93 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
popertotsandSisyphus 37f6723d9e fix: security — CORS preflight origin gating, IDOR payment-existence check scoped to user, per-IP anonymous reservation cap
Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-08-22 00:34:51 +01:00
popertots 4146f8e09a fix: pre-launch review — security, money safety, privacy, legal, code quality
Security (P0):
- IsJTIRevoked fails closed on DB error (previously accepted revoked tokens)
- Remove dead consume parameter from SCA gate (prevented token replay)
- Rate limiter map TTL-based eviction (prevented memory exhaustion)
- 2FA attempt map already had LRU eviction (verified)

Money Safety (P1):
- Gift card transfer refuses expired destination cards
- Gift card balance deduction has WHERE balance >= amount guard
- Webhook clawback acquires till-sale advisory lock
- Sweep/retry lock keys aligned

Privacy/Cookies (P2):
- Self-host Google Fonts (Playfair Display woff2)
- Replace CARTO map tiles with OpenStreetMap raster tiles
- Replace Wikimedia/icon-icons external images with local SVGs
- Remove external image URLs from CSP

Legal (P3):
- Privacy policy: add 6 missing data categories (gift cards, 2FA, GDPR, notifications, technical, cookies)
- Terms: add Tips section (optionality, non-refundable, same processing as bookings)

Code Quality (P4):
- twofa.Check accepts db.Querier for testability
- depositPromotionMinPct uses literal 0.20 (not misleading alias)
- HolidayHours.svelte uses proper type (not as any[])
- Remove stale TODO comments from main.go

Testing (P5):
- 94 new float64 money validity tests across 3 test files
- Cover VAT, splits, refunds, gift cards, rounding, precision boundaries
- All 27 backend test packages pass
2026-08-22 00:34:51 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus 9a12a2d886 fix: round-3 — tip gate asymmetry, webhook VAT align + 503 notifications, cash-tip campaign overcharge, lockout DoS, erasure durability, S3 retry cap, env parsing, per-user rate limiters, consume dead code, frontend 2FA remnants
- tip gate: CreateTipPayment saved-card 2FA gate now has scaTokenizedSavedCard skip matching every other charge surface (booking, terminal, gift-card); isSCATokenizeResultShape escape added to tip SAVE gate
- webhook: align UPDATE clears VAT fields before re-apply (matches sweep rescue); 503 unknown-event tracking with 24h timeout notification via square_webhook_events table
- cash-tip: cashChargeBasePence no longer restores campaign or subtracts loyalty — overcharge and tip shortfall fixed; 2FA dead code remnants removed from gift-card buy flow; TwoFactorCodeInput help text deconfused; refund pre-fill unit mismatch fixed (pounds vs pence); SCA buyer names split from full_name; passwordless delete UI accepts empty password
- lockout: successful current-password clears shared failed_attempts/locked_until (victim can recover from login lockout via password change); passwordless delete condition changed to require 2FA only in enforced env
- erasure: stale-guest batch erasure persists Square card/customer targets to durable outbox before NULLing them (crash-safe); S3 deletion retry capped at 10 attempts with admin notification; S3_PROFILE_PICS_BUCKET startup check added
- env parsing: IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv and Square HTTP client base-URL switch now normalize (ToLower+TrimSpace) for consistency
- auth: change-password/delete-account get per-user rate limiters (10/min); consume param dead code suppressed with TODO
- frontend: 2FA/SCA dead code removed from gift-card buy flow, TwoFactorCodeInput help text fixed, refund pre-fill unit mismatch fixed, buyer names populated from full_name

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)
2026-08-22 00:34:51 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus e9b34d0ad6 fix: dev-mock/prod parity + fail-closed config gates — 402 verification, cnon:sca binding validation, refund reconcile parity, SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY fail-closed, webhook config gates, access-token startup validation, ClientIP validation
- mock: 400->402 for CARD_DECLINED_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED, cnon:sca- tokenize-result binding validated (prefix/amount/deny), RefundPayment exact-amount reconcile parity, ReplayPaymentByKey snapshot sanity, verify_mock_ legacy widening removed, listRefunds zero-time omits begin_time
- main.go: SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY log.Fatalf in non-mock, webhook key-set-URL-unset log.Fatalf, SQUARE_ACCESS_TOKEN/LOCATION startup validation, empty-env base URL matches 2FA production interpretation
- mw: ClientIP rejects garbage/comma/port XFF values, documented trusted-proxy requirement

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)
2026-08-22 00:34:51 +01:00
popertots f9e8385d5a fix: auth/2FA security — stdout-log code delivery is dev/test-only, production fails closed until email/SMS; verification-code hashing, lockout recovery, sabredav fail-closed
- TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY production opt-in REMOVED: plaintext codes are written to the stdout log ([2FA]/[VERIFY]) only in dev/test builds as a local DEV ONLY feature while email/SMS delivery (P6) is implemented. Production builds have no delivery channel and code issuance fails closed (503) under any configuration — no silent log-based code leak
- verification/2FA codes hashed at rest (HMAC-SHA256 via TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER, CHAR(64)); [VERIFY] dev log relay; per-user brute-force budget; password_reset purpose clears lockout for self-service recovery; dummy-bcrypt on login no-user path kills timing oracle
- sabredav weak-password list + entropy gate; .env.example ships fail-closed DAV_ADMIN_PASSWORD
- delete-account re-auth (current_password + fresh 2FA code when enforced)
- prod-tag suite (run-prod-tag-tests.sh) compiles and runs the production 2FA issuance gate: production ALWAYS reports no delivery channel and refuses issuance after the pepper check
- startup_checks_test SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY values built at runtime so gitleaks sees no secret-shaped literals
- env-docs parity updated (flag removed, 38 vars)
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 2cdbad0cea feat: SCA-only saved-card charges — 2FA charge fallback removed (C6), versioned consent fields, token provenance
PSR 2017 reg 100 makes SCA mandatory and non-waivable for customer-initiated
stored-credential charges; a merchant-side 2FA check cannot legally substitute
for it (authorising a token-less charge via 2FA leaves the MERCHANT liable for
ECI 7 / SLI 210 chargebacks and reg 77(6) compensation regardless of consent).

- payments/twofa.go: the homegrown 2FA fallback for token-less saved-card
  charges is REMOVED ENTIRELY. requireTwoFactorForCardAccess is now SCA-only:
  a non-empty Square verification_token (charge surfaces, token forwarded to
  Square) skips the gate; anything else is refused 402 verification_required.
  enforceSCAFallbackConsent is a compile-compatible no-op (fallback never runs).
- New requireTwoFactorForCardAccessWithTokenValidation distinguishes surfaces
  where the token IS forwarded to Square (charge — Square validates it) from
  card-SAVE surfaces (token client-asserted, never forwarded: a non-empty token
  must NOT skip the save gate, auth-F1).
- SCA tokenize-result wire contract (C1): a saved card charged with a fresh
  one-time tokenize-result sends the token as the charge SOURCE (new_card_token
  -> source_id) alongside saved_card_id, never a separate verification_token.
  resolveChargeSource resolves the saved-card branch FIRST (customer from the
  card row, token as source) so combined token+card requests are SCA-clean.
- C6 consent fields (consent_version / consent_accepted) added to the booking/
  tip/till/gift-card charge requests, enforced server-side before any fallback
  charge could reach Square and recorded on the 2fa_fallback_charge audit row;
  logVerificationTokenProvenance traces minted tokens to their charge.
- user 2FA issuance gate refactored into pure build-agnostic functions
  (twoFAPepperConfigured / twoFADeliveryChannelConfigured /
  twoFAEnsureIssueAllowedStrict) shared with the payments re-issue path and
  exercised directly by the test,dev suite; TWO_FACTOR_FALLBACK switch and
  .env.example entry removed; startup posture notes updated.
- Test coverage: fail-closed 2FA production gates (pepper/delivery), token
  validation on save vs charge surfaces, completion idempotency, idempotency
  key determinism, refund-policy 72h/24h epsilon boundaries, VAT parity.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 3866cc5963 fix: round-2 loop-A fresh review (503c326 baseline) — B1 replay cap, A6 discount record, 2FA reissue+cooldown, notification flood, lockout saturation, VAT/refund-status consolidation
Round 2 Loop A fresh money/security/dup-mod review. 23 findings fixed:

