Implement every finding from the deep payment review (P0-P2, minors, nitpicks), then close the post-implementation re-review items, then align card-form typography and roll out the Square trust badge. Backend - Square API alignment: - tip_settings.allow_tipping nested under device_options (was top-level: terminal tips were silently lost in prod) - CreateCardOnFile now accepts customerID and sends card.customer_id; saved-card (ccof:) charges forward square_customer_id as CustomerID - New SquareClient methods GetPayment, CreateCustomer, CancelCheckout - SCA verification_token accepted + forwarded in all charge paths - ExpMonth/ExpYear -> *int; URL-path id validation; CancelCheckout NOT_FOUND-only no-op (dropped unverified NOOP); exported ErrorCode/ ErrorDetail helpers; mock rejects raw PANs, RList locks, redacts emails, ForceRefundPending hook Backend - money safety: - sweepManualPendingSquareRefunds reconciles rows WITH square_refund_id instead of stranding them forever - SweepStalePendingPayments reconciles at Square before failing (tri-state: leave pending on transport error, rescue completed, fail definitively) - GetCheckoutStatus cancellation-recheck; terminal CANCELED resolution; SweepStaleTerminalCheckouts covers terminal_checkouts table - till gift-card clawback on definitive failure incl. retry path + INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS/ADDRESS_VERIFICATION_FAILURE/TRANSACTION_LIMIT - cross-user saved-card collision fixed (UNIQUE(user_id,square_card_id)) - customer provisioning (lazy, save-only); one-off/guest mint no customer - discount preview/apply unified in discounts.go (global-milestone visible in preview, N+1 eliminated, redemption counter preserved on failures) - webhook event_id dedup; refund loop dedup; stale comment fixes - test-isolation t.Cleanup on committed sweep tests Frontend: - SCA tokenizeWithVerification across all charge flows (amount as major-units decimal), 5-min token-expiry re-tokenize, verification_token in request bodies - PaymentModal synchronous double-click + zero/negative-amount guards - till online-card UI wired to /api/admin/till/sale - policyPopover generalised; new /privacy-policy route; consent checkbox copy + Square privacy link - Square card iframe styled to app typography (Inter 14px, oklch tokens); mock form md:text-sm parity - 'Secure payment powered by Square' badge on all 8 card-payment flows Schema/docs: terminal_checkouts + square_customer_id + per-user card constraint in init-script.sql; README migrations; P14 plan + backlog + Technical Manual updated. Includes 39 modified/new test files; full backend suite (25 pkgs), -race on payments+square, and frontend build are green.
155 lines
5.0 KiB
Go
155 lines
5.0 KiB
Go
package webhooks
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import (
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"io"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"sync"
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)
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type SquareWebhookEvent struct {
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Type string `json:"type"`
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EventID string `json:"event_id"`
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CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
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Data json.RawMessage `json:"data"`
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LocationID string `json:"location_id"`
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}
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// squareWebhookDedup is a bounded, mutex-guarded set of recently handled
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// event IDs. Square redelivers signed webhooks on retries (or a replay); once
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// the handlers mutate state a duplicate delivery would double-apply, so drop
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// replays while keeping the set bounded.
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type squareWebhookDedup struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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seen map[string]struct{}
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order []string
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max int
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}
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func newSquareWebhookDedup(max int) *squareWebhookDedup {
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return &squareWebhookDedup{
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seen: make(map[string]struct{}),
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order: make([]string, 0, max),
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max: max,
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}
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}
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// register reports whether id was already handled: false on first occurrence
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// (recording id, evicting the oldest once the cap is reached), true on a
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// replay (set untouched, preserving insertion order). Mutex-guarded — the
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// handler may be hit concurrently.
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func (d *squareWebhookDedup) register(id string) bool {
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d.mu.Lock()
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defer d.mu.Unlock()
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if _, ok := d.seen[id]; ok {
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return true
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}
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d.seen[id] = struct{}{}
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d.order = append(d.order, id)
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if len(d.order) > d.max {
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oldest := d.order[0]
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d.order = d.order[1:]
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delete(d.seen, oldest)
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}
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return false
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}
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// 1000 IDs far exceeds Square's redelivery window while capping memory.
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var squareWebhookEventsSeen = newSquareWebhookDedup(1000)
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func HandleSquareWebhook(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 512*1024)
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body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to read webhook body: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "request body too large or unreadable", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
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return
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}
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defer r.Body.Close()
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// Verification logic per Square spec (HMAC-SHA256, base64, notificationURL + body).
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// Production setup: set SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY and SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL
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// in env vars (see Square Developer Console → Webhooks → Subscription).
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// Reference: https://developer.squareup.com/docs/webhooks/step3validate
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// Fail closed: a missing signing key means the webhook cannot be verified,
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// so reject rather than process unauthenticated events (S-4). Square
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// always sends the signature header, so an unset key in production is a
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// misconfiguration that must not silently accept forged events.
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signingKey := os.Getenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY")
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notificationURL := os.Getenv("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_NOTIFICATION_URL")
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if notificationURL == "" {
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notificationURL = "http://localhost:8080/webhooks/square"
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}
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if signingKey == "" {
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log.Printf("SQUARE_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_KEY is not set — rejecting webhook (fail-closed)")
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http.Error(w, "webhook signature verification unavailable", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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signature := r.Header.Get("x-square-hmacsha256-signature")
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if signature == "" {
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log.Printf("Missing Square webhook signature header")
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http.Error(w, "Invalid signature", http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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if !verifySquareSignature(body, signature, signingKey, notificationURL) {
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log.Printf("Invalid Square webhook signature")
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http.Error(w, "Invalid signature", http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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var event SquareWebhookEvent
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if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &event); err != nil {
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log.Printf("Failed to parse webhook event: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "Invalid event", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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// Dedup BEFORE dispatch: a correctly signed replay of a handled event
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// must not re-enter the handlers (which will mutate state once wired).
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// Returns 200 to acknowledge delivery without processing.
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if event.EventID != "" && squareWebhookEventsSeen.register(event.EventID) {
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Duplicate event_id %s; skipping (already processed)", event.EventID)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
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return
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}
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Received event: %s", event.Type)
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switch event.Type {
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case "payment.updated":
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handlePaymentUpdated(event.Data)
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case "refund.updated":
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handleRefundUpdated(event.Data)
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case "dispute.created":
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Dispute created: %s", event.EventID)
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default:
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] Unknown event type: %s", event.Type)
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok"))
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}
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func verifySquareSignature(body []byte, signature, signingKey, notificationURL string) bool {
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(signingKey))
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mac.Write([]byte(notificationURL))
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mac.Write(body)
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expected := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
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return hmac.Equal([]byte(signature), []byte(expected))
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}
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func handlePaymentUpdated(data json.RawMessage) {
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] payment.updated: %s", string(data))
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}
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func handleRefundUpdated(data json.RawMessage) {
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log.Printf("[SQUARE-WEBHOOK] refund.updated: %s", string(data))
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}
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