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Author SHA1 Message Date
popertots fe88f2084d fix: review-loop B — adversarial findings (sweep auto-refund, admin clamp, 2FA real challenge, opaque refresh tokens, gated client IP, GBP pence) 
Loop B aggressive adversarial round (3 attack agents) + fix + secondary + verification:
- CRITICAL: sweep replay auto-refunds provably-created-later duplicate charges (gated on parseable CreatedAt); 22h legitimate-retry window == 22h sweep cutoff (no dead zone)
- HIGH: admin Take Payment clamps to remaining obligation (cash/giftcard/saved-card/terminal); no unintended tip from overflow; campaign credit against remaining
- HIGH: /api/services/eligible-for/{id} requires auth + owner-or-admin (DOB/age + patch-test health-data leak closed)
- HIGH: opaque refresh-token rotation (login/refresh return {token, jti, refreshToken}; refresh REQUIRES opaque token; single-use rotation; logout revokes; access token rejected at refresh)
- HIGH: saved-card charges require a REAL 2FA verification code (B6/B10) — backend gate on all 8 charge paths + shared TwoFactorCodeInput frontend component on all 7 surfaces; 2FA gate is no longer setup-flag-only
- MEDIUM: ungated CF-Connecting-IP in reserve/admin_reserve gated via exported mw.ClientIP; 2FA limiter keyed on userID alone (no header-rotation bypass); ChangePassword actually revokes JTI + refresh tokens; 2FA setup mint cooldown + persistent failed-attempt counter; campaign redemption race surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- Terminal saved-card VAT applied (was under-collected); age-guard reconcile failures notify; isWeakJWTSecret entropy gate; gift-card redeem per-card counter + per-user limiter; webhook signature key startup validation
- NEW internal/twofa package (single source of truth breaking the payments<->user import cycle); consolidation of duplicate 2FA hash/verify
- Frontend: refresh-token storage + rotation, TwoFactorCodeInput component, amountPaidPence in admin modal, B5/B6/B10 contract wiring; 70 frontend tests
- Tests: loop_b_fixes_test.go, internal/twofa tests, updated auth/services/profile/twofa/mw tests

All 26 backend packages pass (incl. internal/twofa); frontend 70/70 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots faceb9809c fix: review-loop A — discount credit on admin payments, campaign over-credit cap, sweep replay window, dedup refund revalidation, duplication/modularisation, GBP pence naming 
Round-A fresh review (6 agents) + fix + secondary cross-cutting + verification rounds:
- F1: campaign discounts reduce the charged amount (deposit credit + admin PaymentModal discounted total); capDiscountToRemainingObligation prevents over-credit at completion in all four campaign blocks
- F2: sweep replay rescue distinguishes legitimate same-key retries (21h window) from expired-key new charges; ccof blind-fails leave pending + CRITICAL instead of clawing back
- F3: post-start online overflow carved as a tip record (mirrors terminal split builder)
- A1: single-source Square decline-code classification (till delegates to square.IsDefinitivePaymentError)
- A2/A5: refund attempt-cap literals consolidated; refund-failure counter capped + reset on terminal resolutions + admin notifications
- A3/A9: idempotency helpers adopted across derivations; IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv relocated + all gates unified (incl. health-check)
- A7: 2FA user+IP limiter + TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS startup warning; SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY startup validation; TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER docs corrected
- A8: snapshot encryption on all 6 write sites + marker-aware reuse paths; MPV->SPV effective voucher type (single VAT point)
- A10/A11/A12/A16: gift-card slot scan advances past failed; amount-aware refund reconciliation; completed-booking refund re-check; PaymentWasRefunded on SquareClient interface
- Dedup refund revalidation on tip/terminal/gift-card paths; sweep acknowledged_at IS NULL parity; refund-notification single source (exported payments.InsertRefundFailedNotifications)
- Duplication/modularisation round: shared frontend helpers (sanitizeDecimalInput, campaignDiscountCents, twoFactorBlocksSavedCards getter, generateUUID), single-source MaxIdempotencyKeyLength, notification-helper consolidation, snapshot-guard comments
- Cross-cutting GBP rename: Cents->Pence across backend + frontend + tests (26 identifiers, 16 files)
- Tests: 11 behavior-change tests updated to new invariants; coverage for fixed functions; frontend vitest 55 tests; docs corrected (test counts, 2FA delivery, pre-launch checklist, resolution status)
- gitleaks: allowlist backend/internal/square test fixtures (mock idempotency keys)