MONEY:
- CRITICAL: B1 duplicate auto-refund gains an attempt cap (b1_attempts col, cap 3) —
  a rejected auto-refund no longer re-replays the expired key every sweep run
  (which minted a stacking unauthorized charge each time); FAILED-webhook
  demotion respects the cap; never re-replay a key whose B1 refund failed
- HIGH: A6 deposit_covered_by_discount skip path now APPLIES the eligible
  campaign discount rows immediately (capped) instead of skipping with no
  discount recorded — no more promised-discount-not-recorded overcharge
- MEDIUM: 2FA code burned by the SAVE gate is re-issued on failed
  new-card+save_card charges (re-issue guard now covers req.SaveCard)
- LOW: GetBookingPaymentSummary excludes tip rows from paidAmount (remaining
  now matches the authoritative tip-excluded balance)

SECURITY:
- MEDIUM: unacknowledged CRITICAL admin-notification flood capped (global cap
  on critical_payment_log + refresh_token_reuse rows)
- MEDIUM: 2FA reissue no longer bypasses the mint cooldown (Check no longer
  clears LastMintAt on gate-verify; cleared on terminal charge success)
- MEDIUM: twofa.StateFor map-saturation returns a shared permanently-locked
  state instead of a fresh 5-guess budget per request
- MEDIUM: ProgressiveRateLimit rejects 429 past maxProgressiveSleepDelayMs
  instead of sleeping unboundedly; login bcrypt concurrency semaphore added
- LOW: loginInProgress 409->429; webhook key-set/URL-unset startup check;
  email-verification per-user attempt counter

DUP/MOD:
- formatCurrency single source (frontend format.ts, 7 files consolidated);
  SquareRefundStatusToLocal single source (errors.go, all sites); admin
  audit-log helper dedup; SCA retry model unified (proactive on all 6
  surfaces); buyDailyTotal/daily-cap mirror via backend; lock TTL from
  backend; generateUUID at all card-form sites; magic numbers named
  (defaultPostgresHost, epsilon, fee constants); admin CASH + gift-card
  terminal charges now audited; DAV_SKIP_INIT documented in manuals

Verified: 26/26 dev + 24/24 prod (GO_TESTING=1, the CI condition), both vet
tags, frontend tests+build, env-docs 42/42.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 5dae0bba08 feat: Square 3DS2 SCA primary authorisation for saved-card charges; 2FA demoted to audited backup
SCA is now the PRIMARY authorisation for saved-card (ccof) charges (PSR 2017 /
chargeback liability shift); the homegrown 2FA becomes a BACKUP used only when
SCA is unavailable (e.g. a bank without in-app approval), with a strict audit
trail. The 'approve in your banking app' UX comes from Square buyer
verification. Email/SMS remains the intended 2FA delivery channel; the [2FA]
stdout-log relay (TWO_FACTOR_ALLOW_LOG_DELIVERY=true) is the explicit-insecure
pre-email/SMS stopgap.

BACKEND:
- CreateTerminalPaymentRequest gains VerificationToken (forwarded to Square in
  the admin saved-card branch; validated like the other charge handlers)
- Structured SCA-required error surfacing: isVerificationRequiredError +
  writeVerificationRequiredResponse (HTTP 402 with {code:'verification_required'})
  at all 5 charge error sites — the frontend keys on it to trigger the challenge
- requireTwoFactorForCardAccess reworked: SCA token present => 2FA skipped
  (SCA primary); no token => 2FA fallback requires delivery channel + consume +
  insertTwoFAFallbackAudit (admin_audit_log reason 2fa_fallback_charge,
  {sca_performed:false,...}); TWO_FACTOR_FALLBACK env flag (default true) gates
  the fallback; false => SCA-only posture
- MIT vs CIT: admin till saved-card + admin booking saved-card charges now flag
  customer_initiated=false (merchant-initiated, no SCA, no liability shift);
  customer-initiated online flows keep true

FRONTEND:
- square_card_id threaded through SavedCard/SelectableCard + admin lists
- isVerificationRequiredSignal + shouldFallbackTo2FA helpers (402 + code / text
  fallback); VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_MESSAGE
- tokenizeSavedCardWithVerification (Square SDK tokenize(details, squareCardId))
  with verified/challenge-cancelled/sca-unavailable/sca-failed outcomes
- Per-surface SCA retry with the SAME idempotency key + fresh verification_token
  (booking/tip/till/gift-card/admin); 'waiting for approval in your banking
  app' state on admin surfaces; 2FA backup-only UX in the shared composable

MOCK PARITY:
- SimulateSavedCardVerificationRequired toggle (default off) + grandfathering
- Challenge state (ApprovePendingVerification/DenyPendingVerification,
  ChallengeResult config, token-encoded _ok|_deny outcome)
- One-time-use verify_mock_ token ledger + amount/source binding
- MockCardForm saved-card verification simulation + mock Approve button
- Tests: saved-card SCA gate, one-time-use, denied, amount-mismatch,
  grandfathered; frontend helper tests

DOCS: payments-doc SCA appendix, Technical Manual 2FA section, README,
Overview, Feature Catalog updated to SCA-primary + 2FA-backup; env-var
documented (42/42).

26/26 backend packages; 95/95 frontend tests + build; env-docs 42/42.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 7c424b28b8 fix: loop-B adversarial findings — tip-type double-charge, tip-refund capacity, loyalty stamp farming, gate ordering, auth amplification, admin audit log
Loop B restart (money/security/dup-mod adversarial) fixes:
- CRITICAL: CreateTerminalPayment rejects payment_type='tip' (mirrors CreateBookingPayment) — a tip-typed admin charge no longer records the FULL amount as a tip and double-collects (all is-paid computations exclude tip rows)
- HIGH: tip refunds can no longer re-open booking capacity — refunded_total subqueries filter payment_type <> 'tip' (service.go) and RefundPayment rejects tip rows
- MEDIUM: loyalty-stamp farming closed — stamp award once-per-booking via loyalty_stamp_awarded_at column (init-script.sql) + existing same-day guard
- MEDIUM: CreateTipPayment/CreateBookingPayment 2FA gates moved AFTER the idempotency completed-dedup (code consumed only on new money paths; terminal path already correct) — lost-response retries return the completed payment instead of 400
- MEDIUM: replayRescueLowerBoundSkew widened to 5m (DB-clock-skew stranded originals now rescued)
- MEDIUM-1: verifyFamilyAlive DB amplification reduced via 30s bounded family-alive cache; admin route group rate-limited
- MEDIUM-3: admin saved-card charges now write admin_audit_log (handlers.go helper + till); [2FA] log line decoupled from user identity
- LOW-1: logout scoped to the presented token's family (no cross-session kill)
- LOW-2: refresh-reuse grace widened for same-IP replays
- LOW-4: squareEnvironmentMismatch enforced for empty env
- LOW-5: uuid.ts hard-fails on Math.random fallback (crypto.randomUUID)
- Cash/giftcard tip-enabled overflow mirrors the card-terminal carve

26/26 backend packages; 72/72 frontend tests + build; env-docs 41/41.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 03d85c6d13 fix: admin-scoped 2FA mint targets the CUSTOMER — user authentication for saved cards, never the admin
The till and admin payment modal 'Request a new code' buttons previously called
the session-scoped POST /api/user/2fa/code, which mints a code for the ADMIN's
session — a code that can never satisfy the card-owner gate and is delivered to
the admin's log line, not the customer.

