)
}
token, _, err := GenerateRefreshToken(ctx, userID, "verified_email")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateRefreshToken() failed: %v", err)
}
// First verify should succeed
retUserID, retRole, _, err := VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("VerifyRefreshToken() failed: %v", err)
}
if retUserID != userID {
t.Errorf("expected user_id %q, got %q", userID, retUserID)
}
if retRole != "verified_email" {
t.Errorf("expected role 'verified_email', got %q", retRole)
}
// Second verify with same token must fail (rotation — token consumed)
_, _, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, token)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for consumed token, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid or expired") {
t.Errorf("expected 'invalid or expired' error, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestVerifyRefreshToken_Rotation verifies the token rotation mechanism:
// first call succeeds, second call with the same token fails.
func TestVerifyRefreshToken_Rotation(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create test user: %v", err)
}
token, _, err := GenerateRefreshToken(ctx, userID, "verified_email")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateRefreshToken() failed: %v", err)
}
// First call should succeed
_, _, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, token)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first verification should succeed, got: %v", err)
}
// Second call with the same token must fail
_, _, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, token)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for rotated token, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid or expired") {
t.Errorf("expected 'invalid or expired' error, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestVerifyRefreshToken_ReuseRevokesFamilyAndAlerts verifies the reuse
// detection: generate a token → rotate it once (minting a descendant in the
// SAME family via GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily) → present the ORIGINAL token
// again. The replay must (i) delete the ENTIRE rotation family (the descendant
// included) from refresh_tokens and (ii) insert an admin_notifications row with
// reason 'refresh_token_reuse' for the user.
func TestVerifyRefreshToken_ReuseRevokesFamilyAndAlerts(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create test user: %v", err)
}
// 1. Generate a refresh token (new family) and rotate it once.
original, _, err := GenerateRefreshToken(ctx, userID, "verified_email")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateRefreshToken() failed: %v", err)
}
_, _, familyID, err := VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, original)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first verification should succeed, got: %v", err)
}
if familyID == "" {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty family_id from rotation")
}
// 2. Mint the descendant in the SAME family (as RefreshTokenHandler does).
descendant, err := GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily(ctx, userID, "verified_email", familyID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily() failed: %v", err)
}
var famCount int
if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM refresh_tokens WHERE family_id = $1`, familyID).Scan(&famCount); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to count family rows: %v", err)
}
if famCount != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 refresh tokens in family, got %d", famCount)
}
// Reuse grace window: backdate the original's used_at past the 60s reuse
// grace so the replay below is genuine theft. WITHOUT this, a replay
// moments after rotation is a benign two-tab concurrent refresh and the
// family must NOT be killed.
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
UPDATE refresh_tokens
SET used_at = NOW() - make_interval(secs => 120)
WHERE token_hash = encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex')
`, original); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to backdate used_at for reuse test: %v", err)
}
// 3. Replay the ORIGINAL token — theft.
_, _, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, original)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for replayed token, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid or expired") {
t.Errorf("expected 'invalid or expired' error, got: %v", err)
}
// (i) The entire family is revoked: the used original AND the descendant.
var famAfter int
if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM refresh_tokens WHERE family_id = $1`, familyID).Scan(&famAfter); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to count family rows after replay: %v", err)
}
if famAfter != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected 0 refresh tokens in family after reuse (descendant killed), got %d", famAfter)
}
var descHashCount int
if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM refresh_tokens WHERE token_hash = encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex')`,
descendant).Scan(&descHashCount); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to check descendant: %v", err)
}
if descHashCount != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected descendant to be deleted, got %d rows", descHashCount)
}
// (ii) An admin alert with reason 'refresh_token_reuse' exists for the user.
var alertCount int
if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM admin_notifications WHERE reason = 'refresh_token_reuse' AND user_id = $1`,
userID).Scan(&alertCount); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to query admin_notifications: %v", err)
}
if alertCount != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected 1 'refresh_token_reuse' alert, got %d", alertCount)
}
}
// TestVerifyRefreshToken_ReplayWithinGrace_IsBenign verifies the reuse
// hardening: a used-token replay WITHIN the 60s grace window (two tabs sharing
// one localStorage refresh token both refreshing on load) is a benign
// concurrent refresh — the generic error is returned, but the rotation family
// survives and no refresh_token_reuse alert is raised.
func TestVerifyRefreshToken_ReplayWithinGrace_IsBenign(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create test user: %v", err)
}
original, _, err := GenerateRefreshToken(ctx, userID, "verified_email")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateRefreshToken() failed: %v", err)
}
_, _, familyID, err := VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, original)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first verification should succeed, got: %v", err)
}
if familyID == "" {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty family_id from rotation")
}
// Mint the descendant in the same family (as RefreshTokenHandler does).
if _, err := GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily(ctx, userID, "verified_email", familyID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily() failed: %v", err)
}
// Replay the original IMMEDIATELY — inside the grace window → benign.
