Files
Crussell/backend/auth/jwt.go
T
popertots fe88f2084d fix: review-loop B — adversarial findings (sweep auto-refund, admin clamp, 2FA real challenge, opaque refresh tokens, gated client IP, GBP pence)
Loop B aggressive adversarial round (3 attack agents) + fix + secondary + verification:
- CRITICAL: sweep replay auto-refunds provably-created-later duplicate charges (gated on parseable CreatedAt); 22h legitimate-retry window == 22h sweep cutoff (no dead zone)
- HIGH: admin Take Payment clamps to remaining obligation (cash/giftcard/saved-card/terminal); no unintended tip from overflow; campaign credit against remaining
- HIGH: /api/services/eligible-for/{id} requires auth + owner-or-admin (DOB/age + patch-test health-data leak closed)
- HIGH: opaque refresh-token rotation (login/refresh return {token, jti, refreshToken}; refresh REQUIRES opaque token; single-use rotation; logout revokes; access token rejected at refresh)
- HIGH: saved-card charges require a REAL 2FA verification code (B6/B10) — backend gate on all 8 charge paths + shared TwoFactorCodeInput frontend component on all 7 surfaces; 2FA gate is no longer setup-flag-only
- MEDIUM: ungated CF-Connecting-IP in reserve/admin_reserve gated via exported mw.ClientIP; 2FA limiter keyed on userID alone (no header-rotation bypass); ChangePassword actually revokes JTI + refresh tokens; 2FA setup mint cooldown + persistent failed-attempt counter; campaign redemption race surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- Terminal saved-card VAT applied (was under-collected); age-guard reconcile failures notify; isWeakJWTSecret entropy gate; gift-card redeem per-card counter + per-user limiter; webhook signature key startup validation
- NEW internal/twofa package (single source of truth breaking the payments<->user import cycle); consolidation of duplicate 2FA hash/verify
- Frontend: refresh-token storage + rotation, TwoFactorCodeInput component, amountPaidPence in admin modal, B5/B6/B10 contract wiring; 70 frontend tests
- Tests: loop_b_fixes_test.go, internal/twofa tests, updated auth/services/profile/twofa/mw tests

All 26 backend packages pass (incl. internal/twofa); frontend 70/70 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00

270 lines
7.7 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"log/slog"
"time"
"crussell/clock"
"crussell/db"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/jwtauth/v5"
)
var TokenAuth *jwtauth.JWTAuth
// AuthResponse is the response structure for login/refresh endpoints.
// RefreshToken is a 90-day opaque, DB-hashed, single-use credential; the
// client stores it and presents it (Bearer) to POST /api/refresh-token in
// exchange for a fresh access token + a rotated refresh token. It is returned
// in JSON so the SPA can persist it — omitting it would make the refresh flow
// unusable — but it is never logged and never returned by any other endpoint.
type AuthResponse struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
JTI string `json:"jti"`
RefreshToken string `json:"refreshToken,omitempty"`
}
// generateJTI generates a UUID v4 string using crypto/rand
func generateJTI() (string, error) {
b := make([]byte, 16)
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate JTI: %w", err)
}
b[6] = (b[6] & 0x0f) | 0x40
b[8] = (b[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80
return fmt.Sprintf("%08x-%04x-%04x-%04x-%012x",
b[0:4], b[4:6], b[6:8], b[8:10], b[10:16]), nil
}
// RevokeJTI adds a JTI to the revoked set in PostgreSQL.
// Returns an error if the operation fails.
func RevokeJTI(ctx context.Context, jti string, expiresAt time.Time) error {
if db.Conn == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("revoke JTI: db.Conn is nil")
}
tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("revoke JTI: begin transaction: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if err := tx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
}
}()
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx,
`INSERT INTO revoked_jtis (jti, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2)
ON CONFLICT (jti) DO NOTHING`,
jti, expiresAt)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("revoke JTI %s: %w", jti, err)
}
if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("revoke JTI: commit transaction: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// IsJTIRevoked checks if a JTI is in the revoked set via PostgreSQL.
