Crussell/backend/main.go

package main

import (
	"context"
	"crussell/auth"
	"crussell/internal/dav"
	"crussell/internal/jobs"
	"crussell/internal/logutil"
	"crussell/internal/s3"
	"crussell/internal/square"
	"encoding/base64"
	"encoding/json"
	"fmt"
	"log"
	"net/http"
	"os"
	"os/signal"
	"strings"
	"sync/atomic"
	"syscall"
	"time"

	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"

	"crussell/db"
	"crussell/mw"

	"crussell/handlers/admin"
	authHandlers "crussell/handlers/auth"
	"crussell/handlers/bookings"
	"crussell/handlers/notifications"
	"crussell/handlers/payments"
	"crussell/handlers/portfolio"
	"crussell/handlers/scheduling"
	"crussell/handlers/services"
	"crussell/handlers/today"
	"crussell/handlers/user"
	"crussell/handlers/webhooks"
)

func init() {
	// The testing framework passes -test.* to the binary; skip JWT init
	// because test packages handle it via testutils/jwt. This is more
	// precise than checking GO_TESTING env var, which can leak from the
	// test runner into the environment during seeding.
	for _, arg := range os.Args {
		if strings.HasPrefix(arg, "-test.") {
			return
		}
	}

	jwtSecret := os.Getenv("JWT_SECRET_KEY")
	if jwtSecret == "" {
		log.Fatal("FATAL: JWT_SECRET_KEY environment variable not set. Application cannot start.")
	}
	// Fail-closed: a weak, publicly-known, or placeholder JWT_SECRET_KEY must
	// not start the server. Every deployment copying .env.example unchanged
	// would otherwise share the SAME signing key, letting anyone forge an
	// admin JWT (gift-card minting, refunds, saved-card access).
	if isWeakJWTSecret(jwtSecret) {
		log.Fatal("FATAL: JWT_SECRET_KEY is too weak: it must be at least 32 characters and not a known placeholder value (the current value is publicly documented). Generate a strong random key and set it, e.g. `openssl rand -hex 32`.")
	}
	auth.InitJWT(jwtSecret)
}

// minJWTSecretBytes is the minimum length enforced for JWT_SECRET_KEY. HS256
// needs at least 32 bytes (256 bits) to be meaningful; shorter keys are
// trivially brute-forceable and every deployment sharing one is forgeable.
const minJWTSecretBytes = 32

// weakJWTSecretValues lists known placeholder/example values for
// JWT_SECRET_KEY that are public (documented in .env.example, READMEs, or
// attack tooling) and must never be accepted as a signing key.
var weakJWTSecretValues = []string{
	"a-very-secret-key-that-should-be-in-env",
	"change-me",
	"changeme",
	"changethis",
	"CHANGE_ME",
	"secret",
	"password",
	"your-secret-key",
	"your-secret",
	"jwt-secret",
	"jwt-secret-key",
	"default-secret",
	"my-secret",
	"test-secret",
	"test-secret-key",
	"test-secret-key-for-testing-only",
	"super-secret",
}

// isWeakJWTSecret reports whether a JWT_SECRET_KEY is a known placeholder,
// shorter than the minimum safe length, or lacks sufficient entropy.
func isWeakJWTSecret(secret string) bool {
	trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(secret))
	if len(trimmed) < minJWTSecretBytes {
		return true
	}
	for _, weak := range weakJWTSecretValues {
		if trimmed == weak {
			return true
		}
	}
	// Entropy gate (B15): at least 8 distinct bytes. All-same-char and
	// tiny-alphabet secrets ("aaaa...", "0000...", "abcdabcdabcd...") pass the
	// length and blacklist checks but have trivial key space — HS256 keys need
	// meaningful entropy, not just length. A strong random secret (even pure
	// hex, which can use at most 16 distinct chars) clears the 8-byte bar.
	seen := make(map[byte]struct{}, 8)
	for i := 0; i < len(trimmed); i++ {
		seen[trimmed[i]] = struct{}{}
		if len(seen) >= 8 {
			return false
		}
	}
	return len(seen) < 8
}

func limitBody(limit int64) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
			if r.Body != nil {
				r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, limit)
			}
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
		})
	}
}

const (
	defaultBodyLimit   int64 = 1 * 1024 * 1024  // 1MB
	uploadBodyLimit    int64 = 20 * 1024 * 1024 // 20MB
	portfolioBodyLimit int64 = 30 * 1024 * 1024 // 30MB (7 variants)
)

// nColor / bColor — Chi-style ANSI colors for request logging.
type nColor string
type bColor string

var (
	reset   = nColor(logutil.Reset)
	nYellow = nColor(logutil.Yellow)
	nCyan   = nColor(logutil.Cyan)

	bGreen   = bColor(logutil.BoldGreen)
	bYellow  = bColor(logutil.BoldYellow)
	bRed     = bColor(logutil.BoldRed)
	bBlue    = bColor(logutil.BoldBlue)
	bMagenta = bColor(logutil.BoldMagenta)

	debugLvl = nColor(logutil.DebugLvl)
	warnLvl  = nColor(logutil.WarnLvl)
	errorLvl = nColor(logutil.ErrorLvl)
)

var apiLog = log.New(os.Stdout, "", log.LstdFlags)

func initDB() {
	if err := db.Connect(); err != nil {
		log.Fatal("Failed to connect to DB:", err)
	}
	fmt.Println("Connected to DB successfully")
}

func initDav() {
	if dav.Service == nil {
		log.Fatal("Failed to initialize DAV service")
	}
	fmt.Println("DAV Service connected successfully")
}

