Files
Crussell/backend/handlers/auth/local.go
T
popertotsandSisyphus e4b9003439 refactor(handlers): migrate remaining backend handlers to clock.Now() and transaction patterns
Apply clock.Now() migration, transaction wrapping, and minor refactors across admin, scheduling, today, user, auth handler, notifications, webhooks, services, portfolio, ratelimit, testutils, and main.go.

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-06-24 23:43:50 +01:00

695 lines
20 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"crussell/auth"
"crussell/clock"
"crussell/db"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
"crussell/internal/dav"
"crussell/internal/validators"
"crussell/internal/zxcvbnjs"
"crussell/mw"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
"os"
"regexp"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/nyaruka/phonenumbers"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
"golang.org/x/text/cases"
"golang.org/x/text/language"
)
const maxLoginInProgress = 20
// Login state management
var (
loginStateMu sync.Mutex
loginInProgress = make(map[string]time.Time)
)
func init() {
go func() {
ticker := time.NewTicker(1 * time.Hour)
defer ticker.Stop()
for range ticker.C {
func() {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
log.Printf("Panic recovered in login state cleanup ticker: %v", r)
}
}()
loginStateMu.Lock()
now := clock.Now()
// Clean up stuck loginInProgress entries (older than 30s)
for userID, startedAt := range loginInProgress {
if now.Sub(startedAt) > 30*time.Second {
delete(loginInProgress, userID)
}
}
loginStateMu.Unlock()
}()
}
}()
}
type RegisterRequest struct {
FirstName string `json:"firstName" validate:"required,min=1,max=50"`
LastName string `json:"lastName" validate:"required,min=1,max=50"`
Email string `json:"email" validate:"required,email,max=254"`
Password string `json:"password" validate:"required,min=6,max=72"`
Phone string `json:"phone" validate:"required"`
DateOfBirth string `json:"dateOfBirth" validate:"required"`
AgreedToPolicy bool `json:"agreedToPolicy"`
ReferralCode string `json:"referralCode,omitempty" validate:"omitempty,max=12"`
}
type LoginRequest struct {
Email string `json:"email" validate:"required,email,max=254"`
Password string `json:"password" validate:"required,max=72"`
}
// POST /api/register
func RegisterHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req RegisterRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if err := validators.Validate.Struct(&req); err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Must accept terms
if !req.AgreedToPolicy {
http.Error(w, "must agree to terms", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Normalize input
req.Email = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(req.Email))
req.FirstName = strings.TrimSpace(req.FirstName)
req.LastName = strings.TrimSpace(req.LastName)
req.Phone = strings.TrimSpace(req.Phone)
req.DateOfBirth = strings.TrimSpace(req.DateOfBirth)
// Check required fields
if req.FirstName == "" || req.LastName == "" || req.Email == "" || req.Phone == "" || req.DateOfBirth == "" || req.Password == "" {
http.Error(w, "all fields are required", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Password must not exceed bcrypt's 72-byte limit
if len(req.Password) > 72 {
http.Error(w, "password must be 72 characters or less", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if len(req.Password) < 6 {
http.Error(w, "password must be at least 6 characters", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Server-side password strength check using the same @zxcvbn-ts/core as the frontend
// via goja (ExecJS-style). Guarantees exact parity with frontend scoring.
// Skipped when GO_TESTING=1 (dev/test environments) to allow weaker passwords.
