Money-safety: - Deterministic till idempotency fallback (Square-charging only); cash/on_the_house keep unique keys; £250 till gift-card cap; 45-char key validation - Gift-card admin caps £250/tx + £5,000/day; user buy £500/day; BuyGiftCard allowlist unchanged - CancelGiftCard: CCR 2013 14-day right with partial-spend refund of the unspent balance (spend verified via payments.gift_card_id); atomic vs redeem/transfer; refunds stay pending until reversal commits; admin cancel surface (AdminCancelGiftCard) - Sweep: cancelled-booking charges failed+notified instead of silently completed; source-override replay uses live square_source_id; legacy square-less refund sweep; snapshot refresh on pending reuse - Refund lock consolidation; recordTerminalPaymentTx shared recorder; structured Square error codes; terminal checkout CustomerID GDPR / security: - Notes retained as de-identified medical/safety record at erasure (single field treated as health data; rest of record wiped, no re-identification map) + comments updated per UK GDPR/Art 9/Equality Act 2010 - square_request_snapshot PII scrubbed on all erasure paths; delete_guest_user FK unlinks; verification codes + dispute reasons handled; idle/stale-guest erasure deletes Square cards/customers + CardDAV/R2 - Durable square-erasure outbox job (retry-square-erasures); 2FA dev/prod build split, pepper fail-closed, no prod code-in-log; prod 2FA delivery fail-loud without a channel - Webhook unknown-type family split (non-money acked, money retried); untracked dispute notifications; rate-limit CF/X-Real-IP trust gating; nginx CSP nonce + api_limit Frontend: - Dynamic z-index stack (ui/dialog/zindex.ts) claimed in open order via data-state observer; re-claims on every reopen; removes stale !z-* overrides — nested modals (booking→user→booking) always paint newest-on-top (browser-verified 3-level + reopen) - Mobile: iOS zoom fixes, bottom-sheet dialogs, 44px touch targets, inputmode decimal, dvh - Gift-card buy/cancel UI, admin £250 + daily limits, cancellation/privacy/terms policy accuracy S3: - Connect() creates buckets before probing; in-memory fallback only on genuine unreachability; health reports degraded; stale S3_PUBLIC_URL documented (host-specific) Tests/docs: - 2263 test functions; all 22 backend packages green; round8/9/10 regression suites; NextEditWindowTime removes wall-clock flake; docs reconciled (notes retention, gift-card partial-use, modal T15 future work)
514 lines
21 KiB
Go
514 lines
21 KiB
Go
package user
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"database/sql"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"os"
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"time"
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"crussell/db"
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"crussell/handlers/payments"
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"crussell/internal/dav"
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"crussell/internal/s3"
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"crussell/internal/square"
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"crussell/mw"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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)
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// --- Square erasure retry + alerting + durable outbox (GDPR H3 / A1) ---
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//
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// The deletion goroutine in DeleteAccountHandler retries transient Square
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// failures and, on final failure, logs at ERROR and raises a critical admin
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// notification (reason 'critical_payment_log'). A failed Square-side erasure
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// must never be silently dropped: by the time the goroutine runs, the local
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// anonymization has already committed and NULLed square_card_id/
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// square_customer_id, so the external Square references would otherwise be
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// orphaned — permanently, with no way to retrace them.
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//
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// Fault A1 (crash window): the erasure targets are ALSO persisted as a durable
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// outbox INSIDE the anonymization transaction (persistSquareErasureOutbox),
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// before it commits. The just-scrubbed, soft-deleted user_saved_cards rows keep
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// their square_card_id / square_customer_id (and lose their user_id, matching
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// delete_guest_user) until the Square-side erasure completes. If the process
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// dies between the local commit and the async goroutine finishing, those rows
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// are the only remaining record of the external Square PII; the
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// retry-square-erasures job (internal/jobs/cleanup.go) finds them and retries
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// the deletion. The goroutine drains the outbox (NULLing the refs on success);
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// the job is the crash safety net. Either the local tx rolls back (nothing
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// NULLed) or the durable queue guarantees the Square deletion is eventually
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// attempted and alerted on failure.
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const (
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// squareDeleteMaxAttempts is the number of times a Square erasure call is
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// attempted before it is treated as failed (1 initial + 2 retries).