func initS3() {
	if err := s3.Connect(); err != nil {
		log.Printf("WARNING: Failed to connect to S3: %v", err)
	} else {
		fmt.Println("S3 client initialized")
	}
}

func initSquare() {
	payments.SquareClient = square.NewClient()
	env := os.Getenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT")
	if env == "sandbox" || env == "production" {
		fmt.Printf("Square client initialized (%s, real API)\n", env)
	} else {
		fmt.Println("Square client initialized (dev mock)")
	}
	// 2FA enforcement is fail-closed (see payments.twoFactorEnforced): it is
	// OFF only when REQUIRE_2FA explicitly disables it (false/0/off/no,
	// case-insensitive) or SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT explicitly selects the dev/mock
	// stack. In an enforced env a token-less saved-card charge is refused 402
	// verification_required (SCA-only — see the posture note below); in a
	// dev/mock env the gate lifts and the mock simulates SCA. Warn loudly when
	// a non-dev env (empty/unknown — a likely misconfiguration) leaves the gate
	// disabled.
	enforced := payments.NewPaymentService().TwoFactorEnforced()
	if enforced {
		// Delivery is build-dependent (handlers/user/twofa_dev.go /
		// twofa_prod.go): dev/test builds ALWAYS write the plaintext code to
		// the local-dev [2FA] stdout log; production builds NEVER log it —
		// stdout-log delivery is a dev/test-only feature, not a production
		// channel. With no email/SMS transport wired yet (P6), a production
		// build has NO delivery channel at all, so 2FA code issuance FAILS
		// CLOSED and no user can complete 2FA setup or disable until the
		// email/SMS transport lands. Warn loudly so the operator is never
		// misled into thinking codes are reaching users when issuance is
		// actually failing closed.
		log.Printf("WARNING: 2FA enforcement is ON, but this is not a dev/test build: stdout-log delivery is a LOCAL DEV ONLY feature and email/SMS is not wired yet (P6), so there is NO code-delivery channel and 2FA code issuance FAILS CLOSED — no user can complete 2FA setup or disable until email/SMS delivery is implemented. Card charges are unaffected (SCA-only). Run a dev/test build for local log-delivery testing.")
	}
	if !enforced && !payments.IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv() {
		log.Printf("WARNING: 2FA enforcement is OFF (REQUIRE_2FA=%q) with SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=%q (not an explicit mock/dev value). Online saved-card payments will NOT require 2FA.", os.Getenv("REQUIRE_2FA"), env)
	}
	// SCA-only posture (permanent — no switch): saved-card charges are
	// authorised exclusively by Square PSD2 SCA. PSR 2017 reg 100 makes SCA
	// mandatory and non-waivable for customer-initiated stored-credential
	// charges, and the homegrown 2FA cannot legally act as an SCA fallback: a
	// token-less saved-card charge is refused 402 verification_required ("pay
	// online later") — a fallback-authorised charge would leave the MERCHANT
	// liable for ECI 7 / SLI 210 chargebacks and PSR 2017 reg 77(6)
	// compensation, and consent does not cure it. The dev mock simulates SCA
	// (SimulateSavedCardVerificationRequired + cnon:sca-... tokenize-results),
	// so development has full parity. There is no TWO_FACTOR_FALLBACK switch to
	// warn about — it was removed; a token-less charge can never be authorised
	// by 2FA in any environment.
	// The mirror-image confusion: enforcement is ON but the Square client fell
	// back to the in-memory mock (internal/square.NewDevClient only picks the
	// real API for sandbox/production) because SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT is empty or
	// unknown. The operator may believe they are in dev — warn so enforced-2FA
	// 403s on online saved-card payments do not arrive as a surprise.
	if enforced && env != "sandbox" && env != "production" {
		log.Printf("WARNING: 2FA enforcement is ON but SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=%q is empty/unknown — the Square client is the dev mock while the 2FA gate stays enforced (fail-closed). Online saved-card payments will 403 until users enable 2FA; set SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT to a dev value (mock/dev/development/test) to lift the gate, or to sandbox/production for the real API.", env)
	}

	checkSnapshotEncKey()
	checkProxyRateLimitConfig()
	checkWebhookSignatureKey()
	checkSquareCredentials()
}

// checkSnapshotEncKey validates SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY at startup in non-mock
// deployments. charge_helpers.snapshotEncKey() (handlers/payments) parses the
// key on every call and silently falls back to storing square_request_snapshot
// rows PLAINTEXT (buyer PII: email + ccof card tokens) with a one-time CRITICAL
// log. That runtime fallback is a money-safety convenience for the dev/mock
// stack (no real PII), but in a REAL deployment a missing/invalid key would
// leave buyer email + ccof card tokens unencrypted at rest — so this startup
// check FAILS CLOSED there, mirroring the JWT_SECRET_KEY gate (main.go init):
// in a non-mock environment the key must be present and decode to exactly 32
// bytes (AES-256), or the process refuses to start. The warn+plaintext-fallback
// posture survives ONLY in explicit dev/mock environments (no real data).
func checkSnapshotEncKey() {
	if payments.IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv() {
		return
	}
	raw := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY"))
	switch {
	case raw == "":
		log.Fatalf("FATAL: SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY is not set with SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=%q (non-mock) — square_request_snapshot rows (buyer PII: email + ccof card tokens) would be stored PLAINTEXT at rest. Generate a base64-encoded 32-byte key with `openssl rand -base64 32`.", os.Getenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT"))
	default:
		decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(raw)
		switch {
		case err != nil:
			log.Fatalf("FATAL: SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY is not valid base64 (%v) with SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=%q (non-mock) — square_request_snapshot rows would be stored PLAINTEXT at rest. Generate a base64-encoded 32-byte key with `openssl rand -base64 32`.", err, os.Getenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT"))
		case len(decoded) != 32:
			log.Fatalf("FATAL: SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY must decode to exactly 32 bytes for AES-256 (got %d) with SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=%q (non-mock) — square_request_snapshot rows would be stored PLAINTEXT at rest. Generate a base64-encoded 32-byte key with `openssl rand -base64 32`.", len(decoded), os.Getenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT"))
		}
	}
}

