Sixth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security,
context-mining). QA FAILED the deposit-required new-card flow; the P0 root
cause was backend + frontend, now fixed. All 20 packages green.
P0 money-safety:
- Deposit-required bookings now actually charge the deposit on new-card
payment. Two-part fix: (1) CreateBookingHandler re-reads the
trigger-maintained total_amount/total_duration_minutes from the DB after the
booking_services insert (the INSERT..RETURNING row predates the recalc
trigger, so TotalAmount serialized as 0 and DepositPaid computed TRUE on an
unpaid booking — the frontend gate trusted deposit_paid:true, never charged,
and confirmed the booking with zero payment rows); (2) BookingFlow.svelte
gates the confirmation view on depositPaid and guards against re-creating a
booking on retry. Regression test
TestBookings_Create_DepositPaidFalseOnUnpaidBooking.
Payments (idempotency + money):
- deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey: no-client-key fallback now advances a
sequence for repeatable types (partial) and rotates past refunded completed
rows, so refund-then-repay and equal-amount partials diverge onto distinct
keys; an un-refunded completed row keeps its key (double-charge protection
holds). Dedup hits on refunded rows now 409, never stale success.
- chargeFailureStatus default is 503 (ambiguous), never 402; table test.
- Flaky TestBookingPayment_FullPayment_SplitsIntoDepositAndBalance fixed
(ORDER BY payment_type).
- resolveChargeSource: orphaned card-on-file disabled via DeleteCardOnFile
when SaveCardForUser fails (best-effort, redacted log); retry path preserved.
Square client:
- Dev builds HARD-FAIL (panic) on SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=production without
SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API=1; sandbox routes with a loud banner.
- Mock fault-injection FailAfterCommit (commit-then-5xx) exercises the exact
lost-response same-key retry; SimulateCardTokenUsed; 45-char idempotency-key
cap parity; SquareEnvironment/SquareLocationID shared env helpers used by
the sweep (env contract no longer comment-only).
- listRefunds truncation now errors (money-sensitive reconcile retries
instead of over-refunding); getCardsOnFile truncation loudly logged.
Webhooks + 2FA:
- square-environment header checked fail-closed (403) when configured env is
production/sandbox; dispatch DB work bounded by 30s timeout contexts.
- 2FA codes HMAC-SHA256 pepper'd (TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER) with legacy-hash
migration + upgrade-on-verify; disable-flow mint cooldown (1/min, 429) caps
the brute-force loop; in-lockout records never LRU-evicted.
Repo hygiene:
- env-docs CI gate green again (FRONTEND_ORIGIN + SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API +
TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER documented; Vite DEV built-in allowlisted).
- Dead square_deposits schema dropped; obsidian/README/legal-page drift fixed
(consumeradvice.scot signposting, CORS allowlist, p11 R3/P13, T1).
- 2FA disable residual documented; P6 email/SMS delivery and P12 sandbox
smoke test remain the pre-go-live gates.
Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (20/20 ok),
go build ./... + -tags dev, go vet clean, svelte-check 0 errors, env-docs
gate OK, live deposit-required flow re-verified end-to-end (deposit £11
charged, square_payment_id recorded).
Fifth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security,
context-mining). Code verdict: PASS across all five. The findings this round
were documentation-only — the code changes from round 4 (per-dispute chargeback
alerting, single-source clawback, 2FA lockout coherence) were verified correct.
Docs:
- Test counts corrected everywhere to the ACTUAL compiled number under
-tags test,dev: 2,137 (README, Technical Manual, Testing Architecture doc).
Prior docs claimed 2,151 / 2,133 — neither matched the compiled count, and
the raw func-Test grep (2,154) includes 17 build-tag-excluded tests.
- Technical Manual 2FA Gate: corrected the false 'fresh verification code is
generated ... when disabling' claim. The disable flow REUSES a still-valid
pending code and only mints fresh when none exists; the 'always-fresh on
disable' alternative was deliberately NOT adopted (an out-of-band [2FA]-log
code cannot be submitted within the same request that generates it). This
now matches the code and the round-4 commit's own rationale.
- Technical Manual: documented the accepted residual 2FA brute-force exposure:
a fresh-code delivery resets the shared 5-attempt counter, so an attacker
who already holds the victim's password can loop disable to obtain unlimited
fresh codes (6-digit guessing bounded only by the per-IP rate limit and
10-min TTL). Documented rather than fixed because a hard lockout would strand
a legitimate code-lost user with no email/SMS recovery (P6).
- README: corrected the -count=10 verification claim — handlers/payments and
handlers/webhooks share package-global state (Square mock ledger, in-memory
webhook dedup cache, fixed-ID test rows) that leaks across in-process
iterations, so -count>1 is unreliable there; use -count=1 for those two.
