Money-safety: - Deterministic till idempotency fallback (Square-charging only); cash/on_the_house keep unique keys; £250 till gift-card cap; 45-char key validation - Gift-card admin caps £250/tx + £5,000/day; user buy £500/day; BuyGiftCard allowlist unchanged - CancelGiftCard: CCR 2013 14-day right with partial-spend refund of the unspent balance (spend verified via payments.gift_card_id); atomic vs redeem/transfer; refunds stay pending until reversal commits; admin cancel surface (AdminCancelGiftCard) - Sweep: cancelled-booking charges failed+notified instead of silently completed; source-override replay uses live square_source_id; legacy square-less refund sweep; snapshot refresh on pending reuse - Refund lock consolidation; recordTerminalPaymentTx shared recorder; structured Square error codes; terminal checkout CustomerID GDPR / security: - Notes retained as de-identified medical/safety record at erasure (single field treated as health data; rest of record wiped, no re-identification map) + comments updated per UK GDPR/Art 9/Equality Act 2010 - square_request_snapshot PII scrubbed on all erasure paths; delete_guest_user FK unlinks; verification codes + dispute reasons handled; idle/stale-guest erasure deletes Square cards/customers + CardDAV/R2 - Durable square-erasure outbox job (retry-square-erasures); 2FA dev/prod build split, pepper fail-closed, no prod code-in-log; prod 2FA delivery fail-loud without a channel - Webhook unknown-type family split (non-money acked, money retried); untracked dispute notifications; rate-limit CF/X-Real-IP trust gating; nginx CSP nonce + api_limit Frontend: - Dynamic z-index stack (ui/dialog/zindex.ts) claimed in open order via data-state observer; re-claims on every reopen; removes stale !z-* overrides — nested modals (booking→user→booking) always paint newest-on-top (browser-verified 3-level + reopen) - Mobile: iOS zoom fixes, bottom-sheet dialogs, 44px touch targets, inputmode decimal, dvh - Gift-card buy/cancel UI, admin £250 + daily limits, cancellation/privacy/terms policy accuracy S3: - Connect() creates buckets before probing; in-memory fallback only on genuine unreachability; health reports degraded; stale S3_PUBLIC_URL documented (host-specific) Tests/docs: - 2263 test functions; all 22 backend packages green; round8/9/10 regression suites; NextEditWindowTime removes wall-clock flake; docs reconciled (notes retention, gift-card partial-use, modal T15 future work)
139 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
139 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
// Shared types, registration, and cleanup for RateLimiter + ProgressiveRateLimiter.
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// Used by both production (!dev) and dev (dev) builds — keep tag-free.
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package mw
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import (
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"context"
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"crussell/clock"
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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// trustProxyHeaders gates clientIP()'s use of the proxy-set client-IP headers:
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// CF-Connecting-IP in clientIP(), and (via TrustProxyHeaders) the X-Real-IP
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// ClientIPFromHeader middleware registered in main.go. It is read once at
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// startup from the TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS env var and defaults to false.
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//
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// nginx (nginx/conf.d/default.conf) resolves the real client IP itself with
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// the real_ip module (set_real_ip_from <Cloudflare ranges> +
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// real_ip_header CF-Connecting-IP), then overwrites both X-Real-IP and
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// CF-Connecting-IP with the validated $remote_addr — so behind nginx those
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// headers are the authoritative, unspoofable per-client key. Set
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// TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true for ANY deployment where a trusted proxy (nginx
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// and/or the Cloudflare edge) sits between clients and this backend and
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// overwrites these headers itself. It MUST stay false when the backend is
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// origin-exposed: a client talking directly to the backend could otherwise
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// rotate X-Real-IP and/or CF-Connecting-IP to bypass per-IP rate limiting.
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var trustProxyHeaders = func() bool {
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v, ok := os.LookupEnv("TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS")
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if !ok {
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return false
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}
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b, err := strconv.ParseBool(v)
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return err == nil && b
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}()
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// TrustProxyHeaders reports whether proxy-set client-IP headers (X-Real-IP,
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// CF-Connecting-IP) are honored by the rate limiter. main.go uses it to gate
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// middleware.ClientIPFromHeader("X-Real-IP") on the same flag, so an
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// origin-exposed backend never registers a middleware that would let a client
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// forge its own rate-limit key. Both the header trust in clientIP() and the
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// middleware registration read this single source of truth.
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func TrustProxyHeaders() bool { return trustProxyHeaders }
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// RateLimiter implements a simple in-memory rate limiter
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type RateLimiter struct {
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requests map[string][]time.Time
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mu sync.RWMutex
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limit int
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window time.Duration
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}
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// ProgressiveRateLimiter implements per-IP rate limiting with increasing backoff.
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// Designed for bot-spam prevention across accounts (not account-specific lockout).
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type ProgressiveRateLimiter struct {
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requests map[string]*ipProgressiveState
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mu sync.RWMutex
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}
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type ipProgressiveState struct {
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// Timestamps of all requests within the tracking window
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timestamps []time.Time
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}
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var (
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registeredLimiters []*RateLimiter
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registeredLimitersMu sync.Mutex
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)
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func registerLimiter(rl *RateLimiter) {
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registeredLimitersMu.Lock()
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registeredLimiters = append(registeredLimiters, rl)
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registeredLimitersMu.Unlock()
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}
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// CleanupAllRateLimiters runs Cleanup on every registered RateLimiter.
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// Called by the centralised jobs scheduler.
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func CleanupAllRateLimiters(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
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registeredLimitersMu.Lock()
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limiters := make([]*RateLimiter, len(registeredLimiters))
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copy(limiters, registeredLimiters)
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registeredLimitersMu.Unlock()
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for _, l := range limiters {
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l.Cleanup()
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}
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return 0, nil
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}
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// CleanupProgressiveRateLimiter runs Cleanup on the global progressive rate limiter.
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// Called by the centralised jobs scheduler.
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func CleanupProgressiveRateLimiter(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
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globalProgressiveLimiter.Cleanup()
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return 0, nil
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}
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// Cleanup removes expired entries from the rate limiter map.
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func (rl *RateLimiter) Cleanup() {
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rl.mu.Lock()
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defer rl.mu.Unlock()
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now := clock.Now()
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for key, times := range rl.requests {
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var valid []time.Time
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for _, t := range times {
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if now.Sub(t) < rl.window {
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valid = append(valid, t)
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}
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}
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if len(valid) == 0 {
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delete(rl.requests, key)
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} else {
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rl.requests[key] = valid
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}
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}
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}
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// Cleanup removes expired entries from the progressive rate limiter map.
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func (prl *ProgressiveRateLimiter) Cleanup() {
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prl.mu.Lock()
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defer prl.mu.Unlock()
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cutoff := clock.Now().Add(-60 * time.Second)
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for ip, state := range prl.requests {
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var valid []time.Time
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for _, t := range state.timestamps {
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if t.After(cutoff) {
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valid = append(valid, t)
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}
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}
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if len(valid) == 0 {
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delete(prl.requests, ip)
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} else {
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state.timestamps = valid
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}
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}
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}
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var globalProgressiveLimiter = NewProgressiveRateLimiter()
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