Addresses the adversarial fresh-eyes audit (findings A1-A20) plus review-round fixes: - CRITICAL A1: replay-by-key rescue cross-checks replayed CreatedAt; ccof blind-fail leaves pending with CRITICAL + notification instead of clawing back - A2/A3/A4: till idempotency key restored to unconditional hash; tip rejected in CreateBookingPayment; campaign discount now reduces the charged amount (deposit credit) - A5: admin notifications on blind-fail, manual-refund re-arm, cap-stranded charge-group, webhook FAILED/REJECTED refunds - A6/A10: BuyGiftCard idempotency user-scoped; gift-card slot scan advances past failed rows - A7/A14/A15: 2FA user+IP limiter, SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY startup validation, accurate pepper/log-delivery docs - A8/A9: snapshot encryption on all write+reuse sites; MPV->SPV effective voucher type (single VAT point) - A11/A12/A13/A16: amount-aware refund reconciliation; completed-booking refund re-validation; till retry dedup; PaymentWasRefunded on SquareClient interface - A17/A18/A19/A20: CI runs npm test; confirm_overflow_tip frontend dialog; unknown-event admin notification; mock token redaction - M7 ConfirmOverflowTip, M9 snapshot encryption, C1 discount ordering regression test - Frontend vitest framework (41 tests), backend coverage for fixed functions, docs corrected (2,269 tests, SUPPORT_EMAIL tokens, resolution status) All 25 backend packages pass; frontend 41/41; build + env-docs green.
127 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
127 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
//go:build test
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package mw
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import (
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"testing"
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"time"
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"crussell/clock"
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)
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// ============================================================
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// TrustProxyHeaders — exported accessor for the init-time
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// TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS capture (batch-1 fix)
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// ============================================================
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// TestTrustProxyHeaders_ReflectsPackageVar pins the accessor contract: it
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// reports the current value of the package-level trustProxyHeaders flag. The
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// flag is captured once at init from TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS (ratelimit_shared.go)
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// and cannot be re-read after process start, so the true/false paths are
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// exercised by toggling the var directly (the test lives in package mw).
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func TestTrustProxyHeaders_ReflectsPackageVar(t *testing.T) {
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saved := trustProxyHeaders
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t.Cleanup(func() { trustProxyHeaders = saved })
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trustProxyHeaders = false
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if TrustProxyHeaders() {
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t.Error("expected TrustProxyHeaders() == false when trustProxyHeaders is false")
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}
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trustProxyHeaders = true
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if !TrustProxyHeaders() {
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t.Error("expected TrustProxyHeaders() == true when trustProxyHeaders is true")
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}
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}
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// TestTrustProxyHeaders_DefaultIsFalse verifies the documented default: when
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// the flag has never been flipped to true (the init-time no-TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS
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// path resolves to false), the accessor reports false — an origin-exposed
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// backend must not trust proxy headers by default.
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func TestTrustProxyHeaders_DefaultIsFalse(t *testing.T) {
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saved := trustProxyHeaders
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t.Cleanup(func() { trustProxyHeaders = saved })
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trustProxyHeaders = false
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if TrustProxyHeaders() {
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t.Error("expected TrustProxyHeaders() to default to false")
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}
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}
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// ============================================================
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// RateLimiter.Allow — fixed-window per-key semantics (batch-1
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// fix regression: per-key bucketing)
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// ============================================================
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// TestRateLimiter_Allow_RespectsLimit verifies exactly `limit` allowances per
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// key within the window, then refusals.
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func TestRateLimiter_Allow_RespectsLimit(t *testing.T) {
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rl := NewRateLimiter(2, time.Minute)
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if !rl.Allow("key-a") {
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t.Fatal("expected first request to be allowed")
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}
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if !rl.Allow("key-a") {
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t.Fatal("expected second request to be allowed")
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}
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if rl.Allow("key-a") {
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t.Error("expected third request to be refused once the limit is hit")
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}
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}
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// TestRateLimiter_Allow_PerKeyBuckets verifies keys are bucketed independently:
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// exhausting one key must not consume another key's allowance.
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func TestRateLimiter_Allow_PerKeyBuckets(t *testing.T) {
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rl := NewRateLimiter(2, time.Minute)
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for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
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if !rl.Allow("busy-key") {
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t.Fatalf("request %d: expected busy-key to be allowed", i+1)
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}
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}
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if rl.Allow("busy-key") {
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t.Error("expected busy-key to be exhausted after its limit")
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}
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if !rl.Allow("other-key") {
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t.Error("expected other-key to keep its own allowance")
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}
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}
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// TestRateLimiter_Allow_WindowExpiryPrunesStale verifies timestamps older than
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// the window no longer count: an Allow after the window is free again.
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func TestRateLimiter_Allow_WindowExpiryPrunesStale(t *testing.T) {
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rl := NewRateLimiter(1, time.Minute)
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// Fill the bucket with a timestamp from before the window started.
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rl.mu.Lock()
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rl.requests["key-stale"] = []time.Time{clock.Now().Add(-2 * time.Minute)}
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rl.mu.Unlock()
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if !rl.Allow("key-stale") {
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t.Error("expected an expired entry to be pruned and the request allowed")
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}
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rl.mu.RLock()
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got := len(rl.requests["key-stale"])
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rl.mu.RUnlock()
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if got != 1 {
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t.Errorf("expected the stale entry to be replaced by the fresh one, got %d entries", got)
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}
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}
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// TestRateLimiter_Allow_BoundaryExactLimit verifies the limit is an exclusive
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// boundary: the request that makes the count EQUAL the limit is the last one
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// allowed.
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func TestRateLimiter_Allow_BoundaryExactLimit(t *testing.T) {
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rl := NewRateLimiter(3, time.Minute)
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for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
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if !rl.Allow("boundary-key") {
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t.Fatalf("request %d: expected allowed (count == limit is allowed)", i+1)
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}
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}
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if rl.Allow("boundary-key") {
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t.Error("expected the count-over-limit request to be refused")
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}
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}
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