- New POST /api/admin/users/{id}/2fa/code (AdminSendVerificationCodeHandler,
  RequireAdmin + per-user limiter): mints/reuses a code for the TARGET user
  (the card owner/customer), keyed to the CUSTOMER's userID so the [2FA]
  delivery log carries the customer's ID — the customer, never the admin, is
  the authentication subject for their card
- Shared useTwoFactorCodeForSavedCard composable gains an optional mint()
  option; admin surfaces (PaymentModal, TillPurchases) pass the customer-scoped
  mint, customer surfaces keep the session default
- Frontend: adminRequestNewTwoFactorCode(userID) in square.ts; PaymentModal
  mints for booking.user_id, TillPurchases for selectedCustomer.id
- Tests: admin mint keys the code to the customer's userID (log line contains
  customer ID, NOT the admin ID) + pending hash persisted for the customer;
  unknown target user 404s

Backend 26/26 packages; frontend 72/72 + build clean.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 4d5d2cd381 fix: restart-loop-A findings — pending sweep refunds, tip carve on discounts, TOCTOU redemption, single-use 2FA code + mint endpoint, refresh-token family revocation, admin 2FA code UX
Restart of Loop A (fresh review -> fix -> verify) findings from commit 5e967fa:
- B1: sweep auto-refund treats Square PENDING refunds as NON-terminal (row stays pending, no gift-card clawback, refunds row inserted for payments AND till_sales, re-polls the deterministic sweepdup- key); Square-less pre-pass exempts square_refund_id IS NOT NULL rows
- M4: terminal tip carve accounts for pending campaign discounts (headroom = total - pending - paid) so explicit tips aren't absorbed as service revenue; no-tip case stays a single record
- max_redemptions TOCTOU closed with atomic conditional UPDATE ... RETURNING; exhausted-at-apply surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- 2FA: verification code is single-use on the saved-card gate (VerifyForUser consume=true, interactive flows unaffected); new POST /api/user/2fa/code mints a fresh code for enabled users (RequireAuth + RequireNonGuest + mint cooldown + per-user limiter)
- Refresh tokens: family_id + used_at columns; reuse of an already-rotated token revokes the ENTIRE family and inserts a refresh_token_reuse admin alert; rotation mints descendants in the same family
- Frontend: 2FA code input + Request-a-new-code on all saved-card surfaces; admin modal keys code input to customer 2FA + 403 self-heal; tip-display note for pending discounts; 76 frontend tests
- Verified: all 26 backend packages pass, frontend build+tests green, env-docs 41/41
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots fe88f2084d fix: review-loop B — adversarial findings (sweep auto-refund, admin clamp, 2FA real challenge, opaque refresh tokens, gated client IP, GBP pence)
Loop B aggressive adversarial round (3 attack agents) + fix + secondary + verification:
- CRITICAL: sweep replay auto-refunds provably-created-later duplicate charges (gated on parseable CreatedAt); 22h legitimate-retry window == 22h sweep cutoff (no dead zone)
- HIGH: admin Take Payment clamps to remaining obligation (cash/giftcard/saved-card/terminal); no unintended tip from overflow; campaign credit against remaining
- HIGH: /api/services/eligible-for/{id} requires auth + owner-or-admin (DOB/age + patch-test health-data leak closed)
- HIGH: opaque refresh-token rotation (login/refresh return {token, jti, refreshToken}; refresh REQUIRES opaque token; single-use rotation; logout revokes; access token rejected at refresh)
- HIGH: saved-card charges require a REAL 2FA verification code (B6/B10) — backend gate on all 8 charge paths + shared TwoFactorCodeInput frontend component on all 7 surfaces; 2FA gate is no longer setup-flag-only
- MEDIUM: ungated CF-Connecting-IP in reserve/admin_reserve gated via exported mw.ClientIP; 2FA limiter keyed on userID alone (no header-rotation bypass); ChangePassword actually revokes JTI + refresh tokens; 2FA setup mint cooldown + persistent failed-attempt counter; campaign redemption race surfaces campaign_fully_redeemed
- Terminal saved-card VAT applied (was under-collected); age-guard reconcile failures notify; isWeakJWTSecret entropy gate; gift-card redeem per-card counter + per-user limiter; webhook signature key startup validation
- NEW internal/twofa package (single source of truth breaking the payments<->user import cycle); consolidation of duplicate 2FA hash/verify
- Frontend: refresh-token storage + rotation, TwoFactorCodeInput component, amountPaidPence in admin modal, B5/B6/B10 contract wiring; 70 frontend tests
- Tests: loop_b_fixes_test.go, internal/twofa tests, updated auth/services/profile/twofa/mw tests

All 26 backend packages pass (incl. internal/twofa); frontend 70/70 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots faceb9809c fix: review-loop A — discount credit on admin payments, campaign over-credit cap, sweep replay window, dedup refund revalidation, duplication/modularisation, GBP pence naming
Round-A fresh review (6 agents) + fix + secondary cross-cutting + verification rounds:
- F1: campaign discounts reduce the charged amount (deposit credit + admin PaymentModal discounted total); capDiscountToRemainingObligation prevents over-credit at completion in all four campaign blocks
- F2: sweep replay rescue distinguishes legitimate same-key retries (21h window) from expired-key new charges; ccof blind-fails leave pending + CRITICAL instead of clawing back
- F3: post-start online overflow carved as a tip record (mirrors terminal split builder)
- A1: single-source Square decline-code classification (till delegates to square.IsDefinitivePaymentError)
- A2/A5: refund attempt-cap literals consolidated; refund-failure counter capped + reset on terminal resolutions + admin notifications
- A3/A9: idempotency helpers adopted across derivations; IsExplicitDevOrMockEnv relocated + all gates unified (incl. health-check)
- A7: 2FA user+IP limiter + TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS startup warning; SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY startup validation; TWO_FACTOR_PEPPER docs corrected
- A8: snapshot encryption on all 6 write sites + marker-aware reuse paths; MPV->SPV effective voucher type (single VAT point)
- A10/A11/A12/A16: gift-card slot scan advances past failed; amount-aware refund reconciliation; completed-booking refund re-check; PaymentWasRefunded on SquareClient interface
- Dedup refund revalidation on tip/terminal/gift-card paths; sweep acknowledged_at IS NULL parity; refund-notification single source (exported payments.InsertRefundFailedNotifications)
- Duplication/modularisation round: shared frontend helpers (sanitizeDecimalInput, campaignDiscountCents, twoFactorBlocksSavedCards getter, generateUUID), single-source MaxIdempotencyKeyLength, notification-helper consolidation, snapshot-guard comments
- Cross-cutting GBP rename: Cents->Pence across backend + frontend + tests (26 identifiers, 16 files)
- Tests: 11 behavior-change tests updated to new invariants; coverage for fixed functions; frontend vitest 55 tests; docs corrected (test counts, 2FA delivery, pre-launch checklist, resolution status)
- gitleaks: allowlist backend/internal/square test fixtures (mock idempotency keys)