Verification: build clean, user/webhooks/payments packages green via
run-tests.sh, frontend builds, svelte-check 0 errors.
Fourth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security,
context-mining). All PASS on the money-safety core; this round closes the
remaining MAJOR/MINOR items they surfaced.
Webhooks:
- Untracked disputes now raise ONE admin notification PER distinct chargeback:
the notification id is derived deterministically from the square_dispute_id
(SHA-256 truncated into the CHAR(12) slot) so a second untracked dispute is
no longer silently suppressed by the first's dedup row. ON CONFLICT (id)
keeps same-dispute replays idempotent; the booking-scoped NOT EXISTS guard
is retained for the tracked path. Verified: distinct disputes -> distinct
rows; re-delivered dispute -> one row.
- The gift-card clawback SQL now lives in exactly ONE place:
payments.RevertGiftCardFunding (new giftcard_clawback.go). till.go and the
webhook path both call it — eliminating the byte-for-byte copy whose
divergence would be a money-loss drift trap (the same two-sources-of-truth
pattern this commit eliminated for GDPR scrubbing).
2FA:
- Applied the lockout-coherence fix from the review: when a disable request
must mint a fresh code (no valid pending one), the held attempt counter is
reset so the locked-out user can use the freshly delivered code in the SAME
request (no wasted round-trip). The reuse path keeps accumulating wrong
attempts toward the 5-attempt lockout — the two behaviors no longer
conflict. (The 'always-fresh on disable' suggestion was NOT adopted: it
would break the out-of-band [2FA]-log delivery model, since a code generated
by a request can never be submitted within that same request.)
- New test pins the shared verify/disable lockout: 5 wrong verifies 429 and
destroy the code; a stale code then 400s on disable while the freshly
delivered code succeeds in the same request.
- Startup now warns that 2FA codes travel in PLAINTEXT via the server log in
enforced mode (operator must restrict log access + relay out-of-band until
email/SMS lands).
Docs:
- Test counts updated to the current 2,154 across README + Technical Manual.
- User Manual 2FA nav corrected: the settings live on the Account page, not an
'Admin' area.
Tests: 2,154 (up from 2,151). Backend 25/26 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres auth for the test role; package
byte-identical to HEAD). Frontend builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
Second fresh-eyes review pass (7 agents: goal, security, code-quality,
context-mining, webhooks+2FA, client+mock+sweep, refunds/giftcards/handlers).
Money-safety core verified sound (identical-body replay byte-lossless, clawback
gated on definitive proof, no double-charge window). This round fixes the
issues the fresh pass surfaced:
2FA:
- Setup now DELIVERS the code via the [2FA] server log in ALL modes (was:
nothing in enforced mode -> production 2FA was an unbreakable dead-end and
saved-card charges were permanently 403). Enforced mode still withholds the
code from the API response; the log line is the fake delivery channel until
email/SMS lands (P6).
- Disabling 2FA now requires a fresh verification code when enforcement is ON
(previously ignored the code -> a password-only attacker could lift the gate).
Shares the 5-attempt lockout and timing-safe compare. Dev bypass retained.
- REQUIRE_2FA parsing normalized (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive);
startup warning extended to the empty-env/mock-client/enforced-2FA confusion.
GDPR:
- anonymize_user() SQL now scrubs two_factor_* columns + staff notes, so the
idle-account batch cleanup (CleanupIdleAccounts) is erasure-clean, not just
the user-initiated delete path.
Webhooks:
- dispute.created for an untracked Square payment now raises a
critical_payment_log admin notification (chargeback the app can't reconcile
is never silent). Reason strings truncated on rune boundaries (valid UTF-8).
Stale at-most-once comment corrected; revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding
duplication noted.
Sweep/mock parity:
- Mock CreatePayment dedup is now source-aware (IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED on
source mismatch) matching ReplayPaymentByKey and real Square.
- COMPLETED-but-never-polled terminal till-sale checkouts are now recorded by
the sweep (previously only booking checkouts were; till charges were
invisible until the 24h blind-fail WARN).
- Legacy snapshot-less minimal-body replay, SQUARE_LOCATION_ID drift, and
in-memory-mock-restart limitations documented.
Docs:
- Webhook path corrected everywhere (/webhooks/square, not /api/webhooks/square
- a deployer following the old path would 404 and silently lose all webhook
reconciliation).
- 2FA enforcement semantics + code-delivery mechanism documented accurately
(fail-closed default; log-delivery channel; disable re-verification).
- README/User Manual note the 2FA requirement on online saved-card payments.
Tests: 2,151 (up from 2,142). Backend 26/27 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres doesn't offer scram-sha-256 for the
test role; package is byte-identical to HEAD and untouched here). Frontend
builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the
review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced.
