popertots
5cc5a7f6d2
Fresh-eyes review round with 6 independent agents (money-safety, concurrency, Square wire parity, security, frontend flow, testing-gaps). Every finding was independently verified against the code before fixing. All backend changes now carry full test suites (10+ new tests, each verified to FAIL without its guard). All 20 packages green, race detector clean. Money-safety: - Gift-card purchase refunds no longer create money: manual refunds of a no-booking (gift-card purchase) payment are rejected with a clear message in the direct handler AND never re-issued by the sweep-resume path (processManualPaymentGroup skips them; reconcile-then-fail, no re-issue). - BuyGiftCard no-client-key fallback: derived deterministically under the advisory lock (pending-row reuse fixes lost-response double-charge; completed-row sequence advance preserves distinct-purchase collapse fix). - Terminal completion is never unrecorded: activeTerminalCheckoutID now calls recordUntrackedTerminalPayment when a provisional (tmp-) checkout is found COMPLETED at Square (previously only marked the row COMPLETED — a lost poll left the payment invisible and unrefundable). - Sweep: provisional tmp- checkout rows are resolved against Square first (COMPLETED → record; live → keep guard; NOT_FOUND/CANCELED → fail; ambiguous → leave pending) instead of blind-failing a possibly-live checkout. recordUntrackedTerminalPayment re-checks the booking status (FOR UPDATE) and refuses to record on a cancelled booking, inserting a critical_payment_log admin notification instead. Till-sale post-charge UPDATE now requires status='pending' (no resurrection of a clawed-back sale). Frontend (Svelte 5): - UserPaymentModal keeps CardSelection mounted through processing (bind:this ref + Square iframe survive the loyalty/tokenize awaits) — new-card payments work again. - BookingFlow clears the cached nonce/verification pair on any failure (retry re-tokenizes fresh; idempotency key retained for dedup); 409 'already paid' refetches the booking and reconciles depositPaid so the confirmation gate opens; Back button disabled during processing. - Synchronous double-submit guards on buyGiftCard/redeemGiftCard/submitTip. Square wire parity (mock vs real): - processing_fee sign unified (negated at paymentFromSquare; mock agrees). - SimulateSourceUsed (SOURCE_USED, 400) matches real CreateCard. - GetCardsOnFile excludes disabled cards (matches ListCards). - ForcePaymentStatus toggle + tests prove the charge path can't be status-blind. - CreateCheckout rejects empty device_id (env fallback SQUARE_TERMINAL_DEVICE_ID); completed terminal checkout's payment resolvable by id. Security: - 2FA attempt-map data race fixed: lastAt is atomic.Int64 (nanos) — eviction scan reads race-free; concurrent verify+evict tests under -race. - Backend refuses to start on weak/placeholder JWT_SECRET_KEY (<32 chars or known public placeholders) with openssl rand -hex 32 guidance. - Dockerfile no longer COPYs .env (secrets injected via compose env_file). - SabreDAV requires DAV_ADMIN_PASSWORD (no admin/admin default); compose fails at config time when missing. Testing gaps closed (each verified to FAIL without its guard): - refunded-dedup 409 (CreateBookingPayment), keyed sweep past-retention blind-fail, reconcile status-switch (CANCELED/FAILED/APPROVED/PENDING/unknown in both by-key and by-id paths), resolveChargeSource Square-failure branches, structured 500 / CARD_DECLINED / cancelled-context E2E (row stays pending), deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey >45-char truncation, webhook findPaymentByDisputeID fallback, clawbackOneTillSale non-gift-card branch, dispute.evidence / terminal.checkout dispatch. Infra: - local-dev-2.sh fails loudly on port-5432 squatters / docker compose failures (previously died silently under ERR_EXIT with hidden output). - Test harness defaults SQUARE_TERMINAL_DEVICE_ID; money_safety_fixes_test.go gained the missing build tag. Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (20/20 ok), -race clean on 2FA + payments money paths, go build ./... + -tags dev, go vet clean, svelte-check 0 errors, env-docs gate OK (36 vars), docker compose config valid.
1097 lines
46 KiB
Go
1097 lines
46 KiB
Go
//go:build test
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package user
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// Tests for the loose-fake 2FA endpoints (GET /api/user/2fa/status,
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// POST /api/user/2fa/setup|verify|disable). Every test that flips
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// REQUIRE_2FA/SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT via t.Setenv must stay sequential (no
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// t.Parallel): os.Getenv is process-global and t.Setenv panics under
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// t.Parallel. Sequential tests in this package run before the parallel batch,
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// so the enforced env never leaks into parallel tests.
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"database/sql"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"os"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"crussell/clock"
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"crussell/db"
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"crussell/mw"
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"crussell/testutils"
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"crussell/testutils/fixtures"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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func twofaEnvEnforced(t *testing.T) {
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t.Helper()
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t.Setenv("REQUIRE_2FA", "true")
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t.Setenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT", "production")
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}
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func twofaEnvUnenforced(t *testing.T) {
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t.Helper()
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// Explicit mock env: empty SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT now defaults to ENFORCED
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// (fail-closed), so an unenforced test must opt in via an explicit dev value.
