Crussell/backend/handlers/user/twofa.go

package user

import (
	"context"
	"crypto/rand"
	"database/sql"
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"log"
	"math/big"
	"net/http"
	"time"

	"crussell/clock"
	"crussell/db"
	"crussell/handlers/payments"
	"crussell/internal/twofa"
	"crussell/internal/validators"
	"crussell/mw"

	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
)

// twoFARequired reports whether 2FA enforcement is active in this deployment.
// The user endpoints and the profile handler expose this to the frontend so it
// can gate the settings UI.
func twoFARequired() bool {
	return payments.NewPaymentService().TwoFactorEnforced()
}

// twoFAPendingExpiry is how long a generated verification code stays valid.
// Loose fake: real email/SMS infrastructure will own this lifetime once it lands.
const twoFAPendingExpiry = 10 * time.Minute

// generateTwoFACode returns a random 6-digit verification code.
func generateTwoFACode() (string, error) {
	n, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(1_000_000))
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	return fmt.Sprintf("%06d", n.Int64()), nil
}

// twoFAPepperEnv is the environment variable carrying the server-side pepper
// that keys the HMAC of stored 2FA codes (documented in .env.example). Its
// absence is handled per build: dev/test builds fall back to the legacy plain
// SHA-256 digest with a one-time warning, while production builds fail closed
// at code issuance — see twofa_dev.go / twofa_prod.go.
const twoFAPepperEnv = "TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER"

// errTwoFADeliveryUnavailable is returned by production builds when a 2FA code
// is requested but no delivery channel is configured: the email/SMS transport
// is not wired yet (P6) and the operator has not opted into the insecure
// log-delivery mode (TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true). Handlers surface it
// verbatim so setup fails loudly with an actionable message instead of issuing
// a code that could never reach the user (which would silently dead-end the
// enforced saved-card-payments gate). Dev/test builds always have the [2FA] log
// channel and never return it (see twofa_dev.go).
var errTwoFADeliveryUnavailable = errors.New("2FA requires an email or SMS delivery channel; contact the salon")

// twoFAPepper reads TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER (plus the one-time unset warning) and
// twoFAEnsureIssueAllowed guards code issuance; both are build-dependent.
// Dev/test builds keep the documented loose-fake fallback (twofa_dev.go);
// production builds refuse to issue codes without the pepper (twofa_prod.go),
// matching how main.go fails closed on a missing JWT_SECRET_KEY. The pepper
// reader is registered into crussell/internal/twofa via twofa.SetPepperProvider
// by the build-tagged files (twofa_dev.go / twofa_prod.go).

// The verification core (per-user attempt-state map, brute-force lockout,
// constant-time code check) lives in crussell/internal/twofa — a package that
// imports neither handlers/user nor handlers/payments, so the payments
// card-access gate can verify a real 2FA challenge without an import cycle
// (B11c). The identifiers below are thin aliases/wrappers so the HTTP handlers
// and the existing tests keep their original names.

// twoFAMaxAttempts is the number of consecutive failed verify attempts allowed
// before the pending code is invalidated and a new one must be requested.
const twoFAMaxAttempts = twofa.MaxAttempts

// twoFAAttemptWindow bounds how long a per-user attempt counter lives before
// resetting, and doubles as the stale-entry eviction horizon for the map.
const twoFAAttemptWindow = twofa.AttemptWindow

// hashTwoFACode returns the hex digest of a verification code as stored in the
// DB (pepper-driven HMAC-SHA256, or the legacy plain SHA-256 when the pepper is
// unset). Delegates to the shared implementation.
func hashTwoFACode(code string) string { return twofa.Hash(code) }

// legacyHashTwoFACode returns the pre-pepper plain SHA-256 digest.
func legacyHashTwoFACode(code string) string { return twofa.LegacyHash(code) }

// verifyTwoFACodeHash reports whether reqCode matches a stored pending-code
// digest, always in constant time. Delegates to the shared implementation.
func verifyTwoFACodeHash(reqCode, storedHash string) (match, legacy bool) {
	return twofa.VerifyHash(reqCode, storedHash)
}

