popertots
2cdbad0cea
PSR 2017 reg 100 makes SCA mandatory and non-waivable for customer-initiated stored-credential charges; a merchant-side 2FA check cannot legally substitute for it (authorising a token-less charge via 2FA leaves the MERCHANT liable for ECI 7 / SLI 210 chargebacks and reg 77(6) compensation regardless of consent). - payments/twofa.go: the homegrown 2FA fallback for token-less saved-card charges is REMOVED ENTIRELY. requireTwoFactorForCardAccess is now SCA-only: a non-empty Square verification_token (charge surfaces, token forwarded to Square) skips the gate; anything else is refused 402 verification_required. enforceSCAFallbackConsent is a compile-compatible no-op (fallback never runs). - New requireTwoFactorForCardAccessWithTokenValidation distinguishes surfaces where the token IS forwarded to Square (charge — Square validates it) from card-SAVE surfaces (token client-asserted, never forwarded: a non-empty token must NOT skip the save gate, auth-F1). - SCA tokenize-result wire contract (C1): a saved card charged with a fresh one-time tokenize-result sends the token as the charge SOURCE (new_card_token -> source_id) alongside saved_card_id, never a separate verification_token. resolveChargeSource resolves the saved-card branch FIRST (customer from the card row, token as source) so combined token+card requests are SCA-clean. - C6 consent fields (consent_version / consent_accepted) added to the booking/ tip/till/gift-card charge requests, enforced server-side before any fallback charge could reach Square and recorded on the 2fa_fallback_charge audit row; logVerificationTokenProvenance traces minted tokens to their charge. - user 2FA issuance gate refactored into pure build-agnostic functions (twoFAPepperConfigured / twoFADeliveryChannelConfigured / twoFAEnsureIssueAllowedStrict) shared with the payments re-issue path and exercised directly by the test,dev suite; TWO_FACTOR_FALLBACK switch and .env.example entry removed; startup posture notes updated. - Test coverage: fail-closed 2FA production gates (pepper/delivery), token validation on save vs charge surfaces, completion idempotency, idempotency key determinism, refund-policy 72h/24h epsilon boundaries, VAT parity.
180 lines
9.0 KiB
Bash
180 lines
9.0 KiB
Bash
# Database Credentials for all services
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# These are used by the 'postgres' service to initialize the database
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# These are used by 'backend' (Go) and 'sabredav' (PHP)
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POSTGRES_USER=myuser
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=mypassword
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POSTGRES_DB=mydb
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# and to connect to the 'postgres' service on the Docker network
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POSTGRES_HOST=postgres
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POSTGRES_PORT=5432
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# JWT_SECRET_KEY — REQUIRED, FAIL-CLOSED. The backend refuses to start with an
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# empty, weak (<32 chars), or known-placeholder value, because a shared/public
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# signing key lets anyone forge an admin JWT. Generate a strong random key:
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# openssl rand -hex 32
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JWT_SECRET_KEY=
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# S3/R2 Configuration (for image storage)
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# Dev: Uses local Rustfs container (see compose.yml)
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# Prod: Use Cloudflare R2 credentials
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S3_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:9000
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# Public URL the BROWSER fetches images from. This is HOST-SPECIFIC: it must be
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# the machine's current LAN IP (DHCP changes it). Run `hostname -I` to check.
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# A stale IP makes images fail to load even though the objects exist in Rustfs.
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S3_PUBLIC_URL=http://192.168.0.45:9000
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S3_ACCESS_KEY=rustfsadmin
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S3_SECRET_KEY=rustfsadmin
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S3_BUCKET=crussell
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S3_PROFILE_PICS_BUCKET=crussell-profile-pics
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AWS_REGION=eu-west-2
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# Set DAV_SKIP_INIT=1 to skip CardDAV server initialization (e.g., in CI/test environments).
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DAV_SKIP_INIT=1
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# Prod only: Cloudflare R2 (overrides S3_* vars in non-dev builds).