if os.Getenv("GO_TESTING") != "1" {
passwordStrength, err := zxcvbnjs.Score(req.Password)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Password strength check failed: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "password is too weak. please choose a stronger password.", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if passwordStrength < 2 {
http.Error(w, "password is too weak. please choose a stronger password.", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
}
// Validate name (unicode letters, spaces, hyphen, apostrophe, dot)
nameRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`^[\p{L}\p{M}\s\-'\.]+$`)
if !nameRegex.MatchString(req.FirstName) {
http.Error(w, "invalid characters in name", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Validate length
if len(req.FirstName) > 50 || len(req.FirstName) < 1 {
http.Error(w, "first name must be 1-50 characters", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if len(req.LastName) > 50 || len(req.LastName) < 1 {
http.Error(w, "last name must be 1-50 characters", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Validate email format
if err := validators.ValidateEmail(req.Email); err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Normalize phone (remove spaces, hyphens, parentheses)
req.Phone = strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
if r >= '0' && r <= '9' || r == '+' {
return r
}
return -1
}, req.Phone)
// Validate UK phone number
phone, err := ValidateUKPhoneNumber(req.Phone)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid phone number format", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
req.Phone = strings.TrimSpace(phone)
// Convert names to title case
// Create per-call caser (cases.Caser is not goroutine-safe)
tc := cases.Title(language.English)
req.FirstName = tc.String(strings.ToLower(req.FirstName))
req.LastName = tc.String(strings.ToLower(req.LastName))
// Parse date of birth
dob, err := time.Parse("2006-01-02", req.DateOfBirth)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid date format", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Reject if younger than 16
if !dob.Before(clock.Now().AddDate(-16, 0, 0)) {
http.Error(w, "account creation prohibited for users under 16. Please call to book an appointment.", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Validate referral code if provided
var referrerID *string
req.ReferralCode = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(req.ReferralCode))
if req.ReferralCode != "" {
if len(req.ReferralCode) != 12 {
http.Error(w, "referral code must be exactly 12 characters", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
referralCodeRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9]{12}$`)
if !referralCodeRegex.MatchString(req.ReferralCode) {
http.Error(w, "referral code must be alphanumeric", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Look up referrer by referral code
err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(),
"SELECT id FROM users WHERE referral_code = $1", req.ReferralCode).Scan(&referrerID)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid referral code", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
}
// Hash password
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(req.Password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
defer tx.Rollback(r.Context())
now := clock.Now()
// Insert and return the generated ID
var userID string
err = tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
INSERT INTO users
(n_first_name, n_last_name, phone, date_of_birth, email, password_hash,
account_type, privacy_policy_and_terms_consent, policy_consent_updated_at,
created_at, updated_at)
VALUES
($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, 'email', $7, $8, $8, $8)
RETURNING id
`, req.FirstName, req.LastName, req.Phone, dob, req.Email, string(hash), req.AgreedToPolicy, now).Scan(&userID)
if err != nil {
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "duplicate key") {
http.Error(w, "an account with this email already exists", http.StatusConflict)
} else {
http.Error(w, "could not create user", http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
return
}
// Record referral relationship if referral code was provided
if referrerID != nil {
_, err = tx.Exec(r.Context(), `
INSERT INTO user_referrals (referrer_id, referred_id)
VALUES ($1, $2)
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
`, *referrerID, userID)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "could not process referral", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
}
if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
go func() {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
log.Printf("Panic recovered in CardDAV contact creation: %v", r)
}
}()
input := dav.ContactInput{
UserID: userID,
FirstName: req.FirstName,
LastName: req.LastName,
Email: req.Email,
Phone: req.Phone,
DOB: req.DateOfBirth,
}
if err := dav.Service.CreateContact(1, userID, input); err != nil {
log.Printf("Warning: Failed to create contact in DAV for user %s: %v", userID, err)
}
}()
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
}
func ValidateUKPhoneNumber(phone string) (string, error) {
num, err := phonenumbers.Parse(phone, "GB")
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if !phonenumbers.IsValidNumber(num) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid phone number")
}
// Check if it's actually a UK number
if phonenumbers.GetRegionCodeForNumber(num) != "GB" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("only UK numbers allowed")
}
// Format in E.164 format (+44...)