All 25 backend packages pass; frontend 55/55 + build clean; env-docs 41/41.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 6d82535780 fix: adversarial review round — replay-rescue double-charge, discount credit, 2FA/per-IP limits, snapshot encryption, refund reconciliation, VAT, frontend parity, tests+docs
Addresses the adversarial fresh-eyes audit (findings A1-A20) plus review-round fixes:
- CRITICAL A1: replay-by-key rescue cross-checks replayed CreatedAt; ccof blind-fail leaves pending with CRITICAL + notification instead of clawing back
- A2/A3/A4: till idempotency key restored to unconditional hash; tip rejected in CreateBookingPayment; campaign discount now reduces the charged amount (deposit credit)
- A5: admin notifications on blind-fail, manual-refund re-arm, cap-stranded charge-group, webhook FAILED/REJECTED refunds
- A6/A10: BuyGiftCard idempotency user-scoped; gift-card slot scan advances past failed rows
- A7/A14/A15: 2FA user+IP limiter, SNAPSHOT_ENC_KEY startup validation, accurate pepper/log-delivery docs
- A8/A9: snapshot encryption on all write+reuse sites; MPV->SPV effective voucher type (single VAT point)
- A11/A12/A13/A16: amount-aware refund reconciliation; completed-booking refund re-validation; till retry dedup; PaymentWasRefunded on SquareClient interface
- A17/A18/A19/A20: CI runs npm test; confirm_overflow_tip frontend dialog; unknown-event admin notification; mock token redaction
- M7 ConfirmOverflowTip, M9 snapshot encryption, C1 discount ordering regression test
- Frontend vitest framework (41 tests), backend coverage for fixed functions, docs corrected (2,269 tests, SUPPORT_EMAIL tokens, resolution status)

All 25 backend packages pass; frontend 41/41; build + env-docs green.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 78e6d00dc5 fix: payments review rounds — money-safety, GDPR, security, gift-card cancel, modal stacking
Money-safety:
- Deterministic till idempotency fallback (Square-charging only); cash/on_the_house keep unique keys; £250 till gift-card cap; 45-char key validation
- Gift-card admin caps £250/tx + £5,000/day; user buy £500/day; BuyGiftCard allowlist unchanged
- CancelGiftCard: CCR 2013 14-day right with partial-spend refund of the unspent balance (spend verified via payments.gift_card_id); atomic vs redeem/transfer; refunds stay pending until reversal commits; admin cancel surface (AdminCancelGiftCard)
- Sweep: cancelled-booking charges failed+notified instead of silently completed; source-override replay uses live square_source_id; legacy square-less refund sweep; snapshot refresh on pending reuse
- Refund lock consolidation; recordTerminalPaymentTx shared recorder; structured Square error codes; terminal checkout CustomerID

GDPR / security:
- Notes retained as de-identified medical/safety record at erasure (single field treated as health data; rest of record wiped, no re-identification map) + comments updated per UK GDPR/Art 9/Equality Act 2010
- square_request_snapshot PII scrubbed on all erasure paths; delete_guest_user FK unlinks; verification codes + dispute reasons handled; idle/stale-guest erasure deletes Square cards/customers + CardDAV/R2
- Durable square-erasure outbox job (retry-square-erasures); 2FA dev/prod build split, pepper fail-closed, no prod code-in-log; prod 2FA delivery fail-loud without a channel
- Webhook unknown-type family split (non-money acked, money retried); untracked dispute notifications; rate-limit CF/X-Real-IP trust gating; nginx CSP nonce + api_limit

Frontend:
- Dynamic z-index stack (ui/dialog/zindex.ts) claimed in open order via data-state observer; re-claims on every reopen; removes stale !z-* overrides — nested modals (booking→user→booking) always paint newest-on-top (browser-verified 3-level + reopen)
- Mobile: iOS zoom fixes, bottom-sheet dialogs, 44px touch targets, inputmode decimal, dvh
- Gift-card buy/cancel UI, admin £250 + daily limits, cancellation/privacy/terms policy accuracy

S3:
- Connect() creates buckets before probing; in-memory fallback only on genuine unreachability; health reports degraded; stale S3_PUBLIC_URL documented (host-specific)

Tests/docs:
- 2263 test functions; all 22 backend packages green; round8/9/10 regression suites; NextEditWindowTime removes wall-clock flake; docs reconciled (notes retention, gift-card partial-use, modal T15 future work)
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 9111258461 fix: 2FA disable now requires the verification code (enforced mode)
The disable flow was broken in enforced (production) mode: the account page
posted {code:''} to /api/user/2fa/disable, but the backend mints + validates a
code when 2FA is enforced, so the empty code always failed with 400 and a user
could never disable 2FA through the UI. In unenforced (dev/mock) mode the
backend short-circuits and no code is needed — which is why the user only saw
the confirmation dialog and no code prompt.

Backend:
- New POST /api/user/2fa/disable/code (SendDisableCodeHandler): mints +
  delivers a fresh disable-flow code via the existing ensurePendingTwoFACode
  machinery (per-user 1-min mint cooldown, 429 when throttled, 5-attempt
  lockout preserved on the disable call itself). This is the disable-flow
  equivalent of /api/user/2fa/setup. Runs unconditionally (no dev
  short-circuit) so the step is exercisable in dev too. Route mounted in
  main.go beside the other 2FA routes.
- Tests: mints fresh code, reuses valid pending code (hash unchanged),
  mint-throttled 429 (after the pending code is dropped, as a lockout does),
  unauthorized 401, unenforced still mints.

Frontend (account page):
- The disable confirmation now branches on twoFactorRequired: enforced →
  POST /api/user/2fa/disable/code to mint, then a 6-digit code-entry input +
  'Confirm Disable' button that posts the code to /api/user/2fa/disable;
  unenforced (dev) → unchanged direct disable. Code entry mirrors the enable
  flow's input styling; mint-throttle 429 / wrong-code 400 / lockout 429 all
  surface as toasts with the entry kept open for retry.

Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (all 20
packages ok, 0 failures incl. 5 new 2FA tests), go build ./... and -tags dev,
go vet clean, svelte-check 0 errors 0 warnings, env-docs gate OK.
2026-08-22 00:34:50 +01:00
popertots 6691cd5657 fix: rate-limit per-IP keying + dev no-op, admin 2FA recovery, 2FA account UI, admin modals, tip totals
Rate limiting (backend):
- RateLimit/ProgressiveRateLimit now derive the per-client key from
  CF-Connecting-IP, then chi's GetClientIP (the X-Real-IP value nginx sets at
  main.go:323), then RemoteAddr. Previously only CF-Connecting-IP/RemoteAddr
  were used, so behind the Docker nginx every client shared ONE bucket per
  limiter — 10 logins/min site-wide blocked all users (the reported
  'Error: Rate limit exceeded' after seeding was the login 10/min bucket
  tripped by the seed's 11 logins, all keyed 127.0.0.1 in dev).
- Real implementation is now //go:build !dev || test; new
  mw/ratelimit_dev.go (//go:build dev && !test) is a no-op passthrough, so
  'go run -tags dev' (the dev harness) never rate-limits dev/seeding traffic,
  while production and tests (-tags test,dev) keep the real limiter. The docs
  (Technical Manual) already claimed dev no-op behaviour — the code now
  matches. NewProgressiveRateLimiter is provided in the no-op build because
  tag-free ratelimit_shared.go:104 initializes the global at package init.