// twoFAAttemptState aliases the shared per-user attempt state.
type twoFAAttemptState = twofa.AttemptState

// twoFAAttemptStateFor returns the shared per-user attempt state (creating it
// if needed), under the bounded never-evict-in-lockout map.
func twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID string) *twoFAAttemptState {
	return twofa.StateFor(userID)
}

// twoFAResetAttempts zeroes the shared per-user attempt counter in place.
// Called on successful verify only — a fresh code mint must NOT reset it (B11b).
func twoFAResetAttempts(userID string) {
	twofa.ResetAttempts(userID)
}

// deliverTwoFACode generates a fresh verification code and persists only its
// digest plus the pending expiry (updating two_factor_method when method is
// non-empty).
//
// Delivery is build-dependent (twofa_dev.go / twofa_prod.go): dev/test builds
// write the plaintext code to the server log — the documented loose-fake
// stand-in for the not-yet-wired email/SMS transport (P6) — while production
// builds fail closed up front: twoFAEnsureIssueAllowed refuses to issue a code
// when TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER is unset (an unsalted digest would be
// offline-brute-forceable) or when no delivery channel is configured (email/SMS
// unwired and log delivery not explicitly opted into via
// TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true) — so a production setup never mints a
// code that could never reach the user. The API response still only returns the
// code when 2FA is unenforced (dev convenience). purpose labels the delivery
// (e.g. "setup", "disable 2FA").
//
// A fresh code does NOT reset the per-user failed-attempt counter (B11b): only
// a successful verify does. Resetting on re-mint would let a password-only
// attacker loop mint → burn 5 guesses → mint forever within a code's lifetime.
func deliverTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID, method, purpose string) (string, error) {
	if err := twoFAEnsureIssueAllowed(); err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	code, err := generateTwoFACode()
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	expires := clock.Now().Add(twoFAPendingExpiry)
	if method != "" {
		_, err = db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
			UPDATE users
			SET two_factor_method = $2,
				two_factor_pending_code_hash = $3,
				two_factor_pending_code_expires = $4
			WHERE id = $1
		`, userID, method, hashTwoFACode(code), expires)
	} else {
		_, err = db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
			UPDATE users
			SET two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2,
				two_factor_pending_code_expires = $3
			WHERE id = $1
		`, userID, hashTwoFACode(code), expires)
	}
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}

	label := method
	if label == "" {
		label = purpose
	}
	// Build-dependent delivery: dev/test logs the plaintext code ([2FA] line);
	// production logs it ONLY when the operator explicitly opted into log
	// delivery (TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true) — otherwise issuance was
	// already refused by twoFAEnsureIssueAllowed above, so the default is that
	// the code never reaches a log.
	twoFADeliverCode(userID, label, code)
	return code, nil
}

type TwoFAStatusResponse struct {
	Enabled  bool    `json:"enabled"`
	Method   *string `json:"method"`
	Required bool    `json:"required"`
}

// GET /api/user/2fa/status
func GetTwoFAStatusHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var enabled bool
	var method sql.NullString
	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
		SELECT two_factor_enabled, two_factor_method
		FROM users
		WHERE id = $1
	`, userID).Scan(&enabled, &method)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to fetch 2FA status for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	resp := TwoFAStatusResponse{Enabled: enabled, Required: twoFARequired()}
	if method.Valid {
		resp.Method = &method.String
	}
	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp); err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to encode 2FA status response: %v", err)
	}
}