return phonenumbers.Format(num, phonenumbers.E164), nil
}
// POST /api/login
func LoginHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req LoginRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if err := validators.Validate.Struct(&req); err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Normalize email
req.Email = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(req.Email))
var userID, passwordHash, role string
ctx := r.Context()
err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
SELECT id, password_hash, account_role
FROM users
WHERE email = $1 AND account_type = 'email'
`, req.Email).Scan(&userID, &passwordHash, &role)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid credentials", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Check if account is locked
var failedAttempts int
var lockedUntil *time.Time
err = db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT failed_attempts, locked_until FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).Scan(&failedAttempts, &lockedUntil)
if err == nil && lockedUntil != nil && clock.Now().Before(*lockedUntil) {
http.Error(w, "account is temporarily locked. try again later.", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
log.Printf("LOGIN_AUDIT: locked account attempt - user=%s ip=%s", userID, middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context()))
return
}
// Check if user is already logging in
loginStateMu.Lock()
if t, ok := loginInProgress[userID]; ok && time.Since(t) < 30*time.Second {
loginStateMu.Unlock()
http.Error(w, "login already in progress", http.StatusConflict) // 409
return
}
// Cap the map size - drop new request if at capacity
if len(loginInProgress) >= maxLoginInProgress {
loginStateMu.Unlock()
http.Error(w, "server busy, try again later", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
return
}
loginInProgress[userID] = clock.Now()
loginStateMu.Unlock()
// Always clear flag when done
defer func() {
loginStateMu.Lock()
delete(loginInProgress, userID)
loginStateMu.Unlock()
}()
// Verify password
if err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(passwordHash), []byte(req.Password)); err != nil {
// Increment failed attempts in DB with progressive lockout
var newFailed int
var newLockedUntil *time.Time
tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
defer tx.Rollback(r.Context())
err = tx.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
UPDATE users
SET failed_attempts = failed_attempts + 1,
locked_until = CASE
WHEN failed_attempts + 1 >= 5 THEN NOW() + (CASE
WHEN failed_attempts + 1 >= 20 THEN INTERVAL '2 hours'
WHEN failed_attempts + 1 >= 10 THEN INTERVAL '1 hour'
WHEN failed_attempts + 1 >= 7 THEN INTERVAL '30 minutes'
ELSE INTERVAL '15 minutes'
END)
ELSE locked_until
END
WHERE id = $1
RETURNING failed_attempts, locked_until
`, userID).Scan(&newFailed, &newLockedUntil)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to update failed login attempts: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
log.Printf("LOGIN_AUDIT: failed login user=%s ip=%s attempts=%d locked_until=%v",
userID, middleware.GetClientIP(r.Context()), newFailed, newLockedUntil)
http.Error(w, "invalid credentials", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// On success, clear lockout and update last_login
// TODO: Password reset flow (MVP #4 in Future Work doc) must also clear
// failed_attempts and locked_until — a locked-out user can't call this handler.
tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
defer tx.Rollback(r.Context())
_, err = tx.Exec(r.Context(), `UPDATE users SET failed_attempts = 0, locked_until = NULL, last_login_at = NOW() WHERE id = $1`, userID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to reset login attempts on success: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "Internal server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Generate JWT
tokenString, jti, err := auth.GenerateToken(userID, role)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "could not generate token", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Generate refresh token for token rotation
refreshToken, err := auth.GenerateRefreshToken(r.Context(), userID, role)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to generate refresh token: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "could not generate refresh token", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(auth.AuthResponse{
Token: tokenString,
JTI: jti,
RefreshToken: refreshToken,
})
}
// POST /api/refresh-token (requires auth middleware)
func RefreshTokenHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, _ := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
role, _ := mw.GetUserRole(r.Context())
oldJTI, _ := mw.GetJTI(r.Context())
// Verify user still exists and role hasn't changed
var currentRole string
err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `
SELECT account_role FROM users WHERE id = $1
`, userID).Scan(&currentRole)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "user not found", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
if currentRole != role {
http.Error(w, "role changed, please log in again", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Revoke the old token's JTI before issuing a new one (rotation)
if oldJTI != "" {
auth.RevokeJTI(r.Context(), oldJTI, clock.Now().Add(90*24*time.Hour)) // match refresh token lifetime
}
// Generate new token