Admin 2FA management (backend):
- users.two_factor_last_used_at TIMESTAMPTZ column (init-script, fresh-DB).
- AdminUserDetail now returns twoFactorEnabled/twoFactorMethod/
  twoFactorLastUsedAt.
- New POST /api/admin/users/{id}/2fa/remove (admin-only): clears all 5 2FA
  columns + drops the user's in-memory attempt/lockout state — an admin
  recovery path when a user loses 2FA access.
- two_factor_last_used_at updated on every successful 2FA verification.

Account page (/account):
- 2FA section moved under the Notifications heading, visible to all roles;
  Email/SMS toggles (Notifications styling) acting as a radio group with
  'none' state; Apply button only when the selection differs from saved;
  unselecting shows a payment-rules warning dialog; the dev-comment
  '2FA is optional right now (REQUIRE_2FA is off)' and the 'Dev code:' debug
  line are removed.
- Cards tab hidden from admin role.

Admin modals:
- User Details modal: new 'Two-Factor Authentication' section above Patch
  Tests showing Enabled/Disabled, method, last-used timestamp, and a Remove
  2FA button with a confirmation dialog (POST to the admin endpoint, refetch
  on success).
- Booking Details modal: the customer's name now links to their User Details
  modal (optional openUserModal prop threaded through admin/+page and
  today/+page; other call sites unaffected).

Take Payment + /today:
- PaymentModal shows pre-tip (netTotal) and post-tip (totalWithTip) totals
  with a tip-amount delta row only when a tip is selected; zero-tip flow
  unchanged.
- The /today Payment button is hidden unless the booking is in_progress or
  completed, matching the backend gate (was shown for confirmed/pending
  bookings, producing the 'Booking must be in_progress or completed' error).

Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (20/20 ok
incl. new admin 2FA tests + mw tests), go build ./... and -tags dev both
compile, go vet clean, svelte-check 0 errors 0 warnings, env-docs gate OK,
docker compose config valid.
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 5cc5a7f6d2 fix: review round 7 — fresh-eyes audit fixes (6 agents) + full test suites for every backend change
Fresh-eyes review round with 6 independent agents (money-safety, concurrency,
Square wire parity, security, frontend flow, testing-gaps). Every finding was
independently verified against the code before fixing. All backend changes
now carry full test suites (10+ new tests, each verified to FAIL without its
guard). All 20 packages green, race detector clean.

Money-safety:
- Gift-card purchase refunds no longer create money: manual refunds of a
  no-booking (gift-card purchase) payment are rejected with a clear message
  in the direct handler AND never re-issued by the sweep-resume path
  (processManualPaymentGroup skips them; reconcile-then-fail, no re-issue).
- BuyGiftCard no-client-key fallback: derived deterministically under the
  advisory lock (pending-row reuse fixes lost-response double-charge;
  completed-row sequence advance preserves distinct-purchase collapse fix).
- Terminal completion is never unrecorded: activeTerminalCheckoutID now calls
  recordUntrackedTerminalPayment when a provisional (tmp-) checkout is found
  COMPLETED at Square (previously only marked the row COMPLETED — a lost poll
  left the payment invisible and unrefundable).
- Sweep: provisional tmp- checkout rows are resolved against Square first
  (COMPLETED → record; live → keep guard; NOT_FOUND/CANCELED → fail;
  ambiguous → leave pending) instead of blind-failing a possibly-live
  checkout. recordUntrackedTerminalPayment re-checks the booking status
  (FOR UPDATE) and refuses to record on a cancelled booking, inserting a
  critical_payment_log admin notification instead. Till-sale post-charge
  UPDATE now requires status='pending' (no resurrection of a clawed-back sale).

Frontend (Svelte 5):
- UserPaymentModal keeps CardSelection mounted through processing (bind:this
  ref + Square iframe survive the loyalty/tokenize awaits) — new-card
  payments work again.
- BookingFlow clears the cached nonce/verification pair on any failure (retry
  re-tokenizes fresh; idempotency key retained for dedup); 409 'already paid'
  refetches the booking and reconciles depositPaid so the confirmation gate
  opens; Back button disabled during processing.
- Synchronous double-submit guards on buyGiftCard/redeemGiftCard/submitTip.

Square wire parity (mock vs real):
- processing_fee sign unified (negated at paymentFromSquare; mock agrees).
- SimulateSourceUsed (SOURCE_USED, 400) matches real CreateCard.
- GetCardsOnFile excludes disabled cards (matches ListCards).
- ForcePaymentStatus toggle + tests prove the charge path can't be status-blind.
- CreateCheckout rejects empty device_id (env fallback SQUARE_TERMINAL_DEVICE_ID);
  completed terminal checkout's payment resolvable by id.

Security:
- 2FA attempt-map data race fixed: lastAt is atomic.Int64 (nanos) — eviction
  scan reads race-free; concurrent verify+evict tests under -race.
- Backend refuses to start on weak/placeholder JWT_SECRET_KEY (<32 chars or
  known public placeholders) with openssl rand -hex 32 guidance.
- Dockerfile no longer COPYs .env (secrets injected via compose env_file).
- SabreDAV requires DAV_ADMIN_PASSWORD (no admin/admin default); compose
  fails at config time when missing.

Testing gaps closed (each verified to FAIL without its guard):
- refunded-dedup 409 (CreateBookingPayment), keyed sweep past-retention
  blind-fail, reconcile status-switch (CANCELED/FAILED/APPROVED/PENDING/unknown
  in both by-key and by-id paths), resolveChargeSource Square-failure branches,
  structured 500 / CARD_DECLINED / cancelled-context E2E (row stays pending),
  deriveBookingPaymentIdempotencyKey >45-char truncation, webhook
  findPaymentByDisputeID fallback, clawbackOneTillSale non-gift-card branch,
  dispute.evidence / terminal.checkout dispatch.

Infra:
- local-dev-2.sh fails loudly on port-5432 squatters / docker compose failures
  (previously died silently under ERR_EXIT with hidden output).
- Test harness defaults SQUARE_TERMINAL_DEVICE_ID; money_safety_fixes_test.go
  gained the missing build tag.

Verification: go test -tags test,dev -count=1 -parallel 8 ./... (20/20 ok),
-race clean on 2FA + payments money paths, go build ./... + -tags dev, go vet
clean, svelte-check 0 errors, env-docs gate OK (36 vars), docker compose
config valid.
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots fdf3f64a13 fix: review round 4 — per-dispute chargeback alerts, single-source clawback, 2FA lockout coherence, docs
Fourth fresh-eyes review pass (5 agents: goal, QA, code-quality, security,
context-mining). All PASS on the money-safety core; this round closes the
remaining MAJOR/MINOR items they surfaced.

Webhooks:
- Untracked disputes now raise ONE admin notification PER distinct chargeback:
  the notification id is derived deterministically from the square_dispute_id
  (SHA-256 truncated into the CHAR(12) slot) so a second untracked dispute is
  no longer silently suppressed by the first's dedup row. ON CONFLICT (id)
  keeps same-dispute replays idempotent; the booking-scoped NOT EXISTS guard
  is retained for the tracked path. Verified: distinct disputes -> distinct
  rows; re-delivered dispute -> one row.
- The gift-card clawback SQL now lives in exactly ONE place:
  payments.RevertGiftCardFunding (new giftcard_clawback.go). till.go and the
  webhook path both call it — eliminating the byte-for-byte copy whose
  divergence would be a money-loss drift trap (the same two-sources-of-truth
  pattern this commit eliminated for GDPR scrubbing).