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t.Setenv("REQUIRE_2FA", "")
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t.Setenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT", "mock")
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}
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// performUser2FARequest invokes a handler with the authenticated-user context
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// injected directly (the profile_test.go pattern). An empty userID simulates an
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// unauthenticated request (no mw.UserIDKey in context).
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func performUser2FARequest(t *testing.T, handler http.HandlerFunc, ctx context.Context, method, path string, body any, userID string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
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t.Helper()
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var req *http.Request
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if body != nil {
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b, err := json.Marshal(body)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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req = httptest.NewRequest(method, path, bytes.NewReader(b))
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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} else {
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req = httptest.NewRequest(method, path, nil)
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}
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if userID != "" {
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req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(ctx, mw.UserIDKey, userID))
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} else {
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req = req.WithContext(ctx)
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}
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler(w, req)
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return w
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}
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// seedPendingTwoFA writes a known verification code's SHA-256 hash plus a fresh
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// expiry into the user's pending columns, so enforced-mode verify tests don't
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// depend on reading the logged code.
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func seedPendingTwoFA(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, userID, code string) {
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t.Helper()
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_, err := q.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users
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SET two_factor_method = 'email',
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two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2,
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two_factor_pending_code_expires = $3
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WHERE id = $1`, userID, hashTwoFACode(code), clock.Now().Add(twoFAPendingExpiry))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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}
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// extractCodeFromLog pulls the 6-digit code out of a captured [2FA] log line.
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func extractCodeFromLog(t *testing.T, logOut string) string {
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t.Helper()
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m := regexp.MustCompile(`\[2FA\].*: (\d{6})`).FindStringSubmatch(logOut)
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if len(m) < 2 {
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return ""
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}
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return m[1]
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}
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func TestTwoFAStatus_NotEnabled(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvUnenforced(t)
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, GetTwoFAStatusHandler, ctx, http.MethodGet, "/api/user/2fa/status", nil, userID)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
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var resp TwoFAStatusResponse
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require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp))
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require.False(t, resp.Enabled, "fresh user must report 2FA disabled")
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require.False(t, resp.Required, "unenforced env must report required=false")
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require.Nil(t, resp.Method)
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}
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func TestTwoFAStatus_Required(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvEnforced(t)
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, GetTwoFAStatusHandler, ctx, http.MethodGet, "/api/user/2fa/status", nil, userID)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
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var resp TwoFAStatusResponse
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require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp))
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require.False(t, resp.Enabled)
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require.True(t, resp.Required, "enforced env must report required=true")
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}
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func TestTwoFASetup_InvalidMethod(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvUnenforced(t)
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, SetupTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/setup", TwoFASetupRequest{Method: "carrier-pigeon"}, userID)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
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}
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func TestTwoFASetup_Valid_StoresHash(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvUnenforced(t)
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// Pin the pepper off so the stored hash assertion below is deterministic
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// regardless of the ambient test environment.
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t.Setenv("TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER", "")
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, SetupTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/setup", TwoFASetupRequest{Method: "email"}, userID)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
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var resp struct {
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Message string `json:"message"`
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Code string `json:"code"`
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}
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require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp))
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require.Equal(t, "Code sent", resp.Message)
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require.Len(t, resp.Code, 6, "unenforced env must return the dev-convenience code")
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// The DB must hold the digest of exactly the returned code. With the pepper
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// pinned off, that is the plain SHA-256 (the legacy fallback).
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var pendingHash, method sql.NullString
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var expires sql.NullTime
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require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, `
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SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash, two_factor_method, two_factor_pending_code_expires
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FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&pendingHash, &method, &expires))
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require.True(t, pendingHash.Valid, "setup must write a pending code hash")
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require.Equal(t, "email", method.String)
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require.True(t, expires.Valid && expires.Time.After(clock.Now()), "pending code must have a future expiry")
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(resp.Code))
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require.Equal(t, hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), pendingHash.String, "stored hash must be the SHA-256 of the returned code")
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}
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func TestTwoFASetup_AlreadyEnabled_Conflict(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvUnenforced(t)
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, "UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true WHERE id = $1", userID)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, SetupTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/setup", TwoFASetupRequest{Method: "sms"}, userID)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusConflict, w.Code)
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}
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func TestTwoFAVerify_WrongCode(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvEnforced(t)
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
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var enabled bool
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require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
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require.False(t, enabled, "wrong code must not enable 2FA")
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}
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func TestTwoFAVerify_CorrectCode(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvEnforced(t)
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "123456"}, userID)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
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var resp map[string]bool
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require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp))
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require.True(t, resp["enabled"])
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var enabled bool
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var pendingHash sql.NullString
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require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled, two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled, &pendingHash))
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require.True(t, enabled, "correct code must enable 2FA")
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require.False(t, pendingHash.Valid, "pending code must be cleared after verification")
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}
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func TestTwoFAVerify_Expired(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvEnforced(t)
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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// Seed the correct code but backdate the expiry so the handler's
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// pendingExpires.After(clock.Now()) check fails.