Money-safety:
- Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored
square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original
payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending
forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge).
- Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card
sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface
ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.)
- Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales
claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog.
- Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom
'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending.
- Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card.
- Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the
booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse).
- M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total].
2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments:
- Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into
all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account
admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces.
- Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit
mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env.
- Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare);
plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev).
- GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes.
Infra/docs:
- nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80
redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS;
separate webhook rate-limit zone.
- Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id +
square_request_snapshot.
- Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips
policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected.
- Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26
packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean.
Tip double-count (root cause of £33.75 vs £28.75 display):
- Remove mock's fixed +500p auto-tip when AllowTipping is true (square_dev.go) —
real Square only enables a terminal prompt, it never adds a tip to the amount
- Set AllowTipping=false in CreateTerminalPayment: the frontend already embeds
the tip in the amount, so the terminal must not prompt for a second tip
- M4 tip split now derives the tip as charged amount minus remaining booking
value ('after 100% is tips'), not from Square's TipAmount field
- Success screens divide paymentResult.amount by 100 (pence -> pounds) in both
PaymentModal and UserPaymentModal
Fully-paid bookings auto-complete:
- Extract ApplyBookingCompletionSideEffects into payments package (shared by
admin progress endpoint and payment paths; avoids circular import)
- Add bookingIsFullyPaid + completeFullyPaidBooking: when completed non-tip
payments reach 100% of the booking total, an active booking transitions to
'completed' so it leaves the admin Current Appointment view
- Wired into CreateBookingPayment (inside tx) and GetCheckoutStatus (terminal,
after commit); completion side-effects (loyalty, campaigns, deposits_required)
fire identically to the manual progress endpoint
- Add /admin/bookings/{id}/refund route (AdminRefundBooking)
Discount-refund hardening:
- RefundPayment explicitly rejects discount/on_the_house payments (was relying
on the incidental NULL-square_payment_id guard)
- Hide the Refund button for discount/on_the_house payments in EditBookingModal
- Cancel-refund estimate in BookingModal also excludes on_the_house
- Cancellation refund loop + GetBookingPaymentInfo + GetBookingRefundableAmountCents
exclude payment_type='tip' from refundable totals
Tip flow (start-time guard) fixes tests:
- Tip tests updated to use past-dated bookings (tips now require booking started)
Tests:
- m4_tip_refund_redesign_test.go (tip split, refund exclusion, admin refund cap)
- m5_fully_paid_completion_test.go (online + terminal full-payment completion,
partial stays active, tip excluded, cancelled stays cancelled)
- Full suite passes with -race (25 packages)
The project is pre-launch: there is no production database and all dev starts
from a fresh volume recreated from init-scripts/init-script.sql. The obsolete
'Database migrations' section (ALTER statements and apply-before-deploy notes
for existing deployments) is replaced with the no-ALTER policy — schema
changes are edited directly into the CREATE statements, no migration-managed
delta exists, and the diff on the next recreate IS the migration.
Staff may charge a customer's saved card at the till but cannot add or save
one. A customer picker (reusing the admin user-search pattern, excluding
admin/guest/affiliate) loads the customer's cards via
GET /admin/users/{id}/payment-methods; the 'Saved card' payment option is
hidden outright when the customer has no currently-valid cards, computed
client-side with the Square convention (valid through the end of
exp_month/exp_year). The saved-card charge sends payment_method saved_card
plus user_id/user_saved_card_id with no card_token or verification_token, and
the per-line idempotency keys also key on the selected card so switching cards
yields fresh keys. No Square Dashboard hint, no new-card form, no save
checkbox — the till can never persist a card.
The rule pushes SvelteDate (svelte/reactivity), which this codebase
deliberately removed in 55b2c8c because it caused real bugs. All Date usage is
local wall-clock computation via parseWallClockDate helpers, not reactive
$state Date mutations, and the rule has no options to allowlist Date — so
disable it outright in the svelte block with a rationale comment. Restores a
clean eslint gate for the pre-commit hook and CI.
canSaveCardsForRole(role) in square.ts is the single source of truth for the
save-card product rule (verified_email, admin — never affiliate). All four
predicate sites (account page, UserBookingModal, BookingFlow, TipPayment) were
wrong before, excluding admin and including affiliate. The worst gap was
BookingFlow passing canSaveCards={authStore.isAuthenticated} to the Pay-Early
modal, which let unverified users save cards — it now passes the derived value.
isNonceStale() + NONCE_STALENESS_MS replace the 240s staleness check duplicated
five times, keeping the amount-bound re-tokenization semantics identical.
