Rate limiting (backend):
- RateLimit/ProgressiveRateLimit now derive the per-client key from
CF-Connecting-IP, then chi's GetClientIP (the X-Real-IP value nginx sets at
main.go:323), then RemoteAddr. Previously only CF-Connecting-IP/RemoteAddr
were used, so behind the Docker nginx every client shared ONE bucket per
limiter — 10 logins/min site-wide blocked all users (the reported
'Error: Rate limit exceeded' after seeding was the login 10/min bucket
tripped by the seed's 11 logins, all keyed 127.0.0.1 in dev).
- Real implementation is now //go:build !dev || test; new
mw/ratelimit_dev.go (//go:build dev && !test) is a no-op passthrough, so
'go run -tags dev' (the dev harness) never rate-limits dev/seeding traffic,
while production and tests (-tags test,dev) keep the real limiter. The docs
(Technical Manual) already claimed dev no-op behaviour — the code now
matches. NewProgressiveRateLimiter is provided in the no-op build because
tag-free ratelimit_shared.go:104 initializes the global at package init.
Admin 2FA management (backend):
- users.two_factor_last_used_at TIMESTAMPTZ column (init-script, fresh-DB).
- AdminUserDetail now returns twoFactorEnabled/twoFactorMethod/
twoFactorLastUsedAt.
- New POST /api/admin/users/{id}/2fa/remove (admin-only): clears all 5 2FA
columns + drops the user's in-memory attempt/lockout state — an admin
recovery path when a user loses 2FA access.
- two_factor_last_used_at updated on every successful 2FA verification.
Account page (/account):
- 2FA section moved under the Notifications heading, visible to all roles;
Email/SMS toggles (Notifications styling) acting as a radio group with
'none' state; Apply button only when the selection differs from saved;
unselecting shows a payment-rules warning dialog; the dev-comment
'2FA is optional right now (REQUIRE_2FA is off)' and the 'Dev code:' debug
line are removed.
- Cards tab hidden from admin role.
Admin modals:
- User Details modal: new 'Two-Factor Authentication' section above Patch
Tests showing Enabled/Disabled, method, last-used timestamp, and a Remove
2FA button with a confirmation dialog (POST to the admin endpoint, refetch
on success).
- Booking Details modal: the customer's name now links to their User Details
modal (optional openUserModal prop threaded through admin/+page and
today/+page; other call sites unaffected).
Take Payment + /today:
- PaymentModal shows pre-tip (netTotal) and post-tip (totalWithTip) totals
with a tip-amount delta row only when a tip is selected; zero-tip flow
unchanged.
- The /today Payment button is hidden unless the booking is in_progress or
completed, matching the backend gate (was shown for confirmed/pending
bookings, producing the 'Booking must be in_progress or completed' error).
Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (20/20 ok
incl. new admin 2FA tests + mw tests), go build ./... and -tags dev both
compile, go vet clean, svelte-check 0 errors 0 warnings, env-docs gate OK,
docker compose config valid.
157 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
157 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
//go:build !dev || test
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package mw
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import (
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"crussell/clock"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
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)
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func NewRateLimiter(limit int, window time.Duration) *RateLimiter {
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rl := &RateLimiter{
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requests: make(map[string][]time.Time),
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limit: limit,
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window: window,
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}
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registerLimiter(rl)
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return rl
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}
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func (rl *RateLimiter) Allow(key string) bool {
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rl.mu.Lock()
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defer rl.mu.Unlock()
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now := clock.Now()
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windowStart := now.Add(-rl.window)
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var valid []time.Time
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for _, t := range rl.requests[key] {
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if t.After(windowStart) {
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valid = append(valid, t)
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}
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}
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if len(valid) >= rl.limit {
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rl.requests[key] = valid
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return false
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}
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rl.requests[key] = append(valid, now)
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return true
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}
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func NewProgressiveRateLimiter() *ProgressiveRateLimiter {
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return &ProgressiveRateLimiter{
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requests: make(map[string]*ipProgressiveState),
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}
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}
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// Check returns the delay in milliseconds. Returns 0 if no delay needed.
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// Strategy:
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// - Count requests in last 5 seconds (burst): allow up to 30
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// - Count requests in last 60 seconds (sustained): allow up to 60
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// - Only delay when BOTH windows are exceeded (high sustained rate with recent bursts)
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// - Progressive: once throttled, delay increases with sustained rate
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func (prl *ProgressiveRateLimiter) Check(ip string) (delayMs int) {
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prl.mu.Lock()
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defer prl.mu.Unlock()
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now := clock.Now()
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state, exists := prl.requests[ip]
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if !exists {
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prl.requests[ip] = &ipProgressiveState{
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timestamps: []time.Time{now},
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}
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return 0
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}
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state.timestamps = append(state.timestamps, now)
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burstCutoff := now.Add(-5 * time.Second)
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burstCount := 0
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for _, t := range state.timestamps {
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if t.After(burstCutoff) {
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burstCount++
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}
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}
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sustainedCutoff := now.Add(-60 * time.Second)
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sustainedCount := 0
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for _, t := range state.timestamps {
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if t.After(sustainedCutoff) {
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sustainedCount++
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}
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}
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if burstCount <= 30 && sustainedCount <= 120 {
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return 0
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}
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// Progressive delay based on how far over the sustained limit they are
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// Rate = requests per minute
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switch {
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case sustainedCount <= 140:
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return 500 // 500ms - scraping but not too aggressively
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case sustainedCount <= 200:
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return 2000 // 2s - moderate spam
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case sustainedCount <= 300:
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return 5000 // 5s - heavy spam
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default:
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return 10000 // 10s - abuse
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}
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}
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func ProgressiveRateLimit(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ip := clientIP(r)
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delay := globalProgressiveLimiter.Check(ip)
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if delay > 0 {
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time.Sleep(time.Duration(delay) * time.Millisecond)
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w.Header().Set("X-RateLimit-Delay", fmt.Sprintf("%d", delay))
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// RateLimit middleware - limits requests per IP
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func RateLimit(limit int, window time.Duration) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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limiter := NewRateLimiter(limit, window)
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ip := clientIP(r)
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if !limiter.Allow(ip) {
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RespondJSON(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, map[string]string{"error": "Rate limit exceeded"})
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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// clientIP derives the per-client rate-limit key. Priority:
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// 1. CF-Connecting-IP header (set only when Cloudflare is the edge;
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// nginx never sets it, so it cannot be spoofed through our proxy)
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// 2. middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context()) — the X-Real-IP value nginx sets,
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// captured by middleware.ClientIPFromHeader("X-Real-IP") in main.go
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// 3. net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr) / r.RemoteAddr fallback
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func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
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if ip := r.Header.Get("CF-Connecting-IP"); ip != "" {
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return ip
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}
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if ip := middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context()); ip != "" {
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return ip
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}
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if ip, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr); err == nil && ip != "" {
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return ip
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}
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return r.RemoteAddr
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}
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