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# Local dev uses the S3_* vars above (from .env). Not needed for local builds.
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R2_ENDPOINT=
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# Required for production object storage — the prod S3 client (backend/internal/s3/s3.go,
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# via getEnv) reads all four below; not needed for local dev builds.
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R2_ACCESS_KEY=
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R2_SECRET_KEY=
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R2_BUCKET=crussell
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R2_PUBLIC_URL=
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# Square Payment Gateway
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SQUARE_ACCESS_TOKEN=
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SQUARE_LOCATION_ID=
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SQUARE_TERMINAL_DEVICE_ID=
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SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=mock
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# SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API — dev-build safety valve. In a `//go:build dev` build the
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# backend HARD-FAILS (refuses to construct the client) when SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT
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# is 'production', because a leftover/typo'd production env + real key in a dev
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# shell would create real charges. Set SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API=1 ONLY to
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# deliberately route a dev build to the real production API. Never set in a
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# deployed production build.
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SQUARE_ALLOW_REAL_API=
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# 2FA — homegrown two-factor authentication for ADMIN/ACCOUNT VERIFICATION ONLY
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# (setup, disable, delete-account re-auth). It is NEVER a card-charge
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# authorisation. Saved-card online payments are authorised EXCLUSIVELY by
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# Square PSD2 SCA (3-D Secure / buyer verification), wired for both new-card
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# and saved-card charges. PSR 2017 reg 100 makes SCA mandatory and non-waivable
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# for customer-initiated stored-credential charges, so a saved-card charge
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# carrying no Square verification token is REFUSED 402 verification_required
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# (the payment does not go through; the customer can try again later, or at
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# the till they can be invited to pay online later instead) — the homegrown
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# 2FA fallback was removed entirely and no TWO_FACTOR_FALLBACK switch exists.
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# Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED:
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# ON unless REQUIRE_2FA explicitly disables it (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive)
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# OR SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT explicitly equals one of mock/dev/development/test.
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# Empty or unknown SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT values are treated as production-enforced
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# (a mistyped env var can never silently disarm the gate; the backend logs a
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# startup warning in that case). Set REQUIRE_2FA=false only in controlled
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# environments. The dev mock simulates SCA
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# (SimulateSavedCardVerificationRequired + cnon:sca-... tokenize-results), so
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# development has full parity with the SCA-only production posture.
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# Code delivery: the intended channel is email/SMS (the method chosen at
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# setup) — NOT wired yet. Until it lands, the verification code is delivered
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# via the server log (a [2FA]-prefixed line) when the operator opts into
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# TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true (see below); in enforced/production
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# environments an operator must relay the logged code to the user out-of-band;
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# the API never returns the code while enforcement is ON.
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REQUIRE_2FA=true
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# TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER — server-side pepper for HMAC-hashing 2FA codes. REQUIRED
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# in production builds: code issuance FAILS CLOSED when it is unset (an
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# unsalted SHA-256 digest in the 1M code space would be offline-brute-forceable
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# from a log/DB leak), mirroring JWT_SECRET_KEY's fail-fast stance. Optional
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# only in dev/test builds, where an unset pepper falls back to the legacy
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# digest with a one-time warning. Generate with:
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# openssl rand -base64 32
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TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER=
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# TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY — defaults false. Production 2FA code issuance
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# FAILS CLOSED without a delivery channel: there is no email/SMS transport yet,
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# so the ONLY production channel is the operator's explicit opt-in to the
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# insecure server-log delivery ([2FA] prefix — anyone with backend log access
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# can defeat the account 2FA gate). MUST be set to true to deliver
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# 2FA codes via the server log in production until email/SMS lands. Dev/test
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# builds always deliver via the log and never consult this flag.