The project is pre-launch with no production DB — all dev starts from a fresh
volume recreated from init-scripts/init-script.sql. All ALTER statements are
removed and their effects expressed directly in the CREATE statements:
name_history now lives after bookings with its booking_id FK inlined (no
ALTER TABLE ADD CONSTRAINT), the critical_payment_log enum value is in the
CREATE TYPE (no ALTER TYPE ADD VALUE), and voucher_type_at_purchase is in the
CREATE TABLE gift_cards (no ADD COLUMN).
gift_card_expired_balances.account_id is now nullable: CleanupExpiredGiftCards
inserts NULL for unredeemed gift cards (bought for non-account-holders, never
claimed) — a NOT NULL column made that expiry fail at runtime. The three tests
that papered over this with ALTER TABLE DROP NOT NULL now rely on the schema
directly.
The transaction-scoped TRY variant had no production callers — only the
conn-level try-lock (acquireAdvisoryLock) and the blocking xact variant
(acquireAdvisoryXactLockBlocking, used by the admin cancellation path) are in
use. Dropping the dead code removes a foot-gun: a try-lock that silently
fails to acquire inside a transaction would otherwise look like a safe option.
Guests (account_role='guest') have no login flow and never receive a JWT
normally, so this is defense-in-depth: any token whose role claim is 'guest'
(forged/minted guest tokens or future changes) is refused 403 before the money
handlers run. The check reads role from context ONLY — real guests are seeded
with account_type='email', so account_type is never the discriminator. A
missing role passes through (RequireAuth guarantees presence; same trust model
as isVerifiedRole).
Wired onto all user-facing money routes: booking payment, apply-redemption,
payment-lock POST/DELETE, tip, gift-card redeem and gift-card buy. Admin and
till routes (RequireAdmin) are untouched — admin can never be guest. The
payment-methods routes gain RequireVerified (verified_email, admin) alongside,
so only verified accounts can manage saved cards.
Tests: 6 middleware tests (reject guest, allow verified/unverified/admin/
affiliate/missing-role) + 4 integration tests (guest 403 on booking payment
with zero side effects, tip, gift-card buy; verified user still pays 200).
Only verified accounts (account_role in 'verified_email','admin') may save
cards. CreateBookingPayment, CreateTipPayment and BuyGiftCard now reject
save_card=true for guests, unverified accounts and affiliates with 403 BEFORE
charge-source resolution, the pending-payment insert, or any Square call —
failing closed with zero side effects. Unverified users may still pay; only
card persistence is blocked. The dedicated save endpoints are additionally
protected by mw.RequireVerified middleware on the routes (main.go).
isVerifiedRole / rejectSaveCardForUnverified mirror the existing isAdminRequest
defense-in-depth pattern. Tests cover: unverified save-card 403 with no payment
row, verified save-card succeeds, and unverified pay-without-save succeeds.
A lost-response retry carrying a fresh or absent idempotency key (an old
frontend, or a key regenerated for a changed cart) now reuses the pending
till_sale row by resolving the gift card itself and adopts the row's STORED
key — so Square dedups the retry against the original charge and the card is
never funded twice. An amount mismatch proves a genuinely different sale (same
card, new amount) and leaves the pending row untouched. 'create' actions carry
no gift-card id and continue to rely on the client-supplied key cached per
cart line in the till frontend.
The stale-pending sweep now runs two passes. Pass 1 (22h cutoff — deliberately
2h earlier than the 24h legacy cutoff) targets pending rows with a STORED
idempotency key but NO square_payment_id: the lost-response case, where the
charge may have completed at Square with the response never received. Each row
is reconciled at Square by replaying the key (ReplayPaymentByKey): a COMPLETED
charge is rescued to 'completed' with the real square_payment_id written back,
a charge Square proves never happened is failed (till-sale gift-card clawback
included), an ambiguous answer leaves the row pending for the next run. The
earlier cutoff keeps the replay inside Square's ~24h key-retention window;
replaying at exactly 24h risks an expired key misreading as 'never charged'.
Pass 2 (legacy 24h cutoff) reconciles rows WITH a square_payment_id by payment
id; rows with neither payment id nor stored key (no reconcile possible) are
failed with a WARN that the charge outcome is unknown. Late retries on all
swept rows are rejected (409), preventing a second Square charge.
ReplayPaymentByKey (POST /v2/payments re-issue with the same idempotency key
and a synthetic probe source token that can never process a real charge):
Square returns the ORIGINAL payment for a retained key and definitively
rejects an unknown/expired one, so the stale-pending sweep can rescue
lost-response charges without ever issuing a second payment. ErrReplayKeyNotRetained
marks a probe rejection as proof the charge never happened.
