Files
Crussell/backend/handlers/user/account.go
T
popertots e9b0f0f2a7 fix: review-loop hardening — identical-body replay, 2FA gates, webhook at-least-once, GDPR scrub
Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the
review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced.

Money-safety:
- Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored
  square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original
  payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending
  forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge).
- Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card
  sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface
  ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.)
- Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales
  claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog.
- Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom
  'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending.
- Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card.
- Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the
  booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse).
- M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total].

2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments:
- Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into
  all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account
  admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces.
- Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit
  mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env.
- Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare);
  plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev).
- GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes.

Infra/docs:
- nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80
  redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS;
  separate webhook rate-limit zone.
- Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id +
  square_request_snapshot.
- Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips
  policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected.
- Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26
  packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean.
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00

266 lines
9.5 KiB
Go

package user
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"os"
"time"
"crussell/db"
"crussell/handlers/payments"
"crussell/internal/dav"
"crussell/internal/s3"
"crussell/internal/square"
"crussell/mw"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
)
// scrubAnonymizedUser2FA nulls the 2FA columns and staff notes that the SQL
// anonymize_user() function does not scrub: it predates the 2FA columns and
// intentionally preserves notes. A deleted user's live 2FA credential and any
// PII in staff notes must not survive erasure, so run this inside the same
// transaction as anonymize_user() to keep erasure atomic.
func scrubAnonymizedUser2FA(ctx context.Context, q db.Querier, userID string) error {
_, err := q.Exec(ctx, `
UPDATE users
SET two_factor_enabled = FALSE,
two_factor_method = NULL,
two_factor_pending_code_hash = NULL,
two_factor_pending_code_expires = NULL,
notes = NULL
WHERE id = $1
`, userID)
return err
}
// DELETE /api/user/account
func DeleteAccountHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := mw.GetUserID(r.Context())
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
var accountRole string
var profilePicURL sql.NullString
err := db.Conn.QueryRow(r.Context(), `SELECT account_role, profile_pic_url FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID).
Scan(&accountRole, &profilePicURL)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
http.Error(w, "user not found", http.StatusNotFound)
return
}
log.Printf("Failed to fetch user for deletion: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
ctx := r.Context()
// --- External system scrubbing (BEFORE SQL anonymize) ---
// Delete profile picture from S3/R2
if profilePicURL.Valid && profilePicURL.String != "" && s3.Client != nil {
// #nosec G118 — intentional background goroutine for async profile pic cleanup
go func(picURL string) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
log.Printf("Panic recovered in S3 profile picture deletion: %v", r)
}
}()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
bucket := os.Getenv("S3_PROFILE_PICS_BUCKET")
if bucket == "" {
bucket = "crussell-profile-pics"
}
// profiles/{userID}.jpg — matches UploadProfilePictureHandler key format
key := fmt.Sprintf("profiles/%s.jpg", userID)
if err := s3.Client.Delete(ctx, bucket, key); err != nil {
log.Printf("Warning: Failed to delete profile picture for user %s: %v", userID, err)
}
}(profilePicURL.String)
}
// Snapshot the Square card IDs AND customer IDs synchronously BEFORE the
// SQL anonymization below NULLs square_card_id/square_customer_id, so the
// background cleanup still has the external Square references it needs
// (previously the goroutine read the rows itself, racing the anonymize
// step which wiped them mid-flight). Distinct non-null customer IDs only:
// a user's saved cards share one provisioned Square customer, so
// DeleteCustomer runs once per customer. NULL customer IDs (users with
// no saved cards) are skipped.
var cardIDs []string
customerSeen := map[string]bool{}
var customerIDs []string
// Capture the client synchronously so the async cleanup goroutine never
// reads the global payments.SquareClient (which tests swap per-account).
sqClient := payments.SquareClient
if sqClient != nil {
rows, err := db.Conn.Query(r.Context(),