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squareDeleteMaxAttempts = 3
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// squareDeleteAttemptTimeout bounds a single Square erasure attempt.
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squareDeleteAttemptTimeout = 30 * time.Second
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// squareDeleteBackoffBase is the delay before the first retry (doubled per
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// subsequent retry).
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squareDeleteBackoffBase = 500 * time.Millisecond
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)
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// squareErasureTarget records one saved-card row's external Square references
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// (row id + square_card_id + square_customer_id) captured BEFORE anonymization
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// NULLs them, so the durable outbox and the async cleanup goroutine still have
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// the external refs they need to complete Square-side erasure (Fault A1).
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type squareErasureTarget struct {
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rowID string
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cardID string // empty when the row had no Square card on file
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customerID string // empty when the row had no Square customer profile
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}
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// squareDeletionRetryable reports whether a Square erasure error is transient
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// and worth retrying: transport errors (wrapped *url.Error) and Square 5xx
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// responses. Definitive 4xx rejections and not-found no-ops are NOT retried.
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func squareDeletionRetryable(err error) bool {
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if square.IsNotFound(err) {
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return false
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}
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if sc := square.ErrorStatusCode(err); sc != 0 {
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return sc >= http.StatusInternalServerError
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}
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var urlErr *url.Error
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return errors.As(err, &urlErr)
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}
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// RetrySquareDeletion runs fn (a DeleteCardOnFile/DeleteCustomer call) up to
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// squareDeleteMaxAttempts times, backing off between retries, retrying only
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// transient failures (see squareDeletionRetryable). Returns the final error,
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// nil on success. Exported for the retry-square-erasures job
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// (internal/jobs/cleanup.go), which reuses the same retry budget as the
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// account-deletion goroutine.
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func RetrySquareDeletion(parent context.Context, fn func(context.Context) error) error {
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var lastErr error
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backoff := squareDeleteBackoffBase
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for attempt := 1; attempt <= squareDeleteMaxAttempts; attempt++ {
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if attempt > 1 {
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select {
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case <-time.After(backoff):
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case <-parent.Done():
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return lastErr
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}
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backoff *= 2
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}
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attemptCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(parent, squareDeleteAttemptTimeout)
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err := fn(attemptCtx)
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cancel()
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if err == nil {
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return nil
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}
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lastErr = err
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if !squareDeletionRetryable(err) {
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return err
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}
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}
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return lastErr
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}
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// squareErasureNotificationID derives a deterministic admin_notifications id
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// for a failed Square-side erasure tied to key ("S" + 11 hex chars of a
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// SHA-256 digest, mirroring the webhooks dispute-notification id scheme). For
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// the account-deletion path key is the affected user id; for the
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// retry-square-erasures job key is the user id when the outbox row still
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// carries one, otherwise the outbox row id. One notification per key;
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// re-delivery of the same failure is a no-op.
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func squareErasureNotificationID(key string) string {
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte("square-erasure-failure:" + key))
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return "S" + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])[:11]
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}
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// InsertSquareErasureCriticalNotification surfaces a failed Square-side
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// erasure in the admin notification centre (reason 'critical_payment_log' —
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// the DB-backed stand-in for CRITICAL logs that the payments sweep uses).
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// user_id is deliberately NULL: by the time the async cleanup runs, the account
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// may already be deleted (guests) or anonymized, and the deterministic id keeps
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// exactly one notification per affected key. Exported for the
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// retry-square-erasures job, which reuses the account-deletion alert scheme.
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func InsertSquareErasureCriticalNotification(ctx context.Context, key string) {
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// Fresh bounded context so a near-expiry deletion context cannot suppress
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// the admin alert.
