SCA is now the PRIMARY authorisation for saved-card (ccof) charges (PSR 2017 /
chargeback liability shift); the homegrown 2FA becomes a BACKUP used only when
SCA is unavailable (e.g. a bank without in-app approval), with a strict audit
trail. The 'approve in your banking app' UX comes from Square buyer
verification. Email/SMS remains the intended 2FA delivery channel; the [2FA]
stdout-log relay (TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true) is the explicit-insecure
pre-email/SMS stopgap.
BACKEND:
- CreateTerminalPaymentRequest gains VerificationToken (forwarded to Square in
the admin saved-card branch; validated like the other charge handlers)
- Structured SCA-required error surfacing: isVerificationRequiredError +
writeVerificationRequiredResponse (HTTP 402 with {code:'verification_required'})
at all 5 charge error sites — the frontend keys on it to trigger the challenge
- requireTwoFactorForCardAccess reworked: SCA token present => 2FA skipped
(SCA primary); no token => 2FA fallback requires delivery channel + consume +
insertTwoFAFallbackAudit (admin_audit_log reason 2fa_fallback_charge,
{sca_performed:false,...}); TWO_FACTOR_FALLBACK env flag (default true) gates
the fallback; false => SCA-only posture
- MIT vs CIT: admin till saved-card + admin booking saved-card charges now flag
customer_initiated=false (merchant-initiated, no SCA, no liability shift);
customer-initiated online flows keep true
FRONTEND:
- square_card_id threaded through SavedCard/SelectableCard + admin lists
- isVerificationRequiredSignal + shouldFallbackTo2FA helpers (402 + code / text
fallback); VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_MESSAGE
- tokenizeSavedCardWithVerification (Square SDK tokenize(details, squareCardId))
with verified/challenge-cancelled/sca-unavailable/sca-failed outcomes
- Per-surface SCA retry with the SAME idempotency key + fresh verification_token
(booking/tip/till/gift-card/admin); 'waiting for approval in your banking
app' state on admin surfaces; 2FA backup-only UX in the shared composable
MOCK PARITY:
- SimulateSavedCardVerificationRequired toggle (default off) + grandfathering
- Challenge state (ApprovePendingVerification/DenyPendingVerification,
ChallengeResult config, token-encoded _ok|_deny outcome)
- One-time-use verify_mock_ token ledger + amount/source binding
- MockCardForm saved-card verification simulation + mock Approve button
- Tests: saved-card SCA gate, one-time-use, denied, amount-mismatch,
grandfathered; frontend helper tests
DOCS: payments-doc SCA appendix, Technical Manual 2FA section, README,
Overview, Feature Catalog updated to SCA-primary + 2FA-backup; env-var
documented (42/42).
26/26 backend packages; 95/95 frontend tests + build; env-docs 42/42.
100 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
100 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
package payments
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"crussell/internal/square"
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"crussell/mw"
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)
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// verificationRequiredCodes are Square CreatePayment error codes that mean the
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// buyer must complete Strong Customer Authentication (3DS/SCA) before the
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// charge can succeed: Square is demanding a fresh verification_token from the
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// cardholder's buyer-verification flow. These are NOT plain declines — the
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// frontend must surface the SCA challenge (the banking app / banking-app
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// approval) and retry the charge with the resulting verification token. This
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// is the SINGLE authoritative list of SCA-challenge codes; keep it in lock-step
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// with the dev mock's simulated SCA toggle (square_dev.go).
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var verificationRequiredCodes = map[string]bool{
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"CARD_DECLINED_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED": true,
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"VERIFICATION_TOKEN_EXPIRED": true,
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"VERIFICATION_TOKEN_INVALID": true,
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"MISSING_VERIFICATION_TOKEN": true,
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}
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// isVerificationRequiredError reports whether a SquareClient.CreatePayment
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// error is an SCA/verification-required rejection (the charge must be retried
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// through the buyer-verification flow with a fresh verification_token) rather
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// than a plain decline. Matches square.ErrorCode against the four SCA codes;
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// CVV_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED / ADDRESS_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED are deliberately
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// excluded — those mean re-entering card data, not a 3DS challenge.
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func isVerificationRequiredError(err error) bool {
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return verificationRequiredCodes[square.ErrorCode(err)]
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}
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// writeVerificationRequiredResponse responds 402 with the structured
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// verification_required body the frontend keys on to trigger the SCA challenge
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// flow (mirrors the overflow_tip_confirmation_required / campaign_fully_redeemed
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// structured-error pattern — mw.RespondJSON, code + human message). The message
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// tells the buyer to approve the payment in their banking app. Used both by the
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// charge-failure paths (Square returned an SCA-required code) and by the 2FA
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// gate when the SCA-only posture has no fallback for a token-less charge.
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func writeVerificationRequiredResponse(w http.ResponseWriter) {
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mw.RespondJSON(w, http.StatusPaymentRequired, map[string]string{
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"error": "Your card issuer requires verification. Approve this payment in your banking app.",
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"code": "verification_required",
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})
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}
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// chargeFailureStatus classifies a SquareClient.CreatePayment error into the
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// HTTP status a payment handler should return:
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//
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// - 503 (Service Unavailable) for AMBIGUOUS failures: transport/network
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// errors, Square 5xx responses, context cancellation/deadline, and the
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// retryable 4xx statuses 429 (rate limited), 408 (request timeout), and
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// 425 (too early) — the money state at Square is unknown, so the frontend
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// should treat it as a retry (the pending record is resumed on a same-key
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// retry). Square's own docs treat 429 as "retry later"; mapping it (or a
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// timeout/early request) to 402 would mislabel a retryable condition as a
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// permanent decline.
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// - 402 (Payment Required) for DEFINITIVE declines: a structured Square
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// error (squareAPIError) carrying any OTHER 4xx status (400/402/422 etc.)
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// means Square positively rejected the charge (card declined/expired,
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// AVS/CVV failure) — retrying with the same inputs cannot succeed.
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//
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// A nil error is never expected (callers only invoke this on the error path);
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// it maps to 402 defensively. The dev mock returns plain errors for simulated
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// failures, which classify as 503 (ambiguous) — correct for a mock standing in
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// for an unreachable Square.
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func chargeFailureStatus(err error) int {
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if err == nil {
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return http.StatusPaymentRequired
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}
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if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) || errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
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return http.StatusServiceUnavailable
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}
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status := square.ErrorStatusCode(err)
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if status == 0 || status >= 500 {
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return http.StatusServiceUnavailable
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}
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// Retryable/ambiguous 4xx carve-outs: 429 (RATE_LIMITED), 408 (request
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// timeout), and 425 (too early) are not definitive declines — Square's
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// docs tell clients to retry later. Classify them as 503 so the pending
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// record stays resumable on a same-key retry instead of being labelled a
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// permanent decline. True declines (400/402/422 etc.) fall through to 402.
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if status == http.StatusTooManyRequests || status == http.StatusRequestTimeout || status == http.StatusTooEarly {
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return http.StatusServiceUnavailable
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}
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if status >= 400 && status < 500 {
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return http.StatusPaymentRequired
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}
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// Anything else (1xx/2xx/3xx — impossible in practice, but defensive) is
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// AMBIGUOUS: the money state at Square is unknown, so the failure must be
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// retryable. The default is deliberately 503, never 402 — a definitive
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// decline classification on an ambiguous outcome would suppress the
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// same-key retry that resumes the pending record.
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return http.StatusServiceUnavailable
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}
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