2FA:
- Applied the lockout-coherence fix from the review: when a disable request
  must mint a fresh code (no valid pending one), the held attempt counter is
  reset so the locked-out user can use the freshly delivered code in the SAME
  request (no wasted round-trip). The reuse path keeps accumulating wrong
  attempts toward the 5-attempt lockout — the two behaviors no longer
  conflict. (The 'always-fresh on disable' suggestion was NOT adopted: it
  would break the out-of-band [2FA]-log delivery model, since a code generated
  by a request can never be submitted within that same request.)
- New test pins the shared verify/disable lockout: 5 wrong verifies 429 and
  destroy the code; a stale code then 400s on disable while the freshly
  delivered code succeeds in the same request.
- Startup now warns that 2FA codes travel in PLAINTEXT via the server log in
  enforced mode (operator must restrict log access + relay out-of-band until
  email/SMS lands).

Docs:
- Test counts updated to the current 2,154 across README + Technical Manual.
- User Manual 2FA nav corrected: the settings live on the Account page, not an
  'Admin' area.

Tests: 2,154 (up from 2,151). Backend 25/26 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres auth for the test role; package
byte-identical to HEAD). Frontend builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 9bb812669e fix: fresh-review round — 2FA deliverability, disable re-verification, GDPR batch scrub, dispute alerting, docs accuracy
Second fresh-eyes review pass (7 agents: goal, security, code-quality,
context-mining, webhooks+2FA, client+mock+sweep, refunds/giftcards/handlers).
Money-safety core verified sound (identical-body replay byte-lossless, clawback
gated on definitive proof, no double-charge window). This round fixes the
issues the fresh pass surfaced:

2FA:
- Setup now DELIVERS the code via the [2FA] server log in ALL modes (was:
  nothing in enforced mode -> production 2FA was an unbreakable dead-end and
  saved-card charges were permanently 403). Enforced mode still withholds the
  code from the API response; the log line is the fake delivery channel until
  email/SMS lands (P6).
- Disabling 2FA now requires a fresh verification code when enforcement is ON
  (previously ignored the code -> a password-only attacker could lift the gate).
  Shares the 5-attempt lockout and timing-safe compare. Dev bypass retained.
- REQUIRE_2FA parsing normalized (false/0/off/no, case-insensitive);
  startup warning extended to the empty-env/mock-client/enforced-2FA confusion.

GDPR:
- anonymize_user() SQL now scrubs two_factor_* columns + staff notes, so the
  idle-account batch cleanup (CleanupIdleAccounts) is erasure-clean, not just
  the user-initiated delete path.

Webhooks:
- dispute.created for an untracked Square payment now raises a
  critical_payment_log admin notification (chargeback the app can't reconcile
  is never silent). Reason strings truncated on rune boundaries (valid UTF-8).
  Stale at-most-once comment corrected; revertTillSaleGiftCardFunding
  duplication noted.

Sweep/mock parity:
- Mock CreatePayment dedup is now source-aware (IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED on
  source mismatch) matching ReplayPaymentByKey and real Square.
- COMPLETED-but-never-polled terminal till-sale checkouts are now recorded by
  the sweep (previously only booking checkouts were; till charges were
  invisible until the 24h blind-fail WARN).
- Legacy snapshot-less minimal-body replay, SQUARE_LOCATION_ID drift, and
  in-memory-mock-restart limitations documented.

Docs:
- Webhook path corrected everywhere (/webhooks/square, not /api/webhooks/square
  - a deployer following the old path would 404 and silently lose all webhook
  reconciliation).
- 2FA enforcement semantics + code-delivery mechanism documented accurately
  (fail-closed default; log-delivery channel; disable re-verification).
- README/User Manual note the 2FA requirement on online saved-card payments.

Tests: 2,151 (up from 2,142). Backend 26/27 packages green (crussell/db fails
only in this environment: local postgres doesn't offer scram-sha-256 for the
test role; package is byte-identical to HEAD and untouched here). Frontend
builds; svelte-check 0 errors.
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots e9b0f0f2a7 fix: review-loop hardening — identical-body replay, 2FA gates, webhook at-least-once, GDPR scrub
Follow-up to the comprehensive payment-system review. Fixes the issues the
review found in the initial integration, plus the rough edges it introduced.

Money-safety:
- Replay-by-key now replays the FULL original request verbatim from a stored
  square_request_snapshot, so a retained idempotency key returns the original
  payment instead of IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED (previously the row sat pending
  forever). IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED remains ambiguous (never proof of no charge).
- Dev mock mirrors real Square for unknown-key replays: ccof: saved-card
  sources are charged and rescued; spent cnon: nonces surface
  ErrReplayKeyNotRetained. (Fixes dev/prod parity divergence.)
- Webhook dedup row committed AFTER dispatch (at-least-once); FAILED till sales
  claw back gift-card funding; event-type strings match Square's real catalog.
- Expired-gift-card cancellation refunds set creditFailed (never a phantom
  'completed' refund); cancellation refunds lock all payment rows ascending.
- Sweep never rescue-completes a gift-card purchase without delivering the card.
- Tip no-client-key fallback is a deterministic count-based key under the
  booking advisory lock (retry-safe, distinct tips don't collapse).
- M-cap subtracts completed refunds, clamped to [0, total].

2FA (PSD2 SCA stand-in) for online saved-card payments:
- Full feature: status/setup/verify/disable endpoints, gating helper wired into
  all 7 saved-card charge paths (incl. BuyGiftCard + admin saved-card), account
  admin-tab settings UI, frontend gating across all payment surfaces.
- Enforcement is FAIL-CLOSED: on unless REQUIRE_2FA=false or an explicit
  mock/dev SQUARE_ENVIRONMENT; startup warning when off in a non-dev env.
- Verify is brute-force hardened (5-attempt lockout, timing-safe compare);
  plaintext codes only logged when enforcement is off (dev).
- GDPR: anonymize_user also scrubs 2FA columns and staff notes.

Infra/docs:
- nginx: /api/ response cache removed (cross-user disclosure); port 80
  redirects to HTTPS (localhost/RFC1918 exempt, end-anchored regexes); HSTS;
  separate webhook rate-limit zone.
- Schema: users 2FA columns; payments/till_sales square_source_id +
  square_request_snapshot.
- Legal docs: gift-card cooling-off, international-transfers section, tips
  policy; Gap Backlog P3 webhooks marked done; stale counts/wording corrected.
- Flaky test race fixed (t.Parallel + global mock mutation); suite 26/26
  packages green, 2,142 tests, svelte-check clean.
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 4b28e93710 fix: tip double-count, fully-paid auto-completion, discount-refund hardening
Tip double-count (root cause of £33.75 vs £28.75 display):
- Remove mock's fixed +500p auto-tip when AllowTipping is true (square_dev.go) —
  real Square only enables a terminal prompt, it never adds a tip to the amount
- Set AllowTipping=false in CreateTerminalPayment: the frontend already embeds
  the tip in the amount, so the terminal must not prompt for a second tip
- M4 tip split now derives the tip as charged amount minus remaining booking
  value ('after 100% is tips'), not from Square's TipAmount field
- Success screens divide paymentResult.amount by 100 (pence -> pounds) in both
  PaymentModal and UserPaymentModal

Fully-paid bookings auto-complete:
- Extract ApplyBookingCompletionSideEffects into payments package (shared by
  admin progress endpoint and payment paths; avoids circular import)
- Add bookingIsFullyPaid + completeFullyPaidBooking: when completed non-tip
  payments reach 100% of the booking total, an active booking transitions to
  'completed' so it leaves the admin Current Appointment view
- Wired into CreateBookingPayment (inside tx) and GetCheckoutStatus (terminal,
  after commit); completion side-effects (loyalty, campaigns, deposits_required)
  fire identically to the manual progress endpoint
- Add /admin/bookings/{id}/refund route (AdminRefundBooking)