type TwoFASetupRequest struct {
	Method string `json:"method"`
}

// POST /api/user/2fa/setup
// Generates a verification code and stores only its SHA-256 hash plus a
// 10-minute expiry in the pending columns. Delivery is build-dependent (see
// deliverTwoFACode): dev/test builds log the code with a [2FA] prefix — the
// loose-fake stand-in for the not-yet-wired email/SMS transport (P6) — while
// production builds fail closed when TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER is unset or when no
// delivery channel is configured (email/SMS unwired and
// TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true unset), returning a clear actionable
// error instead of silently issuing a code that would never arrive. When 2FA is
// not enforced (dev), the code is also returned in the response so the flow is
// testable without reading backend logs.
func SetupTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var req TwoFASetupRequest
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}
	if req.Method != "email" && req.Method != "sms" {
		http.Error(w, "method must be 'email' or 'sms'", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	var enabled bool
	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&enabled)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to check 2FA state for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if enabled {
		http.Error(w, "Two-factor authentication is already enabled", http.StatusConflict)
		return
	}

	// The per-user mutex serializes the mint with the disable flow's
	// checkTwoFACode critical section so concurrent requests from the same user
	// cannot race the mint cooldown or the lockout counter.
	st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
	st.Mu.Lock()
	defer st.Mu.Unlock()

	// Mint cooldown (B11a): the same twoFAMintCooldown guard the disable flow
	// applies via ensurePendingTwoFACode now bounds setup re-mints too. A fresh
	// setup code no longer resets the failed-attempt counter (B11b), so without
	// this a setup-spam loop could mint fresh codes (each invalidating the
	// prior lockout state) and keep a guessing budget alive indefinitely.
	now := clock.Now()
	if !st.LastMintAt.IsZero() && now.Sub(st.LastMintAt) < twoFAMintCooldown {
		http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Wait before requesting a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
		return
	}

	// Deliver a fresh code via the shared setup mechanism: generate, persist
	// only the hash + expiry, and deliver it build-dependently (the [2FA] log
	// channel in dev/test; in production only when the operator explicitly
	// opted into log delivery — see deliverTwoFACode). A production build with
	// no delivery channel fails here with a clear, actionable error instead of
	// issuing a code that would never reach the user.
	code, err := deliverTwoFACode(r, userID, req.Method, "setup")
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFADeliveryUnavailable) {
			// The deployment has no delivery channel at all (email/SMS unwired
			// and no explicit log-delivery opt-in). Fail loudly — the code is
			// never generated, never logged, and never persisted.
			http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("failed to store 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	st.LastMintAt = now

	resp := map[string]any{"message": "Code sent"}
	if !twoFARequired() {
		// Dev convenience: unenforced environments return the code so the
		// fake-delivery flow is usable without grepping the backend log.
		resp["code"] = code
	}
	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp); err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to encode 2FA setup response: %v", err)
	}
}

type TwoFAVerifyRequest struct {
	Code string `json:"code"`
}

// twoFACodeCheckResult classifies checkTwoFACode's outcome so callers can map
// it to the correct HTTP status. Aliased to the shared twofa.Result.
type twoFACodeCheckResult = twofa.Result

const (
	twoFACodeOK               = twofa.OK
	twoFACodeIncorrect        = twofa.Incorrect
	twoFACodeLockedOut        = twofa.LockedOut
	twoFACodeMissingOrExpired = twofa.MissingOrExpired
)

// checkTwoFACode verifies the submitted code against the user's stored pending
// code under the per-user brute-force lockout, shared by VerifyTwoFAHandler,
// DisableTwoFAHandler and VerifyTwoFACodeForUser. The caller must hold st.Mu
// (from twoFAAttemptStateFor) so concurrent attempts from the same user cannot
// race the limit check. Delegates to the shared implementation in
// crussell/internal/twofa with consume=false: the interactive setup/disable
// flows clear the pending code themselves on success (enableTwoFA /
// disableTwoFA), so the code must stay valid through the whole handshake here.
func checkTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID string, st *twoFAAttemptState, reqCode string) (twoFACodeCheckResult, error) {
	res, err := twofa.Check(r.Context(), userID, st, reqCode, false)
	return twoFACodeCheckResult(res), err
}