All 25 backend packages pass; frontend 55/55 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 6d82535780 fix: adversarial review round — replay-rescue double-charge, discount credit, 2FA/per-IP limits, snapshot encryption, refund reconciliation, VAT, frontend parity, tests+docs 
Addresses the adversarial fresh-eyes audit (findings A1-A20) plus review-round fixes:
- CRITICAL A1: replay-by-key rescue cross-checks replayed CreatedAt; ccof blind-fail leaves pending with CRITICAL + notification instead of clawing back
- A2/A3/A4: till idempotency key restored to unconditional hash; tip rejected in CreateBookingPayment; campaign discount now reduces the charged amount (deposit credit)
- A5: admin notifications on blind-fail, manual-refund re-arm, cap-stranded charge-group, webhook FAILED/REJECTED refunds
- A6/A10: BuyGiftCard idempotency user-scoped; gift-card slot scan advances past failed rows
- A7/A14/A15: 2FA user+IP limiter, SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY startup validation, accurate pepper/log-delivery docs
- A8/A9: snapshot encryption on all write+reuse sites; MPV->SPV effective voucher type (single VAT point)
- A11/A12/A13/A16: amount-aware refund reconciliation; completed-booking refund re-validation; till retry dedup; PaymentWasRefunded on SquareClient interface
- A17/A18/A19/A20: CI runs npm test; confirm_overflow_tip frontend dialog; unknown-event admin notification; mock token redaction
- M7 ConfirmOverflowTip, M9 snapshot encryption, C1 discount ordering regression test
- Frontend vitest framework (41 tests), backend coverage for fixed functions, docs corrected (2,269 tests, SUPPORT_EMAIL tokens, resolution status)

All 25 backend packages pass; frontend 41/41; build + env-docs green.
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 78e6d00dc5 fix: payments review rounds — money-safety, GDPR, security, gift-card cancel, modal stacking 
Money-safety:
- Deterministic till idempotency fallback (Square-charging only); cash/on_the_house keep unique keys; £250 till gift-card cap; 45-char key validation
- Gift-card admin caps £250/tx + £5,000/day; user buy £500/day; BuyGiftCard allowlist unchanged
- CancelGiftCard: CCR 2013 14-day right with partial-spend refund of the unspent balance (spend verified via payments.gift_card_id); atomic vs redeem/transfer; refunds stay pending until reversal commits; admin cancel surface (AdminCancelGiftCard)
- Sweep: cancelled-booking charges failed+notified instead of silently completed; source-override replay uses live square_source_id; legacy square-less refund sweep; snapshot refresh on pending reuse
- Refund lock consolidation; recordTerminalPaymentTx shared recorder; structured Square error codes; terminal checkout CustomerID

GDPR / security:
- Notes retained as de-identified medical/safety record at erasure (single field treated as health data; rest of record wiped, no re-identification map) + comments updated per UK GDPR/Art 9/Equality Act 2010
- square_request_snapshot PII scrubbed on all erasure paths; delete_guest_user FK unlinks; verification codes + dispute reasons handled; idle/stale-guest erasure deletes Square cards/customers + CardDAV/R2
- Durable square-erasure outbox job (retry-square-erasures); 2FA dev/prod build split, pepper fail-closed, no prod code-in-log; prod 2FA delivery fail-loud without a channel
- Webhook unknown-type family split (non-money acked, money retried); untracked dispute notifications; rate-limit CF/X-Real-IP trust gating; nginx CSP nonce + api_limit

Frontend:
- Dynamic z-index stack (ui/dialog/zindex.ts) claimed in open order via data-state observer; re-claims on every reopen; removes stale !z-* overrides — nested modals (booking→user→booking) always paint newest-on-top (browser-verified 3-level + reopen)
- Mobile: iOS zoom fixes, bottom-sheet dialogs, 44px touch targets, inputmode decimal, dvh
- Gift-card buy/cancel UI, admin £250 + daily limits, cancellation/privacy/terms policy accuracy