Refund classification: zero-amount refunds are now rejected (Square requires
amount_money) instead of lenient full-refund; REFUND_ALREADY_PENDING is
classified as already-processed to match the real contract.
Dev mock parity: SquarePayID == payment ID (was fabricated 'sqp_' prefix),
ForceCheckoutState for IN_PROGRESS/CANCEL_REQUESTED terminal states,
replay-by-key support, aligned refund error codes.
Gift-card rolling expiry (setting-driven, was dead config):
- GetGiftCardExpiryMonths(): single source of truth (business_settings
gift_card_expiry_months, fallback 24) shared by payment handlers and the
CleanupExpiredGiftCards job (was hardcoded 24).
- expiry_date now maintained on ALL 9 gift-card write sites (buy, topup,
transfer, redeem, terminal payment, refund credit, till) so the refund-time
guard at refunds.go actually fires. Schema default 12->24 + migration note;
test-DB seed aligned. Stale "expiry_date IS NULL" test rewritten; new
expired-card-rejected regression test.
Frontend SvelteDate purge (docs' stated convention, wide):
- All 180+ raw `new SvelteDate(...)` uses across routes/components replaced
with parseWallClockDate (backend UTC ISO) or new Date (wall-clock
constructors). SvelteDate imports removed. timeSlots.ts getDayWithOrdinal
fixed. Zero SvelteDate references remain; svelte-check clean.
Strict timezone/DST testing + QA fixes:
- 8 new hermetic boundary tests: clock.DST transitions (both 2026 folds),
closing-hours GMT vs BST, booking date-window midnight, refund-tier
elapsed-time independence, deposit-window UTC-instant, scheduling
LondonDateString midnight, today AT TIME ZONE window + UTC round-trip.
- today.go summary date labels fixed to London wall-clock (were showing the
previous UTC day during BST) + regression test.
- pgx ScanLocation fixed to UTC via AfterConnect (was host-local -> JSON
offsets depended on deployment TZ, contradicting the documented UTC
invariant) + regression test. Registered as a new *Type to avoid a data
race on the shared type map (caught by -race).
Admin Business Settings (setting now functional => legal floor):
- gift_card_expiry_months validation floor raised 1 -> 12 months (CMA/
Consumer Rights Act 2015 unfair-contract-term guidance) in endpoint + UI,
with rolling-expiry semantics shown in both display and edit form.
- 3 new expiry validation tests; 2 pre-existing message assertions updated.
Full suite 25/25 + race clean via run-tests.sh lockfile; svelte-check 0
errors/warnings; production build succeeds.
Money-safety idempotency hardening (I1, wide):
- validate:"max=45" on CreateTerminalPayment/BookingPayment/Refund/Tip/
BuyGiftCard idempotency keys (all feed Square's 45-char /v2/payments,
/v2/refunds, /v2/cards caps); BuyGiftCard corrected from a wrongly-loose
max=64. Till keeps max=64 (its key also feeds the 64-char terminal-checkout
endpoint).
- Explicit 45-char guard in RefundPayment: the one handler that decodes
RefundRequest without running the struct validator, so the tag alone was
inert; a longer key would 400 at Square and be misclassified as a
definitive refund decline.
- New TestIdempotencyKey_OverLength_RejectedAcrossPaymentHandlers covers all
six endpoints (terminal saved-card, booking, tip, gift-card, till, refund).
Stable-sentinel card identity in idempotency keys (C1, wide):
- BookingFlow deposit key now uses the 'new-card' sentinel instead of
embedding the cnon: nonce (matches UserPaymentModal/account). A re-tokenize
after a spent nonce no longer regenerates the key, closing a lost-response
double-charge window.
- TipPayment + UserBookingModal tip keys now include card identity
(selectedCardId || 'new-card'); previously keyed on amount only, so a
same-amount tip on a DIFFERENT card reused the key and deduped a distinct
charge. Resets cleared in every success/close path.
Test isolation (R1): TestRefund_PendingResume_NewKeyAfterModalReopen no
longer t.Parallel — it swaps the package-level SquareClient mid-test and a
concurrent parallel test could observe the swapped instance.
Naming/quality (M1/M2/M4): resolveChargeSource local renamed savedRowID (was
shadowing the cardID *string parameter); BuyGiftCard fallback prefix
"till-" -> "gc-"; saved-card terminal response key "checkout_id" -> "payment_id"
(it holds a DB payment row, not a Square checkout) with matching frontend
fallback. README maintenance-job count corrected 24 -> 25.
Full suite 25/25 + race clean via run-tests.sh lockfile; svelte-check 0
errors/warnings; production build succeeds.