// checkProxyRateLimitConfig warns when per-IP rate limiting collapses to a
// single GLOBAL budget: TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS is unset/false (the shipped
// default — .env.example ships false, compose.yml never sets it) while
// SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT selects a real deployment (sandbox/production/empty).
// Behind a trusted proxy (the nginx in compose.yml), every request's
// RemoteAddr is the proxy's IP, so clientIP() returns the SAME key for all
// users and any one client can exhaust the shared per-IP budget — permanently
// 429ing the whole surface for everyone. The user+IP 2FA limiter is immune
// (each authenticated account gets its own bucket), but every other per-IP
// limiter still collapses. Set TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true when a trusted proxy
// (nginx and/or the Cloudflare edge) sits in front and overwrites X-Real-IP /
// CF-Connecting-IP with the real client IP.
func checkProxyRateLimitConfig() {
	if payments.IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv() {
		return
	}
	if mw.TrustProxyHeaders() {
		return
	}
	log.Printf("WARNING: TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS is unset/false with SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=%q (not a dev/mock value) — behind a trusted proxy (e.g. the nginx in compose.yml) every per-IP rate-limit key uses the proxy's RemoteAddr, collapsing all rate limiters to ONE global budget that any single client can exhaust for everyone. Set TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true when a trusted proxy sits in front and overwrites X-Real-IP/CF-Connecting-IP; keep it false only when the backend is origin-exposed.", os.Getenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT"))
}

// checkWebhookSignatureKey validates SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY at startup in
// non-mock deployments. Square webhooks are HMAC-signed and the handler rejects
// unsigned/mis-signed events fail-closed (503 without the key, 403 on a bad
// signature), so an empty key silently disables the only integration path that
// reconciles payments and refunds from Square. Mirroring the fail-fast
// JWT_SECRET_KEY check (main.go init): when an operator HAS configured a
// notification URL (they clearly intend to receive webhooks) but left the
// signing key empty, startup FAILS — discovering mid-run that every event is
// rejected would strand payment reconciliation. When the URL is also unset
// (webhooks not in use — the documented optional setup) a loud warning is
// logged instead, so the fail-fast never breaks webhook-less deployments.
//
// Round 2 Loop A finding 6 (the reverse misconfiguration): when the KEY is set
// but the URL is unset, the handler falls back to the public default
// http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square (webhooks/square.go) and HMAC
// verification runs against that string, so every GENUINE Square event fails
// signature verification (403) and payment/refund reconciliation is silently
// broken. The key signals intent to use webhooks; the missing URL breaks them.
// A key with no URL is therefore FATAL (not a warning): the operator has
// explicitly configured webhooks, so every event silently failing signature
// verification would strand payment/refund reconciliation mid-run. The fail
// stays availability-only (the handler is fail-closed, so no event — genuine
// or forged — can mutate state), but it must be unmissable at boot.
func checkWebhookSignatureKey() {
	if payments.IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv() {
		return
	}
	keySet := os.Getenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY") != ""
	urlSet := os.Getenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL") != ""
	switch {
	case keySet && urlSet:
		return
	case keySet && !urlSet:
		log.Fatalf("FATAL: SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY IS set but SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL is unset with SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=%q (non-mock) — the webhook handler falls back to the default http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square, so every GENUINE Square event fails signature verification (403, fail-closed) and payment/refund reconciliation is silently broken. Set SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL to exactly the notification URL configured in the Square Dashboard webhook subscription.", os.Getenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT"))
	case !keySet && urlSet:
		log.Fatalf("FATAL: SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY environment variable not set with SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=%q (non-mock) while SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL IS set — Square webhook events (payment/refund reconciliation) would be rejected fail-closed at runtime. Generate the signing key in the Square Dashboard webhook subscription and set it in .env.", os.Getenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT"))
	default:
		log.Printf("CRITICAL: SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY is not set with SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=%q (non-mock) and SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL is unset — Square webhooks are not configured; any webhook event Square sends will be rejected (503, fail-closed). Set both in .env if you rely on webhook payment/refund reconciliation.", os.Getenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT"))
	}
}

// checkSquareCredentials fail-closes the REAL Square API credentials at
// startup in non-mock deployments. The env interpretation (dev/mock gate)
// stays here via payments.IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv — the single source — and
// the value validation itself lives in internal/square
// (square.ValidateCredentials) next to the client that consumes the
// credentials, so the check cannot drift from the code that reads them.
func checkSquareCredentials() {
	if payments.IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv() {
		return
	}
	square.ValidateCredentials()
}