S3:
- Connect() creates buckets before probing; in-memory fallback only on genuine unreachability; health reports degraded; stale S3_PUBLIC_URL documented (host-specific)

Tests/docs:
- 2263 test functions; all 22 backend packages green; round8/9/10 regression suites; NextEditWindowTime removes wall-clock flake; docs reconciled (notes retention, gift-card partial-use, modal T15 future work)
 2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 67cf5b9a45 fix: review round 6 — P0 deposit charge, idempotency rotation, dev-safety guard, 2FA/webhook hardening 
Sixth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security,
context-mining). QA FAILED the deposit-required new-card flow; the P0 root
cause was backend + frontend, now fixed. All 20 packages green.

P0 money-safety:
- Deposit-required bookings now actually charge the deposit on new-card
  payment. Two-part fix: (1) CreateBookingHandler re-reads the
  trigger-maintained total_amount/total_duration_minutes from the DB after the
  booking_services insert (the INSERT..RETURNING row predates the recalc
  trigger, so TotalAmount serialized as 0 and DepositPaid computed TRUE on an
  unpaid booking — the frontend gate trusted deposit_paid:true, never charged,
  and confirmed the booking with zero payment rows); (2) BookingFlow.svelte
  gates the confirmation view on depositPaid and guards against re-creating a
  booking on retry. Regression test
  TestBookings_Create_DepositPaidFalseOnUnpaidBooking.

Payments (idempotency + money):
- deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey: no-client-key fallback now advances a
  sequence for repeatable types (partial) and rotates past refunded completed
  rows, so refund-then-repay and equal-amount partials diverge onto distinct
  keys; an un-refunded completed row keeps its key (double-charge protection
  holds). Dedup hits on refunded rows now 409, never stale success.
- chargeFailureStatus default is 503 (ambiguous), never 402; table test.
- Flaky TestBookingPayment_FullPayment_SplitsIntoDepositAndBalance fixed
  (ORDER BY payment_type).
- resolveChargeSource: orphaned card-on-file disabled via DeleteCardOnFile
  when SaveCardForUser fails (best-effort, redacted log); retry path preserved.

Square client:
- Dev builds HARD-FAIL (panic) on SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=production without
  SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API=1; sandbox routes with a loud banner.
- Mock fault-injection FailAfterCommit (commit-then-5xx) exercises the exact
  lost-response same-key retry; SimulateCardTokenUsed; 45-char idempotency-key
  cap parity; SquareEnvironment/SquareLocationID shared env helpers used by
  the sweep (env contract no longer comment-only).
- listRefunds truncation now errors (money-sensitive reconcile retries
  instead of over-refunding); getCardsOnFile truncation loudly logged.

Webhooks + 2FA:
- square-environment header checked fail-closed (403) when configured env is
  production/sandbox; dispatch DB work bounded by 30s timeout contexts.
- 2FA codes HMAC-SHA256 pepper'd (TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER) with legacy-hash
  migration + upgrade-on-verify; disable-flow mint cooldown (1/min, 429) caps
  the brute-force loop; in-lockout records never LRU-evicted.

Repo hygiene:
- env-docs CI gate green again (FRONTEND_ORIGIN + SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API +
  TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER documented; Vite DEV built-in allowlisted).
- Dead square_deposits schema dropped; obsidian/README/legal-page drift fixed
  (consumeradvice.scot signposting, CORS allowlist, p11 R3/P13, T1).
- 2FA disable residual documented; P6 email/SMS delivery and P12 sandbox
  smoke test remain the pre-go-live gates.

Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (20/20 ok),
go build ./... + -tags dev, go vet clean, svelte-check 0 errors, env-docs
gate OK, live deposit-required flow re-verified end-to-end (deposit £11
charged, square_payment_id recorded).
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots fdf3f64a13 fix: review round 4 — per-dispute chargeback alerts, single-source clawback, 2FA lockout coherence, docs 
Fourth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security,
context-mining). All PASS on the money-safety core; this round closes the
remaining MAJOR/MINOR items they surfaced.