// VerifyTwoFACodeForUser verifies a 2FA code for a user under the same
// per-user brute-force lockout as the interactive endpoints, outside the HTTP
// handler layer. It returns nil on a correct code, or one of the exported
// twofa.ErrIncorrect / twofa.ErrLockedOut / twofa.ErrMissingOrExpired (or a DB
// error, wrapped).
//
// Coordination contract for the payments agent (B6/B10): handlers/payments
// cannot import handlers/user — handlers/user imports handlers/payments
// (TwoFactorEnforced, SquareClient), so a payments→user import is a cycle. The
// payments gate must call twofa.VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, code, consume) from
// crussell/internal/twofa (the shared home of this verification core) instead
// of importing this package. Since MEDIUM-2 the payments saved-card CHARGE
// gates pass consume=false and NULL the code at the charge's terminal success
// via twofa.ConsumePendingCode; the save-card SAVE gates pass consume=true.
func VerifyTwoFACodeForUser(ctx context.Context, userID, code string) error {
	st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
	st.Mu.Lock()
	defer st.Mu.Unlock()

	result, err := twofa.Check(ctx, userID, st, code, false)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	switch result {
	case twoFACodeOK:
		return nil
	case twoFACodeIncorrect:
		return twofa.ErrIncorrect
	case twoFACodeLockedOut:
		return twofa.ErrLockedOut
	case twoFACodeMissingOrExpired:
		return twofa.ErrMissingOrExpired
	}
	return nil
}

// POST /api/user/2fa/verify
// Confirms the pending code (SHA-256, timing-safe, not expired) and flips
// two_factor_enabled on. When 2FA is not enforced (dev) any code — including an
// empty one — verifies, so local testing never depends on reading the logged
// code.
func VerifyTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var req TwoFAVerifyRequest
	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
		http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if !twoFARequired() {
		// Dev bypass: no code verification in unenforced environments.
		if err := enableTwoFA(r, userID); err != nil {
			log.Printf("failed to enable 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
			http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		writeTwoFAEnabled(w)
		return
	}

	// Enforced path — brute-force resistant (see checkTwoFACode): the per-user
	// mutex serializes the critical section so concurrent attempts cannot race
	// the limit; after 5 consecutive failures the pending code is invalidated
	// and further attempts get 429 until a new code is requested via setup.
	st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
	st.Mu.Lock()
	defer st.Mu.Unlock()

	result, err := checkTwoFACode(r, userID, st, req.Code)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to check 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	switch result {
	case twoFACodeIncorrect:
		http.Error(w, "incorrect verification code", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	case twoFACodeLockedOut:
		http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Request a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
		return
	case twoFACodeMissingOrExpired:
		// No valid pending code exists. If the deployment also has no delivery
		// channel (production without an explicit log-delivery opt-in), the
		// user can never receive a fresh code — setup and the disable mint all
		// refuse issuance. Surface that actionable setup error instead of the
		// generic "missing or expired" (which implies a simple retry would
		// help), so this is never a silent lockout.
		if !twoFADeliveryAvailable() {
			http.Error(w, errTwoFADeliveryUnavailable.Error(), http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
			return
		}
		http.Error(w, "verification code is missing or has expired", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := enableTwoFA(r, userID); err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to enable 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	writeTwoFAEnabled(w)
}

// enableTwoFA persists two_factor_enabled=true, records the last successful
// verification in two_factor_last_used_at, and clears the pending code fields
// (the method was set during setup). The last-used stamp is written here so it
// covers both the enforced verify path and the dev bypass.
func enableTwoFA(r *http.Request, userID string) error {
	_, err := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
		UPDATE users
		SET two_factor_enabled = true,
			two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
			two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL,
			two_factor_last_used_at = NOW()
		WHERE id = $1
	`, userID)
	return err
}

func writeTwoFAEnabled(w http.ResponseWriter) {
	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]bool{"enabled": true}); err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to encode 2FA verify response: %v", err)
	}
}