// Returns false if the DB is not initialized (unit tests, startup) — treating
// the token as valid is the safer default for availability over security during
// startup, and revoked checks are quickly re-evaluated on each request.
func IsJTIRevoked(ctx context.Context, jti string) bool {
if db.Conn == nil {
return false
}
var exists bool
err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM revoked_jtis WHERE jti = $1 AND expires_at > NOW())`,
jti).Scan(&exists)
if err != nil {
return false
}
return exists
}
// CleanupRevokedJTIs removes expired entries from PostgreSQL and returns the count of deleted rows.
func CleanupRevokedJTIs(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
if db.Conn == nil {
return 0, nil
}
tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("WARN: Failed to begin transaction for JTI cleanup: %v", err)
return 0, err
}
defer func() {
if err := tx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
}
}()
tag, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
`DELETE FROM revoked_jtis WHERE expires_at < NOW()`)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("WARN: Failed to cleanup revoked JTIs: %v", err)
return 0, err
}
if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
log.Printf("WARN: Failed to commit transaction for JTI cleanup: %v", err)
return 0, err
}
return int(tag.RowsAffected()), nil
}
func InitJWT(secret string) {
TokenAuth = jwtauth.New("HS256", []byte(secret), nil)
}
// GenerateToken creates a JWT with user_id, role, and a unique jti claim
// Returns the token string, the JTI, and any error
func GenerateToken(userID string, role string) (string, string, error) {
jti, err := generateJTI()
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
_, tokenString, err := TokenAuth.Encode(map[string]any{
"user_id": userID,
"role": role,
"jti": jti,
"exp": clock.Now().Add(1 * time.Hour).Unix(), // 1 hour
})
return tokenString, jti, err
}
// VerifyToken validates JWT and returns user_id, role, and jti
func VerifyToken(tokenString string, ctx context.Context) (userID string, role string, jti string, err error) {
token, err := jwtauth.VerifyToken(TokenAuth, tokenString)
if err != nil {
return "", "", "", err
}
var uidVal any
if err := token.Get("user_id", &uidVal); err != nil {
return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("invalid user_id claim")
}
userID, ok := uidVal.(string)
if !ok {
return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("invalid user_id claim")
}
var roleVal any
if err := token.Get("role", &roleVal); err != nil {
return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("invalid role claim")
}
role, ok = roleVal.(string)
if !ok {
return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("invalid role claim")
}
var jtiVal any
if err := token.Get("jti", &jtiVal); err != nil {
return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("invalid jti claim")
}
jti, ok = jtiVal.(string)
if !ok || jti == "" {
return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("invalid jti claim")
}
if IsJTIRevoked(ctx, jti) {
return "", "", "", fmt.Errorf("token revoked")
}
return userID, role, jti, nil
}
// generateRefreshTokenString creates a cryptographically random opaque refresh token
func generateRefreshTokenString() (string, error) {
b := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate refresh token: %w", err)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%x", b), nil
}
// GenerateRefreshToken creates a refresh token stored in the database
// Returns the opaque token string to return to the client
func GenerateRefreshToken(ctx context.Context, userID string, role string) (string, error) {
token, err := generateRefreshTokenString()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Store hashed version in DB with 90-day expiry
query := `
INSERT INTO refresh_tokens (user_id, token_hash, role, expires_at)
VALUES ($1, encode(sha256($2::bytea), 'hex'), $3, NOW() + INTERVAL '90 days')
RETURNING id`
tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to begin transaction: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if err := tx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
}
}()
var tokenID int64
err = tx.QueryRow(ctx, query, userID, token, role).Scan(&tokenID)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to store refresh token: %w", err)
}
if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to commit transaction: %w", err)
}
return token, nil
}
// VerifyRefreshToken checks a refresh token and returns user details if valid
// The token is consumed (deleted) upon successful verification, implementing rotation.
func VerifyRefreshToken(ctx context.Context, tokenString string) (userID string, role string, err error) {
query := `
DELETE FROM refresh_tokens
WHERE token_hash = encode(sha256($1::bytea), 'hex')
AND expires_at > NOW()
AND NOT revoked
RETURNING user_id, role`
tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to begin transaction: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if err := tx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
}
}()
err = tx.QueryRow(ctx, query, tokenString).Scan(&userID, &role)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("invalid or expired refresh token")
}
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to verify refresh token: %w", err)
}
if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("failed to commit transaction: %w", err)
}
// Token was consumed (DELETE returned it) — this is rotation
// If a token is used twice, the second DELETE returns no rows = invalid
return userID, role, nil
}