// checkS3ProfilePicsBucket warns at startup when S3_PROFILE_PICS_BUCKET is
// unset in a non-dev/mock deployment. The bucket is only needed for profile-pic
// deletion operations, not for the app to function, so this is a WARNING not a
// Fatal. If R2_ENDPOINT is set (S3 client configured) but the bucket is not,
// the warning is elevated to CRITICAL because the deletion path will be silently
// skipped at runtime — every profile-pic erasure will log a one-time CRITICAL
// and skip the S3 deletion, leaving the object in place.
func checkS3ProfilePicsBucket() {
	if payments.IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv() {
		return
	}
	bucket := os.Getenv("S3_PROFILE_PICS_BUCKET")
	r2Endpoint := os.Getenv("R2_ENDPOINT")
	switch {
	case bucket != "":
		// The deletion path can run, but a non-dev build's S3 client is the
		// "not implemented" stub — every Delete fails and the retry job will
		// eventually hit its attempt cap and raise a critical notification.
		if s3.ClientIsStub {
			log.Printf("CRITICAL: this build's S3 client is the stub that cannot perform real operations — profile-picture deletions will always fail (retry-s3-deletions will exhaust its attempts and raise a critical admin notification). Compile with the real AWS SDK (dev build) or implement the production S3 client before relying on R2 object-store erasure.")
		}
	case r2Endpoint != "":
		log.Printf("CRITICAL: S3_PROFILE_PICS_BUCKET is not set but R2_ENDPOINT=%q is configured — the S3 client is active but profile-picture deletion will be silently skipped at runtime (every erasure logs a one-time CRITICAL and skips the S3 delete). Set S3_PROFILE_PICS_BUCKET to the bucket holding profile pictures.", r2Endpoint)
	default:
		log.Printf("WARNING: S3_PROFILE_PICS_BUCKET is not set — profile-picture deletion from object storage will be skipped. This is safe if no object store is configured; set it when R2_ENDPOINT is configured.")
	}
}

func healthCheckHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	status := "ok"
	services := map[string]string{
		"backend":         "ok",
		"database":        "ok",
		"s3_storage":      "ok",
		"square_payments": "ok",
		"frontend":        "unknown",
	}

	if db.Conn != nil {
		if err := db.Conn.Ping(r.Context()); err != nil {
			services["database"] = "error"
			status = "degraded"
		}
	} else {
		services["database"] = "error"
		status = "degraded"
	}

	var s3Message string
	if s3.Client == nil {
		services["s3_storage"] = "not_configured"
	} else if s3.FallbackToInMemory {
		// The dev build fell back to the in-memory client: uploads are stored
		// in RAM with placeholder cdn.example.com URLs and are lost on restart.
		services["s3_storage"] = "degraded"
		status = "degraded"
		s3Message = "S3 in-memory fallback active: RUSTFS unreachable — portfolio/photo uploads use placeholder URLs and data is lost on restart"
	}

	// Display-only label: uses the shared env set PLUS the empty default (dev
	// builds fall back to the mock client when SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT is unset, but
	// IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv is intentionally fail-closed for empty).
	if payments.IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv() || os.Getenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT") == "" {
		services["square_payments"] = "mock"
	}

	if status == "degraded" {
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
	} else {
		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	}
	resp := map[string]any{
		"status":   status,
		"services": services,
	}
	if s3Message != "" {
		resp["message"] = s3Message
	}
	if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp); err != nil {
		log.Printf("Failed to encode JSON response: %v", err)
	}
}

// corsAllowedOrigins returns the frontend origins permitted to call the API,
// read from the comma-separated FRONTEND_ORIGIN env var. Entries are trimmed
// and blanks dropped; an unset/empty var falls back to the local dev origin.
func corsAllowedOrigins() []string {
	var allowed []string
	for _, o := range strings.Split(os.Getenv("FRONTEND_ORIGIN"), ",") {
		if o = strings.TrimSpace(o); o != "" {
			allowed = append(allowed, o)
		}
	}
	if len(allowed) == 0 {
		allowed = []string{"http://localhost:5173"}
	}
	return allowed
}

// originAllowed reports whether origin is exactly in the allowlist.
func originAllowed(origin string, allowed []string) bool {
	for _, o := range allowed {
		if origin == o {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// corsMiddleware sets security headers plus a CORS allowlist so credentialed
// cross-origin requests (Authorization: Bearer) work only from configured
// frontend origins.
func corsMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	allowedOrigins := corsAllowedOrigins()
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
		w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
		w.Header().Set("X-XSS-Protection", "1; mode=block")
		// TODO: Enable HSTS in production
		w.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains")
		// TODO: Enable Referrer-Policy in production
		w.Header().Set("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin")
		w.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'")

		origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
		if origin != "" && originAllowed(origin, allowedOrigins) {
			w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
			w.Header().Set("Vary", "Origin")
		}
		w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, OPTIONS")
		w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Authorization, Content-Type, Idempotency-Key")

		if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
			return
		}

		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})
}

func main() {
	initDB()
	initDav()
	initS3()
	checkS3ProfilePicsBucket()
	initSquare()

	sched := jobs.New()
	jobs.RegisterAll(sched)
	sched.Start()

	r := chi.NewRouter()

	// --- Global Middleware ---
	// Custom RequestID using shared random prefix (matches jobs scheduler)
	var reqCounter atomic.Uint64
	r.Use(func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
			myid := reqCounter.Add(1)
			requestID := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s-%06d", jobs.Hostname(), jobs.RandomPrefix(), myid)
			ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), middleware.RequestIDKey, requestID)
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
		})
	})
	// Trust the X-Real-IP proxy header ONLY when TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true,
	// i.e. a trusted proxy (nginx/Cloudflare) sits in front and overwrites it
	// with the real client IP. When the backend is origin-exposed, X-Real-IP
	// is fully client-controlled and must be ignored, or a client could rotate
	// it to bypass per-IP rate limiting. Without this middleware, chi's
	// GetClientIP returns "" and the mw rate limiters fall back to the real
	// RemoteAddr (the TCP peer). Same flag gates the mw.clientIP CF-Connecting-
	// IP trust (mw/ratelimit_shared.go).
	if mw.TrustProxyHeaders() {
		r.Use(middleware.ClientIPFromHeader("X-Real-IP"))
	}
	r.Use(func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
			ww := middleware.NewWrapResponseWriter(w, r.ProtoMajor)
			t1 := time.Now()
			defer func() {
				status := ww.Status()
				bytes := ww.BytesWritten()
				reqID := middleware.GetReqID(r.Context())