Webhooks:
- Untracked disputes now raise ONE admin notification PER distinct chargeback:
  the notification id is derived deterministically from the square_dispute_id
  (SHA-256 truncated into the CHAR(12) slot) so a second untracked dispute is
  no longer silently suppressed by the first's dedup row. ON CONFLICT (id)
  keeps same-dispute replays idempotent; the booking-scoped NOT EXISTS guard
  is retained for the tracked path. Verified: distinct disputes -> distinct
  rows; re-delivered dispute -> one row.
- The gift-card clawback SQL now lives in exactly ONE place:
  payments.RevertGiftCardFunding (new giftcard_clawback.go). till.go and the
  webhook path both call it — eliminating the byte-for-byte copy whose
  divergence would be a money-loss drift trap (the same two-sources-of-truth
  pattern this commit eliminated for GDPR scrubbing).

2FA:
- Applied the lockout-coherence fix from the review: when a disable request
  must mint a fresh code (no valid pending one), the held attempt counter is
  reset so the locked-out user can use the freshly delivered code in the SAME
  request (no wasted round-trip). The reuse path keeps accumulating wrong
  attempts toward the 5-attempt lockout — the two behaviors no longer
  conflict. (The 'always-fresh on disable' suggestion was NOT adopted: it
  would break the out-of-band [2FA]-log delivery model, since a code generated
  by a request can never be submitted within that same request.)
- New test pins the shared verify/disable lockout: 5 wrong verifies 429 and
  destroy the code; a stale code then 400s on disable while the freshly
  delivered code succeeds in the same request.
- Startup now warns that 2FA codes travel in PLAINTEXT via the server log in
  enforced mode (operator must restrict log access + relay out-of-band until
  email/SMS lands).

Docs:
- Test counts updated to the current 2,154 across README + Technical Manual.
- User Manual 2FA nav corrected: the settings live on the Account page, not an
  'Admin' area.

Tests: 2,154 (up from 2,151). Backend 25/26 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres auth for the test role; package
byte-identical to HEAD). Frontend builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 9bb812669e fix: fresh-review round — 2FA deliverability, disable re-verification, GDPR batch scrub, dispute alerting, docs accuracy 
Second fresh-eyes review pass (7 agents: goal, security, code-quality,
context-mining, webhooks+2FA, client+mock+sweep, refunds/giftcards/handlers).
Money-safety core verified sound (identical-body replay byte-lossless, clawback
gated on definitive proof, no double-charge window). This round fixes the
issues the fresh pass surfaced:

2FA:
- Setup now DELIVERS the code via the [2FA] server log in ALL modes (was:
  nothing in enforced mode -> production 2FA was an unbreakable dead-end and
  saved-card charges were permanently 403). Enforced mode still withholds the
  code from the API response; the log line is the fake delivery channel until
  email/SMS lands (P6).
- Disabling 2FA now requires a fresh verification code when enforcement is ON
  (previously ignored the code -> a password-only attacker could lift the gate).
  Shares the 5-attempt lockout and timing-safe compare. Dev bypass retained.
- REQUIRE_2FA parsing normalized (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive);
  startup warning extended to the empty-env/mock-client/enforced-2FA confusion.

GDPR:
- anonymize_user() SQL now scrubs two_factor_* columns + staff notes, so the
  idle-account batch cleanup (CleanupIdleAccounts) is erasure-clean, not just
  the user-initiated delete path.

Webhooks:
- dispute.created for an untracked Square payment now raises a
  critical_payment_log admin notification (chargeback the app can't reconcile
  is never silent). Reason strings truncated on rune boundaries (valid UTF-8).
  Stale at-most-once comment corrected; revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding
  duplication noted.

Sweep/mock parity:
- Mock CreatePayment dedup is now source-aware (IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED on
  source mismatch) matching ReplayPaymentByKey and real Square.
- COMPLETED-but-never-polled terminal till-sale checkouts are now recorded by
  the sweep (previously only booking checkouts were; till charges were
  invisible until the 24h blind-fail WARN).
- Legacy snapshot-less minimal-body replay, SQUARE_LOCATION_ID drift, and
  in-memory-mock-restart limitations documented.