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_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users
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SET two_factor_method = 'email',
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two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2,
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two_factor_pending_code_expires = NOW() - INTERVAL '1 minute'
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WHERE id = $1`, userID, hashTwoFACode("123456"))
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require.NoError(t, err)
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "123456"}, userID)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code)
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var enabled bool
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require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
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require.False(t, enabled, "expired code must not enable 2FA")
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}
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func TestTwoFAVerify_Unenforced_AnyCodeSucceeds(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvUnenforced(t)
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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// Dev bypass: in an unenforced env even an empty code with no pending row
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// verifies.
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: ""}, userID)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
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var enabled bool
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require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
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require.True(t, enabled)
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}
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// TestTwoFADisable_CorrectCode verifies that disabling in an enforced env
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// requires the pending code: the correct code clears the flag, method and
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// pending fields.
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func TestTwoFADisable_CorrectCode(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvEnforced(t)
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "123456"}, userID)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
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var enabled bool
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var method sql.NullString
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var pendingHash sql.NullString
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require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled, two_factor_method, two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled, &method, &pendingHash))
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require.False(t, enabled, "disable must clear two_factor_enabled")
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require.False(t, method.Valid, "disable must clear the method")
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require.False(t, pendingHash.Valid, "disable must clear the pending code")
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}
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// TestTwoFADisable_WrongCode verifies that a wrong code leaves 2FA enabled:
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// the gate cannot be lifted with the password alone.
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func TestTwoFADisable_WrongCode(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvEnforced(t)
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, w.Body.String())
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var enabled bool
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require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
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require.True(t, enabled, "wrong code must not disable 2FA")
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}
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// TestTwoFADisable_NoPendingCode_GeneratesFreshCode verifies that disabling
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// with no valid pending code delivers a fresh one via the [2FA] log channel and
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// requires it before clearing the flag.
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func TestTwoFADisable_NoPendingCode_GeneratesFreshCode(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvEnforced(t)
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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log.SetOutput(&buf)
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t.Cleanup(func() { log.SetOutput(os.Stderr) })
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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// No pending code exists: the handler must generate + log a fresh code and
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// reject the (empty) submission.
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: ""}, userID)
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require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, w.Body.String())
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require.Regexp(t, regexp.MustCompile(`\[2FA\].*\d{6}`), buf.String(), "disable must log the fresh code as the delivery channel")
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var pendingHash sql.NullString
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require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&pendingHash))
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require.True(t, pendingHash.Valid, "disable must persist a fresh pending code when none existed")
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var enabled bool
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require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
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require.True(t, enabled, "fresh code must be verified before 2FA can be disabled")
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}
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// TestTwoFADisable_LockoutAfterFiveFailedAttempts verifies that disable shares
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// the 5-attempt lockout with verify: 4 wrong codes 400, the 5th 429s and
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// invalidates the pending code.
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func TestTwoFADisable_LockoutAfterFiveFailedAttempts(t *testing.T) {
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twofaEnvEnforced(t)
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ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
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userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
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require.NoError(t, err)
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seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
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for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
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w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, "attempt %d", i+1)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
require.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "Too many attempts. Request a new code.")
|
|
|
|
var pendingHash sql.NullString
|
|
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&pendingHash))
|
|
require.False(t, pendingHash.Valid, "lockout must invalidate the pending code")
|
|
|
|
var enabled bool
|
|
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
|
|
require.True(t, enabled, "locked-out user must still have 2FA enabled")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFA_VerifyAndDisable_SharedLockoutResetsOnFreshCode pins the shared
|
|
// per-user lockout across verify and disable: 5 wrong VERIFY attempts 429 and
|
|
// destroy the pending code; a subsequent DISABLE with a wrong code returns 400
|
|
// (not 429) because the disable flow delivers a FRESH code which resets the
|
|
// shared counter — and only that fresh code (not the old one) succeeds.
|
|
func TestTwoFA_VerifyAndDisable_SharedLockoutResetsOnFreshCode(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twofaEnvEnforced(t)
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
|
|
|
|
// Burn all 5 attempts on VERIFY: 4 wrong 400, the 5th 429 + code destroyed.
|
|
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, "verify attempt %d", i+1)
|
|
}
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
|
|
// The lockout is shared: the OLD code is gone, so disabling with it fails.
|
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
|
log.SetOutput(&buf)
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() { log.SetOutput(os.Stderr) })
|
|
|
|
// First disable delivers a fresh code (resetting the shared counter) and
|
|
// rejects the stale submission with 400, not 429.
|
|
w = performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "123456"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, "stale code must be rejected after lockout")
|
|
|
|
// The freshly delivered code succeeds in the SAME request that generated it.
|
|
freshCode := extractCodeFromLog(t, buf.String())
|
|
require.NotEmpty(t, freshCode, "disable must deliver a fresh code after verify lockout")
|
|
w = performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: freshCode}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
|
|
var enabled bool
|
|
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
|
|
require.False(t, enabled, "fresh code must disable 2FA after the shared lockout")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFADisable_Unenforced_NoCodeRequired verifies the dev bypass: in an
|
|
// unenforced env disabling works with no code at all.