A soft-deleted card row (DeletePaymentMethod sets deleted_at) still occupies
the non-partial UNIQUE (user_id, square_card_id) slot. Re-saving the same
physical card via a save_card=true charge hit ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING, got
pgx.ErrNoRows, and the deleted_at IS NULL fallback SELECT also missed the
row → 500. DO UPDATE now revives it (deleted_at/retained_until = NULL),
matching CreatePaymentMethodFromToken's revival semantics; the ErrNoRows
fallback is removed. Regression test: soft-delete then re-save same card id
→ existing row returned, deleted_at cleared.
Money-safety idempotency fixes (external review bugs 1-3):
- processChargeGroup: aggregated refund key now hashes the sorted pending-row
set (chargeID-square-agg-<sha256 suffix>) so a changed group can never mark
a new row completed against an old smaller refund; >45-char chargeIDs use a
hashed prefix instead of verbatim truncation (which would collide charges on
Square's global key dedup). Same-set crash-retry keeps Square's dedup.
- CreateTerminalPayment saved_card: two-tier idempotency key — client-supplied
per-attempt UUID preferred (distinct identical charges no longer collapse),
deterministic booking+type+amount+card fallback for no-key retry safety.
PaymentModal sends a per-charge UUID cleared after success.
- ensureRefundKey: legacy NULL-key manual refunds persist a generated key to
the row BEFORE the Square call (race-safe AND idempotency_key IS NULL guard),
so a lost-response retry reuses the key and never double-refunds. Wired into
resumeManualPendingRefund and the sweep's manual-retry loop.
Classification + money-safety hardening:
- till.go/sweep.go: structured square.ErrorCode/IsNotFound are authoritative
when present; message-substring matching only for non-structured errors
(dev mock, client-side status errors). Fixes fragile string-matching driving
sweep retries and gift-card clawbacks.
- SaveCardForUser: ON CONFLICT (user_id, square_card_id) DO NOTHING + re-select
(was a latent UNIQUE-violation 500 on save-card retry).
- CreateBookingPayment: partial payments re-validated against remaining balance
inside the advisory lock (closes concurrent-overpayment race).
- InvalidateSquareCustomerCache on GDPR erasure paths (account.go,
time-blockers.go stale-guest anonymization).
- GetUserGiftCardBalanceAdmin: in-handler admin check (defense-in-depth).
- getCheckoutHTTP: warn on multi-payment checkouts instead of dropping
payments[1:].
- Cash/giftcard terminal branch: removed dead idempotency SELECT, "tip-" ->
"till-" prefix.
- UserPaymentModal: removed vestigial polling state; proper interval cleanup.
- account/+page.svelte: gift-card redeem dialog links /terms.
- nginx CSP: allow *.squarecdn.com and js.squareup.com so the Square Web
Payments SDK + card iframe can tokenize behind the proxy.
Tests: +8 regression tests covering changed-set refund keys, legacy NULL-key
single-refund, saved-card client-key dedup/no-dedup, concurrent partials, and
cache invalidation. Full suite + race detector clean via run-tests.sh lockfile.
Re-review (2 Oracle + security + QA + librarian + context-miner) surfaced fixes, all applied: (1) UserPaymentModal and the account-page gift-card buy now key the cached idempotency key on a stable 'new-card' sentinel instead of the cnon: nonce, so clearing the nonce on a failed charge no longer regenerates the key — a lost-response retry now dedups at Square instead of double-charging (the tip flows already keyed on amount only). (2) The create-with-redeem clawback now logs CRITICAL when the guarded balance reversal is blocked (previously silent), and its transaction DELETE is scoped to this sale instead of deleting every transaction on the card. (3) reconcileStalePaymentAtSquare now treats APPROVED/PENDING as non-terminal (leave pending) instead of definitively failed, matching Square's documented state machine. (4) GetTillCheckoutStatus returns 404 for a sale already swept to failed instead of reporting a live state. (5) The critical-payment scan job skips candidates whose booking was hard-deleted, so one orphan can no longer silence all critical alerts.
Adds critical_payment_log to the admin_notification_reason enum (fresh installs + ALTER TYPE for existing deploys); corrects the README's false cash-with-change claim; updates Gap Backlog T14 with the scan job stopgap; documents the till flow's clawback/cash-reconciliation model in the Technical Manual; records the frontend's re-tokenize-on-failure design in P11; and marks the P14 customer_id assumption VERIFIED (Square runtime enforces it per its SDK maintainer; only the OpenAPI schema stays ambiguous, so the P12 sandbox test remains the definitive live check).
A cnon: nonce and its SCA verification token are consumed by a definitive charge failure (e.g. declined card) and can never succeed again, but TipPayment, UserBookingModal, UserPaymentModal and the account-page Buy-a-Gift-Card cached them and resubmitted the dead nonce on every retry — a non-retryable failure loop. The nonce/verification-token/amount/timestamp cache is now cleared in each error branch so retries re-tokenize fresh, while the idempotency key is kept for network-timeout dedup.