Docs:
- Webhook path corrected everywhere (/webhooks/square, not /api/webhooks/square
  - a deployer following the old path would 404 and silently lose all webhook
  reconciliation).
- 2FA enforcement semantics + code-delivery mechanism documented accurately
  (fail-closed default; log-delivery channel; disable re-verification).
- README/User Manual note the 2FA requirement on online saved-card payments.

Tests: 2,151 (up from 2,142). Backend 26/27 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres doesn't offer scram-sha-256 for the
test role; package is byte-identical to HEAD and untouched here). Frontend
builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots e9b0f0f2a7 fix: review-loop hardening — identical-body replay, 2FA gates, webhook at-least-once, GDPR scrub 
Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the
review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced.

Money-safety:
- Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored
  square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original
  payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending
  forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge).
- Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card
  sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface
  ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.)
- Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales
  claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog.
- Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom
  'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending.
- Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card.
- Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the
  booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse).
- M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total].

2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments:
- Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into
  all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account
  admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces.
- Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit
  mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env.
- Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare);
  plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev).
- GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes.

Infra/docs:
- nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80
  redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS;
  separate webhook rate-limit zone.
- Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id +
  square_request_snapshot.
- Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips
  policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected.
- Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26
  packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 5e3dc9b428 fix: comprehensive payment system hardening (4 review passes) 
CRITICAL fixes:
- C1: JWT exp claim now validated via jwtauth.VerifyToken (was Decode)
- C2: OverrideAmount validated post-substitution (prevents negative money minting)
- C3: Terminal gift-card payments store gift_card_id; refund credits user balance
- C4: Refund dedup returns stored amount, not req.Amount (prevents admin mislead)
- C5: Booking recheck uses FOR UPDATE (prevents TOCTOU with cancellation)
- C6: processChargeGroup idempotency key stable (charge-only, prevents double-refund)

MAJOR fixes:
- M2: Gift-card refund UPDATE checks RowsAffected; 0 rows -> failed
- M3: ProcessCancellationRefund returns commit error (was swallowed)
- M5: Dispute webhook handling (created + state.updated + disputes table)

MEDIUM fixes:
- ME1: CORS restricted to FRONTEND_ORIGIN env var (was reflect-any)
- ME2: anonymize_user() scrubs users.notes, bookings.notes, name_history, refresh_tokens
- ME3: Webhook handlers now mutate state (payment.updated, refund.updated)

Frontend fixes:
- Same-key retry on 503 (ambiguous failure) wired to all 8 payment flows
- CHARGE_AND_STORE intent for save-card flows (SCA compliance)
- Nonce staleness check verified across all flows

Additional fixes from adversarial re-review:
- F1: Till-sale completed dedup echoes stored amount (C4-class)
- F2: Cash/giftcard terminal path uses FOR UPDATE (C5-class)
- F3: Square-success UPDATE checks RowsAffected (till sales)
- F4: Dispute reason truncated to 192 chars (prevents INSERT failure)
- F5: Booking-user lookup failure marks refund failed (prevents silent money loss)
- F6: Saved-card/tip rechecks wrapped in transaction (C5 residual)

Tests:
- 15 adversarial attack tests (negative override, zero override, terminal gift card,
  refund dedup, TOCTOU, deleted gift card, advisory lock, overcharge, zero/negative/huge
  amount, raw PAN, missing auth, gift card balance, concurrent refunds)
- 14 webhook state tests (dispute created/state, payment/refund updated)
- 3 CORS tests, 3 GDPR tests, 1 HTTP timeout test
- Full suite passes with -race (25 packages, 0 failures)

25 files changed, +1532/-275 lines
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 5ea89da2ad Make Square webhook dedup restart-safe via database 
The in-memory dedup is now only a fast path; the square_webhook_events INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING is the source of truth, so replays across restarts and after FIFO eviction are skipped. A DB failure fails closed with 503 so Square retries. Empty event_ids are rejected with 400 (no dispatch, no dedup row). Ordering trade-off (insert-before-dispatch) documented for when handlers mutate state.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 2652aa66be Redact PII from Square webhook logging 
payment.updated/refund.updated handlers log only the Square object id and payload length instead of the raw JSON body (which contained buyer email, card brand/last4, cardholder name). Add a test asserting no raw payload reaches the log.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 54a5b1024e Implement full Square payment review fixes + frontend polish 
Implement every finding from the deep payment review (P0-P2, minors,
nitpicks), then close the post-implementation re-review items, then
align card-form typography and roll out the Square trust badge.