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actx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 10*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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tag, err := db.Conn.Exec(actx, `
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INSERT INTO admin_notifications (id, reason, booking_id, user_id, created_at)
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VALUES ($1, 'critical_payment_log'::admin_notification_reason, NULL, NULL, NOW())
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ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING
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`, squareErasureNotificationID(key))
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to insert critical notification for failed Square erasure", "key", key, "err", err)
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return
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}
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if int(tag.RowsAffected()) > 0 {
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slog.Error("Square-side erasure FAILED after retries — critical notification raised", "key", key)
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}
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}
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// persistSquareErasureOutbox writes the captured Square erasure targets back
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// onto the just-scrubbed, soft-deleted user_saved_cards rows INSIDE the
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// anonymization transaction, BEFORE it commits (Fault A1). anonymize_user() /
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// delete_guest_user() NULL square_card_id/square_customer_id for GDPR
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// scrubbing; this UPDATE restores them on the soft-deleted rows so the erasure
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// targets survive the commit as a durable queue entry. user_id is also NULLed
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// (delete_guest_user already does this for guests): payments.EnsureSquareCustomer
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// reads square_customer_id across ALL of a user's rows regardless of
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// deleted_at, so an outbox row that kept its user_id would let the erased
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// identity's deleted Square customer resurface on a later save-card flow. The
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// rows remain in place for the 7-year financial retention; only the user link
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// is dropped. If the process crashes before the async Square cleanup finishes,
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// the retry-square-erasures job (internal/jobs/cleanup.go) finds these rows and
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// completes the external deletion — the erasure is never permanently lost.
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func persistSquareErasureOutbox(ctx context.Context, tx pgx.Tx, targets []squareErasureTarget) error {
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for _, t := range targets {
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var cardID, customerID any
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if t.cardID != "" {
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cardID = t.cardID
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}
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if t.customerID != "" {
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customerID = t.customerID
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}
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if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `
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UPDATE user_saved_cards
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SET square_card_id = $2, square_customer_id = $3, user_id = NULL
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WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NOT NULL
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`, t.rowID, cardID, customerID); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// clearSquareErasureOutboxRows NULLs the durable outbox marker on the given
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// soft-deleted user_saved_cards rows after their Square-side erasure is
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// complete (or deliberately abandoned as still-referenced). Best-effort: the
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// retry-square-erasures job re-covers any row left behind by a failure.
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func clearSquareErasureOutboxRows(ctx context.Context, rowIDs []string) {
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for _, rowID := range rowIDs {
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if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
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UPDATE user_saved_cards SET square_customer_id = NULL
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WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NOT NULL
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`, rowID); err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to clear Square erasure outbox for customer", "row", rowID, "error", err)
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}
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}
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}
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// DELETE /api/user/account
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func DeleteAccountHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
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if !ok {
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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var accountRole string
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var profilePicURL sql.NullString
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err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT account_role, profile_pic_url FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).
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Scan(&accountRole, &profilePicURL)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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http.Error(w, "user not found", http.StatusNotFound)
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return
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}
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log.Printf("Failed to fetch user for deletion: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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ctx := r.Context()
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// --- External system scrubbing (BEFORE SQL anonymize) ---
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// Delete profile picture from S3/R2
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if profilePicURL.Valid && profilePicURL.String != "" && s3.Client != nil {
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// #nosec G118 — intentional background goroutine for async profile pic cleanup
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go func(picURL string) {
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defer func() {
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if r := recover(); r != nil {
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log.Printf("Panic recovered in S3 profile picture deletion: %v", r)
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}
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}()
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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bucket := os.Getenv("S3_PROFILE_PICS_BUCKET")
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if bucket == "" {
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bucket = "crussell-profile-pics"
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}
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// profiles/{userID}.jpg — matches UploadProfilePictureHandler key format
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key := fmt.Sprintf("profiles/%s.jpg", userID)
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if err := s3.Client.Delete(ctx, bucket, key); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Warning: Failed to delete profile picture for user %s: %v", userID, err)
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}
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}(profilePicURL.String)
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}
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// Snapshot the Square card AND customer references per saved-card row
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// synchronously BEFORE the SQL anonymization below NULLs
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// square_card_id/square_customer_id, so both the durable outbox and the
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// background cleanup still have the external Square references they need
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// (previously the goroutine read the rows itself, racing the anonymize step
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// which wiped them mid-flight). Distinct non-null customer IDs only: a
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// user's saved cards share one provisioned Square customer, so
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// DeleteCustomer runs once per customer. NULL customer IDs (users with no
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// saved cards) are skipped.
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var erasureTargets []squareErasureTarget
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needsSquareErasure := false
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// Capture the client synchronously so the async cleanup goroutine never
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// reads the global payments.SquareClient (which tests swap per-account).