				var level nColor
				var statusColor bColor
				switch {
				case status >= 500:
					level, statusColor = errorLvl, bRed
				case status >= 400:
					level, statusColor = warnLvl, bYellow
				default:
					level, statusColor = debugLvl, bGreen
				}

				clientIP := middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context())
				if clientIP == "" {
					clientIP = r.RemoteAddr
				}
				apiLog.Printf("%s %s%s%s \"%s%s %s%s %s%s\" from %s - %s %s%03d%s %s%dB%s in %s",
					level,
					nYellow, reqID, reset,
					bMagenta, r.Method, nCyan, r.URL.String(), nCyan, r.Proto, reset,
					clientIP,
					statusColor, status, reset,
					bBlue, bytes, reset,
					logutil.ColoredDuration(time.Since(t1)),
				)
			}()
			next.ServeHTTP(ww, r)
		})
	})

	r.Use(middleware.Recoverer)
	r.Use(middleware.Timeout(15 * time.Second))
	// CORS + security headers: credentialed cross-origin requests
	// (Authorization: Bearer) are only answered for origins in the configured
	// FRONTEND_ORIGIN allowlist — never reflected blindly, so a leaked JWT
	// cannot be used from a rogue site.
	r.Use(corsMiddleware)

	// All API routes grouped under /api for clarity
	r.Route("/api", func(r chi.Router) {
		r.Use(mw.JsonContentType)

		// Public read-only (but check auth context if present for eligibility)
		r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
			r.Use(mw.RateLimit(120, time.Minute))
			r.Use(mw.OptionalAuth)
			r.Get("/services", services.ServicesHandler)
			r.Get("/services/popular", services.PopularServicesHandler)
		})

		// Per-user eligibility (B4): requires authentication, and the handler
		// itself enforces owner-or-admin. The user-agnostic /api/services
		// stays public; the per-user variant exposes DOB-derived age + patch
		// test status, so an arbitrary user_id must never be queryable
		// unauthenticated (the frontend calls it only with the current user's
		// ID, or via the admin booking flows).
		r.With(mw.RateLimit(120, time.Minute), mw.RequireAuth).Get("/services/eligible-for/{user_id}", services.ServicesEligibleForUserHandler)

		// Registration: 10/min to prevent spam + progressive per-IP backoff
		r.With(mw.ProgressiveRateLimit, mw.RateLimit(10, time.Minute), limitBody(defaultBodyLimit)).Post("/register", authHandlers.RegisterHandler)

		// Login: Has its own internal rate limiting + progressive per-IP backoff
		r.With(mw.ProgressiveRateLimit, mw.RateLimit(10, time.Minute), limitBody(defaultBodyLimit)).Post("/login", authHandlers.LoginHandler)

		// Logout: requires valid token
		r.With(mw.RequireAuth).Post("/logout", authHandlers.LogoutHandler)

		// Email verification
		r.With(mw.RateLimit(10, time.Minute), limitBody(defaultBodyLimit)).Post("/verify/generate", authHandlers.GenerateVerificationCodeHandler)
		r.With(mw.RateLimit(20, time.Minute), limitBody(defaultBodyLimit)).Post("/verify/check", authHandlers.VerifyCodeHandler)

		// Health check
		r.Get("/health", healthCheckHandler)

		// Public contact info
		r.Get("/contact", user.GetContactInfoHandler)

		// Public contact-availability (no auth required)
		r.With(mw.RateLimit(120, time.Minute)).Get("/contact-availability", scheduling.GetContactAvailability)

		// Public business info (limited, safe for non-admin users)
		r.Get("/business-info", admin.GetPublicBusinessInfo)

		// Portfolio
		r.Route("/portfolio", func(r chi.Router) {
			r.Get("/images", portfolio.ListImages)
			r.Get("/tags", portfolio.ListTags)
			r.With(mw.RateLimit(60, time.Minute)).Get("/filters", portfolio.ListFilters)
			r.With(mw.RateLimit(120, time.Minute)).Get("/images/{id}", portfolio.GetImage)

			r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Use(mw.RequireAuth)
				r.Use(mw.RequireAdmin)
				r.Use(mw.RateLimit(60, time.Minute))
				r.With(limitBody(portfolioBodyLimit)).Post("/images", portfolio.UploadImage)
				r.Delete("/images/{id}", portfolio.DeleteImage)
			})
		})

		// Scheduling
		r.Route("/scheduling", func(r chi.Router) {
			r.Use(mw.RateLimit(120, time.Minute))
			r.Use(mw.OptionalAuth)
			r.Get("/default-hours", scheduling.GetDefaultHours)
			r.Get("/exceptional-groups", scheduling.ListExceptionalGroups)
			r.Get("/working-hours", scheduling.GetWorkingHours)
			r.Get("/available-hours", scheduling.GetAvailableHours)

			r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Use(mw.RequireAuth)
				r.Use(mw.RequireAdmin)
				r.Use(mw.RateLimit(60, time.Minute))

				r.Get("/preview-available-hours", scheduling.GetPreviewAvailableHours)

				r.Put("/default-hours", scheduling.UpdateDefaultHours)
				r.Post("/default-hours/conflicting", scheduling.GetDefaultHoursConflictingBookings)
				r.Post("/default-hours/schedule", scheduling.ScheduleDefaultHoursChange)
				r.Get("/default-hours/scheduled", scheduling.GetScheduledDefaultHoursChange)
				r.Delete("/default-hours/scheduled", scheduling.CancelScheduledDefaultHoursChange)
				r.Post("/exceptional-groups", scheduling.CreateExceptionalGroup)
				r.Delete("/exceptional-groups", scheduling.DeleteExceptionalGroup)
				r.Put("/exceptional-applications", scheduling.UpdateExceptionalApplications)
			})
		})

