Files
Crussell/backend/handlers/webhooks/webhooks_test.go
T
popertots 54a5b1024e Implement full Square payment review fixes + frontend polish
Implement every finding from the deep payment review (P0-P2, minors,
nitpicks), then close the post-implementation re-review items, then
align card-form typography and roll out the Square trust badge.

Backend - Square API alignment:
- tip_settings.allow_tipping nested under device_options (was top-level:
  terminal tips were silently lost in prod)
- CreateCardOnFile now accepts customerID and sends card.customer_id;
  saved-card (ccof:) charges forward square_customer_id as CustomerID
- New SquareClient methods GetPayment, CreateCustomer, CancelCheckout
- SCA verification_token accepted + forwarded in all charge paths
- ExpMonth/ExpYear -> *int; URL-path id validation; CancelCheckout
  NOT_FOUND-only no-op (dropped unverified NOOP); exported ErrorCode/
  ErrorDetail helpers; mock rejects raw PANs, RList locks, redacts
  emails, ForceRefundPending hook

Backend - money safety:
- sweepManualPendingSquareRefunds reconciles rows WITH square_refund_id
  instead of stranding them forever
- SweepStalePendingPayments reconciles at Square before failing (tri-state:
  leave pending on transport error, rescue completed, fail definitively)
- GetCheckoutStatus cancellation-recheck; terminal CANCELED resolution;
  SweepStaleTerminalCheckouts covers terminal_checkouts table
- till gift-card clawback on definitive failure incl. retry path +
  INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS/ADDRESS_VERIFICATION_FAILURE/TRANSACTION_LIMIT
- cross-user saved-card collision fixed (UNIQUE(user_id,square_card_id))
- customer provisioning (lazy, save-only); one-off/guest mint no customer
- discount preview/apply unified in discounts.go (global-milestone visible
  in preview, N+1 eliminated, redemption counter preserved on failures)
- webhook event_id dedup; refund loop dedup; stale comment fixes
- test-isolation t.Cleanup on committed sweep tests

Frontend:
- SCA tokenizeWithVerification across all charge flows (amount as
  major-units decimal), 5-min token-expiry re-tokenize, verification_token
  in request bodies
- PaymentModal synchronous double-click + zero/negative-amount guards
- till online-card UI wired to /api/admin/till/sale
- policyPopover generalised; new /privacy-policy route; consent checkbox
  copy + Square privacy link
- Square card iframe styled to app typography (Inter 14px, oklch tokens);
  mock form md:text-sm parity
- 'Secure payment powered by Square' badge on all 8 card-payment flows

Schema/docs: terminal_checkouts + square_customer_id + per-user card
constraint in init-script.sql; README migrations; P14 plan + backlog +
Technical Manual updated.

Includes 39 modified/new test files; full backend suite (25 pkgs),
-race on payments+square, and frontend build are green.
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00