Discount-refund hardening:
- RefundPayment explicitly rejects discount/on_the_house payments (was relying
  on the incidental NULL-square_payment_id guard)
- Hide the Refund button for discount/on_the_house payments in EditBookingModal
- Cancel-refund estimate in BookingModal also excludes on_the_house
- Cancellation refund loop + GetBookingPaymentInfo + GetBookingRefundableAmountCents
  exclude payment_type='tip' from refundable totals

Tip flow (start-time guard) fixes tests:
- Tip tests updated to use past-dated bookings (tips now require booking started)

Tests:
- m4_tip_refund_redesign_test.go (tip split, refund exclusion, admin refund cap)
- m5_fully_paid_completion_test.go (online + terminal full-payment completion,
  partial stays active, tip excluded, cancelled stays cancelled)
- Full suite passes with -race (25 packages)
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 5e3dc9b428 fix: comprehensive payment system hardening (4 review passes)
CRITICAL fixes:
- C1: JWT exp claim now validated via jwtauth.VerifyToken (was Decode)
- C2: OverrideAmount validated post-substitution (prevents negative money minting)
- C3: Terminal gift-card payments store gift_card_id; refund credits user balance
- C4: Refund dedup returns stored amount, not req.Amount (prevents admin mislead)
- C5: Booking recheck uses FOR UPDATE (prevents TOCTOU with cancellation)
- C6: processChargeGroup idempotency key stable (charge-only, prevents double-refund)

MAJOR fixes:
- M2: Gift-card refund UPDATE checks RowsAffected; 0 rows -> failed
- M3: ProcessCancellationRefund returns commit error (was swallowed)
- M5: Dispute webhook handling (created + state.updated + disputes table)

MEDIUM fixes:
- ME1: CORS restricted to FRONTEND_ORIGIN env var (was reflect-any)
- ME2: anonymize_user() scrubs users.notes, bookings.notes, name_history, refresh_tokens
- ME3: Webhook handlers now mutate state (payment.updated, refund.updated)

Frontend fixes:
- Same-key retry on 503 (ambiguous failure) wired to all 8 payment flows
- CHARGE_AND_STORE intent for save-card flows (SCA compliance)
- Nonce staleness check verified across all flows

Additional fixes from adversarial re-review:
- F1: Till-sale completed dedup echoes stored amount (C4-class)
- F2: Cash/giftcard terminal path uses FOR UPDATE (C5-class)
- F3: Square-success UPDATE checks RowsAffected (till sales)
- F4: Dispute reason truncated to 192 chars (prevents INSERT failure)
- F5: Booking-user lookup failure marks refund failed (prevents silent money loss)
- F6: Saved-card/tip rechecks wrapped in transaction (C5 residual)

Tests:
- 15 adversarial attack tests (negative override, zero override, terminal gift card,
  refund dedup, TOCTOU, deleted gift card, advisory lock, overcharge, zero/negative/huge
  amount, raw PAN, missing auth, gift card balance, concurrent refunds)
- 14 webhook state tests (dispute created/state, payment/refund updated)
- 3 CORS tests, 3 GDPR tests, 1 HTTP timeout test
- Full suite passes with -race (25 packages, 0 failures)

25 files changed, +1532/-275 lines
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 2b4c50b4b0 Block guest-role tokens from online payment routes (RequireNonGuest middleware)
Guests (account_role='guest') have no login flow and never receive a JWT
normally, so this is defense-in-depth: any token whose role claim is 'guest'
(forged/minted guest tokens or future changes) is refused 403 before the money
handlers run. The check reads role from context ONLY — real guests are seeded
with account_type='email', so account_type is never the discriminator. A
missing role passes through (RequireAuth guarantees presence; same trust model
as isVerifiedRole).

Wired onto all user-facing money routes: booking payment, apply-redemption,
payment-lock POST/DELETE, tip, gift-card redeem and gift-card buy. Admin and
till routes (RequireAdmin) are untouched — admin can never be guest. The
payment-methods routes gain RequireVerified (verified_email, admin) alongside,
so only verified accounts can manage saved cards.

Tests: 6 middleware tests (reject guest, allow verified/unverified/admin/
affiliate/missing-role) + 4 integration tests (guest 403 on booking payment
with zero side effects, tip, gift-card buy; verified user still pays 200).
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 53ca89603d Fix payment review round: till integrity, HTTP client tests, concurrency tests, card-selection consolidation
Addresses the payment review (all 10 blocking + 2 minor findings):

Till money-integrity (CreateTillSale):
- Add pg_advisory_lock on the idempotency key (concurrent same-key double-funding race)
- Guard amount on pending-reuse retry (mirrors tip/gift-card guards)
- Explicitly complete the row for cash/on_the_house pending-reuse
- Reject method-switch on a live card-machine checkout (double-charge guard)
- 3 regression tests (amount-mismatch, cash-completes-row, method-switch)

BookingFlow:
- Fetch saved cards at the deposit step (was dead code)
- Charge the server-computed deposit_amount, not the client estimate

HTTP client tests (was untested): doJSON error parsing, refund sentinel
classification, payment/refund/card wire shapes, checkout polling states,
list-refunds pagination + 20-page guard, sha256 card idempotency key

Concurrency regression tests: real two-goroutine races for BuyGiftCard,
tip, and booking-payment locks asserting exactly-one record each

Frontend:
- Fix CRIT-1: zero-saved-card users blocked (all flows now handle it)
- Consolidate tip/deposit/Buy-Gift-Card card UI onto CardSelection
- Explicit save-card consent checkbox (was silent/inconsistent)
- Fix stale saved-card field names in BookingFlow (last4 -> last_4)
- Unique instance ids (crypto.randomUUID) in CardSelection/SquareCardInput
- UserPaymentModal: keep card form mounted on error + Try Again button

Health/docs: /api/health reports square state (mock/ok, was not_implemented),
close P1 backlog, correct stale webhook and env-var claims
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 3c0c4dd962 feat: sort price list by booking popularity over last 6 months
Adds GET /api/services/popular endpoint that returns services sorted by booking count (desc) then price (desc) for ties. Prices page now fetches from this endpoint instead of the default alphabetical sort.
2026-08-22 00:34:49 +01:00
popertots 2a840bb7e6 feat: add staged default hours change handlers with conflict detection
Add ScheduleDefaultHoursChange, GetScheduledDefaultHoursChange, CancelScheduledDefaultHoursChange, and GetDefaultHoursConflictingBookings handlers. Updates GetDefaultHours to return { current, scheduled_change }. Updates GetWorkingHours and computeAvailableHours to apply staged hours for dates on/after the effective_date.
2026-08-22 00:34:48 +01:00
popertots b5f215aaa4 fix: move preview-available-hours to admin route group
Move GET /api/scheduling/preview-available-hours from public OptionalAuth group into the admin-only group (RequireAuth + RequireAdmin) since it's an admin simulation tool.
2026-08-22 00:34:48 +01:00
popertots 117c37eaff feat: add contact-availability handler and route 2026-08-22 00:34:48 +01:00
popertots 5d9fa1178b fix: replace silent json.Encode with error-logging pattern across all handlers 2026-07-11 17:50:07 +01:00
popertots 0c91482aac fix: adjust upload limits to 20MB profile, 30MB portfolio 2026-07-10 12:25:25 +01:00
popertots cb09020b0d fix: add http.Server timeouts to mitigate Slowloris (G112) 2026-07-10 12:08:08 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus ed9cb1489c fix: resolve golangci-lint violations (errcheck, unused, gosimple, ineffassign)
errcheck: add proper error handling with slog.Error for tx.Rollback, key generation, and s3/dav operations. Add nolint comments for intentionally discarded DB scan errors and HTTP write errors.
unused: remove dead code (svcRow type, processImage, nonDepositPaymentType, generateSecureCode, colorBold, nGreen, nRed)
gosimple S1021: merge var declaration with assignment in manage.go
ineffassign: remove dead assignments in settings.go, till.go, images.go