		// Public booking endpoints (optional auth for slot reservation and guest bookings)
		r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
			r.Use(mw.RateLimit(30, time.Minute), mw.OptionalAuth)
			r.Use(limitBody(defaultBodyLimit))
			r.Post("/bookings/reserve", bookings.ReserveSlotHandler)
			r.Post("/bookings", bookings.CreateBookingHandler)
		})

		// Guest user creation (public, no auth required)
		r.With(mw.RateLimit(10, time.Minute), limitBody(defaultBodyLimit)).Post("/users/guest", user.CreateGuestUserHandler)

		// Public email check (used by BookingFlow for proactive registered-email detection)
		r.With(mw.RateLimit(60, time.Minute)).Get("/check-email", user.CheckEmailHandler)

		// Refresh-token exchange (B5): the client presents the opaque refresh
		// token in the Authorization header (Bearer). This MUST be outside the
		// RequireAuth group — the refresh token is NOT a JWT, so RequireAuth
		// would reject it. The handler itself validates + rotates the refresh
		// token and mints a fresh access-token/refresh-token pair.
		r.With(mw.RateLimit(10, time.Minute)).Post("/refresh-token", authHandlers.RefreshTokenHandler)

		// Authenticated users
		r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
			r.Use(mw.RequireAuth)
			r.Use(mw.RateLimit(120, time.Minute))
			r.Use(limitBody(defaultBodyLimit))

			r.Get("/user/profile", user.GetProfileHandler)
			r.Put("/user/profile", user.UpdateProfileHandler)
			// Change-password and delete-account get a dedicated per-user limiter
			// (10/min) on top of the group's generic 120/min per-IP limiter:
			// these endpoints re-verify the current password, and without a
			// per-user budget a stolen session token lets an attacker brute-force
			// that password with unlimited guesses (the account lockout is the
			// last line of defence; the per-user limiter is the first).
			accountLimiter := mw.RateLimitByUser(10, time.Minute)
			r.With(accountLimiter).Put("/user/change-password", user.ChangePasswordHandler)
			r.With(accountLimiter).Delete("/user/account", user.DeleteAccountHandler)
			r.Get("/user/notification-preferences", user.GetNotificationPreferencesHandler)
			r.Put("/user/notification-preferences", user.UpdateNotificationPreferencesHandler)
			// 2FA settings — merchant-level authorization gate on saved-card
			// payments; NOT PSD2 SCA (Square buyer verification is the SCA
			// mechanism, wired for new-card charges); kept as an additional
			// fraud control until Square verification is wired for saved-card
			// charges.
			// RequireNonGuest: any logged-in user who could save cards must be
			// able to reach these, not just verified accounts.
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest).Get("/user/2fa/status", user.GetTwoFAStatusHandler)
			// The code-issuing/verifying endpoints get a dedicated per-user
			// limiter (10/min) on top of the group's generic 120/min per-IP
			// limiter:
			// the 6-digit codes live in a 1M space, so a single user must not be
			// able to hammer setup/verify/disable/code-mint faster than the
			// per-user 5-attempt lockout can trip. The key is the authenticated
			// userID ALONE (RateLimitByUser) — NOT user+IP (B8): with the IP in
			// the key, a client that can rotate its source IP (or that sits behind
			// a proxy echoing a client-supplied CF-Connecting-IP when
			// TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true) mints a fresh bucket per IP for the
			// same account, collapsing the per-account budget. One shared
			// limiter for all five so the whole 2FA surface counts against a
			// single per-user budget.
			twoFALimiter := mw.RateLimitByUser(10, time.Minute)
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest, twoFALimiter).Post("/user/2fa/setup", user.SetupTwoFAHandler)
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest, twoFALimiter).Post("/user/2fa/verify", user.VerifyTwoFAHandler)
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest, twoFALimiter).Post("/user/2fa/disable", user.DisableTwoFAHandler)
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest, twoFALimiter).Post("/user/2fa/disable/code", user.SendDisableCodeHandler)
			// Fresh-code request for an already-ENABLED user making a saved-card
			// charge (the B6/B10 gate). Setup refuses enabled users (409) and
			// setup clears the pending code on success, so this is the only mint
			// path for an enabled user. Same middleware chain + shared limiter as
			// the rest of the 2FA surface.
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest, twoFALimiter).Post("/user/2fa/code", user.SendVerificationCodeHandler)
			r.Delete("/user/account", user.DeleteAccountHandler)
			r.Get("/user/gdpr-export", user.GetGDPRExportHandler)
			r.Get("/user/loyalty", user.GetLoyaltyHandler)

			r.Get("/bookings", bookings.GetAllUserBookingsHandler)
			r.Get("/bookings/{id}", bookings.GetBookingHandler)
			r.Get("/bookings/{id}/calendar", bookings.GetBookingCalendarHandler)
			r.Put("/bookings/{id}", bookings.EditBookingHandler)
			r.Delete("/bookings/{id}", bookings.DeleteBookingHandler)
			r.Post("/bookings/{id}/edit-request", bookings.RequestEditHandler)
			r.Delete("/bookings/{id}/edit-request", bookings.DeleteEditRequestHandler)
			r.Get("/bookings/{id}/edit-request", bookings.GetMyEditRequestHandler)
			r.Get("/bookings/edit-requests", bookings.GetMyEditRequestsHandler)
			r.Delete("/bookings/reserve", bookings.CancelReservationHandler)

