fix: loop-B adversarial findings — tip-type double-charge, tip-refund capacity, loyalty stamp farming, gate ordering, auth amplification, admin audit log

Loop B restart (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) fixes:
- CRITICAL: CreateTerminalPayment rejects payment_type='tip' (mirrors CreateBookingPayment) — a tip-typed admin charge no longer records the FULL amount as a tip and double-collects (all is-paid computations exclude tip rows)
- HIGH: tip refunds can no longer re-open booking capacity — refunded_total subqueries filter payment_type <> 'tip' (service.go) and RefundPayment rejects tip rows
- MEDIUM: loyalty-stamp farming closed — stamp award once-per-booking via loyalty_stamp_awarded_at column (init-script.sql) + existing same-day guard
- MEDIUM: CreateTipPayment/CreateBookingPayment 2FA gates moved AFTER the idempotency completed-dedup (code consumed only on new money paths; terminal path already correct) — lost-response retries return the completed payment instead of 400
- MEDIUM: replayRescueLowerBoundSkew widened to 5m (DB-clock-skew stranded originals now rescued)
- MEDIUM-1: verifyFamilyAlive DB amplification reduced via 30s bounded family-alive cache; admin route group rate-limited
- MEDIUM-3: admin saved-card charges now write admin_audit_log (handlers.go helper + till); [2FA] log line decoupled from user identity
- LOW-1: logout scoped to the presented token's family (no cross-session kill)
- LOW-2: refresh-reuse grace widened for same-IP replays
- LOW-4: squareEnvironmentMismatch enforced for empty env
- LOW-5: uuid.ts hard-fails on Math.random fallback (crypto.randomUUID)
- Cash/giftcard tip-enabled overflow mirrors the card-terminal carve

26/26 backend packages; 72/72 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
parent 03d85c6d13
commit 7c424b28b8
23 changed files with 1151 additions and 225 deletions
+41 -8
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
"crussell/db"
"crussell/internal/square"
"crussell/internal/twofa"
"crussell/internal/validators"
"crussell/mw"
@@ -888,6 +889,11 @@ func CreateTillSale(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
}
// cardUserID is the owner of the charged saved card (till sales are not
// user-scoped). Resolved in the saved_card case below; hoisted here because
// the post-charge 2FA consumption + audit after the Square call need it.
var cardUserID sql.NullString
switch req.PaymentMethod {
case "cash":
saleStatus = "completed"
@@ -909,13 +915,14 @@ func CreateTillSale(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// The till path is not user-scoped, so fetch the card's owner along with
// the charge details — the owner is needed to lazily provision a Square
// customer if the row predates P14 (R6).
var cardUserID sql.NullString
// customer if the row predates P14 (R6). cardUserID is declared at
// function scope (before the switch) because the post-charge 2FA
// consumption + audit need it after the Square call.
err = tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
SELECT user_id, COALESCE(square_card_id, ''), COALESCE(square_customer_id, '')
FROM user_saved_cards
WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
`, *req.UserSavedCardID).Scan(&cardUserID, &savedCardSqCardID, &savedCardCustomerID)
SELECT user_id, COALESCE(square_card_id, ''), COALESCE(square_customer_id, '')
FROM user_saved_cards
WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
`, *req.UserSavedCardID).Scan(&cardUserID, &savedCardSqCardID, &savedCardCustomerID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to get saved card details: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "Card not found", http.StatusNotFound)
@@ -947,8 +954,12 @@ func CreateTillSale(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
// 2FA gating (C5): charging a customer's saved card requires 2FA when
// the feature is enforced.
if cardUserID.Valid && !requireTwoFactorForCardAccess(w, r, service, cardUserID.String, req.VerificationCode) {
// the feature is enforced. consume=false (MEDIUM-2): the code is
// verified here but only NULLed once the charge reaches its terminal
// success state below (ConsumePendingCode), so a failed/ambiguous
// Square charge does NOT burn the operator-relayed code and a same-key
// retry can re-verify the SAME code.
if cardUserID.Valid && !requireTwoFactorForCardAccess(w, r, service, cardUserID.String, req.VerificationCode, false) {
return
}
@@ -1274,6 +1285,28 @@ func CreateTillSale(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
// MEDIUM-2: a saved-card till charge reached its terminal SUCCESS state
// — consume the verified 2FA code now (the gate verified without
// consuming, so a failed/ambiguous charge did not burn the code and a
// same-key retry could reuse it). Best-effort after the completion
// write: a consume failure cannot undo the completed sale, it only
// leaves the code valid until its 10-minute expiry.
if req.PaymentMethod == "saved_card" && cardUserID.Valid {
if consErr := twofa.ConsumePendingCode(ctx, db.Conn, cardUserID.String); consErr != nil {
log.Printf("CRITICAL: Square payment %s succeeded but consuming the 2FA code for user %s failed: %v — MANUAL RECONCILIATION REQUIRED", paymentResult.SquarePayID, cardUserID.String, consErr)
}
// MEDIUM-3a: record the admin-initiated saved-card till charge in
// admin_audit_log (mirroring giftcards.go's balance_check audit).
insertAdminAuditCharge(ctx, adminID, cardUserID.String, "till_saved_card_charge", map[string]any{
"till_sale_id": tillSaleID,
"item_type": req.ItemType,
"gift_card_id": giftCardID,
"amount": req.Amount,
"card_last4": paymentResult.CardLast4,
"square_payment_id": paymentResult.SquarePayID,
})
}
saleStatus = "completed"
}