Adds the scan-critical-payment-logs job (daily 2:45am) that surfaces stale pending payments/till-sales and refunds at the retry cap as admin_notifications with reason='critical_payment_log' — the app has no log/alert pipeline (Gap Backlog T14), so money events that would otherwise sit in un-watched CRITICAL log lines now reach the owner's in-app notification centre. Dedup is NULL-safe (IS NOT DISTINCT FROM) and re-surfaces acknowledged-but-still-unresolved rows. Stopgap until a real alerting pipeline lands.
Square rejects POST /v2/cards without card.customer_id at runtime (confirmed by Square's SDK maintainer); the production client omits an empty id via omitempty and every caller provisions a customer first, so the mock now enforces the same structured 400 INVALID_REQUEST_ERROR to keep sandbox/dev parity with the gate the production code depends on.
HIGH-1: a till sale whose card-machine checkout is provably dead, or whose Square reconcile proves the charge never landed, now claws back the funded gift card atomically with the failed mark (claim-first gating UPDATE serializes against the admin retry; blind-fail and ambiguous/lost-response rows never claw back, and a bare CANCEL_REQUESTED is not treated as proof of non-completion). HIGH-2: a card-machine checkout created at Square but not committed is cancelled on any pre-commit failure. HIGH-3: a cash/on_the_house retry of a pending card sale is reconciled at Square first (COMPLETED rescues + refuses cash; NOT_FOUND/FAILED/CANCELED allows cash; lost-response forces the card-method retry; ambiguous rejects). GetTillCheckoutStatus no longer resurrects a swept-failed sale, and the cash-completion UPDATE checks RowsAffected so the admin is never told to take cash against an already-resolved sale. 23 new tests covering the clawback matrix, the reconcile-or-reject matrix, cancel-on-error, and a till concurrency test.
TransferGiftCard locked source-then-destination in caller-chosen order, so concurrent cross-transfers (A→B and B→A) acquired row locks in opposite orders and deadlocked (SQLSTATE 40P01), aborting one transfer with a generic 500. Both rows are now locked in lexicographically sorted ID order (case-insensitive, matching the 12-hex mixed-case card codes), with the scanned values mapped back to source/destination roles afterward. Adds a deterministic concurrency regression test that holds both row locks on dedicated connections to force the AB-BA cycle, proving the old code deadlocks and the new code serializes cleanly.
README test count corrected to 1,934 (4 skipped) with the square_webhook_events migration entry; Technical Manual fixed to match the bounded try-lock, terminal flow, till idempotency, and refund sweep behaviour, and records the RespondError de-scope for the payments package; Feature Catalog and P11 plan corrected to match the actual UserBookingModal/CardSelection wiring.
A load that resolved the script tag but failed to expose window.Square (or timed out) permanently cached a rejected promise, bricking card entry until reload. sdkPromise now resets and the injected script element is removed on every failure path so later calls retry fresh.
square_webhook_events is now CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS, registered as the 24th maintenance job (sweep-square-webhook-events, daily 2:30am) pruning rows older than 90 days, and testdb gives a clear docker compose hint when the admin DB connection fails.
The in-memory dedup is now only a fast path; the square_webhook_events INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING is the source of truth, so replays across restarts and after FIFO eviction are skipped. A DB failure fails closed with 503 so Square retries. Empty event_ids are rejected with 400 (no dispatch, no dedup row). Ordering trade-off (insert-before-dispatch) documented for when handlers mutate state.
golang.org/x/text/cases.Caser is not safe for concurrent use, but UpdateProfileHandler shared one package-level instance. A fresh caser is now created per call via titleCase().
Account deletion now snapshots card and customer IDs before the local anonymize transaction and dispatches the Square cleanup goroutine only after the tx commits, deleting each distinct Square customer once and skipping any customer still referenced by another user's card. AnonymizeStaleGuestAccounts also disables cards and deletes the guest's Square customer profile (PII) before NULLing references locally. Token redaction applied to all error logs.
Till sales and gift-card purchases now use uniqueChargeKey and resolveChargeSource/chargeFailureStatus instead of duplicated inline logic. The saved-card delete path logs the square_card_id through square.TokenPrefix so full ccof references never reach logs.
Downgrades routine sweep bookkeeping from CRITICAL to WARN (genuine post-charge manual-reconciliation branches keep CRITICAL) and replaces the per-attempt time.After in tryAdvisoryLock with a single reusable timer.