// twoFAMintCooldown bounds how often a fresh 2FA code may be minted for one
// user during the disable flow. Without it, a password-only attacker could loop
// disable → fresh code (which resets the 5-attempt counter) → 5 wrong guesses →
// fresh code again, for ~100 guesses/min unbounded. The cooldown caps guessing
// at 5 per window (~5/min) while still letting a legitimate code-lost user
// recover after a short wait.
const twoFAMintCooldown = 1 * time.Minute

// errTwoFAMintThrottled is returned by ensurePendingTwoFACode when the user's
// last disable-flow mint is inside twoFAMintCooldown, so the caller returns 429
// instead of minting another fresh code.
var errTwoFAMintThrottled = errors.New("2FA code mint throttled")

type TwoFADisableRequest struct {
	Code string `json:"code"`
}

// POST /api/user/2fa/disable/code
// Mints + delivers a fresh disable-flow verification code so the frontend can
// show a code-entry step before it calls POST /api/user/2fa/disable. This is
// the disable-flow equivalent of SetupTwoFAHandler: it guarantees a valid
// (unexpired) pending code exists, delivering a fresh one via the same
// build-dependent delivery channel (see deliverTwoFACode) and persisting only
// its hash + expiry when none does. The actual disable still happens through
// the existing disable endpoint, which validates the entered code under the
// shared 5-attempt lockout — this handler only performs the mint. Fresh-code
// mints are throttled per-user (twoFAMintCooldown), so a password-only attacker
// cannot loop request-code → burn 5 guesses → request-code forever; a throttled
// request returns 429. Like the disable handler, no code is returned in the
// response (delivery is the [2FA] log line in dev/test builds; production
// fails closed when no delivery channel is configured — no email/SMS and no
// explicit TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY opt-in), and unlike setup this
// endpoint runs unconditionally — it does not short-circuit on
// !twoFARequired(), so dev environments can exercise the same step (the mint
// is harmless there).
func SendDisableCodeHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	// The per-user mutex serializes the mint with the disable handler's
	// checkTwoFACode critical section so concurrent requests from the same user
	// cannot race the cooldown or lockout counters.
	st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
	st.Mu.Lock()
	defer st.Mu.Unlock()

	if _, _, err := ensurePendingTwoFACode(r, userID, st, "disable 2FA"); err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFAMintThrottled) {
			http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Wait before requesting a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
			return
		}
		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFADeliveryUnavailable) {
			// Production with no delivery channel: a fresh code cannot be
			// minted, so the disable flow (and thus the user's recovery) fails
			// loudly with the actionable setup error.
			http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("failed to prepare 2FA code for disable for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}

// POST /api/user/2fa/code
// Lets an ENABLED user request a fresh verification code for a saved-card
// charge (the B6/B10 gate). This closes the enforced-deployment dead-end where
// 2FA setup clears the pending code and SetupTwoFAHandler refuses already
// enabled users (409): without it there is no way to mint a code for a
// saved-card charge, so every charge returned 400 "Verification code expired —
// request a new one" with no way to get a new one.
//
// The mint machinery is shared with the disable flow: ensurePendingTwoFACode
// reuses a still-valid pending code when one exists and otherwise mints +
// delivers a fresh one via the same build-dependent channel as setup
// (deliverTwoFACode — [2FA] log in dev/test; pepper- and delivery-channel
// gated in production). Fresh-code mints are throttled per-user
// (twoFAMintCooldown) and never reset the failed-attempt counter (B11b).
//
// Contract: 200 {"message":"Code sent","remaining_seconds":N} (+ a dev-only
// "code" field when 2FA is unenforced, matching setup) where N is how many
// seconds the effective pending code stays valid — the FULL twoFAPendingExpiry
// after a fresh mint, or the decremented lifetime when an existing valid code
// was reused (LOW 5). A 200 with a reused code must NOT be read as "a new code
// was sent": the frontend should use the already-delivered code and show the
// countdown. 409 when the user has not enabled 2FA; 429 on the mint cooldown;
// 503 when no delivery channel is configured (production without
// TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true); 500 on DB failure. The route is
// mounted with RequireAuth + RequireNonGuest + the shared per-user 2FA limiter
// (plus the group's per-IP limiter), so an enabled user cannot hammer code
// requests faster than the surface budget.
func SendVerificationCodeHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	var enabled bool
	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&enabled)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to check 2FA state for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if !enabled {
		http.Error(w, "Two-factor authentication is not enabled", http.StatusConflict)
		return
	}

