Files
Crussell/backend/internal/twofa/twofa_test.go
T
popertots 7c424b28b8 fix: loop-B adversarial findings — tip-type double-charge, tip-refund capacity, loyalty stamp farming, gate ordering, auth amplification, admin audit log
Loop B restart (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) fixes:
- CRITICAL: CreateTerminalPayment rejects payment_type='tip' (mirrors CreateBookingPayment) — a tip-typed admin charge no longer records the FULL amount as a tip and double-collects (all is-paid computations exclude tip rows)
- HIGH: tip refunds can no longer re-open booking capacity — refunded_total subqueries filter payment_type <> 'tip' (service.go) and RefundPayment rejects tip rows
- MEDIUM: loyalty-stamp farming closed — stamp award once-per-booking via loyalty_stamp_awarded_at column (init-script.sql) + existing same-day guard
- MEDIUM: CreateTipPayment/CreateBookingPayment 2FA gates moved AFTER the idempotency completed-dedup (code consumed only on new money paths; terminal path already correct) — lost-response retries return the completed payment instead of 400
- MEDIUM: replayRescueLowerBoundSkew widened to 5m (DB-clock-skew stranded originals now rescued)
- MEDIUM-1: verifyFamilyAlive DB amplification reduced via 30s bounded family-alive cache; admin route group rate-limited
- MEDIUM-3: admin saved-card charges now write admin_audit_log (handlers.go helper + till); [2FA] log line decoupled from user identity
- LOW-1: logout scoped to the presented token's family (no cross-session kill)
- LOW-2: refresh-reuse grace widened for same-IP replays
- LOW-4: squareEnvironmentMismatch enforced for empty env
- LOW-5: uuid.ts hard-fails on Math.random fallback (crypto.randomUUID)
- Cash/giftcard tip-enabled overflow mirrors the card-terminal carve

26/26 backend packages; 72/72 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00

132 lines
5.2 KiB
Go

//go:build test
package twofa
// Tests for the shared 2FA verification core (the package the payments
// card-access gate — B6/B10 — imports for real-challenge verification).
// The pepper provider is never registered here (handlers/user's build-tagged
// files register it), so Hash falls back to the legacy plain SHA-256 digest —
// which is exactly what the seeded pending-code hashes use.
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"testing"
"time"
"crussell/clock"
"crussell/db"
"crussell/testutils"
"crussell/testutils/fixtures"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func seedPending(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, tx db.Querier, userID, code string) {
t.Helper()
_, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users
SET two_factor_method = 'email',
two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2,
two_factor_pending_code_expires = $3
WHERE id = $1`, userID, Hash(code), clock.Now().Add(10*time.Minute))
require.NoError(t, err)
}
func TestVerifyForUser_CorrectAndWrongCode(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
// consume=false (interactive setup/disable path): a success keeps the
// pending code valid, so a wrong follow-up code reports ErrIncorrect.
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", false), "correct code must verify")
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", false), ErrIncorrect)
// consume=true (payments saved-card gate path): a success DESTROYS the
// pending code, so re-verifying the same code reports ErrMissingOrExpired
// — a verified code is single-use and cannot authorize a second charge.
userID2, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID2, "123456")
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456", true), "correct code must verify")
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456", true), ErrMissingOrExpired, "a consumed code must be single-use")
var pendingHash sql.NullString
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID2).Scan(&pendingHash))
require.False(t, pendingHash.Valid, "a consumed code must be NULLed in the DB")
}
func TestVerifyForUser_LockoutAndMissing(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
// Wrong code #1 → ErrIncorrect; four more reach the 5-attempt cap.
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", true), ErrIncorrect)
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
_ = VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", true)
}
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", true), ErrLockedOut)
// A fresh user with no pending code → ErrMissingOrExpired.
userID2, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456", true), ErrMissingOrExpired)
}
// TestConsumePendingCode pins the MEDIUM-2 contract: ConsumePendingCode NULLs
// the stored pending-code digest and expiry (idempotently), and is the ONLY
// place a verified-but-unconsumed code dies on the saved-card charge path.
func TestConsumePendingCode(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
// A code verified WITHOUT consuming stays valid (the saved-card charge gate
// path, MEDIUM-2) — re-verification must keep working until consumption.
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", false), "verify-without-consume must pass")
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", false), "an unconsumed code must still verify on a same-key retry")
require.NoError(t, ConsumePendingCode(ctx, tx, userID), "explicit consumption at charge success must succeed")
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", false), ErrMissingOrExpired, "a consumed code must no longer verify")
// Consumption is idempotent — a second call (e.g. a retried completed
// charge) is a no-op, never an error.
require.NoError(t, ConsumePendingCode(ctx, tx, userID), "consuming an already-consumed code must be a no-op")
// An unknown user is a no-op too.
require.NoError(t, ConsumePendingCode(ctx, tx, "000000000000"))
}
// TestVerifyForUser_AttemptStateMapPersists exercises the shared per-user
// attempt map directly (the state the payments gate shares with the interactive
// endpoints): the map is bounded and a locked-out record is never evicted.
func TestVerifyForUser_AttemptStateMapPersists(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(func() {
MapMu.Lock()
Map = make(map[string]*AttemptState)
MaxTrackedAttempts = 10_000
MapMu.Unlock()
})
MapMu.Lock()
Map = make(map[string]*AttemptState)
MaxTrackedAttempts = 2
MapMu.Unlock()
// Fill the map with locked-out records; a new key must NOT evict one.
now := clock.Now()
for _, id := range []string{"victim_a", "victim_b"} {
st := &AttemptState{}
st.SetLastActive(now)
st.Count.Store(MaxAttempts)
Map[id] = st
}
_ = StateFor("new_user") // transient, untracked (map full of lockouts)
MapMu.Lock()
defer MapMu.Unlock()
require.Len(t, Map, 2, "locked-out records must survive the cap pressure")
}