Extracts resolveChargeSource (new-card vs saved-card vs one-off nonce, with Square customer provisioning) and shared advisory-lock + post-charge recheck helpers into charge_helpers.go. Adds errors.go with chargeFailureStatus: transport/5xx/context and 429/408/425 map to 503 (retryable), structured 4xx declines map to 402, used across all four charge paths. Also fixes the no-client-key refund fallback to append a crypto/rand suffix (distinct same-amount partial refunds no longer collide) and adds refundResumeKey so legacy NULL idempotency_key rows resume with a derived key instead of an empty one.
Adds SquareClient.DeleteCustomer for GDPR erasure (DELETE /v2/customers/{id}, NOT_FOUND as no-op), bounds doJSON response reads to 1 MiB with rune-safe 500-byte error snippets, adds validCardID guard to the disable-card URL, makes paymentFromSquare card fields consistent when the card ID is empty, redacts ccof/cnon tokens in all log paths, and fixes the idempotency-key-length comment (45 chars for payments/refunds/cards, 64 only for terminal checkouts).
Refresh README and obsidian docs to the post-review state: 1,902 tests passed (4 skipped), 23 jobs / three sweeps, nonce-direct one-off charges, save-only card-on-file, GDPR square-reference scrubbing, /terms and /privacy-policy routes, webhook fail-closed wording. Mark Email, S3/R2, Mettle/FreeAgent accounting, and user notification delivery as planned upcoming bodies of work (including new backlog item P15) so references no longer read as dead features.
compose.yml backend service now reads the root ./.env (which README instructs users to create) instead of the nonexistent backend/.env. Promote R2_ACCESS_KEY/R2_SECRET_KEY/R2_BUCKET/R2_PUBLIC_URL to active vars (prod S3 reads all four via getEnv) and document the webhook URL/signature-key exact-match requirement with fail-closed (503/403) wording.
Fix the P0 infinite refetch in BookingFlow (payment-methods fetched once via a guard flag, was looping on empty saved-card arrays and DoS-ing the rate limiter). Extract the shared TipPayment component so tip and pay-tip routes no longer drift; reconcile formatTimeRange override_duration_minutes and subtotal/tipsPaid. CardBrandIcon gains the correct Square enum keys (DISCOVER_DINERS, CHINA_UNIONPAY). PaymentModal reads card_last4. Login links resolve to the new /terms and /privacy-policy routes. Add frontend/.env.example.
Close the coverage-gap round: terminal CreateCheckout-failure marks the provisional row failed, GetCheckoutStatus reference_id mismatch 400, deadline wire shape, concurrent loyalty redemption 409, delete_guest_user + stale-guest saved-card scrubbing, ValidateAmount and isTokenLike direct units, bounded try-lock timeout, buildSplitRecords tip-overflow, and concurrent same-key dedup for gift card / booking / tip / checkout.
anonymize_user, delete_guest_user, and AnonymizeStaleGuestAccounts now NULL square_card_id and square_customer_id on user_saved_cards (7-year retained_until soft-delete kept for financial records). Make square_card_id nullable in the schema. GDPR export refunds join fixed to include gift-card-purchase refunds. Add scrub assertions to the GDPR and stale-guest test suites.
payment.updated/refund.updated handlers log only the Square object id and payload length instead of the raw JSON body (which contained buyer email, card brand/last4, cardholder name). Add a test asserting no raw payload reaches the log.
BuyGiftCard and till online_square charge the cnon: nonce directly (no synthetic card-on-file); BuyGiftCard.IdempotencyKey is now validate-required (empty key previously collided on the UNIQUE constraint). Saved-card branches forward customer_id and lazily provision legacy cards. lockCancellationPayments uses the deliberately-blocking xact lock so a cancellation never silently drops a refund under contention (admins see the full manual refund round-trip).
One-off new-card charges now pass the cnon: nonce directly as source_id (no card-on-file, no customer). Save-card charges forward customer_id; legacy saved cards lazily provision a Square customer before charging (EnsureSquareCustomerForSavedCard). Terminal checkouts insert the terminal_checkouts row FIRST with a provisional tmp- id, then update with the real checkout_id, closing the crash window. GetDiscountPreviewHandler gains the fail-closed ownership check (IDOR). DeletePaymentMethod disables the card at Square before soft-delete. Sweep resolves provisional/tmp- terminal rows without a Square round-trip. GetCheckoutStatus rejects tmp- ids.
Introduce acquireAdvisoryLock (pg_try_advisory_lock with a ~3s bounded retry) and acquireAdvisoryXactLockBlocking (deliberately blocking for the cancellation-refund path where silently dropping a refund is worse than waiting). Convert ApplyLoyaltyRedemption to the bounded variant: concurrent redemptions during an in-flight payment return 409 instead of pinning a pool connection. Add uncontended + contended-timeout unit tests and a lock-contended 409 redemption test.
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