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sqClient := payments.SquareClient
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if sqClient != nil {
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rows, err := db.Conn.Query(r.Context(),
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`SELECT id, square_card_id, square_customer_id FROM user_saved_cards WHERE user_id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`, userID)
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if err != nil {
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// Fail-closed: anonymization must never proceed without the
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// external Square refs the cleanup needs — otherwise the card and
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// customer would be permanently orphaned at Square with the local
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// ids already NULLed (GDPR erasure completeness).
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log.Printf("Failed to query saved cards for user %s: %v", userID, err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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for rows.Next() {
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var t squareErasureTarget
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var cardID, customerID sql.NullString
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if err := rows.Scan(&t.rowID, &cardID, &customerID); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Warning: Failed to scan card ID for user %s: %v", userID, err)
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continue
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}
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if cardID.Valid && cardID.String != "" {
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t.cardID = cardID.String
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}
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if customerID.Valid && customerID.String != "" {
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t.customerID = customerID.String
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}
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if t.cardID != "" || t.customerID != "" {
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needsSquareErasure = true
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}
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erasureTargets = append(erasureTargets, t)
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}
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if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to iterate saved cards for user %s: %v", userID, err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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rows.Close()
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}
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// --- SQL-level anonymization/deletion ---
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if accountRole == "guest" {
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tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction for guest user deletion: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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defer func() {
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if err := tx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
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slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
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}
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}()
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_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `SELECT delete_guest_user($1)`, userID)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to delete guest user %s: %v", userID, err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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// A1 durable outbox: persist the Square erasure targets on the
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// just-scrubbed, soft-deleted rows BEFORE this tx commits — if the
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// process dies after the commit, the retry-square-erasures job still
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// finds them.
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if sqClient != nil && needsSquareErasure {
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if err := persistSquareErasureOutbox(ctx, tx, erasureTargets); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to persist Square erasure outbox for guest %s: %v", userID, err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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}
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if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction for guest user deletion: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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} else {
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tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction for user anonymization: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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defer func() {
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if err := tx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
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slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
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}
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}()
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// anonymize_user() is the single source of truth for erasure: it NULLs
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// the 2FA columns and staff notes in the same statement that anonymizes
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// the rest of the row, so every call site (this handler AND the
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// idle-account batch cleanup in scheduling.CleanupIdleAccounts) is
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// GDPR-clean without a separate Go-side scrub.
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_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `SELECT anonymize_user($1)`, userID)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to anonymize user %s: %v", userID, err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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// A1 durable outbox: persist the Square erasure targets on the
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// just-scrubbed, soft-deleted rows BEFORE this tx commits — if the
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// process dies after the commit, the retry-square-erasures job still
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// finds them.
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if sqClient != nil && needsSquareErasure {
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if err := persistSquareErasureOutbox(ctx, tx, erasureTargets); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to persist Square erasure outbox for user %s: %v", userID, err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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}
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if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction for user anonymization: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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// TODO: Create 'user_anonymized' notification for admin audit trail
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}
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// The local erasure committed: drop the user's cached Square customer id so
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// the erased identity cannot resurface from the process-local cache on a
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// later save-card flow (the Square customer is deleted below and the DB
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// columns are NULLed, but the cache is never touched by either).
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payments.InvalidateSquareCustomerCache(userID)
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// Build the context used for critical-notification inserts: route through
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// the request transaction when one is active (tests) so alerts roll back
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// with the fixture; otherwise fall back to the shared pool (production,
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// where the request context is cancelled once this handler returns).
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// Captured synchronously for the goroutine below.
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notifyCtx := context.Background()
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if activeTx := db.TxFromContext(r.Context()); activeTx != nil {
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notifyCtx = db.ContextWithTx(notifyCtx, activeTx)
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}
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// external Square cleanup fires only after local anonymization/deletion
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// commits, so a failed local tx leaves external state intact for retry. The
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// durable outbox persisted above guarantees the targets survive even a
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// process crash before this goroutine finishes — this goroutine is the
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// primary drain, and the retry-square-erasures job is the safety net.
