Files
Crussell/backend/internal/twofa/twofa_test.go
T
popertots 9a182db932 fix: full-scope review — tip-inclusive amount_due, sweep deposit-strand, A6 clamp cap, B13 clawback, 2FA single-use, mint audit, account-deletion re-auth, refresh dedup
Full-scope Loop A restart review (18 findings across money/security/dup-mod):

MONEY:
- HIGH: amount_paid/amount_due CTEs now exclude payment_type='tip' (bookings.go x6, today.go) — a tip before the final balance no longer undercharges the booking
- MEDIUM-HIGH: pending payment row stores the actual chargeAmount (not req.Amount) so the sweep replay amount-match rescues deposit-with-discount rows instead of auto-refunding them; refundSweepDuplicateCharge refunds the replayed payment's actual amount
- MEDIUM: A6 deposit clamp-up now caps at the discounted obligation (remainingPence - eligibleDiscountPence) — no more silent overcharge when a campaign discount >= deposit
- MEDIUM: B13 campaign-loss balance credits are clawed back on cancellation (clawbackB13CampaignCredit in ProcessCancellationRefundTx)
- LOW: replayLegitimateRetryWindow extended 22h->24h so a legitimate same-key retry in the retry-eligible window is rescued, not auto-refunded

SECURITY:
- 2FA single-use strengthened (consume-at-gate for fresh charges, re-issue on failure)
- Admin 2FA mint now writes admin_audit_log + logs code reuse
- Account deletion requires current password (and 2FA when enforced) — stolen token can no longer destroy the account
- Multi-tab refresh-token replay deduped via cross-tab lock (no false family-kill alerts)
- family-alive cache invalidated on password change / GDPR erasure
- Login lockout keyed per user+IP with a capped ceiling

FRONTEND/DUP-MOD:
- OverflowTipConfirm shared component (UserPaymentModal + BookingFlow); overflow computation aligned (deposit-discount-aware)
- PaymentModal admin 2FA gate now method-conditioned (no over-reveal on cash/giftcard)
- requestTwoFactorCode shared helper (requestNewTwoFactorCode + adminRequestNewTwoFactorCode)
- BookingFlow deposit display aligned to the discounted amount; formatCurrency used consistently

26/26 backend packages; 80/80 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00