|
|
func TestTwoFADisable_Unenforced_NoCodeRequired(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twofaEnvUnenforced(t)
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: ""}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
|
|
var enabled bool
|
|
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
|
|
require.False(t, enabled, "dev bypass must disable without a code")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestTwoFA_Unauthenticated(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
method string
|
|
path string
|
|
body any
|
|
}{
|
|
{"status", http.MethodGet, "/api/user/2fa/status", nil},
|
|
{"setup", http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/setup", TwoFASetupRequest{Method: "email"}},
|
|
{"verify", http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "123456"}},
|
|
{"disable", http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", nil},
|
|
}
|
|
handlers := map[string]http.HandlerFunc{
|
|
"status": GetTwoFAStatusHandler,
|
|
"setup": SetupTwoFAHandler,
|
|
"verify": VerifyTwoFAHandler,
|
|
"disable": DisableTwoFAHandler,
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, handlers[tt.name], context.Background(), tt.method, tt.path, tt.body, "")
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, w.Code)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestProfile_Get_IncludesTwoFAState(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twofaEnvEnforced(t)
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, GetProfileHandler, ctx, http.MethodGet, "/api/user/profile", nil, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
|
|
|
|
var profile UserProfile
|
|
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &profile))
|
|
require.True(t, profile.TwoFactorEnabled)
|
|
require.True(t, profile.TwoFactorRequired, "profile must expose the enforced flag")
|
|
require.NotNil(t, profile.TwoFactorMethod)
|
|
require.Equal(t, "email", *profile.TwoFactorMethod)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestTwoFA_FailClosedDefaultEnforced(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Empty SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT (a misconfigured prod deploy) must default to
|
|
// ENFORCED, never silently disable the gate.
|
|
t.Setenv("REQUIRE_2FA", "")
|
|
t.Setenv("SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT", "")
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, GetTwoFAStatusHandler, ctx, http.MethodGet, "/api/user/2fa/status", nil, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code)
|
|
var resp TwoFAStatusResponse
|
|
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp))
|
|
require.True(t, resp.Required, "empty SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT must be treated as enforced (fail-closed)")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestTwoFASetup_Enforced_NoCodeInResponse(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twofaEnvEnforced(t)
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, SetupTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/setup", TwoFASetupRequest{Method: "email"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
|
|
var resp map[string]any
|
|
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp))
|
|
_, hasCode := resp["code"]
|
|
require.False(t, hasCode, "enforced setup must NOT return the code in the response")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestTwoFASetup_CodeAlwaysLoggedAsDeliveryChannel(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Capture the standard logger so we can assert on what setup logs.
|
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
|
log.SetOutput(&buf)
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() { log.SetOutput(os.Stderr) })
|
|
|
|
// Enforced (production): the plaintext code MUST be logged — the [2FA] log
|
|
// line is the only delivery channel until email/SMS lands, and an operator
|
|
// relays it to the user out-of-band. Without it, enforced-mode 2FA is a
|
|
// dead-end (every online saved-card charge stays 403).
|
|
twofaEnvEnforced(t)
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, SetupTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/setup", TwoFASetupRequest{Method: "email"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
require.Regexp(t, regexp.MustCompile(`\[2FA\].*\d{6}`), buf.String(), "enforced setup must log the plaintext code as the delivery channel")
|
|
|
|
// Unenforced (dev): the plaintext code is also logged for the loose-fake flow.
|
|
buf.Reset()
|
|
twofaEnvUnenforced(t)
|
|
ctx2, tx2 := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID2, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx2)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
w = performUser2FARequest(t, SetupTwoFAHandler, ctx2, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/setup", TwoFASetupRequest{Method: "sms"}, userID2)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
require.Regexp(t, regexp.MustCompile(`\[2FA\].*\d{6}`), buf.String(), "unenforced setup must log the plaintext code")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestTwoFAVerify_LockoutAfterFiveFailedAttempts(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twofaEnvEnforced(t)
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
|
|
|
|
// Attempts 1-4: plain 400.
|
|
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, "attempt %d", i+1)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Attempt 5: lockout — 429 and the pending code is invalidated.
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
require.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "Too many attempts. Request a new code.")
|
|
|
|
var pendingHash sql.NullString
|
|
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&pendingHash))
|
|
require.False(t, pendingHash.Valid, "lockout must invalidate the pending code")
|
|
|
|
var enabled bool
|
|
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
|
|
require.False(t, enabled, "locked-out user must not be enabled")
|
|
|
|
// Attempt 6: still 429 (even with the correct code) until a new code is
|
|
// requested via setup.
|
|
w = performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "123456"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, "post-lockout attempts must keep returning 429")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestTwoFAVerify_NewCodeViaSetupResetsLockout(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twofaEnvEnforced(t)
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
|
|
|
|
// Reach lockout: 4 plain 400s, then the 5th failure locks out.
|
|
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, "attempt %d", i+1)
|
|
}
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
|
|
// Requesting a new code via setup resets the attempt counter, so
|
|
// verification is possible again.
|
|
w = performUser2FARequest(t, SetupTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/setup", TwoFASetupRequest{Method: "email"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
|
|
// The setup-generated code is unknown (enforced), so seed a fresh known
|
|
// code and confirm the reset allows verification.