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TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=false
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# SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY — base64-encoded 32-byte AES-256 key for encrypting stored
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# square_request_snapshot rows (buyer PII: email + ccof card tokens) at rest in
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# non-mock (production/sandbox) deployments. If unset/invalid, snapshots fall
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# back to PLAINTEXT with a one-time CRITICAL log warning (money-safety first:
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# the replayable snapshot must not be lost). Generate with:
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# openssl rand -base64 32
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SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY=
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# Webhook config MUST exactly match the Square Dashboard webhook subscription
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# (URL + signature key). If SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL is left unset it
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# defaults to http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square, which is fail-closed (503
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# without the signing key, 403 on missing/bad signature). Leave both empty if
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# you do not use webhooks.
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SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY=
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SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL=
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# Frontend (public — safe for the browser). Square Web Payments SDK:
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# VITE_SQUARE_APPLICATION_ID — client-side application ID (sandbox IDs start with "sandbox-")
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# VITE_SQUARE_LOCATION_ID — Square location ID
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# VITE_SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT — 'mock' | 'sandbox' | 'production'. Local dev: 'mock' renders the
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# frontend's built-in mock card form (tokens only; pairs with
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# SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=mock above). NEVER set 'mock' in production.
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VITE_SQUARE_APPLICATION_ID=
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VITE_SQUARE_LOCATION_ID=
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VITE_SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT=mock
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# Test Database (separate from main DB)
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# Used by testutils/testdb for running tests without corrupting dev data
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TEST_DB_HOST=localhost
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TEST_DB_DSN=
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# Dev/CI mode — set to "true" to enable mock services
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# Disables zxcvbn password checks, skips artificial Square mock delays,
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# skips DAV sync, and relaxes production guardrails
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GO_TESTING=
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# CardDAV (SabreDAV) — profile photo sync
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# DAV_BASE_URL is retained for reference only: the Go backend no longer reads it
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# — updateCardDAV writes through the dav.Service directly (Postgres-backed
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# CardDAV store), it never calls this URL. Only the sabredav PHP container needs
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# the server-side credential below.
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DAV_BASE_URL=http://localhost:8080
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# DAV_ADMIN_PASSWORD — REQUIRED, FAIL-CLOSED. sabredav/server.php refuses to
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# start when unset or set to a known weak/default value ('admin' etc.) — this
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# server exposes customer PII vCards, so no public default credential is ever
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# acceptable. The placeholder below satisfies compose validation only; it MUST
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# be replaced before any deployment (compose.yml fails fast via
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# ${DAV_ADMIN_PASSWORD:?} if it is ever unset). Generate a strong random value:
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# openssl rand -hex 32
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DAV_ADMIN_PASSWORD=changeme-admin-password
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# Logging
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# Set to "true" to disable ANSI color escape sequences in log output
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NO_COLOR=
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# Frontend
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VITE_BACKEND_URL=http://localhost:8080
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# Backend CORS allowlist — comma-separated list of allowed frontend origins
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# (read by the backend CORS middleware, see backend/main.go). Falls back to
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# http://localhost:5173 when unset.
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FRONTEND_ORIGIN=http://localhost:5173
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# TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS — defaults false. Set to true ONLY when a trusted proxy
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# (nginx and/or the Cloudflare edge) sits between clients and this backend and
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# overwrites X-Real-IP / CF-Connecting-IP with the real client IP. When true,
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# the per-IP rate limiter keys requests on those proxy-set headers and main.go
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# registers chi's ClientIPFromHeader("X-Real-IP") middleware. MUST be true
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# behind nginx/Cloudflare, or every request keyed by IP collapses onto the
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# proxy's IP — one client exhausting the limit throttles everyone, and per-IP
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# limiter protection is effectively bypassed. MUST stay false when the backend
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# is origin-exposed: a client talking directly to the backend could otherwise
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# rotate X-Real-IP/CF-Connecting-IP to bypass per-IP rate limiting.
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TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=false
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# Local S3 (Rustfs) — requires GO_TESTING=1 or dev build tag
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# These are dev-only overrides used by the dev S3 implementation
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RUSTFS_ENDPOINT=http://rustfs:9000
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RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=rustfsadmin
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RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=rustfsadmin
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RUSTFS_BUCKET=crussell
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