Second fresh-eyes review pass (7 agents: goal, security, code-quality, context-mining, webhooks+2FA, client+mock+sweep, refunds/giftcards/handlers). Money-safety core verified sound (identical-body replay byte-lossless, clawback gated on definitive proof, no double-charge window). This round fixes the issues the fresh pass surfaced: 2FA: - Setup now DELIVERS the code via the [2FA] server log in ALL modes (was: nothing in enforced mode -> production 2FA was an unbreakable dead-end and saved-card charges were permanently 403). Enforced mode still withholds the code from the API response; the log line is the fake delivery channel until email/SMS lands (P6). - Disabling 2FA now requires a fresh verification code when enforcement is ON (previously ignored the code -> a password-only attacker could lift the gate). Shares the 5-attempt lockout and timing-safe compare. Dev bypass retained. - REQUIRE_2FA parsing normalized (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive); startup warning extended to the empty-env/mock-client/enforced-2FA confusion. GDPR: - anonymize_user() SQL now scrubs two_factor_* columns + staff notes, so the idle-account batch cleanup (CleanupIdleAccounts) is erasure-clean, not just the user-initiated delete path. Webhooks: - dispute.created for an untracked Square payment now raises a critical_payment_log admin notification (chargeback the app can't reconcile is never silent). Reason strings truncated on rune boundaries (valid UTF-8). Stale at-most-once comment corrected; revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding duplication noted. Sweep/mock parity: - Mock CreatePayment dedup is now source-aware (IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED on source mismatch) matching ReplayPaymentByKey and real Square. - COMPLETED-but-never-polled terminal till-sale checkouts are now recorded by the sweep (previously only booking checkouts were; till charges were invisible until the 24h blind-fail WARN). - Legacy snapshot-less minimal-body replay, SQUARE_LOCATION_ID drift, and in-memory-mock-restart limitations documented. Docs: - Webhook path corrected everywhere (/webhooks/square, not /api/webhooks/square - a deployer following the old path would 404 and silently lose all webhook reconciliation). - 2FA enforcement semantics + code-delivery mechanism documented accurately (fail-closed default; log-delivery channel; disable re-verification). - README/User Manual note the 2FA requirement on online saved-card payments. Tests: 2,151 (up from 2,142). Backend 26/27 packages green (crussell/db fails only in this environment: local postgres doesn't offer scram-sha-256 for the test role; package is byte-identical to HEAD and untouched here). Frontend builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
244 lines
8.7 KiB
Go
244 lines
8.7 KiB
Go
package user
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import (
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"context"
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"database/sql"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"time"
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"crussell/db"
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"crussell/handlers/payments"
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"crussell/internal/dav"
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"crussell/internal/s3"
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"crussell/internal/square"
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"crussell/mw"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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)
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// DELETE /api/user/account
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func DeleteAccountHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
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if !ok {
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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var accountRole string
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var profilePicURL sql.NullString
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err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT account_role, profile_pic_url FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).
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Scan(&accountRole, &profilePicURL)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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http.Error(w, "user not found", http.StatusNotFound)
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return
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}
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log.Printf("Failed to fetch user for deletion: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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ctx := r.Context()
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// --- External system scrubbing (BEFORE SQL anonymize) ---
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// Delete profile picture from S3/R2
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if profilePicURL.Valid && profilePicURL.String != "" && s3.Client != nil {
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// #nosec G118 — intentional background goroutine for async profile pic cleanup
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go func(picURL string) {
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defer func() {
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if r := recover(); r != nil {
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log.Printf("Panic recovered in S3 profile picture deletion: %v", r)
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}
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}()
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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bucket := os.Getenv("S3_PROFILE_PICS_BUCKET")
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if bucket == "" {
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bucket = "crussell-profile-pics"
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}
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// profiles/{userID}.jpg — matches UploadProfilePictureHandler key format
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key := fmt.Sprintf("profiles/%s.jpg", userID)
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if err := s3.Client.Delete(ctx, bucket, key); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Warning: Failed to delete profile picture for user %s: %v", userID, err)
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}
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}(profilePicURL.String)
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}
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// Snapshot the Square card IDs AND customer IDs synchronously BEFORE the
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// SQL anonymization below NULLs square_card_id/square_customer_id, so the
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// background cleanup still has the external Square references it needs
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// (previously the goroutine read the rows itself, racing the anonymize
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// step which wiped them mid-flight). Distinct non-null customer IDs only:
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// a user's saved cards share one provisioned Square customer, so
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// DeleteCustomer runs once per customer. NULL customer IDs (users with
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// no saved cards) are skipped.
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var cardIDs []string
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customerSeen := map[string]bool{}
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var customerIDs []string
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// Capture the client synchronously so the async cleanup goroutine never
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// reads the global payments.SquareClient (which tests swap per-account).