_, _, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, original)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for within-grace replay, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid or expired") {
t.Errorf("expected 'invalid or expired' error, got: %v", err)
}
// The family survives: used original + descendant both still present.
var famCount int
if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM refresh_tokens WHERE family_id = $1`, familyID).Scan(&famCount); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to count family rows: %v", err)
}
if famCount != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected 2 refresh tokens in family after within-grace replay, got %d", famCount)
}
// No theft alert.
var alertCount int
if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM admin_notifications WHERE reason = 'refresh_token_reuse' AND user_id = $1`,
userID).Scan(&alertCount); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to query admin_notifications: %v", err)
}
if alertCount != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected 0 'refresh_token_reuse' alerts for a within-grace replay, got %d", alertCount)
}
}
// TestAccessTokenKilledWithRotationFamily verifies the HIGH 1 fix: an access
// token minted at rotation is bound (family_id claim) to the rotation family,
// so when reuse detection DELETEs the family the access token — which the
// attacker was handed at rotation — stops verifying immediately instead of
// staying valid for its 1-hour TTL.
func TestAccessTokenKilledWithRotationFamily(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create test user: %v", err)
}
original, _, err := GenerateRefreshToken(ctx, userID, "verified_email")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateRefreshToken() failed: %v", err)
}
_, _, familyID, err := VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, original)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first verification should succeed, got: %v", err)
}
// The rotation response: a descendant refresh token in the same family and
// an access token minted in that SAME family (as RefreshTokenHandler does).
if _, err := GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily(ctx, userID, "verified_email", familyID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateRefreshTokenInFamily() failed: %v", err)
}
attackerToken, attackerJTI, err := GenerateTokenForFamily(userID, "verified_email", familyID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GenerateTokenForFamily() failed: %v", err)
}
if attackerJTI == "" {
t.Fatal("expected non-empty JTI")
}
// While its family is alive the access token verifies (JTI not revoked).
if _, _, _, err := VerifyToken(attackerToken, ctx); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("access token must verify while its rotation family is alive: %v", err)
}
// Backdate used_at past the grace window, then replay the original — theft
// detected, whole family DELETEd.
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
UPDATE refresh_tokens
SET used_at = NOW() - make_interval(secs => 120)
WHERE token_hash = encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex')
`, original); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to backdate used_at: %v", err)
}
_, _, _, err = VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, original)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected theft detection on replayed token, got nil")
}
var famCount int
if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM refresh_tokens WHERE family_id = $1`, familyID).Scan(&famCount); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to count family rows: %v", err)
}
if famCount != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected 0 refresh tokens in family after reuse, got %d", famCount)
}
// The attacker's access token is now dead even though its JTI was never
// revoked — the family-alive check rejects it (HIGH 1).
if _, _, _, err := VerifyToken(attackerToken, ctx); err == nil {
t.Fatal("access token must be rejected once its rotation family is killed")
} else if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "token revoked") {
t.Fatalf("expected 'token revoked' error, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestVerifyRefreshToken_InvalidToken calls VerifyRefreshToken with a fake
// token string and expects it to fail with "invalid or expired".
func TestVerifyRefreshToken_InvalidToken(t *testing.T) {
ctx, _ := testtx.SetupTestTx(t)
_, _, _, err := VerifyRefreshToken(ctx, "this-is-a-completely-fake-token-string")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for invalid token, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid or expired") {
t.Errorf("expected 'invalid or expired' error, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestVerifyToken_EmptyJTI creates a token with an empty "jti" claim and
// verifies that VerifyToken returns an error containing "invalid jti claim".