`SELECT square_card_id, square_customer_id FROM user_saved_cards WHERE user_id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL`, userID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Warning: Failed to query saved cards for user %s: %v", userID, err)
} else {
for rows.Next() {
var cardID, customerID sql.NullString
if err := rows.Scan(&cardID, &customerID); err != nil {
log.Printf("Warning: Failed to scan card ID for user %s: %v", userID, err)
continue
}
if cardID.Valid && cardID.String != "" {
cardIDs = append(cardIDs, cardID.String)
}
if customerID.Valid && customerID.String != "" && !customerSeen[customerID.String] {
customerSeen[customerID.String] = true
customerIDs = append(customerIDs, customerID.String)
}
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
log.Printf("Warning: Row iteration error for user %s: %v", userID, err)
}
rows.Close()
}
}
// --- SQL-level anonymization/deletion ---
if accountRole == "guest" {
tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction for guest user deletion: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
defer func() {
if err := tx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
}
}()
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `SELECT delete_guest_user($1)`, userID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to delete guest user %s: %v", userID, err)
http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction for guest user deletion: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
} else {
tx, err := db.Conn.Begin(ctx)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to begin transaction for user anonymization: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
defer func() {
if err := tx.Rollback(ctx); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrTxClosed) {
slog.Error("failed to rollback transaction", "err", err)
}
}()
_, err = tx.Exec(ctx, `SELECT anonymize_user($1)`, userID)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to anonymize user %s: %v", userID, err)
http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// GDPR erasure gap: anonymize_user() leaves the 2FA columns and staff
// notes on the row. Scrub them here, in the same transaction, so erasure
// is atomic with the anonymization.
if err := scrubAnonymizedUser2FA(ctx, tx, userID); err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to scrub 2FA fields for user %s: %v", userID, err)
http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
log.Printf("Failed to commit transaction for user anonymization: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// TODO: Create 'user_anonymized' notification for admin audit trail
}
// The local erasure committed: drop the user's cached Square customer id so
// the erased identity cannot resurface from the process-local cache on a
// later save-card flow (the Square customer is deleted below and the DB
// columns are NULLed, but the cache is never touched by either).
payments.InvalidateSquareCustomerCache(userID)
// external Square cleanup fires only after local anonymization/deletion
// commits, so a failed local tx leaves external state intact for retry.
if sqClient != nil && (len(cardIDs) > 0 || len(customerIDs) > 0) {
// #nosec G118 — intentional background goroutine for async account deletion
go func(client square.SquareClient, cards, customers []string) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
log.Printf("Panic recovered in Square cleanup: %v", r)
}
}()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
for _, cardID := range cards {
if err := client.DeleteCardOnFile(ctx, cardID); err != nil {
// TokenPrefix redacts the ccof: card token — the full ID must
// never reach logs.
log.Printf("Warning: Failed to delete Square card %s for user %s: %v", square.TokenPrefix(cardID), userID, err)
}
}
for _, customerID := range customers {
// Square customers are provisioned per-user from a deterministic
// email-derived key, but the UNIQUE(email) index excludes guest
// accounts — so a guest and a registered user sharing an email can
// end up on the SAME Square customer profile (Square dedups within
// its idempotency window). Deleting it would break the other
// account's saved-card charges, so skip the deletion when any OTHER
// non-deleted saved card still references the customer.
var stillReferenced bool
if err := db.Conn.QueryRow(ctx, `
SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM user_saved_cards WHERE square_customer_id = $1 AND user_id <> $2 AND deleted_at IS NULL)
`, customerID, userID).Scan(&stillReferenced); err != nil {
log.Printf("Warning: Failed to check Square customer %s references before deletion: %v", square.TokenPrefix(customerID), err)
continue
}
if stillReferenced {
// PII-redacted customer id — the full id never reaches logs.
log.Printf("Warning: skipping Square customer deletion — customer %s still referenced by another account", square.TokenPrefix(customerID))
continue
}
if err := client.DeleteCustomer(ctx, customerID); err != nil {
log.Printf("Warning: Failed to delete Square customer %s for user %s: %v", square.TokenPrefix(customerID), userID, err)
}
}
}(sqClient, cardIDs, customerIDs)
}
// Delete CardDAV contact (non-blocking, best-effort)
if dav.Service != nil {
go func() {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
log.Printf("Panic recovered in CardDAV contact deletion: %v", r)
}
}()
uri := fmt.Sprintf("%s.vcf", userID)
if err := dav.Service.DeleteContact(1, uri); err != nil {
log.Printf("Warning: Failed to delete CardDAV contact for user %s: %v", userID, err)
}
}()
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}