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sqClient := payments.SquareClient
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if sqClient != nil {
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rows, err := db.Conn.Query(r.Context(),
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`SELECT square_card_id, square_customer_id FROM user_saved_cards WHERE user_id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`, userID)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Warning: Failed to query saved cards for user %s: %v", userID, err)
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} else {
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for rows.Next() {
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var cardID, customerID sql.NullString
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if err := rows.Scan(&cardID, &customerID); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Warning: Failed to scan card ID for user %s: %v", userID, err)
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continue
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}
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if cardID.Valid && cardID.String != "" {
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cardIDs = append(cardIDs, cardID.String)
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}
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if customerID.Valid && customerID.String != "" && !customerSeen[customerID.String] {
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customerSeen[customerID.String] = true
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customerIDs = append(customerIDs, customerID.String)
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}
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}
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if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Warning: Row iteration error for user %s: %v", userID, err)
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}
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rows.Close()
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}
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}
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// --- SQL-level anonymization/deletion ---
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if accountRole == "guest" {
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tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction for guest user deletion: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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defer func() {
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if err := tx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
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slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
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}
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}()
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_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `SELECT delete_guest_user($1)`, userID)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to delete guest user %s: %v", userID, err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction for guest user deletion: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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} else {
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tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction for user anonymization: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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defer func() {
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if err := tx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
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slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
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}
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}()
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// anonymize_user() is the single source of truth for erasure: it NULLs
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// the 2FA columns and staff notes in the same statement that anonymizes
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// the rest of the row, so every call site (this handler AND the
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// idle-account batch cleanup in scheduling.CleanupIdleAccounts) is
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// GDPR-clean without a separate Go-side scrub.
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_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `SELECT anonymize_user($1)`, userID)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to anonymize user %s: %v", userID, err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction for user anonymization: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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// TODO: Create 'user_anonymized' notification for admin audit trail
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}
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// The local erasure committed: drop the user's cached Square customer id so
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// the erased identity cannot resurface from the process-local cache on a
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// later save-card flow (the Square customer is deleted below and the DB
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// columns are NULLed, but the cache is never touched by either).
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payments.InvalidateSquareCustomerCache(userID)
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// external Square cleanup fires only after local anonymization/deletion
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// commits, so a failed local tx leaves external state intact for retry.
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if sqClient != nil && (len(cardIDs) > 0 || len(customerIDs) > 0) {
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// #nosec G118 — intentional background goroutine for async account deletion
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go func(client square.SquareClient, cards, customers []string) {
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defer func() {
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if r := recover(); r != nil {
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log.Printf("Panic recovered in Square cleanup: %v", r)
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}
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}()
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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for _, cardID := range cards {
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if err := client.DeleteCardOnFile(ctx, cardID); err != nil {
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// TokenPrefix redacts the ccof: card token — the full ID must
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// never reach logs.
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log.Printf("Warning: Failed to delete Square card %s for user %s: %v", square.TokenPrefix(cardID), userID, err)
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}
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}
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for _, customerID := range customers {
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// Square customers are provisioned per-user from a deterministic
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// email-derived key, but the UNIQUE(email) index excludes guest
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// accounts — so a guest and a registered user sharing an email can
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// end up on the SAME Square customer profile (Square dedups within
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// its idempotency window). Deleting it would break the other
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// account's saved-card charges, so skip the deletion when any OTHER
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// non-deleted saved card still references the customer.
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var stillReferenced bool
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if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM user_saved_cards WHERE square_customer_id = $1 AND user_id <> $2 AND deleted_at IS NULL)
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`, customerID, userID).Scan(&stillReferenced); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Warning: Failed to check Square customer %s references before deletion: %v", square.TokenPrefix(customerID), err)
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continue
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}
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if stillReferenced {
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// PII-redacted customer id — the full id never reaches logs.
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log.Printf("Warning: skipping Square customer deletion — customer %s still referenced by another account", square.TokenPrefix(customerID))
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continue
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}
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if err := client.DeleteCustomer(ctx, customerID); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Warning: Failed to delete Square customer %s for user %s: %v", square.TokenPrefix(customerID), userID, err)
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}
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}
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}(sqClient, cardIDs, customerIDs)
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}
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// Delete CardDAV contact (non-blocking, best-effort)
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if dav.Service != nil {
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go func() {
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defer func() {
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if r := recover(); r != nil {
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log.Printf("Panic recovered in CardDAV contact deletion: %v", r)
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}
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}()
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uri := fmt.Sprintf("%s.vcf", userID)
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if err := dav.Service.DeleteContact(1, uri); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Warning: Failed to delete CardDAV contact for user %s: %v", userID, err)
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}
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}()
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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