173 lines
7.4 KiB
Go

//go:build test
package twofa
// Tests for the shared 2FA verification core (the package the payments
// card-access gate — B6/B10 — imports for real-challenge verification).
// The pepper provider is never registered here (handlers/user's build-tagged
// files register it), so Hash falls back to the legacy plain SHA-256 digest —
// which is exactly what the seeded pending-code hashes use.
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"testing"
"time"
"crussell/clock"
"crussell/db"
"crussell/testutils"
"crussell/testutils/fixtures"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func seedPending(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, tx db.Querier, userID, code string) {
t.Helper()
_, err := tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users
SET two_factor_method = 'email',
two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2,
two_factor_pending_code_expires = $3
WHERE id = $1`, userID, Hash(code), clock.Now().Add(10*time.Minute))
require.NoError(t, err)
}
func TestVerifyForUser_CorrectAndWrongCode(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
// consume=false (interactive setup/disable path): a success keeps the
// pending code valid, so a wrong follow-up code reports ErrIncorrect.
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", DeferredConsume), "correct code must verify")
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", DeferredConsume), ErrIncorrect)
// consume=true (payments saved-card gate path): a success DESTROYS the
// pending code, so re-verifying the same code reports ErrMissingOrExpired
// — a verified code is single-use and cannot authorize a second charge.
userID2, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID2, "123456")
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456", ConsumeOnVerify), "correct code must verify")
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456", ConsumeOnVerify), ErrMissingOrExpired, "a consumed code must be single-use")
var pendingHash sql.NullString
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID2).Scan(&pendingHash))
require.False(t, pendingHash.Valid, "a consumed code must be NULLed in the DB")
}
func TestVerifyForUser_LockoutAndMissing(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
// Wrong code #1 → ErrIncorrect; four more reach the 5-attempt cap.
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", ConsumeOnVerify), ErrIncorrect)
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
_ = VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", ConsumeOnVerify)
}
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "999999", ConsumeOnVerify), ErrLockedOut)
// A fresh user with no pending code → ErrMissingOrExpired.
userID2, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID2, "123456", ConsumeOnVerify), ErrMissingOrExpired)
}
// TestVerifyForUser_ConsumeOnVerifyConcurrency pins the finding-1 contract: a
// code verified with ConsumeOnVerify authorizes exactly ONE operation. Even
// though the per-user mutex serializes the critical section (so no test can
// actually race it), the observable guarantee is that the first verify burns the
// code and any subsequent verify of the same code fails with
// ErrMissingOrExpired — two concurrent charge gates can never both pass.
func TestVerifyForUser_ConsumeOnVerifyConcurrency(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "424242")
// Two "concurrent" charge-gate verifies of the same code, serialized by
// StateFor's per-user mutex exactly as the payments gate would experience
// them. Only the first may succeed.
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "424242", ConsumeOnVerify), "first charge gate must verify")
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "424242", ConsumeOnVerify), ErrMissingOrExpired,
"second charge gate with the same code must fail — one code, one charge")
}
// TestVerifyForUser_SuccessClearsLoginLockout pins LOW 6b: a successful 2FA
// verify lifts any password-guessing login lockout (users.failed_attempts /
// locked_until) because a correct code proves control of the second factor.
func TestVerifyForUser_SuccessClearsLoginLockout(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET failed_attempts = 9, locked_until = NOW() + INTERVAL '30 minutes' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", ConsumeOnVerify))
var failedAttempts int
var lockedUntil *time.Time
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT failed_attempts, locked_until FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&failedAttempts, &lockedUntil))
require.Zero(t, failedAttempts, "successful 2FA verify must reset the login lockout counter")
require.Nil(t, lockedUntil, "successful 2FA verify must clear locked_until")
}
// TestConsumePendingCode pins the MEDIUM-2 contract: ConsumePendingCode NULLs
// the stored pending-code digest and expiry (idempotently), and is the ONLY
// place a verified-but-unconsumed code dies on the saved-card charge path.
func TestConsumePendingCode(t *testing.T) {
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
require.NoError(t, err)
seedPending(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
// A code verified WITHOUT consuming stays valid (the saved-card charge gate
// path, MEDIUM-2) — re-verification must keep working until consumption.
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", false), "verify-without-consume must pass")
require.NoError(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", false), "an unconsumed code must still verify on a same-key retry")
require.NoError(t, ConsumePendingCode(ctx, tx, userID), "explicit consumption at charge success must succeed")
require.ErrorIs(t, VerifyForUser(ctx, userID, "123456", false), ErrMissingOrExpired, "a consumed code must no longer verify")
// Consumption is idempotent — a second call (e.g. a retried completed
// charge) is a no-op, never an error.
require.NoError(t, ConsumePendingCode(ctx, tx, userID), "consuming an already-consumed code must be a no-op")
// An unknown user is a no-op too.
require.NoError(t, ConsumePendingCode(ctx, tx, "000000000000"))
}
// TestVerifyForUser_AttemptStateMapPersists exercises the shared per-user
// attempt map directly (the state the payments gate shares with the interactive
// endpoints): the map is bounded and a locked-out record is never evicted.
func TestVerifyForUser_AttemptStateMapPersists(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(func() {
MapMu.Lock()
Map = make(map[string]*AttemptState)
MaxTrackedAttempts = 10_000
MapMu.Unlock()
})
MapMu.Lock()
Map = make(map[string]*AttemptState)
MaxTrackedAttempts = 2
MapMu.Unlock()
// Fill the map with locked-out records; a new key must NOT evict one.
now := clock.Now()
for _, id := range []string{"victim_a", "victim_b"} {
st := &AttemptState{}
st.SetLastActive(now)
st.Count.Store(MaxAttempts)
Map[id] = st
}
_ = StateFor("new_user") // transient, untracked (map full of lockouts)
MapMu.Lock()
defer MapMu.Unlock()
require.Len(t, Map, 2, "locked-out records must survive the cap pressure")
}