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if sqClient != nil && needsSquareErasure {
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// #nosec G118 — intentional background goroutine for async account deletion
|
|
go func(client square.SquareClient, targets []squareErasureTarget, notifyCtx context.Context) {
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if r := recover(); r != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("Panic recovered in Square cleanup: %v", r)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
|
|
cardRow := map[string]string{}
|
|
for _, t := range targets {
|
|
if t.cardID != "" {
|
|
cardRow[t.cardID] = t.rowID
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for cardID, rowID := range cardRow {
|
|
if err := RetrySquareDeletion(ctx, func(actx context.Context) error {
|
|
return client.DeleteCardOnFile(actx, cardID)
|
|
}); err != nil {
|
|
// TokenPrefix redacts the ccof: card token — the full ID must
|
|
// never reach logs. A failed erasure is logged at ERROR and
|
|
// raised as a critical admin notification — never silently
|
|
// dropped after the local refs are NULLed.
|
|
log.Printf("Error: Failed to delete Square card %s for user %s after %d attempts: %v", square.TokenPrefix(cardID), userID, squareDeleteMaxAttempts, err)
|
|
slog.Error("square card deletion failed after retries", "user_id", userID, "card", square.TokenPrefix(cardID), "error", err)
|
|
InsertSquareErasureCriticalNotification(notifyCtx, userID)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
// Drain the durable outbox so the safety-net job has nothing to
|
|
// retry. Best-effort: a failed clear leaves the entry in place
|
|
// for the job, which treats NOT_FOUND as complete.
|
|
if _, err := db.Conn.Exec(ctx, `
|
|
UPDATE user_saved_cards SET square_card_id = NULL
|
|
WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NOT NULL
|
|
`, rowID); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Error("failed to clear Square erasure outbox for card", "user_id", userID, "card", square.TokenPrefix(cardID), "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
customerRows := map[string][]string{}
|
|
for _, t := range targets {
|
|
if t.customerID != "" {
|
|
customerRows[t.customerID] = append(customerRows[t.customerID], t.rowID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for customerID, rows := range customerRows {
|
|
// Square customers are provisioned per-user from a deterministic
|
|
// email-derived key, but the UNIQUE(email) index excludes guest
|
|
// accounts — so a guest and a registered user sharing an email can
|
|
// end up on the SAME Square customer profile (Square dedups within
|
|
// its idempotency window). Deleting it would break the other
|
|
// account's saved-card charges, so skip the deletion when any OTHER
|
|
// non-deleted saved card still references the customer.
|
|
var stillReferenced bool
|
|
if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
|
|
SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM user_saved_cards WHERE square_customer_id = $1 AND user_id <> $2 AND deleted_at IS NULL)
|
|
`, customerID, userID).Scan(&stillReferenced); err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("Error: Failed to check Square customer %s references before deletion: %v", square.TokenPrefix(customerID), err)
|
|
slog.Error("failed to check Square customer references before deletion", "user_id", userID, "customer", square.TokenPrefix(customerID), "error", err)
|
|
InsertSquareErasureCriticalNotification(notifyCtx, userID)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if stillReferenced {
|
|
// PII-redacted customer id — the full id never reaches logs.
|
|
log.Printf("Warning: skipping Square customer deletion — customer %s still referenced by another account", square.TokenPrefix(customerID))
|
|
// The customer is deliberately kept (still referenced by
|
|
// another account) — not a pending erasure, so drain the
|
|
// outbox rows and let the job stop retrying it.
|
|
clearSquareErasureOutboxRows(ctx, rows)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if err := RetrySquareDeletion(ctx, func(actx context.Context) error {
|
|
return client.DeleteCustomer(actx, customerID)
|
|
}); err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("Error: Failed to delete Square customer %s for user %s after %d attempts: %v", square.TokenPrefix(customerID), userID, squareDeleteMaxAttempts, err)
|
|
slog.Error("square customer deletion failed after retries", "user_id", userID, "customer", square.TokenPrefix(customerID), "error", err)
|
|
InsertSquareErasureCriticalNotification(notifyCtx, userID)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
clearSquareErasureOutboxRows(ctx, rows)
|
|
}
|
|
}(sqClient, erasureTargets, notifyCtx)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Delete CardDAV contact (non-blocking, best-effort)
|
|
if dav.Service != nil {
|
|
go func() {
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if r := recover(); r != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("Panic recovered in CardDAV contact deletion: %v", r)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
uri := fmt.Sprintf("%s.vcf", userID)
|
|
if err := dav.Service.DeleteContact(1, uri); err != nil {
|
|
log.Printf("Warning: Failed to delete CardDAV contact for user %s: %v", userID, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|