|
|
seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "654321")
|
|
w = performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "654321"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestTwoFAVerify_WrongCodesAnyLengthRejected(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Exercises the constant-time compare path: wrong codes of any length and
|
|
// shape fail identically (400) without enabling, while the correct code
|
|
// still succeeds — no length-based early exit leaks match information.
|
|
twofaEnvEnforced(t)
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID, "123456")
|
|
|
|
for _, code := range []string{"12345", "1234567", "abcdef", ""} {
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: code}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, "wrong code %q must be rejected", code)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var enabled bool
|
|
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
|
|
require.False(t, enabled)
|
|
|
|
// Four wrong attempts were consumed above; one more would lock out. Use a
|
|
// fresh user to prove the correct code still verifies.
|
|
userID2, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
seedPendingTwoFA(t, ctx, tx, userID2, "123456")
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "123456"}, userID2)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// Pepper hashing (finding c)
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFAPepper_HashUsesHMAC verifies that with TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER set the
|
|
// stored digest is HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the pepper, NOT the legacy unsalted
|
|
// SHA-256 — so a leaked digest cannot be brute-forced offline.
|
|
func TestTwoFAPepper_HashUsesHMAC(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Setenv("TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER", "test-pepper-secret")
|
|
const code = "123456"
|
|
got := hashTwoFACode(code)
|
|
|
|
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte("test-pepper-secret"))
|
|
mac.Write([]byte(code))
|
|
want := hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
|
|
require.Equal(t, want, got, "stored hash must be HMAC-SHA256 keyed by TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER")
|
|
require.NotEqual(t, legacyHashTwoFACode(code), got, "pepper'd hash must differ from the legacy plain SHA-256")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFAPepper_UnsetFallback_PlainSHA256 verifies the graceful no-pepper
|
|
// fallback keeps the legacy unsalted SHA-256 digest when TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER is
|
|
// unset.
|
|
func TestTwoFAPepper_UnsetFallback_PlainSHA256(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Setenv("TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER", "")
|
|
const code = "654321"
|
|
got := hashTwoFACode(code)
|
|
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(code))
|
|
require.Equal(t, hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), got, "unset pepper must fall back to legacy plain SHA-256")
|
|
require.Equal(t, legacyHashTwoFACode(code), got)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFAPepper_LegacyHashDetected verifies verifyTwoFACodeHash accepts both
|
|
// the pepper'd and the legacy plain forms (the transition window) and flags
|
|
// legacy rows for upgrade.
|
|
func TestTwoFAPepper_LegacyHashDetected(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Setenv("TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER", "test-pepper-secret")
|
|
const code = "123456"
|
|
match, legacy := verifyTwoFACodeHash(code, hashTwoFACode(code))
|
|
require.True(t, match)
|
|
require.False(t, legacy, "pepper'd stored hash must not be flagged for upgrade")
|
|
match, legacy = verifyTwoFACodeHash(code, legacyHashTwoFACode(code))
|
|
require.True(t, match)
|
|
require.True(t, legacy, "legacy stored hash must verify and flag the upgrade")
|
|
match, legacy = verifyTwoFACodeHash("999999", legacyHashTwoFACode(code))
|
|
require.False(t, match)
|
|
require.False(t, legacy)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFAPepper_LegacyHashUpgrade_OnSuccessfulVerify verifies that a legacy
|
|
// pre-pepper row still verifies during the migration window AND that the stored
|
|
// hash is upgraded to the pepper'd form on the next successful verify (the
|
|
// plain digest is retired).
|
|
func TestTwoFAPepper_LegacyHashUpgrade_OnSuccessfulVerify(t *testing.T) {
|
|
t.Setenv("TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER", "test-pepper-secret")
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
// Seed a legacy row exactly as the pre-pepper code wrote it: plain SHA-256.
|
|
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users
|
|
SET two_factor_method = 'email',
|
|
two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2,
|
|
two_factor_pending_code_expires = $3
|
|
WHERE id = $1`, userID, legacyHashTwoFACode("123456"), clock.Now().Add(twoFAPendingExpiry))
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// checkTwoFACode (the shared verify path) must accept the legacy hash.
|
|
st := &twoFAAttemptState{}
|
|
st.setLastActive(clock.Now())
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", nil).WithContext(ctx)
|
|
result, err := checkTwoFACode(req, userID, st, "123456")
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
require.Equal(t, twoFACodeOK, result)
|
|
|
|
// The stored hash must now be the pepper'd form.
|
|
var stored sql.NullString
|
|
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_pending_code_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&stored))
|
|
require.True(t, stored.Valid, "checkTwoFACode alone must not clear the pending hash")
|
|
require.Equal(t, hashTwoFACode("123456"), stored.String, "legacy hash must be upgraded to the pepper'd form on successful verify")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFAVerify_LegacyHash_StillVerifies pins the end-to-end migration
|
|
// window: an enforced env with the pepper set must still accept a user whose
|
|
// pending code was hashed the old (pre-pepper) way.