			// User payment routes
			// Product rule (security): guests (account_role='guest') must not
			// pay online — RequireNonGuest 403s any token with a guest role
			// claim before the money handlers run.
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest).Post("/bookings/{id}/payment", payments.CreateBookingPayment)
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest).Post("/bookings/{id}/apply-redemption", payments.ApplyLoyaltyRedemption)
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest).Post("/bookings/{id}/payment-lock", payments.AcquirePaymentLock)
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest).Delete("/bookings/{id}/payment-lock", payments.ReleasePaymentLock)
			// Product rule (security): cards may only be saved by verified
			// accounts — RequireAuth (group mw above) runs first and injects
			// userID/role into ctx, then RequireVerified 403s the rest.
			r.With(mw.RequireVerified).Get("/user/payment-methods", payments.GetUserPaymentMethods)
			r.With(mw.RequireVerified).Post("/user/payment-methods", payments.CreatePaymentMethod)
			r.With(mw.RequireVerified).Delete("/user/payment-methods/{id}", payments.DeletePaymentMethod)
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest).Post("/bookings/{id}/tip", payments.CreateTipPayment)
			r.Get("/bookings/{id}/payment-summary", payments.GetBookingPaymentSummary)
			r.With(mw.RateLimit(10, time.Minute), limitBody(defaultBodyLimit)).
				Get("/bookings/{id}/discount-preview", payments.GetDiscountPreviewHandler)

			// User gift card routes
			// Dedicated redeem limiter (B16): a gift-card code lives in the
			// 12-hex space, so redemption is brute-forceable. The redeem route
			// gets a per-user 10/min budget (RateLimitByUser — one bucket per
			// account regardless of IP rotation) on top of the group's generic
			// 120/min limiter.
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest, mw.RateLimitByUser(10, time.Minute)).Post("/user/giftcards/redeem", payments.RedeemGiftCard)
			r.Get("/user/giftcards/balance", payments.GetGiftCardBalance)
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest).Post("/user/giftcards/buy", payments.BuyGiftCard)
			// 14-day cooling-off right to cancel online gift-card purchases
			// (Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional
			// Charges) Regulations 2013): list the caller's cancellable cards
			// and execute the cancel+refund. RequireNonGuest mirrors /buy —
			// guests cannot buy (or cancel) gift cards.
			r.Get("/user/giftcards", payments.GetMyGiftCards)
			r.With(mw.RequireNonGuest).Post("/user/giftcards/cancel", payments.CancelGiftCard)
		})

		r.With(mw.RequireAuth, mw.RequireVerified, limitBody(uploadBodyLimit)).Post("/user/profile-picture", user.UploadProfilePictureHandler)

		// Admin-only. The group now carries a per-IP limiter (300/min) to bound
		// the per-request DB amplification of the auth path (VerifyToken runs a
		// JTI-revocation query + a family-alive query per request — MEDIUM-1):
		// an unthrottled admin surface lets a single compromised admin session
		// hammer the DB. 300/min is far above any legitimate admin UI usage and
		// keys per-IP (RateLimitByUser would be a no-op — there is exactly one
		// admin account, so per-user == global). The trusted-session model is
		// unchanged; this only bounds amplification.
		r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
			r.Use(mw.RequireAuth)
			r.Use(mw.RequireAdmin)
			r.Use(mw.RateLimit(300, time.Minute))
			r.Use(limitBody(defaultBodyLimit))

			r.Route("/admin/services", func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Post("/", services.CreateServiceHandler)
				r.Delete("/{id}", services.DeleteServiceHandler)
				r.Get("/", services.AllServicesHandler)
				r.Put("/{id}/toggle", services.ToggleService)
			})

			r.Route("/admin/patch-tests", func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Get("/", admin.GetPatchTests)
				r.Post("/", admin.CreatePatchTest)
				r.Put("/{id}", admin.UpdatePatchTest)
				r.Delete("/{id}", admin.DeletePatchTest)
			})

			r.Route("/admin/custom-services", func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Get("/", admin.GetCustomServices)
				r.Post("/", admin.CreateCustomService)
				r.Get("/{id}", admin.GetCustomService)
				r.Put("/{id}", admin.UpdateCustomService)
				r.Post("/{id}/promote", admin.PromoteCustomService)
				r.Delete("/{id}", admin.DeleteCustomService)
			})

			r.Route("/admin/bookings", func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Get("/", bookings.GetAllAdminBookingsHandler)
				r.Post("/", bookings.AdminCreateBookingForUserHandler)
				r.With(mw.RateLimit(60, time.Minute)).Get("/search", bookings.SearchAdminBookingsHandler)
				r.Get("/user/{user_id}", bookings.GetAllBookingsByUserHandler)
				r.Get("/{id}", bookings.GetAdminBookingHandler)
				r.Put("/{id}", bookings.UpdateBookingServicesHandler)
				r.Get("/{id}/overlapping", bookings.GetOverlappingBookingsHandler)
				r.Get("/overlapping", bookings.GetOverlappingBookingsByTimeHandler)
				r.Get("/by-date-range", bookings.GetBookingsByDateRangeHandler)
				r.Post("/conflicting-for-exception", scheduling.GetConflictingBookingsForExceptionHandler)
				r.Get("/by-created-range", bookings.GetBookingsByCreatedRangeHandler)
				r.Put("/{id}/reschedule", bookings.AdminRescheduleBookingHandler)
				r.Put("/{id}/progress", bookings.ProgressBookingHandler)
				r.Post("/{id}/confirm", bookings.ConfirmBookingHandler)
				r.Post("/{id}/cancel", bookings.AdminCancelBookingHandler)
				r.Post("/reserve", bookings.AdminReserveSlotHandler)
				r.Delete("/reserve", bookings.AdminCancelReservationHandler)
				// Edit request endpoints
				r.Get("/edit-requests", bookings.AdminListAllEditRequestsHandler)
				r.Get("/{id}/edit-request", bookings.AdminGetBookingEditRequestHandler)
				r.Post("/{id}/edit-requests/{request_id}/approve", bookings.AdminApproveEditRequestHandler)
				r.Post("/{id}/edit-requests/{request_id}/deny", bookings.AdminRejectEditRequestHandler)
				// Admin-side loyalty redemption: the admin "Take Payment"
				// PaymentModal applies the customer's pending 10% loyalty
				// redemption on the booking's behalf (the customer-facing
				// /bookings/{id}/apply-redemption route below stays
				// RequireNonGuest). ApplyLoyaltyRedemption resolves the acting
				// role from context and lets an admin redeem on any booking.
				r.Post("/{id}/apply-redemption", payments.ApplyLoyaltyRedemption)
			})