Backend - Square API alignment:
- tip_settings.allow_tipping nested under device_options (was top-level:
  terminal tips were silently lost in prod)
- CreateCardOnFile now accepts customerID and sends card.customer_id;
  saved-card (ccof:) charges forward square_customer_id as CustomerID
- New SquareClient methods GetPayment, CreateCustomer, CancelCheckout
- SCA verification_token accepted + forwarded in all charge paths
- ExpMonth/ExpYear -> *int; URL-path id validation; CancelCheckout
  NOT_FOUND-only no-op (dropped unverified NOOP); exported ErrorCode/
  ErrorDetail helpers; mock rejects raw PANs, RList locks, redacts
  emails, ForceRefundPending hook

Backend - money safety:
- sweepManualPendingSquareRefunds reconciles rows WITH square_refund_id
  instead of stranding them forever
- SweepStalePendingPayments reconciles at Square before failing (tri-state:
  leave pending on transport error, rescue completed, fail definitively)
- GetCheckoutStatus cancellation-recheck; terminal CANCELED resolution;
  SweepStaleTerminalCheckouts covers terminal_checkouts table
- till gift-card clawback on definitive failure incl. retry path +
  INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS/ADDRESS_VERIFICATION_FAILURE/TRANSACTION_LIMIT
- cross-user saved-card collision fixed (UNIQUE(user_id,square_card_id))
- customer provisioning (lazy, save-only); one-off/guest mint no customer
- discount preview/apply unified in discounts.go (global-milestone visible
  in preview, N+1 eliminated, redemption counter preserved on failures)
- webhook event_id dedup; refund loop dedup; stale comment fixes
- test-isolation t.Cleanup on committed sweep tests

Frontend:
- SCA tokenizeWithVerification across all charge flows (amount as
  major-units decimal), 5-min token-expiry re-tokenize, verification_token
  in request bodies
- PaymentModal synchronous double-click + zero/negative-amount guards
- till online-card UI wired to /api/admin/till/sale
- policyPopover generalised; new /privacy-policy route; consent checkbox
  copy + Square privacy link
- Square card iframe styled to app typography (Inter 14px, oklch tokens);
  mock form md:text-sm parity
- 'Secure payment powered by Square' badge on all 8 card-payment flows

Schema/docs: terminal_checkouts + square_customer_id + per-user card
constraint in init-script.sql; README migrations; P14 plan + backlog +
Technical Manual updated.

Includes 39 modified/new test files; full backend suite (25 pkgs),
-race on payments+square, and frontend build are green.
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 7439fa86c1 Fix payment review round 3: saved-card idempotency, stale-pending sweep, webhook fail-closed 
R1/R4: saved_card branch in CreateTerminalPayment now mirrors CreateTipPayment
- advisory lock (crussell:payment:<bookingID>) serializes concurrent double-clicks
- deterministic key bookingID-sc-type-amount-cardID (<=45 chars) so a lost-response
  retry derives the same key and dedups instead of double-charging
- idempotency switch inside the lock: completed -> dedup, pending -> reuse with
  pence amount-guard, failed -> clean 409
- success response includes card_brand/card_last4 (frontend already reads them)

R2: add 'failed' case to all four retry switches (tip, booking, gift card, till)
- a swept/definitively-rejected record returns 409 instead of 500-ing on the
  idempotency_key UNIQUE constraint

R3: extend SweepStalePendingPayments to till_sales card rows
- sweeps pending till_sales (online_square/in_person_card) past Square's ~24h
  key retention, closing the double-charge window for till sales
- swept rows logged with the same CRITICAL manual-reconciliation marker as the
  refund sweep

Webhook fail-closed: reject 503 when SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY unset, 403 on
bad signature (was: skip verification in dev)

Refund status resolution: refunds now resolve by Square status
(COMPLETED/PENDING/FAILED/REJECTED) instead of assuming completed; real error
codes (REFUND_AMOUNT_INVALID, PAYMENT_NOT_REFUNDABLE, REFUND_ALREADY_PENDING)
added to the definitive/processed classification