|
|
func TestTwoFAVerify_LegacyHash_StillVerifies(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twofaEnvEnforced(t)
|
|
t.Setenv("TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER", "test-pepper-secret")
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users
|
|
SET two_factor_method = 'email',
|
|
two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2,
|
|
two_factor_pending_code_expires = $3
|
|
WHERE id = $1`, userID, legacyHashTwoFACode("123456"), clock.Now().Add(twoFAPendingExpiry))
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "123456"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
|
|
var enabled bool
|
|
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
|
|
require.True(t, enabled)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFAVerify_LegacyHash_WrongCodeRejected verifies the legacy path still
|
|
// enforces the correct code: a wrong code against a legacy-hashed row is
|
|
// rejected and 2FA stays off.
|
|
func TestTwoFAVerify_LegacyHash_WrongCodeRejected(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twofaEnvEnforced(t)
|
|
t.Setenv("TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER", "test-pepper-secret")
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users
|
|
SET two_factor_method = 'email',
|
|
two_factor_pending_code_hash = $2,
|
|
two_factor_pending_code_expires = $3
|
|
WHERE id = $1`, userID, legacyHashTwoFACode("123456"), clock.Now().Add(twoFAPendingExpiry))
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, VerifyTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", TwoFAVerifyRequest{Code: "999999"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
|
|
var enabled bool
|
|
require.NoError(t, tx.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT two_factor_enabled FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID).Scan(&enabled))
|
|
require.False(t, enabled)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// Disable-flow mint throttle (finding d)
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFADisable_MintThrottled_BoundsGuessing verifies the unlimited-guess
|
|
// loop is closed: a password-only attacker who burns the 5-attempt budget on a
|
|
// freshly minted code cannot mint ANOTHER fresh code (which would reset the
|
|
// counter) inside the per-user mint cooldown. Exactly one fresh code is minted
|
|
// across the whole loop and the throttled request returns 429.
|
|
func TestTwoFADisable_MintThrottled_BoundsGuessing(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twofaEnvEnforced(t)
|
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
|
log.SetOutput(&buf)
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() { log.SetOutput(os.Stderr) })
|
|
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Request 1 mints a fresh code (the first mint is allowed) and rejects the
|
|
// wrong submission; requests 2-5 reuse that code, reaching the lockout.
|
|
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "000000"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, "attempt %d", i+1)
|
|
}
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "000000"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
|
|
// Request 6 is inside the cooldown: no fresh code may be minted, so the loop
|
|
// stops with 429 instead of minting an unlimited series of fresh codes.
|
|
w = performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "000000"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
require.Contains(t, w.Body.String(), "Wait before requesting a new code.")
|
|
|
|
// Exactly ONE fresh code was minted across all six requests — the loop can
|
|
// no longer reset the attempt budget.
|
|
mints := strings.Count(buf.String(), "disable 2FA")
|
|
require.Equal(t, 1, mints, "expected exactly 1 fresh-code mint; log:\n%s", buf.String())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFADisable_MintThrottle_ExpiresAllowsRecovery verifies the documented
|
|
// residual is not a permanent lockout: once the mint cooldown elapses, a
|
|
// legitimate code-lost user can mint and verify a fresh code again.
|
|
func TestTwoFADisable_MintThrottle_ExpiresAllowsRecovery(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twofaEnvEnforced(t)
|
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
|
log.SetOutput(&buf)
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() { log.SetOutput(os.Stderr) })
|
|
|
|
ctx, tx := testutils.SetupTestTx(t)
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `UPDATE users SET two_factor_enabled = true, two_factor_method = 'email' WHERE id = $1`, userID)
|
|
require.NoError(t, err)
|
|
|
|
// Burn the budget: 4 wrong 400s, the 5th locks out (429).
|
|
for i := 0; i < 4; i++ {
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "000000"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, "attempt %d", i+1)
|
|
}
|
|
w := performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "000000"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
w = performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "000000"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, w.Code, "mint must be throttled inside the cooldown")
|
|
|
|
// Simulate the cooldown elapsing (the test cannot wait a real minute).
|
|
st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
|
|
st.lastMintAt = clock.Now().Add(-twoFAMintCooldown - time.Second)
|
|
|
|
// A fresh disable request now mints a new code via the [2FA] log channel and
|
|
// rejects the wrong submission with 400 — recovery is possible again.
|
|
buf.Reset()
|
|
w = performUser2FARequest(t, DisableTwoFAHandler, ctx, http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/disable", TwoFADisableRequest{Code: "000000"}, userID)
|
|
require.Equal(t, http.StatusBadRequest, w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
|
require.Regexp(t, regexp.MustCompile(`\[2FA\].*\d{6}`), buf.String(), "cooldown expiry must allow a fresh mint")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// Attempt-map eviction (finding e)
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFAAttemptMap_InLockoutRecordNotEvicted verifies the eviction fix: a
|
|
// record still inside its lockout window is NEVER evicted by LRU pressure — a
|
|
// hostile flood of new keys cannot reset the victim's attempt counter. Only an
|
|
// idle/expired record is dropped to make room.