346 lines
11 KiB
Go

//go:build test
package webhooks
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// =============================================================================
// Unit tests — verifySquareSignature (pure function)
// =============================================================================
func TestVerifySquareSignature_ValidSignature(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_1"}`)
key := "test-signing-key"
notificationURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
payload := notificationURL + string(body)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
mac.Write([]byte(payload))
expectedSig := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
if !verifySquareSignature(body, expectedSig, key, notificationURL) {
t.Error("expected valid signature to verify")
}
}
func TestVerifySquareSignature_InvalidSignature(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated"}`)
key := "test-signing-key"
notificationURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
if verifySquareSignature(body, "invalid-signature", key, notificationURL) {
t.Error("expected invalid signature to fail")
}
}
func TestVerifySquareSignature_WrongKey(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated"}`)
notificationURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
payload := notificationURL + string(body)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte("correct-key"))
mac.Write([]byte(payload))
sig := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
// Verify with a different key
if verifySquareSignature(body, sig, "wrong-key", notificationURL) {
t.Error("expected wrong key to produce failing verification")
}
}
func TestVerifySquareSignature_EmptyBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
key := "test-signing-key"
notificationURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
payload := notificationURL + string([]byte{})
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
mac.Write([]byte(payload))
expectedSig := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
if !verifySquareSignature([]byte{}, expectedSig, key, notificationURL) {
t.Error("expected empty body verification to succeed with matching signature")
}
}
func TestVerifySquareSignature_TamperedBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_1"}`)
key := "test-signing-key"
notificationURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
payload := notificationURL + string(body)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
mac.Write([]byte(payload))
sig := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
// Verify with a tampered body
tamperedBody := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_2"}`)
if verifySquareSignature(tamperedBody, sig, key, notificationURL) {
t.Error("expected tampered body to fail verification")
}
}
// =============================================================================
// Integration tests — HandleSquareWebhook
// =============================================================================
func makeWebhookRequest(body []byte, signature string, ctx context.Context) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/webhooks/square", bytes.NewReader(body))
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if signature != "" {
req.Header.Set("x-square-hmacsha256-signature", signature)
}
HandleSquareWebhook(w, req)
return w
}
// webhookTestEnv sets a signing key and returns a valid signature for the body
// (the fail-closed handler requires a verifiable signature on every request).
func webhookTestEnv(t *testing.T, body []byte) (signature string) {
t.Helper()
tKey := "test-signing-key"
tURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(tKey))
mac.Write([]byte(tURL))
mac.Write(body)
t.Setenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY", tKey)
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_PaymentUpdated(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_payment_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if w.Body.String() != "ok" {
t.Errorf("expected body 'ok', got %q", w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_RefundUpdated(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "refund.updated",
EventID: "evt_refund_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"refund_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_DisputeCreated(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "dispute.created",
EventID: "evt_dispute_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"dispute_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200 for dispute.created, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_UnknownEventType(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "invoice.created",
EventID: "evt_unknown_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"inv_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200 for unknown event type, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_InvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
body := []byte(`{invalid json}`)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400 for invalid JSON, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_BodyTooLarge(t *testing.T) {
// 600KB body exceeds the 512KB limit
largeBody := []byte(strings.Repeat("a", 600*1024))
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, largeBody)
w := makeWebhookRequest(largeBody, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Errorf("expected 413 for oversized body, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_ValidSignatureWithEnvKey(t *testing.T) {
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_1"}`)
key := "env-signing-key"
notificationURL := "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
payload := notificationURL + string(body)
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
mac.Write([]byte(payload))
sig := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
t.Setenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY", key)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200 with valid signature, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_InvalidSignatureWithEnvKey(t *testing.T) {
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_1"}`)
t.Setenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY", "env-signing-key")
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, "bad-signature", context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("expected 403 with invalid signature, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_NoSignatureWhenKeySet(t *testing.T) {
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_1"}`)
t.Setenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY", "env-signing-key")
// No x-square-signature header at all
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, "", context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("expected 403 when signature key is set but header missing, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_RejectedWhenKeyEmpty(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY", "")
body := []byte(`{"type":"payment.updated","event_id":"evt_1"}`)
// Fail-closed: an unset signing key means the webhook cannot be verified,
// so the request is rejected rather than accepted with a bad signature.
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, "some-signature", context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
t.Errorf("expected 503 when no key configured (fail-closed), got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
// =============================================================================
// Dedup — event_id replay protection
// =============================================================================
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_DuplicateEventID(t *testing.T) {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: "evt_http_dup_1",
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"payment_dup_1"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
// First delivery processes the event.
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected first delivery 200, got %d. body: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
// Replay of the same signed event returns 200 but skips dispatch.
w2 := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w2.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected replay 200, got %d. body: %s", w2.Code, w2.Body.String())
}
if w2.Body.String() != "ok" {
t.Errorf("expected replay body 'ok', got %q", w2.Body.String())
}
}
func TestHandleSquareWebhook_DistinctEventIDs(t *testing.T) {
for _, id := range []string{"evt_distinct_1", "evt_distinct_2"} {
event := SquareWebhookEvent{
Type: "payment.updated",
EventID: id,
CreatedAt: "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
Data: json.RawMessage(`{"id":"p"}`),
}
body, _ := json.Marshal(event)
sig := webhookTestEnv(t, body)
w := makeWebhookRequest(body, sig, context.Background())
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 for %s, got %d. body: %s", id, w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
}
func TestSquareWebhookDedup_FirstThenDuplicate(t *testing.T) {
d := newSquareWebhookDedup(1000)
if d.register("evt_dedup_1") {
t.Error("expected first occurrence to register as new")
}
if !d.register("evt_dedup_1") {
t.Error("expected second occurrence to register as duplicate")
}
}
func TestSquareWebhookDedup_CapEvictsOldest(t *testing.T) {
d := newSquareWebhookDedup(3)
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
if d.register(fmt.Sprintf("evt_cap_%d", i)) {
t.Errorf("expected evt_cap_%d to register as new", i)
}
}
// The 4th distinct ID pushes out the oldest (evt_cap_0).
if d.register("evt_cap_3") {
t.Errorf("expected evt_cap_3 to register as new")
}
// Survivors still dedupe (register returns true without mutating the set).
for _, id := range []string{"evt_cap_1", "evt_cap_2", "evt_cap_3"} {
if !d.register(id) {
t.Errorf("expected %s to still be a duplicate", id)
}
}
// The evicted ID is treated as new again.
if d.register("evt_cap_0") {
t.Errorf("expected evt_cap_0 to be evicted and treated as new")
}
}