	// The per-user mutex serializes the mint with the charge gate's verify
	// critical section so concurrent requests from the same user cannot race
	// the cooldown or lockout counters.
	st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
	st.Mu.Lock()
	defer st.Mu.Unlock()

	code, remaining, err := ensurePendingTwoFACode(r, userID, st, "saved-card charge")
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFAMintThrottled) {
			http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Wait before requesting a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
			return
		}
		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFADeliveryUnavailable) {
			// Production with no delivery channel: no fresh code can be minted,
			// so the saved-card charge cannot be re-challenged. Surface the
			// actionable setup error instead of a silent 500.
			http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("failed to prepare 2FA code for saved-card charge for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	// remaining_seconds tells the client how much longer the (possibly reused)
	// pending code stays valid, so a button that would otherwise toast "Code
	// sent" while no NEW code was minted can instead show a countdown / keep
	// the existing code (LOW 5).
	resp := map[string]any{"message": "Code sent", "remaining_seconds": int(remaining.Seconds())}
	if !twoFARequired() && code != "" {
		// Dev convenience (matches setup): return the freshly minted code so
		// the request path is testable without grepping the backend log. The
		// code is never included when 2FA is enforced.
		resp["code"] = code
	}
	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp); err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to encode 2FA code response: %v", err)
	}
}

// AdminSendVerificationCodeHandler mints (or reuses) a 2FA code for a TARGET
// user, not the session user. The saved-card charge gate verifies the code
// against the CARD OWNER (customer) — never the admin session (till.go:951,
// handlers.go:797) — so a session-scoped mint would key the code to the admin
// and could never authorize the customer's charge. Delivering keyed to the
// customer preserves the invariant that the customer, not the admin, is the
// authentication subject for their card.
func AdminSendVerificationCodeHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	targetUserID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
	if targetUserID == "" {
		http.Error(w, "user_id is required", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	var enabled bool
	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1`, targetUserID).Scan(&enabled)
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
			http.Error(w, "User not found", http.StatusNotFound)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("failed to check 2FA state for user %s: %v", targetUserID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if !enabled {
		http.Error(w, "Two-factor authentication is not enabled for this user", http.StatusConflict)
		return
	}

	// The per-user mutex serializes the mint with the charge gate's verify
	// critical section for the CUSTOMER, so concurrent mints (admin + customer
	// requesting simultaneously) cannot race the cooldown or lockout counters.
	st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(targetUserID)
	st.Mu.Lock()
	defer st.Mu.Unlock()

	code, remaining, err := ensurePendingTwoFACode(r, targetUserID, st, "saved-card charge")
	if err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFAMintThrottled) {
			http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Wait before requesting a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
			return
		}
		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFADeliveryUnavailable) {
			http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("failed to prepare 2FA code for user %s: %v", targetUserID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	resp := map[string]any{"message": "Code sent", "remaining_seconds": int(remaining.Seconds())}
	if !twoFARequired() && code != "" {
		// Dev convenience (matches setup): return the freshly minted code so
		// the request path is testable without grepping the backend log. The
		// code is never included when 2FA is enforced.
		resp["code"] = code
	}
	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp); err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to encode 2FA code response: %v", err)
	}
}