|
|
func TestTwoFAAttemptMap_InLockoutRecordNotEvicted(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Lock()
|
|
origMap := twoFAAttemptMap
|
|
origCap := twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts
|
|
twoFAAttemptMap = make(map[string]*twoFAAttemptState)
|
|
twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts = 4
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Lock()
|
|
twoFAAttemptMap = origMap
|
|
twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts = origCap
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
now := clock.Now()
|
|
for _, id := range []string{"idle_a", "idle_b", "idle_c"} {
|
|
st := &twoFAAttemptState{}
|
|
st.setLastActive(now.Add(-time.Minute))
|
|
twoFAAttemptMap[id] = st
|
|
}
|
|
victim := &twoFAAttemptState{}
|
|
victim.setLastActive(now.Add(-time.Second))
|
|
victim.count.Store(5)
|
|
twoFAAttemptMap["victim"] = victim
|
|
|
|
// A new user hits the cap: the eviction must drop an idle record, never the
|
|
// in-lockout victim.
|
|
st := twoFAAttemptStateFor("new_user")
|
|
require.NotNil(t, st)
|
|
if _, ok := twoFAAttemptMap["victim"]; !ok {
|
|
t.Error("in-lockout record must never be evicted by LRU pressure")
|
|
}
|
|
if got := twoFAAttemptMap["victim"].count.Load(); got != 5 {
|
|
t.Errorf("victim attempt count must survive eviction pressure, got %d", got)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(twoFAAttemptMap) > 4 {
|
|
t.Errorf("map must stay within the cap, got %d entries", len(twoFAAttemptMap))
|
|
}
|
|
if _, ok := twoFAAttemptMap["new_user"]; !ok {
|
|
t.Error("new user must be tracked in the map")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFAAttemptMap_FullOfLockedOut_ReturnsTransient verifies the pathological
|
|
// case: when every entry is a locked-out in-window record (a flood), the map
|
|
// does NOT evict one and does NOT grow past the cap — the new user gets a
|
|
// transient, untracked state for this request instead.
|
|
func TestTwoFAAttemptMap_FullOfLockedOut_ReturnsTransient(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Lock()
|
|
origMap := twoFAAttemptMap
|
|
origCap := twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts
|
|
twoFAAttemptMap = make(map[string]*twoFAAttemptState)
|
|
twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts = 3
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Lock()
|
|
twoFAAttemptMap = origMap
|
|
twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts = origCap
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
now := clock.Now()
|
|
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
|
|
st := &twoFAAttemptState{}
|
|
st.setLastActive(now.Add(-time.Second))
|
|
st.count.Store(5)
|
|
twoFAAttemptMap[fmt.Sprintf("locked_%d", i)] = st
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
st := twoFAAttemptStateFor("new_user")
|
|
require.NotNil(t, st)
|
|
if _, ok := twoFAAttemptMap["new_user"]; ok {
|
|
t.Error("expected the transient state NOT to be stored when the map is full of in-lockout records")
|
|
}
|
|
if len(twoFAAttemptMap) != 3 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected all 3 locked-out records to survive, got %d", len(twoFAAttemptMap))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// Attempt-map concurrency (finding-f — lastAt data race)
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFAAttemptMap_ConcurrentVerifyAndEviction is a -race smoke test for the
|
|
// attempt-map data race: checkTwoFACode's st.mu-guarded writes to count and
|
|
// lastAt run concurrently with twoFAAttemptStateFor's mapMu-only eviction scan
|
|
// reading them. lastAt is an atomic.Int64 (nanoseconds since the epoch), so the
|
|
// scan and lockedOut read it without st.mu — no mutex inversion (mapMu→st.mu is
|
|
// forbidden) and no torn 8-byte timestamp. Asserts every concurrent call
|
|
// completes (no deadlock), pre-pinned locked-out records survive the eviction
|
|
// pressure, and the map never grows past the cap.
|
|
func TestTwoFAAttemptMap_ConcurrentVerifyAndEviction(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Lock()
|
|
origMap := twoFAAttemptMap
|
|
origCap := twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts
|
|
twoFAAttemptMap = make(map[string]*twoFAAttemptState)
|
|
twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts = 128
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Lock()
|
|
twoFAAttemptMap = origMap
|
|
twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts = origCap
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
const verifyWorkers = 6
|
|
const evictWorkers = 4
|
|
const iters = 25
|
|
|
|
// Pre-pin locked-out victims so we can assert afterwards that in-window
|
|
// lockout records are never evicted under concurrent pressure.
|
|
now := clock.Now()
|
|
victims := make(map[string]*twoFAAttemptState, verifyWorkers)
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Lock()
|
|
for i := 0; i < verifyWorkers; i++ {
|
|
st := &twoFAAttemptState{}
|
|
st.setLastActive(now.Add(-time.Second))
|
|
st.count.Store(twoFAMaxAttempts)
|
|
id := fmt.Sprintf("victim_%d", i)
|
|
twoFAAttemptMap[id] = st
|
|
victims[id] = st
|
|
}
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
var wg sync.WaitGroup
|
|
|
|
// Verifiers mirror checkTwoFACode's critical section on shared states: take
|
|
// st.mu, reset an expired window, bump the counter, stamp lastAt, and read
|
|
// lockedOut — overlapping the eviction scan's lock-free atomic reads.