HTTP client: CreateCard key truncated to <=45 chars, device_options always sent
(env SQUARE_TERMINAL_DEVICE_ID fallback), processing_fee reads amount_money,
ListCards cursor loop, refund keys hashed to <=45 chars

Other fixes: payment/till/gift-card advisory-lock + FOR UPDATE asymmetries,
GetPaymentByID NULL scans, loyalty redemption lock, card upsert on conflict,
mock ccof: prefix parity, IsValidSquareCheckoutID for real Square IDs,
isAdminRequest defense-in-depth on all 6 admin payment handlers, webhook
signature docs, M8/L5 debug markers removed

Docs: README/FC/TM/Overview updated (22 jobs, 20 CRITICAL sites, 23-section
GDPR export, sweep jobs, webhook fail-closed); P11 plan marks remaining items
(sandbox smoke test, M-8 customer_id, saved-card key dedup trade-off) as
deferred with rationale; gap backlog pruned of completed items
 2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus ed9cb1489c fix: resolve golangci-lint violations (errcheck, unused, gosimple, ineffassign) 
errcheck: add proper error handling with slog.Error for tx.Rollback, key generation, and s3/dav operations. Add nolint comments for intentionally discarded DB scan errors and HTTP write errors.
unused: remove dead code (svcRow type, processImage, nonDepositPaymentType, generateSecureCode, colorBold, nGreen, nRed)
gosimple S1021: merge var declaration with assignment in manage.go
ineffassign: remove dead assignments in settings.go, till.go, images.go

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
 2026-07-09 18:53:51 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus e4b9003439 refactor(handlers): migrate remaining backend handlers to clock.Now() and transaction patterns 
Apply clock.Now() migration, transaction wrapping, and minor refactors across admin, scheduling, today, user, auth handler, notifications, webhooks, services, portfolio, ratelimit, testutils, and main.go.

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
 2026-06-24 23:43:50 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus 3d0e2afc4c refactor(backend): migrate db.DB to db.Conn PoolProxy across all handlers 
Replace direct *pgxpool.Pool usage with PoolProxy wrapper across the entire backend:

- db.DB renamed to db.Conn (*pgxpool.Pool -> *PoolProxy)
- JWT functions now accept context.Context instead of using context.Background()
- Handler DB calls route through PoolProxy for per-test transaction support
- Fixture/helper/testdb functions accept Querier interface for decoupling
- Query ordering fixed in bookings handlers: COUNT after data query to avoid pgx conn busy
- Time truncation fixed: time.Date instead of Truncate(24*time.Hour) for week start calc
- testmain_test.go files updated with SeedBaseline and NewPoolProxy

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
 2026-06-21 19:28:54 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus bc6a5461c1 feat(backend): update webhooks and DAV service 
Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
 2026-06-18 16:26:45 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus 1a6947a9b6 fix: enforce request body size limits across the API 
Ultraworked with Sisyphus (https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
 2026-05-31 10:55:33 +01:00
popertots 2e1ab9d745 feat: Square payment integration, booking flow redesign, and timezone/weekday fixes 
- Add Square payment integration (mock + handlers + UI): terminal/online payments,
  refunds, tips, saved cards, webhooks. Build-tagged dev/prod clients.
- Redesign booking flow: Step 4 conditional (deposit only), Step 5 confirmation
  screen with booking ID, auto-submit on transition.
- Redesign schedule modal: 2x3 button grid with Pay Deposit/Pay Early logic.
- Add deposit warning banner at Step 1 for users with outstanding deposits.
- Fix weekday conversion bug: Go 0=Sunday vs DB 0=Monday mismatch in 6 locations.
- Fix timezone bug: UTC vs London time in closing hours validation.
- Fix frontend error parsing: plain text backend errors now displayed correctly.
- Fix crypto.randomUUID fallback for environments without Web Crypto.
- Add 7 new regression tests: closing hours, advance check, active booking limit,
  weekday conversion, UTC/London, deposit snapshot, exceptional hours.
- Fix 3 flaky tests: dynamic dates instead of fixed, no-show timing.
 2026-05-23 11:29:34 +01:00