// POST /api/user/2fa/disable
// Turns 2FA off and clears method + pending fields for the authenticated user.
//
// Disabling 2FA lifts the SCA stand-in gate on saved-card charges, so in
// enforced environments a verification code is required — a password-only
// attacker must not be able to disable the protection. A fresh code is generated
// and delivered via the build-dependent delivery channel (see deliverTwoFACode)
// when no valid pending code exists, and the submitted code is checked under the
// shared 5-attempt lockout (wrong code → 400, lockout → 429); only a correct
// code clears the flag. When no delivery channel is configured (production
// without email/SMS and without the explicit TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY
// opt-in), the mint fails loudly with the actionable setup error instead of a
// silent 500. Fresh-code mints are throttled per-user (twoFAMintCooldown) so
// the loop above cannot reset the lockout faster than once per cooldown. In
// unenforced (dev) environments the loose behavior is kept: no code required,
// so local dev is not blocked.
func DisableTwoFAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
	if !ok {
		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
		return
	}

	// Body is optional; decode leniently so an empty body still works in
	// unenforced (dev) environments.
	var req TwoFADisableRequest
	_ = json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req)

	if !twoFARequired() {
		// Dev bypass: no re-verification in unenforced environments.
		if err := disableTwoFA(r, userID); err != nil {
			log.Printf("failed to disable 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
			http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
			return
		}
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
		return
	}

	// Enforced path. The per-user mutex serializes the whole critical section
	// (fresh-code generation + code check) so concurrent requests cannot race
	// the lockout counter.
	st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
	st.Mu.Lock()
	defer st.Mu.Unlock()

	// Reuse a valid pending code when one exists; otherwise generate + deliver
	// a fresh one via the same build-dependent channel as setup. Minting a fresh
	// code does NOT reset the failed-attempt counter (B11b): the counter resets
	// only on a successful verify or when the 10-minute attempt window elapses.
	// The per-user mint cooldown still bounds how often a fresh code can be
	// minted — at most one per twoFAMintCooldown — but it cannot grant a fresh
	// guessing budget.
	if _, _, err := ensurePendingTwoFACode(r, userID, st, "disable 2FA"); err != nil {
		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFAMintThrottled) {
			http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Wait before requesting a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
			return
		}
		if errors.Is(err, errTwoFADeliveryUnavailable) {
			// Production with no delivery channel: no fresh code can be minted,
			// so the enforced disable re-verification cannot proceed. Surface
			// the actionable setup error instead of a silent 500.
			http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
			return
		}
		log.Printf("failed to prepare 2FA code for disable for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}

	result, err := checkTwoFACode(r, userID, st, req.Code)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to check 2FA pending code for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	switch result {
	case twoFACodeIncorrect:
		http.Error(w, "incorrect verification code", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	case twoFACodeLockedOut:
		http.Error(w, "Too many attempts. Request a new code.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
		return
	case twoFACodeMissingOrExpired:
		// ensurePendingTwoFACode just guaranteed a valid pending code; defensive.
		http.Error(w, "verification code is missing or has expired", http.StatusBadRequest)
		return
	}

	if err := disableTwoFA(r, userID); err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to disable 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}