|
|
for w := 0; w < verifyWorkers; w++ {
|
|
wg.Add(1)
|
|
go func(w int) {
|
|
defer wg.Done()
|
|
for iter := 0; iter < iters; iter++ {
|
|
st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(fmt.Sprintf("verify_%d_%d", w, iter))
|
|
st.mu.Lock()
|
|
if now := clock.Now(); now.Sub(st.lastActive()) > twoFAAttemptWindow {
|
|
st.count.Store(0)
|
|
st.setLastActive(now)
|
|
}
|
|
_ = st.lockedOut(clock.Now())
|
|
st.count.Add(1)
|
|
st.setLastActive(clock.Now())
|
|
st.mu.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
}(w)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Evictors drive twoFAAttemptStateFor's cap-driven eviction scan, which
|
|
// reads count + lastAt WITHOUT st.mu — the access pattern under test.
|
|
for w := 0; w < evictWorkers; w++ {
|
|
wg.Add(1)
|
|
go func(w int) {
|
|
defer wg.Done()
|
|
for iter := 0; iter < 2000; iter++ {
|
|
_ = twoFAAttemptStateFor(fmt.Sprintf("flood_%d_%d", w, iter))
|
|
}
|
|
}(w)
|
|
}
|
|
wg.Wait()
|
|
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Lock()
|
|
defer twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
|
|
for id, st := range victims {
|
|
if _, ok := twoFAAttemptMap[id]; !ok {
|
|
t.Errorf("in-window lockout record %s was evicted under concurrent pressure", id)
|
|
}
|
|
if !st.lockedOut(clock.Now()) {
|
|
t.Errorf("victim %s must still report locked out", id)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if len(twoFAAttemptMap) > twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts {
|
|
t.Errorf("map grew past the cap: %d > %d", len(twoFAAttemptMap), twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestTwoFA_ConcurrentCheckTwoFACode_NoDeadlock runs the REAL verify path
|
|
// concurrently: each goroutine mints its own transaction and user (pgx.Tx is
|
|
// not concurrency-safe, so per-goroutine tx avoids sharing one), burns the
|
|
// 5-attempt budget to lockout, and asserts lockedOut afterwards — while other
|
|
// goroutines hammer the map eviction scan through twoFAAttemptStateFor. The
|
|
// test completes only if no goroutine deadlocks on mapMu/st.mu.
|
|
func TestTwoFA_ConcurrentCheckTwoFACode_NoDeadlock(t *testing.T) {
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Lock()
|
|
origMap := twoFAAttemptMap
|
|
origCap := twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts
|
|
twoFAAttemptMap = make(map[string]*twoFAAttemptState)
|
|
twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts = 64
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() {
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Lock()
|
|
twoFAAttemptMap = origMap
|
|
twoFAMaxTrackedAttempts = origCap
|
|
twoFAAttemptMapMu.Unlock()
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
const workers = 6
|
|
const iters = 15
|
|
var wg sync.WaitGroup
|
|
errCh := make(chan error, workers)
|
|
|
|
for w := 0; w < workers; w++ {
|
|
wg.Add(1)
|
|
go func(w int) {
|
|
defer wg.Done()
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
tx, err := db.Conn.Pool().Begin(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
errCh <- fmt.Errorf("worker %d begin: %w", w, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer tx.Rollback(context.Background())
|
|
tctx := db.ContextWithTx(ctx, tx)
|
|
for iter := 0; iter < iters; iter++ {
|
|
userID, err := fixtures.CreateTestUser(tx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
errCh <- fmt.Errorf("worker %d iter %d create user: %w", w, iter, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
seedPendingTwoFA(t, tctx, tx, userID, "123456")
|
|
st := twoFAAttemptStateFor(userID)
|
|
for attempt := 1; attempt <= twoFAMaxAttempts; attempt++ {
|
|
st.mu.Lock()
|
|
res, err := checkTwoFACode(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/user/2fa/verify", nil).WithContext(tctx), userID, st, "999999")
|
|
st.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
errCh <- fmt.Errorf("worker %d iter %d check: %w", w, iter, err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
want := twoFACodeIncorrect
|
|
if attempt == twoFAMaxAttempts {
|
|
want = twoFACodeLockedOut
|
|
}
|
|
if res != want {
|
|
errCh <- fmt.Errorf("worker %d iter %d attempt %d: got %v, want %v", w, iter, attempt, res, want)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !st.lockedOut(clock.Now()) {
|
|
errCh <- fmt.Errorf("worker %d iter %d: must be locked out after %d wrong codes", w, iter, twoFAMaxAttempts)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}(w)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Concurrent map pressure: twoFAAttemptStateFor reads count + lastAt under
|
|
// mapMu only, racing the workers' st.mu-guarded writes (the old data race).
|
|
for w := 0; w < 4; w++ {
|
|
wg.Add(1)
|
|
go func(w int) {
|
|
defer wg.Done()
|
|
for iter := 0; iter < 1000; iter++ {
|
|
_ = twoFAAttemptStateFor(fmt.Sprintf("flood_%d_%d", w, iter))
|
|
}
|
|
}(w)
|
|
}
|
|
wg.Wait()
|
|
close(errCh)
|
|
for err := range errCh {
|
|
t.Error(err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|