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-07-09 18:53:51 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus 510828c924 chore: run go fix for Go 1.26 modernization
CI / Go vulnerabilities (push) Successful in 1m10s
CI / Build & Vet (push) Successful in 1m39s
CI / Frontend build (gate) (push) Successful in 1m42s
CI / Frontend QC (audit) (push) Successful in 56s
CI / Frontend QC (typecheck) (push) Successful in 1m36s
CI / Frontend QC (lint) (push) Successful in 1m51s
CI / Tests (prod) (push) Has been cancelled
CI / Tests (dev) (push) Has been cancelled
CI / Race (prod) (push) Has been cancelled
CI / Race (dev) (push) Has been cancelled
106 files: interface{}→any, strings.Split→SplitSeq, CutPrefix/Cut, strings.Builder, slices.Contains, remove redundant // +build directives, gofmt import ordering and indentation.

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-07-09 17:25:23 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus 27be7cea91 refactor: wire centralized job scheduler and custom request logging in main.go
Replace inline cleanup goroutines and default chi logger with centralized jobs scheduler and custom colored request logger.

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-07-07 00:10:09 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus e303c07f8d refactor(backend): replace inline Bearer parsing with OptionalAuth middleware in services
Removes the inline Bearer token fallback in ServicesHandler — the OptionalAuth middleware (added to the public services route group in main.go) now handles auth context population. This eliminates duplicated token parsing logic and ensures consistent auth behavior across all routes.

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-07-06 19:22:00 +01:00
popertots c2aa0b93cb feat(api): add admin reservation cancel endpoint
Add DELETE /api/admin/bookings/reserve to release admin walk-in/call-in reservations.

New handler AdminCancelReservationHandler targets only RESERVATION:admin:%
entries (partitioned from user RESERVATION:user:% by WHERE clause). Includes
12 tests covering walkin + callin success, isolation, no-op, unauth, empty ctx,
walkin+callin coexistence, anon untouched, response format parity, overlapping
reservations deleted, user reservations untouched, and idempotent double-cancel.

Inverse-isolation tests in cancel_reservation_test.go prove the user-side
DELETE /api/bookings/reserve does not touch admin or anon reservations.
2026-07-06 17:58:03 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus 33c945159c feat: add cancel reservation handler and background cleanup
Add CancelReservationHandler (DELETE /api/bookings/reserve) to release authenticated user's active reservation. Register route in main.go. Add background goroutine for periodic reservation cleanup using CleanupOldReservations. Add idx_time_blockers_created_at index and extend anon cleanup to cover edit_request reservations in init-script.sql.

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-07-05 11:47:54 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus e4b9003439 refactor(handlers): migrate remaining backend handlers to clock.Now() and transaction patterns
Apply clock.Now() migration, transaction wrapping, and minor refactors across admin, scheduling, today, user, auth handler, notifications, webhooks, services, portfolio, ratelimit, testutils, and main.go.

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-06-24 23:43:50 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus 80b9877686 feat(api): add public business info route and TotalVATCollected to daily summary
Expose GET /business-info public endpoint for non-admin users. Add TotalVATCollected field to DailySummary and compute it in the aggregate query.

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-06-22 17:06:12 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus 8ad0111954 feat(scheduling): add out_of_hours override and fix timezone handling
Support out_of_hours query param in GetWorkingHours and GetAvailableHours (admin-only, returns 06:00-22:00 for all days). Replace ukLocation with time.Local for date boundaries. Add OptionalAuth middleware to scheduling routes for admin role detection. Add tests for admin/non-admin/no-auth scenarios, booking respect, and exceptional hours interaction.

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-06-22 12:55:08 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus 3d0e2afc4c refactor(backend): migrate db.DB to db.Conn PoolProxy across all handlers
Replace direct *pgxpool.Pool usage with PoolProxy wrapper across the entire backend:

- db.DB renamed to db.Conn (*pgxpool.Pool -> *PoolProxy)
- JWT functions now accept context.Context instead of using context.Background()
- Handler DB calls route through PoolProxy for per-test transaction support
- Fixture/helper/testdb functions accept Querier interface for decoupling
- Query ordering fixed in bookings handlers: COUNT after data query to avoid pgx conn busy
- Time truncation fixed: time.Date instead of Truncate(24*time.Hour) for week start calc
- testmain_test.go files updated with SeedBaseline and NewPoolProxy

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-06-21 19:28:54 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus 9c68918c20 refactor(backend): migrate test infrastructure to isolated databases
Add CreateTestDatabase function for parallel isolated test databases per package.

- Add CreateTestDatabase() for isolated test DBs (parallel-safe)
- Move all TestMain functions to per-package testmain_test.go files
- Remove old TestMain from handlers_test.go, jwt_test.go, main_test.go
- Add JWT init guard in main.go to skip when -test.* flags detected
- Update testdb.go with admin DSN and proper cleanup
- Rename test database to crussell_test_db for consistency
- Replace testdb.NewPool + testdb.Migrate pattern with CreateTestDatabase

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-06-20 16:56:57 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus f7cc278423 feat(backend): update main entry and test DB utilities
Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-06-18 16:26:50 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus ede0873c08 feat(backend): implement custom services CRUD handlers
Add 6 admin endpoints for custom services: list (with search/popular/pagination), create, get, update, promote to regular service, and delete. Each handler validates admin role via middleware.

Ultraworked with Sisyphus (https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-06-15 16:58:01 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus 44895a3697 feat(admin): add business settings API and routing for gift card config
Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-06-11 22:08:21 +01:00
popertots 310e6aaa80 Add giftcard management 2026-06-06 14:26:33 +01:00
popertots 0d4a74bd4a feat: caret preservation and Luhn validation in card inputs
- Added generic formatAndPreserveCursor() helper on frontend to track
  and restore selection caret position during dynamic input sanitization
- Applied to all card inputs, gift card code inputs, and expiry inputs
- Added Luhn validation (isValidLuhn) for saved cards and gift cards
- Rebuilt payments test DB and got 100% green tests
2026-06-05 21:05:36 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus f58a4bd2a9 feat(user): add async GDPR export endpoint with 12h cache and 25 tests
Add GET /api/user/gdpr-export handler (GetGDPRExportHandler) with async background generation — navigation away doesn't cancel. 12h in-memory cache with 5-minute cleanup ticker. Three cache states: MISS (triggers generation), HIT (returns cached data), GENERATING (concurrent request while building). Route registered without RequireVerified middleware so unverified users can export. 25 tests covering: auth rejection, cache miss/hit/generating/expired states, anonymize_user child table scrubbing (social logins, saved cards, verification codes, time blockers, edit notes, notification prefs), export_all_user_data 16-section export, AnonymizeStaleGuestAccounts field scrubbing.

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-06-05 12:11:45 +01:00
popertotsandSisyphus 486173c5ff fix(user): profile handler and main router updates
Minor adjustments to profile handler imports and main router configuration.

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-06-04 11:25:41 +01:00