// ensurePendingTwoFACode guarantees the user has a valid (unexpired) pending
// code to verify against, generating + delivering a fresh one via the same
// build-dependent delivery channel as setup (see deliverTwoFACode) when the
// stored code is missing or expired. purpose labels the delivery for the [2FA]
// log line (e.g. "disable 2FA", "saved-card charge"). The caller must hold the
// user's attempt-state mutex.
//
// It returns the plaintext code only when a FRESH code was minted and
// delivered (dev/test builds always deliver it; production builds only when
// the operator opted into log delivery — see twofa_prod.go). When a valid
// pending code was reused, the returned code is empty: only the digest is
// stored, so the plaintext is unavailable. Callers must only expose the
// returned code in unenforced environments (matching SetupTwoFAHandler's dev
// convenience). The remaining lifetime of the effective pending code (the
// reused one, or the fresh mint's full twoFAPendingExpiry) is always returned
// so a caller can surface "code still valid for N seconds" instead of implying
// a fresh code was sent (LOW 5).
//
// Minting a fresh code does NOT reset the failed-attempt counter (B11b): the
// counter resets only on a successful verify or when the 10-minute attempt
// window elapses (see twoFAResetAttempts — called on successful verify only).
// The per-user mint cooldown still bounds how often a fresh code can be minted
// (at most one per twoFAMintCooldown per user), but it cannot grant a fresh
// guessing budget. A locked-out user therefore stays locked out until the
// attempt window elapses; the documented disable-flow residual is that a user
// who exhausts the budget must wait out the window, not the mint cooldown. A
// failed delivery does not start the cooldown (the stamp is written only after
// the UPDATE persisted).
func ensurePendingTwoFACode(r *http.Request, userID string, st *twoFAAttemptState, purpose string) (string, time.Duration, error) {
	var pendingHash sql.NullString
	var pendingExpires sql.NullTime
	err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
		SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash, two_factor_pending_code_expires
		FROM users
		WHERE id = $1
	`, userID).Scan(&pendingHash, &pendingExpires)
	if err != nil {
		return "", 0, err
	}
	if pendingHash.Valid && pendingExpires.Valid && pendingExpires.Time.After(clock.Now()) {
		return "", pendingExpires.Time.Sub(clock.Now()), nil
	}
	now := clock.Now()
	if !st.LastMintAt.IsZero() && now.Sub(st.LastMintAt) < twoFAMintCooldown {
		return "", 0, errTwoFAMintThrottled
	}
	code, err := deliverTwoFACode(r, userID, "", purpose)
	if err != nil {
		return "", 0, err
	}
	st.LastMintAt = now
	return code, twoFAPendingExpiry, nil
}

// disableTwoFA clears two_factor_enabled and the method + pending code fields.
func disableTwoFA(r *http.Request, userID string) error {
	_, err := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
		UPDATE users
		SET two_factor_enabled = false,
			two_factor_method = NULL,
			two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
			two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL
		WHERE id = $1
	`, userID)
	return err
}

// twoFADeleteAttempts removes a user's attempt-map entry entirely, unlike
// twoFAResetAttempts which only zeroes the count in place. The admin 2FA
// removal flow uses it so any lingering lockout/counter/mint-cooldown state is
// dropped wholesale and a re-setup starts from a clean slate. Delegates to the
// shared implementation.
func twoFADeleteAttempts(userID string) {
	twofa.DeleteAttempts(userID)
}

// removeUser2FA clears all 2FA state for a user: the enabled flag, method,
// pending code fields, and the last-used timestamp. It reports whether a user
// row was actually affected (false means the user does not exist).
func removeUser2FA(r *http.Request, userID string) (bool, error) {
	tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(r.Context(), `
		UPDATE users
		SET two_factor_enabled = false,
			two_factor_method = NULL,
			two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
			two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL,
			two_factor_last_used_at = NULL
		WHERE id = $1
	`, userID)
	if err != nil {
		return false, err
	}
	return tag.RowsAffected() > 0, nil
}

// POST /api/admin/users/{id}/2fa/remove
// Admin-only recovery route for when a user loses access to their 2FA device:
// forcibly disables the user's 2FA without requiring their code (bypassing the
// user-facing disable flow's re-verification). The route is mounted inside the
// admin-gated /admin/users group so RequireAdmin runs first. Mirrors
// disableTwoFA's column clearing plus two_factor_last_used_at, and drops the
// user's in-memory attempt/lockout state. A log line records the admin action.
func AdminRemoveUser2FAHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	userID := chi.URLParam(r, "id")
	if userID == "" || !validators.IsValidID(userID) {
		http.Error(w, "user not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}
	affected, err := removeUser2FA(r, userID)
	if err != nil {
		log.Printf("failed to remove 2FA for user %s: %v", userID, err)
		http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
		return
	}
	if !affected {
		http.Error(w, "user not found", http.StatusNotFound)
		return
	}
	twoFADeleteAttempts(userID)
	log.Printf("[2FA] admin removed 2FA for user %s", userID)
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}