newToken, jti, err := auth.GenerateToken(userID, currentRole)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "could not generate token", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// Also issue a refresh token (opaque, stored in DB)
refreshToken, err := auth.GenerateRefreshToken(r.Context(), userID, currentRole)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to generate refresh token: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "could not generate refresh token", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(auth.AuthResponse{
Token: newToken,
JTI: jti,
RefreshToken: refreshToken,
})
}
// POST /api/logout (requires auth middleware)
func LogoutHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
jti, ok := mw.GetJTI(r.Context())
if !ok || jti == "" {
http.Error(w, "invalid token", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Revoke the JTI — match the access token lifetime (1 hour)
auth.RevokeJTI(r.Context(), jti, clock.Now().Add(1*time.Hour))
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]bool{"success": true})
}
type VerificationCodeRequest struct {
Email string `json:"email" validate:"required,email,max=254"`
}
type VerifyCodeRequest struct {
Code string `json:"code" validate:"required,max=64"`
}
type VerificationResponse struct {
Success bool `json:"success"`
Message string `json:"message,omitempty"`
}
func GenerateVerificationCodeHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req VerificationCodeRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if err := validators.Validate.Struct(&req); err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
email := strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(req.Email))
if email == "" {
http.Error(w, "email is required", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
var userID string
err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(),
"SELECT id FROM users WHERE LOWER(email) = $1", email,
).Scan(&userID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(VerificationResponse{Success: true, Message: "If the email exists, a verification code will be sent"})
return
}
log.Printf("Failed to look up user: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
expiresAt := clock.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)
var code string
err = db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(),
`INSERT INTO verification_codes (user_id, purpose, expires_at) VALUES ($1, 'email_verify', $2) RETURNING code`,
userID, expiresAt,
).Scan(&code)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to insert verification code: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(VerificationResponse{Success: true, Message: "Verification code generated"})
}
func VerifyCodeHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req VerifyCodeRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "invalid request", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
if err := validators.Validate.Struct(&req); err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
code := strings.TrimSpace(req.Code)
if code == "" {
http.Error(w, "code is required", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
var userID string
var purpose string
var expiresAt time.Time
err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(),
`SELECT user_id, purpose, expires_at FROM verification_codes
WHERE code = $1 AND used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > NOW()`,
code,
).Scan(&userID, &purpose, &expiresAt)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
// Check if code exists but was already used or expired
var checkUsedAt *time.Time
checkErr := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(),
`SELECT used_at FROM verification_codes WHERE code = $1`, code,
).Scan(&checkUsedAt)
if checkErr != nil {
// Code doesn't exist at all
http.Error(w, "invalid or expired code", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// Code exists but was already used
if checkUsedAt != nil {
http.Error(w, "code already used", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// Code exists but expired
http.Error(w, "invalid or expired code", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
log.Printf("Failed to verify code: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(r.Context())
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to start transaction: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
defer tx.Rollback(r.Context())
_, err = tx.Exec(r.Context(),
`UPDATE verification_codes SET used_at = NOW() WHERE code = $1`,
code,
)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to mark code as used: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if purpose == "email_verify" {
_, err = tx.Exec(r.Context(),
`UPDATE users SET account_role = 'verified_email' WHERE id = $1 AND account_role = 'unverified_email'`,
userID,
)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to update user role: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
}
if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to commit verification: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(VerificationResponse{Success: true, Message: "Email verified successfully"})
}
// TODO(M8): Replace crypto/rand fallback with proper error handling - time-based fallback is predictable
func generateSecureCode(length int) string {
bytes := make([]byte, length)
if _, err := rand.Read(bytes); err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to generate random code: %v", err)
return strings.ToLower(fmt.Sprintf("%x", clock.Now().UnixNano()))
}
return strings.ToLower(fmt.Sprintf("%x", bytes))
}