func TestVerifyToken_EmptyJTI(t *testing.T) {
_, tokenStr, err := TokenAuth.Encode(map[string]any{
"user_id": "user-test",
"role": "verified_email",
"jti": "",
"exp": clock.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),
})
require.NoError(t, err)
_, _, _, err = VerifyToken(tokenStr, context.Background())
require.Error(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid jti claim")
}
// =============================================================================
// Nil db.Conn Tests
// =============================================================================
// TestRevokeJTI_NilConn verifies that RevokeJTI does not panic when db.Conn is nil.
func TestRevokeJTI_NilConn(t *testing.T) {
savedConn := db.Conn
db.Conn = nil
t.Cleanup(func() { db.Conn = savedConn })
// Should return an error when db.Conn is nil
if err := RevokeJTI(context.Background(), "test-jti", time.Now()); err == nil {
t.Error("expected error when db.Conn is nil, got nil")
}
}
// TestIsJTIRevoked_NilConn verifies that IsJTIRevoked returns false when db.Conn is nil.
func TestIsJTIRevoked_NilConn(t *testing.T) {
savedConn := db.Conn
db.Conn = nil
t.Cleanup(func() { db.Conn = savedConn })
if IsJTIRevoked(context.Background(), "test-jti") {
t.Error("expected IsJTIRevoked to return false when db.Conn is nil")
}
}
// TestCleanupRevokedJTIs_NilConn verifies CleanupRevokedJTIs returns (0, nil) when db.Conn is nil.
func TestCleanupRevokedJTIs_NilConn(t *testing.T) {
savedConn := db.Conn
db.Conn = nil
t.Cleanup(func() { db.Conn = savedConn })
n, err := CleanupRevokedJTIs(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("expected no error, got: %v", err)
}
if n != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected 0 rows, got %d", n)
}
}
// Note: crypto error paths in generateJTI() and generateRefreshTokenString()
// are unreachable on Go 1.26+ because crypto/rand.Read() calls runtime.fatal()
// instead of returning an error (see https://go.dev/issue/66821). The error
// return exists for backward compatibility with older Go versions.
// =============================================================================
// VerifyToken Edge Case Tests
// =============================================================================
// TestVerifyToken_MissingUserID creates a token without user_id claim and verifies
// VerifyToken returns an error containing "invalid user_id claim".
func TestVerifyToken_MissingUserID(t *testing.T) {
_, tokenString, err := TokenAuth.Encode(map[string]any{
"role": "admin",
"jti": "test-jti-001",
"exp": clock.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encode token: %v", err)
}
_, _, _, err = VerifyToken(tokenString, context.Background())
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for missing user_id claim, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid user_id claim") {
t.Errorf("expected 'invalid user_id claim' error, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestVerifyToken_WrongUserIDType creates a token with user_id as an integer (wrong type)
// and verifies VerifyToken returns an error containing "invalid user_id claim".
func TestVerifyToken_WrongUserIDType(t *testing.T) {
_, tokenString, err := TokenAuth.Encode(map[string]any{
"user_id": 12345,
"role": "admin",
"jti": "test-jti-002",
"exp": clock.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encode token: %v", err)
}
_, _, _, err = VerifyToken(tokenString, context.Background())
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for wrong user_id type, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid user_id claim") {
t.Errorf("expected 'invalid user_id claim' error, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestVerifyToken_MissingRole creates a token without role claim and verifies
// VerifyToken returns an error containing "invalid role claim".
func TestVerifyToken_MissingRole(t *testing.T) {
_, tokenString, err := TokenAuth.Encode(map[string]any{
"user_id": "user-001",
"jti": "test-jti-003",
"exp": clock.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encode token: %v", err)
}
_, _, _, err = VerifyToken(tokenString, context.Background())
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for missing role claim, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid role claim") {
t.Errorf("expected 'invalid role claim' error, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestVerifyToken_WrongRoleType creates a token with role as an integer (wrong type)
// and verifies VerifyToken returns an error containing "invalid role claim".
func TestVerifyToken_WrongRoleType(t *testing.T) {
_, tokenString, err := TokenAuth.Encode(map[string]any{
"user_id": "user-001",
"role": 12345,
"jti": "test-jti-004",
"exp": clock.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(),
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encode token: %v", err)
}
_, _, _, err = VerifyToken(tokenString, context.Background())
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for wrong role type, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid role claim") {
t.Errorf("expected 'invalid role claim' error, got: %v", err)
}
}