			r.Route("/admin/users", func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Get("/", user.ListAdminUsersHandler)
				r.Get("/{id}", user.GetAdminUserHandler)
				r.Get("/{id}/relationship", user.GetCustomerRelationshipHandler)
				r.Get("/{id}/patch-tests/eligible", user.GetEligiblePatchTestServicesHandler)
				r.Post("/{id}/patch-tests", user.AddPatchTestHandler)
				r.Get("/{id}/giftcard-balance", payments.GetUserGiftCardBalanceAdmin)
				r.Get("/{id}/payment-methods", payments.AdminGetUserPaymentMethods)
				r.Post("/{id}/2fa/remove", user.AdminRemoveUser2FAHandler)
				// Admin-scoped 2FA mint: the operator requests a code FOR the
				// customer whose saved card is being charged at the till/admin
				// payment modal. Mints keyed to the CUSTOMER so the code is
				// delivered to the customer and can satisfy the card-owner gate.
				r.With(mw.RateLimitByUser(10, time.Minute)).Post("/{id}/2fa/code", user.AdminSendVerificationCodeHandler)
			})

			r.Route("/admin/today", func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Get("/current-next", today.GetCurrentAndNextHandler)
				r.Get("/appointments", today.GetTodayAppointmentsHandler)
				r.Get("/pending-approvals", today.GetPendingApprovalsHandler)
			})

			r.Route("/admin/notifications", func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Get("/", notifications.GetNotifications)
				r.Get("/unread-count", notifications.GetUnreadCount)
				r.Post("/{id}/acknowledge", notifications.AcknowledgeNotification)
			})

			r.Route("/admin/time-blockers", func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Get("/", scheduling.ListTimeBlockers)
				r.Post("/", scheduling.CreateTimeBlocker)
				r.Delete("/{id}", scheduling.DeleteTimeBlocker)
			})

			r.Route("/admin/discount-campaigns", func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Get("/", admin.GetDiscountCampaigns)
				r.Post("/", admin.CreateDiscountCampaign)
				r.Put("/{id}", admin.UpdateDiscountCampaign)
				r.Delete("/{id}", admin.DeleteDiscountCampaign)
				r.Get("/{id}/stats", admin.GetCampaignStats)
			})

			// Admin payment routes
			r.Post("/admin/bookings/{id}/payment", payments.CreateTerminalPayment)
			r.Post("/admin/bookings/{id}/refund", payments.AdminRefundBooking)
			r.Get("/admin/payments/{checkout_id}/status", payments.GetCheckoutStatus)
			r.Post("/admin/payments/{payment_id}/refund", payments.RefundPayment)

			// Admin gift card routes
			r.Get("/admin/gift-cards", payments.GetGiftCards)
			r.Post("/admin/gift-cards", payments.CreateGiftCard)
			r.Put("/admin/gift-cards/{id}/topup", payments.TopUpGiftCard)
			r.Post("/admin/gift-cards/{from}/transfer", payments.TransferGiftCard)
			r.Post("/admin/gift-cards/cancel", payments.AdminCancelGiftCard)
			r.Get("/admin/gift-cards/expired-balances", payments.GetExpiredBalances)
			r.Post("/admin/gift-cards/expired-balances/claim", payments.ClaimExpiredBalance)

			// Admin till sale routes (POS transactions not linked to bookings)
			r.Post("/admin/till/sale", payments.CreateTillSale)
			r.Get("/admin/till/sale/checkout/{checkout_id}/status", payments.GetTillCheckoutStatus)

			r.Route("/admin/settings", func(r chi.Router) {
				r.Get("/", admin.GetBusinessSettings)
				r.Put("/", admin.UpdateBusinessSettings)
			})
		})
	})

	// Webhooks (no auth - Square sends to base path)
	r.Post("/webhooks/square", webhooks.HandleSquareWebhook)

	srv := &http.Server{
		Addr:              ":8080",
		Handler:           r,
		ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
		ReadTimeout:       30 * time.Second,
		WriteTimeout:      30 * time.Second,
		IdleTimeout:       60 * time.Second,
	}

	quit := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
	signal.Notify(quit, syscall.SIGTERM, syscall.SIGINT)
	go func() {
		<-quit
		log.Println("Shutting down server...")
		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
		defer cancel()
		if err := srv.Shutdown(ctx); err != nil {
			log.Printf("Server forced to shutdown: %v", err)
		}
		<-sched.Shutdown()
		log.Println("Background jobs stopped")
	}()

	fmt.Println("Server is listening on :8080")
	if err := srv.ListenAndServe(); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
		log.Fatalf("Server failed to start: %v", err)
	}
	log.Println("Server exited")
}